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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an exercise in the phenomenology of human order, as a necessary
prelude to a new understanding of postcolonial global change. Its starting point is to
question the Western tradition of knowledge as the highest point of human
"development". This is a critique of the traditionally Western notion of reason in
which I argue that an understanding of human order must be grounded in a
phenomenology of religion. In this way I seek to reinterpret the Weberian categories
which have shaped modern/ Western social understanding. In the first part of the
thesis, "Institutions and Legitimation", I describe three ideal types of views of reality:
the pagan/primitive, the Western/Christian, and the Eastern/mystic types.
Nevertheless, these pure types are also theoretically posed as three aspects of
experienced reality, and so, they are considered as both mixed and complementary in
human interaction. I am aware that this leads to a theoretical paradox; but this is
justified by the intuition that at the same time as paradox rules the immediacy of
experienced reality, coherence rules the order and exposition of our disciplined
observations, explanations, and cosmologies. The appreciation of this "simultaneity"
(social reality as both "created" and "creative") leads me to propose a perspective of
observation: the present moment of meaningful experience. This perspective
highlights this aspect of "simultaneity" (synchrony) as opposed to, and in contrast
with, the aspect of coherent "sequentiality" (diachrony) in human order. In the second
part of the thesis, "Organisation and Structure", I propose two ideal types of
organisation structured around the experience of immediate simultaneity. These two
types are considered as complementary aspects of human order: the organic and the
artificial ideal types of organisation. This perspective of observation is congenial
both with phenomenological observation and with the emerging paradigm of
"complexity". My approach counters the traditional view in the social sciences that
"complex" or "higher" forms of order progressively emerge in interaction through
specialisation and differentiation from homogeneity to heterogeneity in time. While
belief in progress may be an important feature of discipline (and a particularly
important one for the modern notion of self), I argue that it should not be imposed as
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If it were within our power,
beyond the reach of slavish pride.
To no longer harbour grievances,
behind the mask's opportunists facade.
We could welcome the responsibility
like a long lost friend,
and re-establish the kingdom of laughter
in the dolls house once again.
For time has imprisoned us
in the order of our years,
in the discipline of our ways
and in the passing ofmomentary stillness
we can view our chaos in motion
and the subsequent collisions of fools
well versed in the subtle art of slavery
—Dead Can Dance: A Passage in Time, track 14
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INTRODUCTION:
Human Order and the Interpretation of Self
This thesis is the product of trying to make sense of my own personal and life-long
troubled relationship with a "Western" sense of self. Right now I identify myself
simultaneously as much with Westerners as with the 'other' in contrast to whom the
Western self identifies itself. This is not really a contradiction but a living paradox,
and it is from within the present experience of this paradox that this
phenomenological exercise of self-interpretation is framed. As an initial approach,
and in order to illustrate where my own effort to explore hybridity is located
theoretically, I will sketch in this introduction the current predicament of the Anglo-
Oriental postcolonial studies (see Ashcroft et al. 1995, Gandhi 1998). I argue that if
the postcolonialist theoretical predicament illustrates anything at all, it is the need to
drop the categories West and non-West to theoretically qualify power-struggles. I
will then introduce the reader to the main working hypothesis, concepts, and
assumptions in this theoretical thesis. In the first instance, in a phenomenological
interpretation of self, the categories West/non-West are transformed and diversified
to theoretically describe the hybrid experience and interpretation of self under the
conditions of globalisation. I will propose to re-examine the roots of the difference
West/non-West towards a tolerant and unencumbered interpretation of the modern
self with respect to the excluded 'other'. Having both critically questioned and
embraced the Western cultural inheritance in academic practice, a second (more
general) instance of hybridity can then be observed in the human condition itself.
Both through a (dis)continuity with Darwinian (Western) cosmology and in the
embodied experience of being human, it is plain to see that we are all hybrids of
nature and culture —animal and human— at the same time. The abased 'other' in
Western cosmology refers not only to the peoples who suffer the historical
consequences of colonisation, but also to women, children, and nature in general (the
latter defined as essentially different from humanity). The 'unknowable other' could
then be considered as 'infinite particularity' and the legitimate source of various
forms of knowledge and discipline that are relevant to human life (in particular) and
to life in this planet (in general) right now.
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The national identity of the people among whom I was born and raised is an
intricate mixture of cultures and creeds with no inner coherence, arbitrarily made up
to be a unity: the Mexican identity is not framed in a cosmology but in a handful of
them. This is due as much to accidents of history as to imperial violence. Mexico is a
nation created by imperial will-to-power: "If Mexico", says Paz, "is born in the XVI
century, we must agree that it is a child of a double imperial and unitary violence:
that of the Aztecs and that of the Spanish" (1993:110). The peoples that today
embody the Mexican nation were arbitrarily unified as a consequence of
cosmological empires based on hierarchical and sacred relationships; first with the
gods (nowadays transformed into saints), and then with the Christian monotheistic
God through the Pope'. Today Mexico is already a genetic and symbolic mixture
between natives and Europeans through "mestizaje"2. In order to create a nation,
these mixed peoples eventually produced a relevant "historical" tale of
(dis)continuity with their own pagan past and also with their European colonisers,
already their own ancestors. The contemporary Mexican identity interprets itself with
respect to this colonial past as well as with respect to its present economic (and
political) dependence on the EInited States at the same time as it admires, criticises,
mixes, deplores, and embraces the latter's developed and wealthy modernity. It is
from the perspective of this contemporary and "peripheric" hybrid nature —with
which my own sense of self finds itself entangled— and in the modern spirit of self-
interpretation, that I question the theoretical logic of insisting in finding ontological
divides between the West and the non-West, between culture and nature.
Postcolonial theory needs the "Western" centre in order to criticise and reject
it at the same time; much in the same way as structuralism depends on an absolutist
1 About the colonial Catholic cosmos, Paz says: "Catholicism is the centre of the colonial society
because it really is the source of life that nourishes the activities, passions, virtues, and even sins of
servants and masters, functionaries and priests, traders and militaries. Thanks to religion the colonial
order is not a mere superposition of new historical forms, but a living organism. With the key of
baptism Catholicism opens the door of society and makes it into a universal order, open to all
inhabitants" (Paz 1993:111)
2 Mestizaje is the mixture of European blood with native blood of the Americas. While the Spanish
empire ruled New Spain (Mexico today) there was a caste system which showed every subject their
place in the cosmos with respect to the crown, and ultimately, to the Pope. The Spanish natives were
above the children of Spanish people born in the Americas (criollos), who were above the mixture of
Indian with Spanish (mestizos) who were above pure native Americans and blacks.
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centre and post-structuralism on the absolutist negation of any centre (Merquior
1986). Its politics of opposition have both the potential to make postcolonialism "yet
another totalising method and theory" while at the same time it "lacks the
methodological structure, and will to totalise, necessary for right thinking and left
politics" (Gandhi 1998:167). My own intellectual exercise is not framed within the
theoretical confines of postcolonial studies, mainly because its internal theoretical
inconsistency fails to clarify the paradoxical nature of our immediate contemporary
hybrid situation (even as it illustrates it). And yet, one of the main intuitions that has
guided this work is a suspicion —analogous to Edward Said's own about Orientalism
(1978)— that the "West", as clearly situated in anything or anybody at all,
contemporaneously, is an imaginary invention of many people's emotional
involvement with both West and non-West all over the world. James Clifford (1988)
has pointed out that Said himself is unable to evade embracing humanist and
typically Western values in his will-to-oppose and criticise European attitudes
towards the conquered East.
Postcolonial intellectuals find themselves in the predicament of needing to
use the Western tools for their own self-interpretation, at the same time as they aspire
to speak for the 'unknowable other' or the subaltern (Spivak 1995). That is, they
become the voice for the non-Western 'other' at the same time as they see themselves
as non-Westerners (or invent themselves as non-Westerners) within their Western
situation. In other words, they must make-up some kind of explicit and "authentic"
non-West in order to oppose the West. And if the non-Western 'other' is an
"inauthentic" invention of the Western imagination; is not the non-Western
"authentic" self of the Westernised postcolonial intellectual also an invention of this
self-same type of imagination? To use such terms as Western and non-Western
people within the intellectual circles of modern academia makes no sense: one must
have already assimilated Western beliefs and categories of thought —be conscious of
historical "reality"— in order to participate in the debate at all. The factual
emancipatory claims of the modern "rationalistic" discipline(s) produce the structural
need for an ongoing "progress" of intellectual knowledge, while it is created, revised,
and re-interpreted as it is taught. And today, it is taught all over the world. The
rationalist Western tradition makes universalist claims that have been used as
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legitimising tools for colonial unifying imperial violence. But as 1 hope to show in
this thesis, imperial will-to-power always resorts to its "language of truth" in order to
make legitimacy claims, be they cosmological, universalistic, or scientific.
Modernity has already superseded the confines of the "West". Even if it is
originally tied to Europe, modern imagination leads the ideals of a global arena of
interaction in which the whole world participates. While current global political
power relations are necessarily tied to colonialism (past or present), it is already
useless to lay the blame for this on a "West" that is no longer embodied in anything
or anybody anymore. Its "embodiment" is really an "enactment" of Western values
and categories of thought that go by the title of "reality". And so, whenever I refer to
the "West" or to the "Western tradition of knowledge" in this thesis, I mean to speak
about a belief system that is already also an intimate aspect of many people living in
the periphery (we find ourselves with it). Factual power relations among human
beings (and living entities in general) take place at all levels of interaction, and I
believe that it is useful to attempt an understanding of one's own emotional,
imaginary, and biological relationship with them before deciding if there is anyone to
"blame" for our present factual, historical, and political predicaments. West and non-
West are not analytical tools, but a traditional identity that defines itself with respect
to an unknown (and unknowable) 'other'. And so, in the postcolonial
contemporaneity, nobody is to blame for this estrangement, we can only blame for
this our own beliefs of what we consider as valid knowledge, valid morality, valid
humanity, valid consciousness of self. Validity and validity claims are in the
Weberian interpretive sociology intimately related to belief (Weber 1987, Lowith
1993). And it is at this point that I find all pagan and monotheistic religions,
intellectual philosophies, and mystic cosmologies to converge: any type of
symbolised "knowledge" must be accompanied by belief --even an intellectual-
factual-historical-scientific one.
What we call the "West" today has many faces and moving "centres of
power" in the current global arena: it can be identified with advanced capitalism,
with the "first world", with consumerism, with the arbitrariness of the powerful, and
even with their painful arrogance; but also with modernity, social revolution, liberal
democracy, academia, science, philosophy, "intelligentsia", and the humanist
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cosmopolitan ethics. While it is true that both the former and the latter groups of
characteristics can today be observed and related to Western peoples, they can also
be related and observed as common characteristics and practices of peoples that,
today we would consider as "peripheric". The mistake of a postcolonial politics of
opposition against the mythical "West" is that, currently, modernity is embodied both
nowhere in its purist and purifying aspirations (see Latour 1993) and everywhere in
the world at the same time. What this means is that political opposition "against" the
tyrant West becomes ipso facto an existential opposition against oneself. This inner
opposition is, then, the existential predicament in which a hybrid postcolonial
identity finds itself. This hybrid identity is then a product, on the one hand, of an
imaginary modernity and our practical and emotional engagement with it at the same
time, and on the other, of an imaginary past that is nonetheless very much practically
and emotionally alive right here and now in us. The possibility, then, of a
contemporary hybrid consciousness of self who lives within this existential
predicament is the "object" of observation and analysis throughout this thesis.
This "existential predicament" problematises many of the instances in which
the modern self perceives itself. A basic one in this thesis is the modern self s secular
"historical consciousness". If we look at this consciousness without questioning our
participation in this "reality" at the same time, it becomes impossible to see the roots
of its legitimacy qua "reality". And so, a phenomenological reduction is necessary in
order to contemplate the history within which we find ourselves as mere
"appearance". From the perspective of history as appearance, we can then discover
that its production as "legitimate reality" is tied as much to imperial violence, as it is
to the ongoing human production of sacred roots to reality. One of the working
hypotheses in this work is that the sacred roots to reality are never left behind by
human beings, as one of the major myths of modernity would have us believe. I
construct an analytical justification for this assertion through a phenomenology of
religion that contemplates the sacred roots to reality as emanating from three distinct
centres lying on either 'world', or 'transcendence', or both at the same time. This leads
me to resort to three constructed types of legitimate reality -pagan/primitive,
Eastern/mystic, and Western/Christian— which remain very much related to Western
culture and belief, but also to the Western tradition's knowledge and appreciation of
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"other cultures". These ideal types are not mutually exclusive: human experience of
"reality" can be framed within any of the three ideal-typical constructions regardless
of our own cultural inheritance.
From the standpoint of hybridity, I attempt a critique of the modern notion of
"objectivity" as used to denote actual reality —or the only admitted type of legitimate
reality. We can identify the source of the modern discipline of self-interpretation
with the European Enlightenment as a mixture of (dis)continuities with the Christian
order and dogma (with its own (dis)continuities with the Jewish cosmology) after
"rediscovering" the Greek classics —with (dis)continuities of their own. The Western
tradition, as we know it today, is created through disciplined observation of
"objective" factuality or "historical consciousness". This factuality is created by the
constant discipline (ritual) of objective observation at the same time as "objective"
observation is made possible by the disciplined experience of factuality itself. In this
thesis I will argue that our modern "objective" view of reality —as well as any other
type of view of reality— is tied to imaginary and emotionally cognised assumptions
about "reality". That is, here, human beings are regarded as a type of animal that
needs myth to interact and sustain a meaningful sense of reality, and thus, of social
order. I am aware that this assumption as a working hypothesis effectively means
that logos and mythos overlap to become the same thing, but I hope that the reader
will allow this extreme artifice initially in order to allow commensurability between
the modern sense of self and its unknown 'other'.
The main thesis of this work is that, what we perceive as reality, is intimately
entwined with what we believe to be reality, and so, it produces 'us' (our sense of
self) as we reproduce it in our daily practices. This means that while social reality is
imaginatively constructed by social actors and interpreters, it also constructs
emotionally the social actors' sense of self back: The moment that we perceive
ourselves as "something", this imagined "something" becomes an intimate emotional
experience of self that defines us. In society, we live 'caught' within this activity
which is partly intended and partly inherited by the business of living in society. We
find ourselves already with it, and believing in it, to sustain our sense of self (and
embodiment) by it. And so, I propose the phenomenological artifice of "bracketing"
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reality in order to contemplate "objective" reality, and the coherence that it allows us
to live in, as a mere appearance of our cultural modern present situation.
"Objectivity", I believe, is the one notion through which the Western tradition
of knowledge can do violence to other views of reality in its universalistic and
totalitarian assumptions. And yet, objectivity can also be a very useful tool in a
specific type of appreciation of our immediate reality. And so, objectivity cannot be
wholly rejected or fought against through a politics of opposition, but I argue that it
should be relativised and regarded as a useful "myth". In order to realise the critique
of "objectivity" as the only legitimate reality, I engage with what it is that produces
and legitimises what we perceive as our immediate "reality". Max Weber's
interpretive sociology is very useful in this task as I argue that, in contemporary
scientific knowledge (especially in Physics), it has become possible to say that
"subjectivity" is the basis for any kind of "objectivity" (see Delanty 1997). The
traditional subject/object divide is radically questioned in this work as an ontology,
in epistemology though, the subjective and objective poles can be radicalised as ideal
typical forms between which there lies a sea of complexity (which can also be seen
as simplicity at the same time). The existential predicament of hybridity is situated
amid complexity and uncertainty, and so, I believe that it is useful to resort to other
(than Western) traditions of knowledge in order to be able to live with this existential
predicament, while refusing to resort solely to the usual totalitarian ontological
assumptions of the Western tradition of knowledge.
Following the Weberian methodology for a sociology of knowledge that
engages in a constant self-interpretation, then, I relativise the notion of "reality" and
consider it as an unfathomable and ongoing mystery, more readily ruled by paradox
than coherence, which we must unavoidably deal with through our conscious
experience and set of beliefs. But both paradox and coherence are ultimately
mediated by conscious experience. As I have said, the main thesis of this work is that
human consciousness is bootstrapped to its own created notion of reality in such an
intimate manner that this notion of reality creates for human consciousness its notion
of self back. This is illustrated by its autopoietic nature, as described by Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela (1987) in their theory about life and cognition, which
in this work is regarded as a useful metaphor for "consciousness". And so, views of
9
reality in this work are regarded as both humanly created and also simultaneously
creative of the particular notion of human self which can be individual, but which
can also be collective. Legitimation in this work is therefore used to denote belief in
a specific ideal type of reality, and only indirectly does it refer to legitimate authority
(yet any form of authority must resort to the prevalent idea of reality in order to
formulate any legitimacy claims). As Weber puts it, legitimation lies on belief and he
stresses that political legitimacy must be considered only as a probability, and that
obedience is not always oriented by a belief in legitimacy (Weber 1987). Instead of
being legitimate, subordination to a type of domination can be "faked by individuals
and whole groups due to convenience, practised effectively obeying material self-
interests, or accepted as something that individual weakness and lack of power
cannot change" (Weber 1987:171). And so, the Weberian notion of legitimacy can be
more strongly related to belief in an ideal sense of "reality" than to the political
structures of authority in any society.
In the contemporary modern arena of global interaction, political legitimation
is already tied to the particular shape and exercise of liberal democracies all over the
world; but this legitimacy is sustained as a consequence of European colonisation at
the same time as contemporary political authority bases its legitimacy claims on
belief in the "superior" modern notions of progress as wealth expansion and political
freedom. In order to define his ideal types of domination, Max Weber relied more
heavily in the latter legitimate belief than in awareness of the consequences of
colonisation. The Western rational enlightenment has traditionally based its claims
of superiority on its cultural creation of a secular (civilised) path that unifies
humanity around the ideal of a universally powerful moral individual and her/his will
to put political power away from religious elites —in the hands of enlightened
rational institutions— which cannot help but to produce a new political elite (however
"rational"). My argument is that although this could be regarded as one of the most
rationally impeccable achievements of the West, it was still conceived within the
Christian view of reality and in the spirit of rational theological speculation. When in
rejection of dogma the latter became secular, Western philosophers turned to their
intellectual teachers (the Greek classics) within their European-Christian
background. The Hellenic ideal of cosmopolitanism had inspired the Catholic drive
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to world-conversion to achieve universal unification of humankind in Christianity.
Humanist theology was the prelude to Reformation and to the achievement of secular
universalist-humanist philosophy3. However, humanism keeps the inherently divided
cosmos of Christianity, which also brings about the (always latent) possibility of a
divided world and a divided human race:
All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in
the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a 'race'. Their embrace
suffocates those whom it does not ignore. The first humanists scripted the
tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of
freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The
liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they
emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the
circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or
Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is
almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the
name of humanity (Davies 1997:131).
It is useful to contemplate the Western Enlightenment under this light in order not to
become too excessively zealous about its claimed superiority.
However, Weber managed to translate the political arenas of the colonised
world into theoretical evolutionary terms which, due to the imperial upper hand,
evidently contemplated Western countries as the most advanced stage. While Weber
did not mean for this stage necessarily to be of a superior quality, he inadvertently
organised a hierarchy with respect to which modernity could identify itself as
opposed to its own past and as opposed to the rest of the world (its own colonies) at
the same time. There was only a small step --which in sociology Jiirgen Habermas
(1989, 1990) explicitly took— to make the Weberian hierarchy into a structure that
organises the degrees of rational Enlightenment with respect to the proximity that
interaction in any cultural situation has with respect to the Western style of order. In
the current scenario of global interaction this hierarchy is only "acceptable" in the
3 "Well known scholars of a radical turn of mind, Valla in Italy, Reuchlin in Germany, Colet in
England, were, like Erasmus, attracted to the humanist theology made possible by Renaissance
scholarship which the rediscovery of the original Hebrew and Greek texts of scripture, hitherto
available only in the Latin Vulgate of St. Jerome, brought into existence. Concerned to take the dust-
covers off the Latin Vulgate Erasmus published in 1516 a fresh edition of the Greek New Testament
which if not free from error at least showed up the mistakes and even doctrinal tendentiousness in
Jerome's version [...] Humanism fertilised the ground for the Protestant reformers, making possible a
more sympathetic response to Protestant criticism of the contemporary Church and to its stress to
scriptural theology [...] Yet though it was to be popularised, humanist theology was pabulum for only
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legal plane of "reality", the one that puts factuality and objectivity as the most
relevant aspects of interaction, and the one that in modernity is valued for its ability
to calculate outcomes and rationalise interaction. But Habermas' universalistic
hierarchy becomes unacceptable very soon, when it takes a cosmic jump to assert
that this value characterises a superior form of human consciousness. While
individually-based rationality, impersonality, and even calculabilility might be
favourable to rule both civilised legal-rational interaction and mass production (and
consumption); when it comes to organisations formed by human beings, the
assumptions of an enlightened rational and universalistic impersonality break down
due to the particular animal and spiritual human elements involved in daily
interaction —which are either systemically neglected by the modern life-style or
insufficiently dealt with4.
Globalisation is generally related to economic interaction, but it would be a
mistake to regard it as only this; globalisation is the major producer of hybrid
identities. Interaction is a creative source of social structures that reproduce
themselves in institutions and organisations, which function in the background of
interaction, laying common grounds for coordination of meaningful human
activities. Weber's types of domination are useful tools for historical analysis, but
they have an in-built bias towards the phenomenon of authority, which is too
strongly seen as domination and not as wilful subordination. I believe this to be
related to a Western obsession with control and rational domination of experienced
"reality"; but if we consider the aspect of wilful subordination in legitimate
authority, we are in a better position to explain how it is that belief systems produce
human order through disciplined practices all over the world. Weber's other ideal-
types of domination (traditional and charismatic) have come to be regarded as (an
unreflective) part of the Western historical past and the peripheric, underdeveloped
domination structures of our days; which renders them primitive and undesirable per
se. However, this produces a biased perception of institutions and organisations that
relies too heavily in the absolutist assumptions of a universalistic type of "objective"
a small scholarly elite, some of whom, like Sir Thomas More and even Erasmus himself, remained
loyal to the Catholic faith" (Green 1996:125-126).
4 The contemporary and popular acknowledgement of existence of wide-spread functional-systemic
mind diseases, such as stress and anxiety, are illustrative symptoms derived from a rationalised
existence.
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rationalism. As Barbara Czarniawska (or Czarniawska-Joerges) has argued,
organisations have been found to be pre-eminently cultural phenomena, intimately
entwined with the consciousness of self that lives in them (1992, 1997, 1998). Under
the light of contemporary world globalisation the Weberian types of domination
should be reconsidered as an exercise of hybrid/modern self-interpretation that
cannot regard itself at the apex of human consciousness anymore.
The Weberian ideal types of domination can be said to be theoretically
mutually exclusive in terms of rationality, but empirically observed to be mixed with
one another in actual social interaction —especially in these days of globalised
interaction. Pre-eminently traditional and/or charismatic types of domination,
according to Weber, still require an administrative structure, which he calls
"organisation" (Weber 1987:212). Legal-rational domination is based upon
legitimate and systematic construction of such "organisation" that will enable society
to achieve specific ends pondered and pursued rationally. This formulation conveys
the idea that due to the lack of stability in traditionally and charismatically
dominated environments it is possible (however deplorable or desirable) that they
disappear through development or "progress" towards complex interaction, or that
they become subordinated to the more stable rational structures which function on
the basis of calculability and thus can be administrated. It takes this subordination for
granted, making it into a theoretical assumption. Ironically, Weber considered
impersonality and calculability as some kind of biblical monsters with apocalyptic
superiority to anything else that would unavoidably bring about an administrative
"iron cage".
However, it has become apparent in organisational theory that a legal-rational
structure on its own will not suffice for sustaining interaction among people, who
always tend to develop some form of "collective action [...] based on interpersonal
relationships, not a system of formal rules" (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992:18), which is
generally identified with the traditional view of order. While the traditional and
charismatic categories of ideal-type domination —as described by Weber— are an
evident manner of differentiating the "West" from the "non-West", a sociological
study of organisational structures today tends to regard them as marginal and
primitive forms of order that the world ought to overcome, or is in the process of
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overcoming, as a systemic necessity. This amounts to an organisational prejudice
against spontaneity and primitivity, a fear motivated by the belief in their potentially
chaotic effects and an empirically groundless assumption that they will eventually be
left behind in human existence. Ultimately, I believe this prejudice to emerge from a
Christian cosmology that contemplates a divided universe of salvation
(transcendence) and condemnation, that relates the latter to sin and the inferior
primitivity of embodiment. In modernity this division evolved into a social thrust to
rationally dominate and control nature, contingency, and the primitive human aspect
in civilised and disciplined interaction. Nevertheless, non-legal-rational elements in
organisation can be said to come from spontaneous arrangements which can become
very useful sources of order which should be considered as such theoretically.
We can consider the legitimacy of tradition and charisma —as Weber
described them— as being different from that of the legal-rational type, by
considering that they are based on different conceptions of self and of time. The
legal-rational type of legitimacy rests on the modern value of the individual self, and
the other (traditional and charismatic) types, rest on a higher estimation of the
collectivity as a form of self. Weber defines legitimacy as based on belief and
stresses that it should only be regarded as a probability, its presence or absence
depending on individual prerogatives (Weber 1987:170-1). Nevertheless, the value
of the individual is greater in the Western world-view than in the non-legal-rational
cosmologies because the interacting individual depends on his/her own personal
awareness of rational interaction. Further, an ideal rational individual believes in and
concedes a much greater value to categories like efficiency and cost reduction during
interaction, which should be possible to submit to rational scrutiny; while legitimacy
in traditional or charismatic types of domination is based on much more communal
values: belief in ancient tradition, strength in relation of kinship, the shared
perception of the sanctity of the leader, mass euphoria. Rationality and calculability
in government ideally should produce public policy with material consequences that
need to be justified rationally; while tradition and charisma are fulfilled in
themselves; that is, ideally, they produce bonding and an immediate justification for
order that is not rationalised because it is lived. The legitimacy of rationality and
calculability is discovered in a historical time-span: the process of legitimation is
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postponed to the analysis of the effects of the action; while the legitimacy of
tradition and charisma is experienced in situ: legitimation is the enactment of a
perceived order. 1 propose to reformulate Weber's ideal types of domination towards
an appreciation of tradition and charisma where they are not necessarily
contemplated as inferior sources of unreflective "reality" and that can be useful and
meaningful sources of order.
The Weberian types of domination are built on the assumption of an
individual basis for social order, and so, are displaced from conceptualising a
collective notion of self. This means that the phenomenon of authority in Weber
considers its empirical manifestation as "domination", but is displaced from
considering wilful "subordination" through trust in discipline and in the creative
spontaneous possibilities of interaction. For this reason, I conceptualise authority
around the notion of its sacred roots to reality as basic categories (as opposed to
Weberian individual agency), which I have conceptualised as three distinct
phenomenological "centres" on which belief in a view of reality is based. And so,
initially, I relate belief in each of the three ideal typical "views of reality" proposed
in this work (pagan/primitive, Western/Christian, and Eastern/mystic) to the notions
of either synchrony (simultaneity) or diachrony (sequence) to illustrate how different
time-frames may be the basis for legitimate "reality" (as in the above discussion of
the Weberian types of domination). But I also relate the types of views of reality
with the notion of phenomenologically differentiated types of ascendant "languages
of truth". In the first part of the thesis I use the concept of institution, and its
relationship to ideal typical categories of time and language that refer to the ideals
and disciplinary maxims of the prevalent conception of legitimate "reality". I will
argue that while human consciousness and embodiment can experience all types of
time (synchronic and diachronic) and language (metaphor, metonymy, and
description) identified, legitimate order institutionalises as "real" only one of the
types of time and only one of the types of language through discipline, according to
the prevalent view of reality. However, in the second part, I attempt to show that
while a legitimate type of time-frame and language may be relevant to a disciplined
interpretation of reality; all views of reality include both time-frames and the three
types of language in the organisation of their practices and cosmologies at the same
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time. And so, all the types of time and language distinguished are seen as relevant to
the dynamic structures of interaction in everyday life (however legitimate or not in a
particular cultural setting). My argument is that beyond (or below) the legitimacy of
an ascendant type of time or language in institutions, there lies the pragmatic need
for organisation in embodied human interaction, which I conceptualise as two ideal
types of human order (organic and artificial) that are regarded as simultaneous and
co-creative.
In this way I attempt to draw a clear analytical difference between the notions
of institutions and organisations, which in organisational theory, remain loosely
defined with respect to each other5. In this work, I define institutions as the ideal
(sacred, mythical, imaginary) aspect of human interaction, while organisations are
defined as the pragmatic and experienced consequences of human interaction. The
institutional aspect of order is identified in this work with the ideal intention of
disciplined interaction, while the organisational aspect of order is practically seen as
'shaped' by disciplined practice at the same time as it must deal with the spontaneity
of everyday life. And so institutions are the ideal aspect of human order (principles
of discipline) while organisations are the pragmatic aspect (disciplined practice and
spontaneity). To be sure, these are artificial (ideal, imaginary) analytical tools in
order to approach the phenomenon of human order; but I have defined this "clean"
and arbitrary distinction for the purposes of analysis, even as institutions and
organisations are deeply entwined with one another and, as social phenomena, are
observed to overlap and become indistinguishable.
I relate the notion of "discipline" to sacred realms of human consciousness
(even secular discipline) which are claimed to be emotionally and imaginatively
cognised. I do not necessarily ascribe a connotation of "goodness" or 'Tightness" to
"discipline", as any form of ritualised and systematic human behaviour in this work
may be regarded as "discipline" (such as systematic "sacrifice" of any kind). I
5 In their introduction to their The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analisis, Powell and
DiMaggio say that while "Institutionalism" is a distinctive approach to the study of society, it is not
easy to define what it is that it analyzes. "There are" Powell and DiMaggio say, "several reasons for
this ambiguity: scholars who have written about institutions have often been rather casual about
defining them; institutionalism has disparate meanings in different disciplines; and even within
organisation theory, "institutionalists" vary in their relative emphasis on micro and macro features, in
their weightings of cognitive and normative aspects of institutions, and in the importance they attribute
to interests and relational networks in the creation and diffusion of institutions" (1991:1)
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artificially isolate the disciplined aspect of human order through the concept of
institution due to its acquired connotation of an "aura of distance" from worldly life
that the term organisation never got. This radicalised distance is meant to point at
the sacred origins of disciplined practice. I consider the concept of organisation as
"closer" to the ordinary practices of everyday life and to the constant need of
improvisation and spontaneity. Organisation in this work thus comprises both the
practical consequences of disciplined practice and its constant reliance on
spontaneity. What we can observe empirically are human forms of organisation, as
they are embodied in human practice, emotional, and imaginative involvement;
while institutions can only be analysed conceptually as they have a more "ethereal"
existence in their imaginary and emotionally cognised legitimacy.
As has been argued, in globalised current interaction it is already a myth to
consider that we can draw conceptual borders between cultures that co-exist in the
world today in different levels of synchretic mixture. This is why the traditional
modern self-interpretation as the highest manifestation of human consciousness is
radically questioned in this work. Rather, a non-hierarchical theoretical construction
is attempted in order to put forms of human knowledge at the same level of
relevance to human life, which I have conceptualised as primary, intellectual, and
spiritual knowledge. 'Legitimate reality' and its relationship with our experienced
reality is equivalent to the relationship between the view of reality that is kept 'alive'
through disciplined practice and the view of reality that is experienced by virtue of
our being alive and embodied in a humanly conscious manner. This involves our
enactment of interaction through language and time, as our most immediate sources
of a humanly experienced idea of reality. Language and time are immediate because
they must be experienced and believed to convey reality at the same time as they
sustain human interaction.
The first chapter engages with the notion of "reality", how it is that our
modern understanding legitimises reality as "objectivity", and I argue that this
understanding can be expanded to include other "views of reality". "Objectivity" I
will argue, is not without its sacred roots for claims of validity. These claims are
rooted in an a prioristic connection of the human being with her/his transcendental
identity and with the "universal" level of reality; as well as in belief on a mechanistic
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cosmos of entities that lie outside of each other. This analytical critique is organised
around Kantian metaphysics in his Critique of Pure Reason and the interpretive
methodology of Max Weber (1949, 1958, 1965, 1987), and based on theoretical
developments in Physics (Bohm 1980, Capra 1982, 1983, Prigogine 1984, 1997) that
have transformed the Newtonian cosmos on which Kant based his reflections on
science. The second chapter defines the different ideal types of time and language
and their relationship to legitimate "reality". Here I will refer to Northrop Frye's
literary study on the Bible (1982) as one of the main sources of inspiration towards a
critique of the Western tradition of knowledge. As I have said before, the ideal types
of views of reality that I propose are defined from the perspective of the Western
culture on "other cultures", and so, the third and fourth chapters engage in
contrasting the Western/Christian ideal type of view of reality with the
pagan/primitive one and the Eastern/mystic one respectively. The third chapter
describes the difference between the formation of historical reality through empire
and the mythical reality of the primary experience of cosmos, but also the structure
of their convergence, which I argue that can only be described in synchronic terms.
Eric Voegelin's study, Order and History (1957, 1974), is an essential reference; and
so are the phenomenologists of religion, especially Mircea Eliade (1955, 1967), both
of which coincide in their portrayal of sacred reality as a dimension of experience in
human consciousness. The fourth chapter aims at disclosing the common
characteristics of the Eastern and Western traditions as well as pointing at their
differences in terms of their legitimate notion of time. Their common grounds are
based on the discovery and symbolisation of a transcendental transhistorical realm;
their differences are expressed here in terms of the human notion of fault and the
conception of transcendence with respect to human consciousness. In this chapter I
rely mainly on the work of Paul Ricoeur (1967, 1967a, 1981) --the most important
living representative of phenomenology in France— and on Keiji Nishitani's Religion
and Nothingness (1982) -the leading figure in the Kyoto School of Philosophy.
Through the structure of the differences between Eastern and Western conceptions of
transcendence and a phenomenological approach to observation, a synchronic
methodology for the observation of self and order in interaction is pondered. This
synchretic intention though, realises that any account of such observation will be
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unavoidably based on some type of primary mythology that we must bring to
awareness.
The second part of the thesis derives from the critique of the notion of
"objectivity" in the Western tradition of knowledge. The opposition subject/object in
scientific observation discloses a deeper opposition between s/he who does the
observation and his/her object of study. In the natural sciences this opposition shows
a straight-forward cosmological difference between human and nature; in the social
sciences this opposition is more nuanced, mainly through the neo-Kantian critique of
positivism (Delanty 1997); but a strict realism still takes on board a positivist
differentiation between s/he who knows and s/he who is known as a social
phenomenon, but unknowable as a consciousness. And so, the second instance of
hybridity to be considered methodologically in this thesis is the general condition of
embodied humanity: we are animal at the same time as we are human and the radical
differentiation between our humanity and our animality is a product of our imaginary
cosmologies. What this means is to point at the experienced notion that our humanity
is intricately entwined with nature, and so is our consciousness —the phenomenon
that we cannot extricate ourselves from while we are alive and embodied. This is
why this second instance of hybridity is approached in this thesis as an existential
predicament that stands on the consciousness of its own "groundlessness" (Varela et
al. 1991) and unavoidable death.
From this perspective of existential observation, then, consciousness is posed
essentially as an undifferentiated phenomenon. From here, any hierarchy of forms of
consciousness cannot be regarded as an essential characteristic of "reality", but only
as a useful 'utopia' to approach the undifferentiated reality that we must face to
produce meaning. In this work I speak of theoretical Utopias, as Weber did, or of
fantastic imaginary myths and not to actual portrayal of the true essence of reality.
Our imagined categories produce certainties that effectively become systematically
enacted. This includes human factual interaction at all levels of experience (personal,
family, tribal, local, national, global...), but it also includes consciousness of
humanity's interaction with nature: the Cartesian "automaton" that functions along
universal mechanical laws and is supposed to be devoid of consciousness. In this
thesis I have conceptually radicalised an opposition to this view of nature by looking
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at it as a conscious whole, and not only to "concede" consciousness to bits of it (like
non-human animals). Nature's consciousness implies that our assumption of
"objectivity" be regarded as a useful myth upon which we depend to produce
(sometimes excessive) order and wealth. While regarding nature as conscious may
look like an adventurous move, I believe that it must be attempted —if only as a
thought-experiment— in order to explore the possibilities that human beings can
legitimately experience consciousness of collective existence and spiritual union,
even while remaining embodied and conscious in a human/animal way.
The second part of the thesis is about similarity among human beings, which
in factual reality, is also total diversity. While the first part is engaged with defining
the differences between three identified human types of forms of symbolising
legitimate reality; these three ideal types of humanly symbolised reality are three
forms of common human possibilities for experiencing reality at the same time. Part
two concentrates on how it is that these "different" forms of experiencing reality (for
heuristic purposes) are also organisationally present for all of human beings. That is,
from a modern (global) "objective" perspective, it is possible to formulate how all
human beings are, simultaneously, equal to each other in experiential potentiality
and absolutely different from each other in their embodied and conscious
uniqueness. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that, as we point to similarities
between humans (their need to live in culture being one of them), we must also point
at how human beings are different from other forms of beings with whom we may
come across in everyday life experience. We concede that nature is conscious as a
whole, but from our cultural inheritance —our scientific discipline— we must also
factually be able to observe that in "objective" experience human consciousness can
be differentiated from other species of consciousness as well as being embodied
differently. However, this means to point at difference and not hierarchy: the
consciousness of animals, plants, and even 'inanimate' matter is not necessarily
'inferior' to human consciousness. "Objective" reality can be regarded as only a
partial idea of what embodied human beings are able to experience and symbolise.
In order to conceive of "objectivity" as useful myth, a methodology that is
based in the experience of time as simultaneity (as opposed to sequentiality) is
proposed. Chapter five is engaged in describing the present moment ofmeaningful
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experience, a perspective from which to study human order that attempts to extricate
itself from traditional Western assumptions about the primacy of human
individuality. This is done through the inclusion of the Eastern notion a collective
self that lies beyond embodiment. This perspective is based on the emerging
paradigm of complexity in interdisciplinary studies, and on the theoretical insights
about structure and organisation proposed by the biologist Humberto Maturana
(1970, 1990, 1992). The model that I propose is mainly based on the simultaneous
presence and heuristic difference between discipline and spontaneity, which I
consider as analogous to the notions of discursive and practical consciousness as
described by the anthropologist Tim Ingold (1986, 1989). The sixth chapter
comprises a critique of Western Darwinian cosmology as characterised by the
adaptationist research program, mainly from the theoretical standpoint of both
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1987) and Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
(1991); and a description of my organic ideal type of human organisation. The latter
is mostly based in these sources, and also on the study on love and play by Maturana
in collaboration with the child psychologist Gerda Verden-Zoler (1995), and in the
historical new-institutionalist notion of past "path dependencies" (Hall & Taylor
1996) which is congenial with biological theory of life and cognition described by
Maturana and Varela. The seventh chapter comprises a critique of the formalist
approach to "objectivist" linguistics and a "cognitivist" approach to intelligence, here
I rely mainly on the work of George Lakoff (1987, 1988) and of Varela et al. (1991).
This chapter also includes a description of my artificial type of human organisation,
based on a transformed version of Niklas Luhmann's theory of meaning (1984,
1995), while I attempt a brief critique of his theory of social systems. In a nutshell,
what the sixth and seventh chapters attempt to emphasise, is the aspect of
simultaneity inherent in human life and cognition as trust and order, whose complex
dynamic whole should learn to deal with uncertainty in an appreciation of its
inherent creativity.
And so, in this work, human beings can be regarded as simultaneously equal
but different to each other while being equal but different from animals in particular
and nature in general. This sounds like a riddle, but it only illustrates the paradox of
life, consciousness, and diversity. This theoretical construct also helps to illustrate
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how the "West" and the "non-West" cannot be considered at the same level of human
consciousness unless our Western tradition of knowledge concedes to share its
absolute inequality, its uniqueness —in which we are all very much delighted— with
every other tradition of knowledge —however rudimentary in appearance. Our
Western cultural inheritance helps us to produce relevant borders for a useful
understanding of "objective" reality... but we would remain trapped by these borders
if we did not have to engage in the business of constant interpretation and
reinterpretation of their present relevance for all embodied humanity right now. In
this sense, all human groups and their culture are regarded as engaged in this
constant activity of interpretation in simultaneity with perception and disciplined
practice; but our own intellectual tradition has turned a half of this quite spontaneous
activity (discursive interpretation) into a purposeful and descriptive discipline, an
art-form. This discipline produces relevant and useful (even dangerous) borders
between phenomenal domains; but it is important to consider that symbols
themselves may become rigid if seen as carriers of absolute aspects of reality.
Imagined and enacted borders can be either useful or terrible, and the subtlety of this
difference can only be grasped ethically in the awareness of our ongoing imaginative
and emotional involvement with them.
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1. Ch'ien/ The Creative
above chien the creative, heaven
_____ below ch'ien the creative, heaven
The first hexagram is made up of six unbroken lines. These
unbroken lines stand for the primal power, which is light-
giving, active, strong, and of the spirit. The hexagram is
consistently strong in character, and since it is without
weakness, its essence is power and energy. Its image is heaven.
Its energy is represented as unrestricted by any fixed
conditions in space and is therefore conceived of as motion.
Time is regarded as the basis of this motion. Thus the
hexagram includes also the power of time, that is, duration.






The Subjective and the Cultural Bases of "Reality"
In its self-interpretation, Modernity set itself in motion and change after an emphatic
rejection of religious dogma during the age of reason. This produced the habit of
modern culture and interpretation as self-interpretation, within a field of private
ownness that is ideally conceived of as individual. But this ideal has already become
part of our experienced reality: We perceive ourselves as individual in modernity.
However, the embodied human longing for spiritual unity is nowhere less explicit
than in nihilism —itself a product of advanced modernity. But is this "advancement"
actually happening or is it only a part of our imagined self-interpretation qua modern
individuals? The answer to this question can only disclose a paradox that the critical
discipline is unable to solve in a "once and for all" manner, or this would mean the
"end of history". My argument is that modern progress is already part of our
imagined and emotionally cognised self-interpretation qua modern individuals —but
this is already part of our actuality. That is, we are only ideally modern or Modernity
is only a myth —yet already one that is relevant for the modern global culture and for
the contemporary disciplined and global interaction. Modernity is only an ideal, but
this ideal is not 'unreal' because it is already part of our modern self-interpretation of
reality.
This is the basis to say that the culture where we abide is created and already
creative of the human self; or of the human conception of self. In the vast diversity
of forms that human beings conceive of themselves in the world today; the human
self as individual personality is only one ideal typical way of conceiving the human
self. There are cultures in the world today where it is legitimate to consider the
notion of human self as a collective self. But it is important to say that this
alternative notion of self is observed as eminently collective from our individualised
perspective of observation; and if it looks 'unreal' and imagined, it is due partly to
our own individual and constant disciplined self-interpretation. It is therefore
possible to say that both a notion of collective self and of individual self are relevant
elements of different views of reality and that it is important to distinguish them
theoretically. I will propose three ideal types of views of reality that theoretically
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"guide" the formation of a notion of human self, one that is produced and sustained
by human emotion, imagination, experience and practice all at the same time.
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I. 1. "Objective" Knowledge and Sacred Belief
Kant's essay on the Enlightenment (1991) defined it as man's realisation of the power
of his rationality in order to leave his "self-caused immaturity". "Sapere audeV, was
Kant's proposed slogan; which had already been adopted from Horace by Gassendi
(Wade 1971:20) and it involved courage. Such determination to leave the guidance
of others in individual life specifically meant that people should stop the blind belief
in religious dogma and use their reason and intelligence to lead a free life. The
Enlightenment —or awakening to reason— implied a logical division of categories
that, from then onwards, would be developed to differentiate the "enlightened"
understanding of the world from the traditional acceptance of religious dogma. The
historical moment in which a few Western philosophers had the realisation of the
power of their own individual rationality was charged with an epic sense of emotion
in leading mankind to truth and freedom. I will argue that any search of this nature is
based on faith and has an intrinsic spiritual stature. Science can be regarded as a
discipline for contemplation of the self; a ritual or a tool to expand consciousness
and create knowledge that can be intellectually shared and agreed upon. Although
this search became secular in the enlightened worldview, it may work as an
alternative faith that is capable of producing a belief system analogous to a religious
one, which defines its own dogma —a veiled one under assumptions and aspirations
of truth.
The history of the Enlightenment is unavoidably linked with the history of
Christianity; it represents a stage in the transformation of one of the most
rationalised, organised, and expanded orthodox religions in the world (Baillie 1945,
Harnak 1904, 1910, Tellenbach 1940, Green 1996, Davies 1997). Modernity
emanated from the historical transformations that took place in pre-eminently
Christian peoples, who remained mostly Christian and whose Christian conception of
reality produced scientific thought. The European Enlightenment is the expression of
the highest deification of reason in the known history of humankind, which currently
shapes our perception of the world through political supremacy and the authority of
science. This work will attempt to unearth the values that create the current academic
assumption that the Eurocentric scientific discipline for the creation of knowledge is
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superior to any other discipline with similar aims in the world. Although modem
science is a major achievement of the human mind, I will regard it as a disciplinary
achievement within an expanded spectrum of disciplined human creativity, which
also includes our animal-primary link to embodiment and our spirituality. I will
suggest that assumptions of superiority have dogmatic roots and that, whoever
subscribes to them, also believes in an essential division of the universe that has no
logical solution and that condemns humankind to suffer an eternal "unrest" of the
soul —and thus of their bodies and mind(s) while in the world.
Nevertheless, this work is grounded on the Western tradition of knowledge
and is ideally based in its view of reality. What this means is that it is written within
the Western cultural inheritance of the author and her disciplined perception of
reality; that is, within the discipline of modem self-interpretation. The Western
secular tradition of knowledge has an in-built mechanism of self-observation and
interpretation that assumes progress as a principle of reality. And so, progress is
lived as a disciplinary chore of secular purification whereby humanity is stripped of
its emotivity through the disciplined practice of rigorous "objectivity". The "hard"
positivistic sciences have "progressed" through a disciplined negation of human
emotions as a negligible aspect of consciousness. In modem social life, this progress
is lived and experienced, on the one hand, as alienation from nature (urban life); and
on the other, as the separation between the private and the public realms: our
emotional aspect is hidden from the public realm —where the scientific inquiry takes
place— and kept private.
Other traditions of knowledge give no such symbolic importance to a notion
of collective progress or of separation to organise what is lived as "public life" and
are in fact more preoccupied with what our tradition regards as negligible aspects of
being human. This thesis is a theoretical attempt to reconcile our intellectual
preoccupation of what it is to be human with those of different traditions of
knowledge, within which this concern might not be formulated in the same
intellectual manner, but that are nevertheless commensurable with the Western
perception of the predicament, because they also come from human practice and
experience. However, I use the intellectual descriptive symbols of our tradition and
our type of "language of truth" while I simultaneously cancel the intellectual
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presupposition of a hierarchy of forms of human representations of reality (with the
Western one at the top). What we differentiate and compartmentalise as intellectual
and emotional ("animal", "spiritual") qualities of being human are in this work
considered as complementary characteristics that are present in us here and now as
well as at all times. It is a basic assumption of this work that, ultimately, the
intellectual perspective (the Western hypertrophy) can only be seen as a useful tool
for concept formation, a disciplined means towards the knowledge of self; but the
latter should dare to look beyond the limits of what we call "objective" reality.
The main difference between science and any other form of ritualised religion
is that science breaks down the traditional realm of the collective-sacred into the
modern realm of the individual-sacred. Hierophany or theophany —an experience of
interaction with the divine— produces the definition and clear conception of other¬
worldly reality as transcendence —beyond and above the world— which in turn opens
the possibility of institutionalised disciplines and religions that strive for reaching
transcendence (or salvation) and for living in the world according to the principles
that emanate from the conception of the "higher" kind of reality. But after the age of
reason in Europe, transcendence was equated with freedom and liberation from
dogmatic bondage. Truth and knowledge were sought for as individual rational
prerogatives, following reformed Christianity, which were eventually taken from the
hands and texts of organised religion. Voltaire's famous promise to defend with his
life somebody else's right to an opinion even if he himself did not share it, is an
illustration of the enlightened ideal according to which universal individual human
freedom transcends particular opinions. In the European enlightened social theodicy,
tolerance would be "grounded on the brotherhood ofman and the right to err" (Wade
1971:27), for universal human consciousness —conceived as reason in modernity— is
believed and perceived to be based on the individual person. Yet this European
achievement created a systematised impersonal scientific discipline with no
precedence in the known history of humankind.
According to Max Weber, science is "unique [...] in the provision of concepts
and judgements which are neither empirical reality nor reproductions of it but which
facilitate its analytical ordering in a valid manner" (1949:111). What Weber means
by valid here explains his enlightened attempt at grounding modern social science on
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objective basis. Following the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, Weber developed his
notion of objectivity for the social sciences at a moment when natural sciences
appeared to be unquestionably objectively grounded. However, in the light of
relatively recent empirically based theories of physics --Einstein's "relativity" and
"quantum" theories— the Kantian conclusions must be revised, as they are based on
the empirical observation of the classical mechanistic assumptions of Newtonian
cosmology. Under the light of this discussion I will argue that the Weberian
methodology for the social sciences becomes relevant to the methodology of science
in general; that is, including the "hard" natural sciences.
I believe that the Weberian philosophy of science has such relevance today
because Weber put into practice his scientific attempt at grounding knowledge both
on empirical facts and "objective" judgement; but this objectivity is also based on
personal awareness of one's own subjectivity, which only after having made it
conscious, can be regarded as "objective". Weber realised that there was no
ontological divide between the subject and her/his object of cognition in the social
sciences. His methodology in investigating social (cultural) phenomena turned him
into one of the the founding parents of sociology as a scientifically valid discipline.
Although his methodological writings must be considered within the historical
context in which they were produced', they convey a clear manifesto of the scientist
as a philosopher. Jaspers regards Weber as a philosopher because he embodied in his
life and scientific practice a certain kind of philosophy. "All philosophers," says
Jaspers, "have one thing in common: they are what they know; every philosopher is
the lucidity of an unconditional being" (Jaspers 1964:195). Weber's 'being' goes
beyond his work as a scientist, and if his controversial figure inspired the wealth of
publications that it did, I believe that this is related to his uncompromising and
honest search for truth which is reflected in his work. But this search is imbued in
the Christian-enlightened attitude towards truth par excellence: It fetters its finding
in imminence, and creates the charming figure of the solitary hero who is engaged in
' There exists a "mountainous literature on the so-called 'reception' of Weber" (Hennis 1988:107),
which Hennis compares in content to the "game of Chinese whispers". I will avoid elaborate
interpretations of what Weber 'really meant' and will concentrate on literature about Weber's
background and methodological sources and elaborations which, according to Roth and Schluchter,
"on the level of historical inquiry the articulation of Weber's substantive theories and practised
methodology" have not been paid much attention (Roth and Schluchter 1979:1).
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an eternal battle with the world. Weber refused to find refuge in abstraction and this
turned him into one of the most charismatic scientists of our time.
In the present times of postmodern and poststructuralist assertion, beyond
Weber's personal epic, and beyond the personal epic of every sacred individuality of
the modern theodicy, the current state of extremely differentiated and clashing
conceptions of the social science leaves us perplexed with an equally extreme
amount of lose ends. I believe that the present postmodern condition and the
atomisation of identities and interests in contemporary modernity is a clear symptom
of what might come as a solution to the solitary, yet inwardly fragmented, 'I':
Extreme subjectivity can only be solved in finding the universe within. But not in a
relativist fashion, which can only create parallel, divided, fragmented and clashing
universes; this extreme subjectivity calls for the search of ultimate union, which can
only be sought for if the reality of the world is bracketed and seen as mere
appearance, as in Husserl's phenomenological epoche (Ricoeur 1967a, 1981,
Hammond et al. 1991). Weber did not do this, he was not a phenomenologist; he was
a social scientist which made him demand experienced empirical evidence —the one
that we can perceive and observe with disciplined ^objectivity". But he remained
'between worlds', demanding conceptual clarity and never quite achieving it himself
in his work; maybe realising that the world's infinite diversity could only be partially
captured by a margin of ambiguity; but always putting a conscious fight against this
realisation. His most lucid conclusions always ended up locating the reality of
ethical-abstract conceptualisations (theoretical valuation) in the realm of the private
individual consciousness:
We know of no scientifically ascertainable ideals. To be sure that makes our
efforts more arduous than those of the past, since we are expected to create
our ideals from within our breast in the very age of subjectivist culture; but
we must not and cannot promise a fool's paradise and an easy street, neither
in thought nor in action. It is the stigma of our human dignity that the peace
of our souls cannot be as great as the peace of one who dreams of such
paradise (Weber 1909)2
The modern-Christian-scientific unrest, I will argue, is identified with the
impossibility that Weber contemplates and criticises in this quotation: the illusion of
extreme reliance on abstraction as a possible reproduction of reality. Nevertheless, as
2 Quoted by (Roth and Schluchter 1979) on the cover page.
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Wilhelm Hennis has argued, Weber's basic concern was that of "the 'fate of
humanity' under conditions of modernity" (Hennis 1988:108), or the development of
"those characteristics we think constitute the greatness and nobility of our human
nature" (Weber "National State")3. But the universalistic assumptions made by
Weber in the latter quotation find themselves located in worldly existence "under
conditions of modernity" with its particular cultural inheritance and its view of
reality, which bases human consciousness on the individual person and in the belief
in a transcendental self that exists within every individual. The Weberian approach
to sociological investigation embraces this belief (human consciousness based on the
individual) in its conception of reality, and consequently, in its methodology to
analyse cultural phenomena:
The social-scientific interest has its point of departure, of course, in the real,
i.e., concrete, individually structured configuration of our cultural life in its
universal relationships which are themselves no less individually-structured,
and in its development out of other social cultural conditions, which
themselves are obviously likewise individually structured. (Weber 1949:74)
Weber's methodology of concept formation is therefore situated in the
modern consciousness of the thinking transcendental 'I' whose existence amid an
infinite diversity of phenomena gives meaning and relevance to the particular ones
which it chooses to consider conceptually. The creation of such concepts in the
social sciences, therefore, gives us knowledge about specific value relations in
human beings, but tells us nothing objective (in the traditional natural science sense)
about the pre-eminence of values related to the studied object. "If one", Weber says,
"perceives the implications of the fundamental ideas of modern epistemology which
ultimately derives from Kant; namely, that concepts are primarily analytical
instruments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data and can be only that, the
fact that precise genetic concepts are necessarily ideal types will not cause him to
desist from constructing them" (1949:106). To Weber, concept formation would be
useful only when backed by empirical investigation; but the knowledge created by
the investigation as a whole would be grounded on knowledge of the self. And here
the relationship between theoretical values and practical valuation becomes clear: the
transcendental subject must be also an embodied personality at the same time. We
3 Quoted by Hennis 1988:123.
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can say that the scientific discipline can be a Husserlian "intermonadological
community of subjectivities" who reach intersubjective understanding, only through
common belief in and contemplation of the transcendental subject that knows the
universe; that is, the traditional concept of intersubjectivity is an important belief in
scientific discipline, but it necessarily remains a spiritual experience and an
intellectual ideal type.
Kantian epistemology requires that the transcendental self be found by the
scientist in her/himself in order to produce universal knowledge. Kant said that it is
impossible for us to accept the unity between the object of knowledge and the
universe unless we also accept the unifying function of the knowing subject, the 'I'
and its a priori relationship to the universe. The object of knowledge must appear to
us as a certain unity which might become problematic because it contains a
multiplicity of elements and functions; but their unity is their origin i. e. the
awareness of the knowing subject. The thinking T or transcendental subject must be
the universe through intuition in order to project it into an ordered unity of concepts.
Nevertheless, Kant does not believe that these concepts can convey the
transcendental meaning of the universe, he sets limits to the human creation of
knowledge. This stemmed out of his enquiries into the possibility of traditional
metaphysics. The possibility of physical science and mathematics implies that
understanding can only make an empirical use of its concepts and not a
transcendental one. When the knowing subject conceives of the super-sensible as a
given object, "he gets entangled in what Kant calls a transcendental illusion"
(Luijpen 1964:27). This is the kind of illusion that produces dogma in religious
environments, which Kant encouraged men to escape in order to lead their own lives
by the use of their own reason (Kant 1991).
According to Kant, therefore, the scientific creation of knowledge could only
refer to empirical appearances, to phenomenal occurrences, they cannot describe the
"thing in itself' or the noumenon. Objects are given to concepts in intuition during
the receptivity of impressions. Kant believed that the only kind of intuition available
for the human mind was sense-intuition which allowed for the spontaneity of the
production of concepts while receiving impressions through experience. According
to Kant, intellectual-intuition which would allow us to have access to the knowledge
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of the noumenon is beyond humans. For the subject to reach scientific knowledge
about the world, it must assume the pure ideas of reason: "God", the "I", and the
"world" (a secular kind of "Holy Trinity" that involves the human self). These ideas
are not really known, but in order to strive for the universality of science, we must
out of necessity think them. They are the "pure concepts of reason" (Kant 1929:316)
and serve the function of directing understanding towards the universe.
However, the Kantian enthusiasm about achieving universal empirical
knowledge through science and reason was tempered by the conclusions of the
Scottish Enlightenment, which relied more heavily on the receptivity of impressions.
Hume's most important point against the enlightened enthusiasm, was that the
concept of causality is only a subjective expectation aroused by the mechanism of
association (Luijpen 1964:10). This subjective expectation lies on beliefs.
If we attempt to harmonise —if it is possible at all— the Kantian and Humean
contributions to the philosophy of science, we could say that Kant contributed the
imperative importance of contemplating the universe when doing science, and Hume
pointed at the —often ignored— principle of subjectivity involved in the confirmation
of causality. Confirmation only means that there are bases for explanatory principles
which can either help us agree about intellectual knowledge or be useful in our
material everyday life. But our scientific contemplation of the universe is based on
the faith that we are mysteriously linked to it from within. Our conceptual
explanations might prove to be useful practically only in the specific domain of
experience where they are applied. Technology and functionality derive from this;
but never precise intellectual knowledge about the "workings" of the universe.
According to the Kantian model of knowledge, belief in the universal
integration of the knowing self in the transcendental subject, provides access to a
priori conceptual constructions given us by intuition. Nevertheless, it is a scientific
principle that there always be a margin of error (or distance between the conceptual a
priori construction and the empirical observation). Even if the error tends to be
negligible with respect to the domain of experience in which we apply our theoretical
abstraction, it can be mathematically shown that infinity still exists within that
margin of error. There are an infinite amount of numbers between two points in any
straight line and therefore we can break a line in two forever into infinity. But there
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are physical limits to perception of infinity in the world of sense-experience, so it is
scientifically correct to reduce the error to the minimum possible range, and make it
negligible in the domain of experience where it is applied. But the scientist should
not forget that to make it negligible in a specific domain of experience is no
justification to ignore the infinity that it contains. Ever shrinking margins of error
allow for further precision, but the significance of a decreasing margin of error also
decreases marginally —the error cannot be cancelled. Beyond the concept lies the
diverse infinity of a universe that will not be apprehended by mere conceptual
abstraction.
This might not have seemed relevant at the time when Kant wrote because, to
him, the confirmation of the possibility of universal sciences lay on the then obvious
universality of Newtonian physics, based on the precise functioning of a mechanical
universe. Although Kant had been trained within the dogmatic rationalism ofWolff
(Luijpen 1964:9), he opposed the idea that pure conceptual operations of logic could
describe reality. But he also ended up rejecting the Humean idea that knowledge was
based solely on changeable and concrete impressions, although this made him look
into empiricism. Kant needed a source of necessary and universal judgements, and
that was a priori knowledge, but the concrete experience which gave him an upper
hand over the sceptics and impressionists was the apparent universal validity of the
physics of Newton. This appearance has been challenged in Einstein's relativity
theory and in quantum physics, both of which have shown that Newton's physics
apply only in a specific domain of experience: that of body-sized matter that moves
slowlier than light (Bohm 1980, Capra 1982). "Universal validity" of intellectual
knowledge can be regarded as a myth that carries fantastic imaginative assumptions
in its very structure. However, these assumptions should not be seen as necessarily
'unreal' because they point at what is important for the society that sustains the
discipline, the order-producing ritual.
One such useful but fantastic assumption in the modern cosmos is the
ontological assumption of a mechanical universe formed by discrete entities.
Newton's physics are wholly based on what David Bohm calls the "mechanistic
order" in his book Wholeness and the Implicate Order; which has been challenged
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by Einstein's relativity theory and also by quantum theory, but which has remained at
the centre of the scientific cosmos and imagination:
[T]he principal feature of this [mechanistic] order is that the world is
regarded as constituted of entities which are outside of each other, in the
sense that they exist independently in different regions of space (and time)
and interact through forces that do not bring about any changes in their
essential natures. The machine gives a typical illustration of such a system of
order. (Bohm 1980:173)
The entities are supposed to be formed of separately existent indivisible and
unchangeable "elementary particles", atoms originally; that later were divided into
electrons, protons and neutrons; and then into hundreds of different kinds of unstable
particles, "and now even smaller ones" says Bohm "like 'quarks' and 'partons' have
been postulated to explain these transformations. Though these have not yet been
isolated there appears to be an unshakeable faith among physicists that either such
particles, or some other kind yet to be discovered, will eventually make possible a
complete and coherent explanation of everything" (1980:173 my italics).
According to Bohm, the theory of relativity was the first indication towards
the need to question the assumed mechanistic order of the universe. Einstein's
relativity implied that the concept of independently existent particles was
impossible, and he proposed to give a secondary importance to the idea of discrete
particles. According to Einstein, reality should be regarded as constituted of "fields",
whose behaviour is consistent with the requirements of the theory of relativity. "A
key new idea", says Bohm, "of this 'unified field theory' of Einstein is that the field
equations are non-linear [which] could have solutions in the form of localised
pulses, consisting of a region of intense field that could move through space stably as
a whole, and that could thus provide a model of the 'particle'" (1980:174). But if any
two 'pulses' come close together they alter each other so radically, that the idea of
independent and discrete particles is thus challenged as the essence of physical
reality; a particle is thus seen as a useful abstraction furnishing valid approximations
in a limited domain. However, Bohm says that Einstein's 'field' concept still keeps
the essential features of a mechanistic universe for being based on pulse-like entities
that still reside outside each other, and for considering that only those separated by
an infinitesimally small distance can affect each other. Einstein was never able to
provide an ultimate mechanistic basis for physics in terms of a generally coherent
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and satisfactory formulation of his unified field theory; but Bohm says that it
provided the basic intuition that the concept of particle is a useful abstraction from
an unbroken and undivided universe (Bohm 1980:174).
According to Bohm, the more serious challenge to a mechanistic order came
from quantum theory in the form of non-continuity, non-causality, and non-locality.
The laws of quantum mechanics are not determinist, they are statistical, and so,
future individual events cannot be predicted uniquely and precisely. But according to
Bohm, this feature does not essentially challenge the mechanistic order because
independently existent elements are still seen as lying outside each other and
connected by external relationships:
The fact that (as in a pinball machine) such elements are related by the rule of
chance (expressed mathematically in terms of the theory of probability) does
not change the basic externality of the elements and so does not essentially
affect the question of whether the fundamental order is mechanistic or not.
(Bohm 1980:175)
But Bohm isolates and refers to the three key features of quantum mechanics that do
challenge the ontology of a classical mechanistic conception of cosmos and order on
which the practice of science is based. Non-continuity at a quantum level means that
action is seen as an indivisible quanta, a whole that remains as such throughout
changes of state; "it has no meaning to say that a system passes through a continuous
series of intermediate states, similar to initial and final states" (Bohm 1980:128);
movement is discontinuous and the observed pulse-like entity can go from one state
to another without passing through any states in between. Non-causality is based on
the absence of determinism in quantum experiments and on the nature of
experimental observation: "in the quantum context", says Bohm, "one can regard
terms like 'observed object', 'observing instrument', 'link electron', 'experimental
results', etc., as aspects of a single overall 'pattern' that are in effect abstracted or
'pointed out' by our mode of description. Thus to speak of interaction of 'observing
instrument' and 'observed object' has no meaning" (1980:134). Further, the observer
is also part of the pattern of the experiment as pulse-like entities "can show different
properties (e.g., particle-like, wave-like, or something in between), depending on the
environmental context within which they exist and are subject to observation"
(Bohm 1980:175). Non-locality is based on the peculiar non-local relationship
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between two entities that are far apart, such as electrons, which have separated after
having initially combined into a molecule; that is, very small pulse-like entities
affect one another at an indefinite distance after having interacted. What is
remarkable about these discoveries is that they highlight the need to see physical
reality as something that has no ontological division and that if there is any
separation between the objects that we observe, it is mainly epistemological, based
on our perspective and scientific style of observation.
Bohm problematises this further and asks if instead of the typical attitude of
looking at the mechanistic consistencies and applications of the relativity and
quantum theories, their intuitions can be used to produce a qualitatively new
perspective of observation of physical order, "from which both relativity and
quantum theory are to be derived as abstractions, approximations and limiting cases"
(Bohm 1980:176). This new perspective would require a serious questioning of the
Cartesian mechanistic cosmos and a different attitude towards our own thinking
process, nature, and the 'other':
Though physics has changed radically in many ways, the Cartesian grid (with
minor modifications, such as the use of curvilinear coordinates) has remained
the one key feature that has not changed. Evidently, it is not easy to change
this, because our notions of order are pervasive, for not only do they involve
our thinking but also our senses, our feelings, our intuitions, our physical
movement, our relationships with other people and with society as a whole
and, indeed, every phase of our lives. (Bohm 1980:176)
Bohm suggests that we become aware of an unbroken continuum of reality, where
distinctions should be seen as abstracted from that whole, in a similar way in which
he highlights the oneness of the thinking process and its content. He believes that
questions about the nature of consciousness cannot be properly expressed if we are
caught up in the principle of a presumed essential separation of the elements of
reality. He expresses this perspective in what he calls the "implicate order":
We proposed that a new notion of order is involved here, which we called the
implicate order (from a Latin root meaning 'to enfold' or 'to fold inward'). In
terms of the implicate order one may say that everything is enfolded into
everything. This contrasts with the explicate order now dominant in physics
in which things are unfolded in the sense that each thing lies only in its own
particular region of space (and time) and outside the regions belonging to
other things. (Bohm 1980:177)
38
But both implicate and explicate orders should be seen as perspectives on an
intellectual contemplation of universal order which remains rooted in the belief on an
essential human transcendental connection to that order. Both perspectives keep a
transcendental connection to the Kantian views on the philosophy of science.
Science and philosophy differentiate or unify the universe artificially to
indulge reason into observing a coherent kind of order in the world, but whatever it
is that we call 'universe' remains a relevant category for our intellectual
contemplation of reality. Kant realised that physical sciences do not regard nature as
a mere conglomeration of data, but as an interconnected whole that we can think of
by means of concepts. Kant conceived intuitions and concepts as the elements of our
intellectual knowledge, but he also thought that each intuition needed to be supported
by a concept —and each concept by an intuition— to yield knowledge of the nature of
the physical sciences (Kant 1929:92). In order for this to be possible, the
propositions that we formulate must come to us before sensible experience. In his
"Transcendental Aesthetic", Kant accepts a priori forms of understanding that are
impressed on the manifold data of intuition, which are reduced to a conceptual unity.
For Kant, the possibility of the existence of physical sciences is only explained if we
accept that this kind of knowledge about the world which obeys determinable
physical laws, cannot possibly come solely from experience. Nature, which is the
sum of all appearances, is made an ordered whole through the intellectual discovery
of a priori laws in the form of categories and concepts. Weber shares with the neo-
Kantian school the idea that "it can be logically demonstrated that the reality
confronting us in our daily lives is the structured version of something immediate
and boundless" (Bruun 1972:99). Bearing in mind our believed internal link to the
transcendental subject and to universal aprioristic knowledge, it is important to
contemplate this knowledge as synthetic, and our artificial process of differentiating
it into concepts will unavoidably yield a model of reality that remains an imaginative
model, an ideal type, a Utopia.
As a consequence, the idea that we are intrinsically linked to the universe
through Kantian aprioristic intuition is really only an act of faith: the certainty that
humankind has an inner open window into the universe that can become conscious.
And this faith may be regarded to be of identical nature to that of any other spiritual
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search. The difference of the Western enlightened discipline is that the scientist or
philosopher can allow him/herself to be the wholeness of the universe through
subjective intuition, but then s/he must translate the product of her/his contemplation
into conceptual theory or explanatory systems that can be understood intellectually,
and reproduced and verified empirically and publicly. This practice (or ritual), with
demands of functionality (as a modern value) gives the scientist an environment of
certainty within which an attitude of "rational domination of the world" thrives. But
the universal validity of intellectual knowledge is a myth that derives from the
disciplinary belief in an individual human relationship with 'universe', which is
originally spiritual as will be discussed below.
The essential Weberian scientific concern is to find out the subjective roots of
practical valuation that gave rise to the development of the Western society in the
direction of rational world domination. He found those roots in his sociology of
religion, which he built in the shape of ideal typical formations. This brought him
into sociology at a time when there was a need for a methodology of concept
formation so that the discipline as a whole would gain the reputation of science
(Hennis 1988). Thomas Burger argues that Weber was pushed into methodological
argumentation "as a result of external circumstances"4 and "left off as soon as he
could", and that his major methodological questions had been answered already by
the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert (Burger 1976:5). However, it is possible to argue
with Bruun that Weber went beyond Rickert's purely philosophical argumentation
and logical categories by his use of his interpretive sociology and the close
relationship between theoretical value relation and practical valuation: "Weber's
attitude to the problem of value relation seems far more flexible [than Rickert's], Of
course scientific propositions and value judgements are two entirely different things;
but in pointing to [practical] valuations as a frequent, and legitimate, condition of
value relation, Weber hints at the possibility of a more extensive, if still controlled,
interplay of practice and theory, interest and perception" (Bruun 1972:106-107).
4 Thomas Burger argues that Weber's involvement with methodological issues is related to the dispute
(Methodenstreit) that took place between the economists in the German Historical School (mainly
Gustav Schmoller, Wilhelm Roscher, Bruno Hildebrand, and Karl Knies) and the Austrian Classical
School of Economics (founded by Carl Menger). For both sides of this dispute, "scientific knowledge
constituted a mental picture of the empirical phenomena in question; it was conceived as a replica of
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However, the Rickertian influence on Weber is clearly recognisable and
Weber himself says that his incursions in methodology are bound up with Rickert's
work (Weber 1949) and that of other neo-Kantians. According to Oakes, "in the
philosophy of history developed by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask, Weber found an
epistemology of the cultural sciences which, in his view, established the conditions
under which knowledge of the historical individual is possible" (Oakes 1987:436).
Rickert's logic created the possibility of contemplating history as a science with the
objective stature of the natural sciences, but with a legitimacy of its own based on
the individual uniqueness of the historically relevant events. Just what gives
individual events their relevance is related to a valuation process :
To attribute importance to the individuality of certain phenomena [...] means
connecting them with some value in relation to which they acquire their
importance [...] only this relation permits a selection from the infinite
multiplicity of reality which respects the individual character of the
phenomena selected, while being rooted in a firm criterion (viz., the value in
question). (Bruun 1972:88)
But, according to Rickert, the value in question would be relevant to everybody,
meaning by this not "just anybody", but everybody in a Gemeinschaft. This brings to
mind the idea of intersubjectivity in a scientific community. But without the
scientific belief in the possibility of collectively invoking the transcendental subject
in everyone in the community, the view of reality formed according to these
principles is unable to overcome its particularistic, locally structured nature.
Weber's ideas on value freedom in science accept that "a person may enter
into two roles, being the source (or the recipient) of, alternately, scientific and
valuational propositions, [...] the social scientist will often have to pass through a
phase of practical valuation in order to be able to assume his theoretical role" (Bruun
1972:106). The Rickertian "careful and deliberate" distinction between the object
level and the research level is not found in Weber, who is more an empiricist
practitioner that a logician. He therefore established a scientific practice according to
which the scientist would look straight into her/his personal practical valuation; but
that would also make him/her contemplate the universe, and project her/his
transcendental self-consciousness into the creation of proper theoretical value
the object in the mind. Consequently, the question which was fundamental to the whole controversy
was: What counts as a satisfactory replica?" (Burger 1976:141).
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relations in order to create systematically correct scientific proof. In his essay on
"objectivity", Weber considers the latter as correct if its empirical relation to the
world could be recognised as such "even by a Chinese". He immediately realises this
might be too broad a generalisation and corrects himself by stating this more
precisely, saying that scientific proof "must constantly strive to attain this goal,
which perhaps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data" (Weber 1949:58
my italics).
Nevertheless, theoretical value relations tell us nothing about individual
perception of reality in itself due to the established principle that immediate
individual perception is a boundless infinite diversity of phenomena. Weberian
methodology is rooted in a view of reality that divides the universe into real worldly
phenomena and real transcendence, and whose only ground to make an objective
claim stands is the conscious self-experience. To Weber, the relation between the
concept and the object of study is always mediated by this conscious self-experience,
through valuation. Lask explored the relationship between the concept and its object
and concluded that concrete reality cannot be derived from its conceptualisation (as
in what he called the emanationist Hegelian logic); but that it is lived in individual
existence as the sole reality, and that its unique and unfathomable nature precludes
the possibility of complete clear conceptualisation. Therefore, the relationship
between object and its concept is purely artificial as an "intellectual construct, reality
[individual perception] is ontologically richer than the concept" (Oakes 1987:439).
The relatively recent possibility of observation of physical phenomena at a
quantum size has brought about similar conclusions: a different theoretical approach
was needed at that level, because Newtonian all-encompassing theoretical physics
described a more "local" kind of universe —one adapted to our body-dimensional
experience of solid objects (Bohm 1980, Capra 1982). Therefore a broader theory
was created which allowed for greater flexibility in measurement —through
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle— instead of the discovery of numerical constants
in the universe (or in the logic of the theory). According to Windelband, the natural
sciences' nomothetic knowledge abstracts from the uniqueness of particular
phenomena in order to concentrate on the patterns of behaviour that govern the
similarities of particular events, thus creating general laws, and cancelling their
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uniqueness. In his view, historical science's kind of knowledge is idiographic, where
"the purpose of knowledge is to comprehend the distinctive properties of the unique
event itself' (Oakes 1987:437). In history, those distinctive properties would be
chosen according to general values that the scientist represents; in quantum physics,
the phenomenon that the scientist decides to observe changes in (conceptual) nature
according to the theoretical expectation that the scientist assumes in his/her
experimental setting.
In the light of the scientific discoveries of our now theoretically "expanded"
universe, we can say that both social and natural sciences have nomological
characteristics, and that their tendencies to observe idiographic uniqueness is ruled
by how close the object of study becomes either the conscious self (social science
and philosophy) or is consciously influenced by the individual scientific "observer"
(participator in quantum experiments). We can now say that, what Weber pointed out
to be the basis for objectivity in the social sciences, applies to any kind of science
natural or social. What the current academia agrees to see as relevant and desirable
for the expansion of intellectual knowledge, and what the initiated ones teach and
accept as the leading paradigm has its basis in this intersubjective legitimacy. In this
conception of reality, an intersubjective agreement —based on the strength of a
rational abstract theory and evidence— is the basis for what we call "objectivity".
Nevertheless, considering its basis on the individual conscious self,
"objectivity" should always be regarded as an act of faith. This does not mean that
objectivity is therefore faulty or impossible, it only means that the blind belief in
absolute certainty through objective knowledge is a cultural scientific by-product of
modernity that, in practice, may acquire a dogmatic nature. In his defence of value-
freedom in the social sciences, Weber always opposed the formation of "scientific"
dogma of this nature. To him, this was reflected in the confusion that science would
be able to elucidate the actual validity of knowledge, which he strove to differentiate
through keeping a clear distinction between empirical science and value-judgements.
"For even the knowledge of the most certain proposition of our theoretical sciences -
-e.g., the exact natural sciences or mathematics, is, like the cultivation and
refinement of the conscience, a product of culture" (Weber 1949:55).
43
If sociology is to remain a science on Weberian grounds, it needs the Kantian
scientific unifying principle of contemplation of the universe —even if only as a
transcendental belief which realises that any intellectual knowledge achieved in this
manner remains a partial view of reality, with particular (local) significance. The
social sciences should take seriously into account the possibility of everything being
enfolded into everything else at the same time as we are able to distinguish discrete
differences; mainly because individual intention at the centre of human action
follows the principles of an atomistic Cartesian universe, one whose ontology has
already been empirically challenged by contemporary physics. The ideal Western
self that we experience as an individual self can also be brought to conscious
experience as a collective self imaginatively and emotionally. Other cultures
represent this collectivity as legitimate "reality" without having to resort to an
individual principle of order based on an atomistic and mechanistic world-view. If
we accept that human consciousness may have imaginative and emotional ways of
experiencing itself as a united whole with other human beings; there is no reason
why a collective self cannot be posed in order to describe a human self-experience
that can produce knowledge; without needing to consider it necessarily "illegitimate"
on the basis of our own Western-scientific terms.
It is in this spirit that I build three ideal typical views of reality as fictions or
Utopias that cannot be observed in their abstract purity, but that complement each
other in human interaction. The ideal types dealt with in this first part of the thesis
are given names of recognisable cultures when they have been identified as such
from the Western perspective (pagan, Christian, Western, Eastern); but also the
names of characteristics of those practices that have been identified as such by the
Western culture (primitive, mystic). Therefore, the centre for intellectual self-
knowledge is the Western tradition of knowledge itself; the perspective of the
observer. My ideal types are metaphors that I consider useful for heuristic purposes
and —at best— they may be valid (Western) approximations in the observation of
human interaction. Their validity is justified in terms of a point of intersection
between practical valuation and theoretical valuation: the practice of science and its
ideal aspirations of truth. But we should be aware that the latter are based on belief
of the sacred type, spelt out by Kantian philosophy of knowledge, which is not
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without its fantastic imaginative roots. These roots are nonetheless reproduced by
human interaction in social reality, sustained by the contemporary political world
order and global interaction, and by the disciplined practice of scientific observation
—which according to Weber, should be essentially practised as self-observation.
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I. 2. Three Ideal-Typical Views of Reality
The basic premise of this work is that the ability to conceive and represent a 'view of
reality' makes human interaction different from any other phenomenon that an
observer may call 'interaction'; and the 'substance' where a view of reality is carved is
the experience of time and language in disciplined practice. Nevertheless, an
observer is already necessarily human and is also her/himself already situated within
a view of reality and cultural inheritance that s/he identifies with through his/her own
embodied interaction and experience of time and language. Currently, our Western
tradition construes reality as organised around the notions of a subject and an object
that are separate from each other. "Objectivity" depends on the disciplined distance
that a subject may take from her/his object of study and this may be based on the
belief that the object and subject are essentially separate from each other. But to take
on board such assumptions as the only source of reality is analogous with assuming
sacred or religious belief as absolute truth; belief and legitimate reality are based on
cosmological myths and on disciplined practice simultaneously.
I suggest that what has been traditionally construed as difference between
religion and institutions (however rational) can also be construed as a continuum.
This continuum has been identified by (New-) forms of institutionalism5 as 'path
dependencies', this is an image of social causation that "rejects the traditional
postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere in
favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual
features of a given situation often inherited from the past" (Hall & Taylor 1996:941).
From this perspective the sharp differences between tradition and modernity become
blurred, but can still be considered as differences of degree. This follows the
experience that, while modernity emanates from the West, the non-West is also
already a part of it through currently sustained global interaction; that is, the non-
West is also the West. At the same time, there is a popularly sustained myth —of the
cosmological primary type— that modernity progressively wipes out tradition; a
suggestion that produces optimistic projections of a possibly better future as much as
5 This is the New Institutionalism that concentrates on organisational analysis. See (Powell and
DiMaggio 1991 and Hall and Taylor 1996)
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terrifying visions of administrated and utterly rationalised worlds. My own position
here is to take fully on board Bruno Latour's claim that We Have Never Been
Modem, a claim that comes from a person who is unquestionably situated in the
West6; and that contends that the project of modernity is both suspended and
sustained by its own inner paradoxes and contradictions (Latour 1993). I would add
that the Western tradition of knowledge is also traditional in its need for mythical
assumptions of the cosmological type about reality. So nobody has ever been
modern, yet modernity is already the ideal basis of a global culture.
The difference in degree between what has traditionally been called the West
and the non-West, or contemporary modern and traditional interaction cannot be
fully appreciated through a dialogical relationship between them where the non-West
is regarded as the 'other' and tradition is assumed to precede modernity in a
sequential manner in universal history, mainly because tradition is part of the present
social experience of both West and non-West simultaneously. This is the reason why
this relationship should be brought to the contemporary world scenario in identifying
various current cosmological beliefs, regardless of their pre-eminence or not in our
own tradition of knowledge about reality and culture. I suggest a theoretical
construction that contemplates three ideal types of reality; the structure of this ideal
difference is essentially organised around the dialogical relationship between 'world'
and 'transcendence' and the notions of time and language that derive from each
cosmology and that give shape to the principles of discipline —to institutions as
defined in this work. But this perspective assumes that all of the elements of the
three ideal types of reality are complementary; that is, they depend conceptually on
each other to be defined at all (this will become clearer organisationally in the
second part of the thesis).
In his book The Interpretation of Cultures, Clifford Geertz speaks about a
pair of complementary concepts that he defines as ethos and world view: "the ethos
is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life implied
by the actual state of affairs which the world view describes, and the world view is
made emotionally acceptable by being presented as an image of an actual state of
6 But if uttered in a peripheric country, it would most probably be taken to express either an obvious
fact or an exclamation of desperate and repeated failure in the face of the expectations of the IMF or
similar supranational entities.
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affairs of which such a way of life is an authentic expression" (Geertz 1973:127).
What Geertz calls an "actual state of affairs" depends on whatever it is that a specific
culture regards as real. "What all sacred symbols assert is that the good for man is to
live realistically; where they differ is in the vision of reality they construct" (Geertz
1973:130). He considers that, "for various individuals and in various cultures",
religion fuses ethos and world view and gives social values what he calls "an
appearance of objectivity" (Geertz 1973:131), which is what he thinks ethos and
world view most need to be successfully sustained.
Geertz's conclusions about social order help us clarify the organisational
implications of a constructed vision of reality, but he uses the symbol of objectivity
(one that is regarded as legitimate reality in the West) in order to convey his link
between reality and another world view's experience of it. His general message is
that another culture may hold an idea of reality that may not agree with ours, but that
it is no less real to the bearers of the culture because of this. His is the relativistic
Boasian stand-point in anthropology, where all cultures are seen as valuable in
themselves (Bennet, 1996). It is only from this standpoint, that we can look at the
Western tradition of analysis itself, and observe it as a culture, a worldview with a
very particular type of ethos, which happens to be universalistic and factual. I will go
briefly back to the discussion of the subject/object divide in order to illustrate the
predicament of this Geertzian type of analysis, through which the observer positions
himself in the privileged perspective of observation to produce intellectual
knowledge, even while he does not claim superiority for his own cultural inheritance.
In order to carry out her/his analysis, the scientist must differentiate between
subject and object as a methodological assumption. But, as has been discussed, this
exercise of differentiation is itself based on a "myth" of separation at the very root of
the Western tradition of knowledge. The methodological assumption of the clear
divide between subject and object is an order-producing ritual in the world-view of
science. Although recent scholars are more willing to see ritual in many Western
practices, there is much resistance to identify ritual with the rationalised practices
that produce secular knowledge and rational domination. Catherine Bell regards the
generic concept of ritual as an analytical tool, based on the division between subject
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and object, that helps to give social shape to the dichotomy thought/action "that runs
particularly deep in the intellectual traditions ofWestern Culture" (Bell 1992:24):
We do not see that we are wielding a particularly powerful analytical tool,
nor do we see how our unconscious manipulation of it is driven not only by
the need to resolve the dichotomy it establishes but also simultaneously to
affirm and resolve the more fundamental opposition it poses —the opposition
between the theoretician and the object of theoretical discourse. In other
words, we do not see how such dichotomies contribute to the rational
definition of a knower, a known, and a particular kind of knowledge. (Bell
1992:25)
In our Western tradition, the kind of knowledge produced by scientific method (or
ritual) is the legitimate one. This knowledge is scientifically produced and coherently
spelt out in the sequentiality of symbols that represent themselves and the world in
the abstract possibilities of conceptual thought. But the critical Western discipline
depends on the assumption of a vantage point (originally related to the Gaze of the
Christian monotheistic God) that produces the rational ability to see the dichotomous
relationships, which traditional cultures do not identify as the basis of reality. This
vantage point belongs to the observer who is poised in a mimetic assimilation of the
transcendental Gaze of God and who is able, from this vantage point of 'pure'
objectivity, to project universal knowledge into the abstract, sequential, scientific
descriptions of "objective" reality. Even if this standpoint has been questioned by the
Western tradition of philosophy itself —and this legitimises the emergence of
poststructuralist and postmodern theoretical constructs as well as various forms of
existentialism and nihilism—, in the realm of everyday life modern interaction, the
privileged standpoint cannot be disposed with. In the collective practice of science,
however, the absolute gaze of the scientist is transformed into a social consensus
where the 'objective' reality can be agreed upon:
Hence the modern use of language has been driven increasingly to define the
objective reality of the world, on the assumption that "objective" means real
because it allows such consensus, and that "subjective" means unreal because
it does not. The word "subject" in English means the observer of the
objective, and it also has the political meaning of an individual subordinated
to the authority of his society or its ruler, as in "British subject". It is not
really possible, however, to separate the two meanings. The "subject" is
subjected to the objective world, and not only subjected but almost crushed
under it, like Atlas. (Frye 1982:21)
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The Geertzian relativistic interpretation of other cultures points at a
metonymic correspondence in our use of the term 'objective' and 'reality'; to us, it is
not really possible to separate the meaning of these two concepts. However, a full
exercise of relativism is impossible for an anthropologist who stands in the vantage
point of an observer that is engaged in the activity of translation from the realm of
the 'other' to the realm of the Western objective tradition of knowledge as it is
practised today. This vantage point is sustained by contemporary cosmology, which
implies a political order that is unavoidably entwined with the contemporary power
structures of the world7. A full exercise of relativism is needed which would imply a
turn of 180 degrees in order to analyse the 'otherness' ofWestern tradition itself. The
problem is that, in this attempt, our own universalistic grounds would be removed
from under the feet of the privileged observer. The question that springs to mind is if
it is possible at all to realise this intellectual exercise, from the point of view of the
observer, and regard the Western tradition as the 'other' and as 'oneself at the same
time. My own way of dealing with this predicament is to embrace the paradox and
give intellectual knowledge only a metaphoric value, useful for understanding, yet
mythical in its universalistic consequences.
According to Geertz, religion encompasses ethos and world view in a given
culture. In the Western tradition though, it is the institutions (legal-rational) which
substitute for religion (and give the latter a marginal function in the private realm of
human life). It is important to stress at this point that the current realm of global
interaction is also situated in culture and belief, and therefore it is also based on an
ethos and a world-view. Our modern institutions encompass this ethos and world-
view; but it is necessary to trace the ancestry of modern institutions all the way to the
Christian religion, together with its own Judaic and Greek ancestries (Snell, 1953,
Jaeger 1962, Voegelin 1974, Nisbet 1994). It is this ancestry, I will argue, that
defines the present relevance of our contemporary use of the notions of a separate
subject and object, the mechanistic cosmos that rules modern interaction, and our
distinct sense for a factual type of history. The concept of religion is used in this
7 It is experienced in the political hierarchies that go up, today past Europe, towards the United States.
But the latter can always be cosmologically and mythologically related to the liberal ideals of the spirit
of Reformation that remain in the syntax of the American constitution (and in the so-called Universal
Declaration of the Human Rights).
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work indistinctly from institution (legitimate belief), spiritual practice, or discipline,
systematic form of worship, or social theodicy to describe the same phenomenon: the
relationship between what Geertz describes as ethos and world-view of a culture, and
their structural consequences in the cosmology that rules interaction. This
relationship is necessarily ideal and therefore, institutions here are regarded as
possessing an aura of distance that is analogous to the charismatic aura of organised
religion8.
An idea of reality, as portrayed in this work, may be couched in religions or
(rational) institutions, cosmologies or the order of the world or the universe; it is
rooted in what is really important for a given society, and in that sense, real. The
concept of 'religion' is linked to Christianity as a spiritual discipline and practice ~
and to the Judeo-Christian conception of God— and although it has been used to
speak about other spiritual disciplines in the world, it was not created as an analytical
tool but as a descriptive symbol of Christian 'togetherness'. This is very relevant to
this work because it attempts to show that the Western tradition has a mythological
basis as much as any other known tradition of human knowledge. The Western view
of reality is prevalent in global interaction, and therefore, we should be aware of its
mythological basis. But this 'mythology', as I have called it, cannot be disclosed
unless —at least— other two stand-points are conceptually constructed and identified
with 'other' world-cultures. But they must be built in the spirit of recognising that
they are also aspects of our own culture as they are aspects of every other culture —
even if they are not culturally pre-eminent in ours. The problem is how to portray
other generic views of reality that Westerners can identify themselves with, not qua
Westerners, but qua human beings. This would produce an empirically plausible
counterpoint to the Western world-view, formulated conceptually, which can at the
same time be regarded as different but sharing its deepest existential concerns
nonetheless.
I will construe three ideal-typical views of reality whose difference is
essentially organised around an alternative dialogical relationship between 'world'
8 In this sense I disagree with the institutionalist tradition, which may have its origins with Thornsten
Veblem, that considers institutions as mere habits. Even though I agree that these habits leave past
dependencies and determine the shape of an organisation, the habits are materialisations of
institutional arrangements, they are not the institution itself. Past habits and present organisations are
to the institution what the Church is to the body of Christ.
and 'transcendence'. The three ideal types are called the Western/Christian,
Eastern/mystic, and pagan/primitive types. Only the first one considers both world
and transcendence as simultaneously real. The Eastern mystic type regards the
'world' as illusory in nature and only transcendence as real. The pagan/primitive type
regards reality as the 'world'. Thus, while the Western/Christian type is based on the
dialectical tension of an 'eternal' division, the Eastern/mystic and the pagan/primitive
types conceive of reality as essentially whole and couched in either of the two poles
whose tension the Western/Christian view inhabits. I am aware that this alternative is
also shaped by Western dialectics, but I explicitly resort to our own traditional
(sacred) Western roots to reality in order to place the 'other' within a perspective
where it can also be 'oneself simultaneously.
In our Western tradition, we divide reality into an opposition —however
ideal— between 'world' and 'transcendence'. The other two typically-ideal
conceptions of reality that I propose are holistic in that reality is fettered either
wholly in 'world' or wholly in 'transcendence', and the opposition between these two
terms in those ideas of reality is either irrelevant or illusory. To an observer, the
pagan/primitive conception regards reality as the 'world' and the Eastern mystic
conception regards reality as 'transcendence'. We are left with three typically-ideal
conceptions of reality whose empirical reference is linked with the prevailing
spiritual practice in diverse cultural settings that, despite their diversity, can
nonetheless be generally classified as pagan/primitive (reality as the 'world' only),
Western/Christian (reality as the 'world' and 'transcendence' at the same time), and
Eastern mystic (reality as 'transcendence' only). However it is important to clarify
that, although these views of reality were conceived in an idealised symbology and
lead to the (Western) classification of cultures mentioned above, the three notions of
reality that they stress are empirically experienced in simultaneous and changing
experiences of human consciousness in all kinds of cultures all over the world. These
three ideal types of reality may be regarded as three types of prevalent cultures, but
are not mutually exclusive, they are complementary in human experience: all
cultures have recognisable organisational features of the three types (see part two).
It is important to point out that the transcendentalist views (Western/Christian
and Eastern/mystic) legitimise the symmetrical opposite at the basis of their belief
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systems: in the West the individual self is a value in itself, while in the East, the
collective mind is sacred. The idea of self that is idealised and given an institutional
aura in the different types of views of reality tends either towards the spiritual
individuality of the human being (the Christ, the transcendental subject or the
knowing Ego) or to humanity unified in awareness of an immanent kind collective
entity that encompasses all, but that is not given a clear personality as in the God of
the "religions of the Book". However, this 'clean' symmetrical differentiation is
mediated by the idea of transcendence, which is clearly articulated in the
Western/Christian and in the Eastern/mystic views of reality, but not in the
pagan/primitive one. In the latter, oneness with the cosmos is a living experience of
either collective or individual ritual, a sense of awe and veneration for the
experienced mysterious characteristics of embodiment and the world, articulated in
archaic symbols and myths and induced by their cyclical mimetic enactment in
synchronic experience. These practices bring about experienced awareness and
renewal of the symbols of spiritual-organic union of life and death.
It is also important to mention at this point that the only conceptual tension
with further dichotomous consequences in this tripartite differentiation exists
between the two views of reality that contemplate 'transcerdence' as real. There is no
conceptual tension between the transcendental views of reality and the
pagan/primitive view of reality because the reality of the world is either repressed
and controlled or engulfed by them —the more problematic tension is not conceptual
but embodied in providing justification for colonialism. The conceptual tension
between the transcendentalist views of reality is not experienced as such in global
social interaction because while the Western conception of reality produces the
practice of what Weber called 'rational domination' of reality (or experience), the
Eastern mystic conception produces the practice of what I call 'intuitive submission'
to experience. Rational domination creates material organisation that is most
successful in coordinating world interaction; intuitive submission produces a type of
peaceful quietism. Both kinds of transcendental practice are aimed at colonising the
pagan/primitive idea of reality bringing it awareness of transcendence —without
being able to abandon the grounds of embodiment and myth that wrap the mysteries
of life and death— that lies beyond the concreteness of this world: transcendence as
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impersonated in the only God in Heaven, as infinity, as the eternal present mystic
instant, or as universal humanity.
The pagan/primitive type conceives reality as only in the world, which due to
diversity in nature, has created a huge range of stories (myths) where a mixture of
human experience, emotional ties, and imagination speculate about the mysteries that
keep the world alive and in constant renewal. But this is not an outward observation
of phenomena, like science, it is an inquiry towards the inner life of the human group
that needs the group organically to survive as an embodied animal. As we will see,
this practical awareness may abandon human interaction only in extreme artificial
circumstances (such as urban life). Nevertheless, the mythological realm of existence
is a human characteristic of interaction and, even if it is left in the background of
modern interaction as a source of the primeval root that links human to nature, it is
still the foundation of social life:
Mythology is not a datum but a factum of human existence: it belongs to the
world of culture and civilisation that man has made and still inhabits. As a
god is a metaphor identifying a personality as an element of nature, solar
myths or star myths or vegetation myths may suggest something of a
primitive form of science. But the real interest of myth is to draw a
circumference around a human community and look inward toward that
community, not [essentially] to inquire into the operations of nature.
Naturally it will draw on elements from nature, just as a creative design in
painting or sculpture would do. But mythology is not a direct response to the
natural environment; it is part of the imaginative insulation that separates us
from that environment. (Frye 1982:37)
It is pertinent to say with Frye that myth is never improved upon (as with the
assumption that evolution is progress and therefore conceptual thinking is superior to
myth), nor is it abolished in any society. Its primitivity is linked to its organic present
relevance to human and not to the 'evolution ofman' (where women are thought of as
lagging behind —linked to moral and spiritual competence— together with children
and the peoples of the non-West).
At the historical period of the Western European enlightenment, what may be
regarded as the historical origin of secular modernity —or the age of reason— the
Western/Christian conception of reality re-defined itself to reject the constraining
dogma of the church. But the Christian dualistic and divided conception of reality in
'world' and 'transcendence' was kept in the rationally enlightened minds of the
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Western philosophers who could not have thought in the void and were thus subject
to their cultural past "path dependencies" (Hall & Taylor 1996). This differentiation
of reality gives the Western conception an intellectual vantage point because it
includes both world and transcendence as real; but at the same time it takes away the
perspective of an experiential vantage point for other types of knowledge where
these two categories lie undifferentiated. A disciplined rational domination of
experience, along the Christian lines of time, eventually brought about science as a
very powerful source of intellectual knowledge. However, there is a fundamentalist
trap here which every scientist should learn to avoid: one may believe that the
discipline produced by this view of reality is the only source of valid knowledge.
The discipline of rational domination of experience constantly re-defines
itself to try to encompass intellectual knowledge of the infinite variation of
phenomena that the world's constant change creates; while the discipline of intuitive
submission to experience accepts the world as it is because its worldly nature as such
is seen as illusion. These two attitudes characterise both 'transcendentalist' views of
reality and consider as important intellectual and spiritual knowledge respectively.
But a primitive type of (primary) knowledge rooted in the world and in myth is not
only also relevant to human, but it is also the basis of any other type of knowledge;
and, as will be argued mainly in the second part of the thesis below, it is the type of
knowledge that human animals share with non-human animals. Knowledge in this
work is not only conceptualised as intellectual knowledge; there are other two kinds
of knowledge that should be taken into consideration when producing a model of
human world-order: spiritual knowledge and the knowledge produced by a direct
experience of the world —not mediated by any kind of explicit transcendentalism
(primary knowledge).
Each of the three types of knowledge referred to correspond to each of the
three types of views of reality and also have an ideal-typical nature in the sense that
they are never pure, but manifest themselves as empirical mixtures in different
symbolisations and degrees of relevance of the three types of knowledge. Even
though primary and spiritual knowledge lack precision in discursive expression, the
realm of experience where they are expressed is real in its 'actuality' for human
interaction, in a way analogous to Mircea Eliade's idea that the sacred realm —where
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the imagined (not necessarily imaginary) realms of magic, transcendence, and
salvation lie— is also 'objective reality' because it 'manifests itself (Bennet
1996:118). Here, I would like to temper this position though, and accept the reality
of primary and spiritual types of knowledge in as much as they organise experienced
domains of present human interaction. Primary and spiritual knowledge are sources
of organisation that are barely noticed or recorded as they are expressed through
practice that is embodied and enacted practically; their discursiveness is limited and
ambiguous, but their presence is lived nonetheless.
Human consciousness is ideally comprised by these three kinds of
knowledge9. Intellectual knowledge is today represented through the scientific
discipline of concept formation or factual knowledge, spiritual knowledge represents
itself in universalistic revelation, the sacred "Word of God", Dahrma, philosophical
disquisition, or spiritual practice of various disciplines; and the primary experience
of reality represents itself through compact symbols of local, particular, and
embodied experience. In order to be able to contemplate a wider scope of human
creativity, it is necessary to give these kinds of knowledge a conceptual existence
within the framework of consciousness. It is necessary to represent them because, to
the best of our knowledge, human experience creates and dwells in these
representations of reality (which may also be said to create human experience back)
and they persist in human life to this day through what is peculiar to our species:
human language and a human type of embodied interaction. The three kinds of
knowledge constantly interact with each other in human language and embodied
interaction. Here, we are dealing with the complex process of consciousness which
in this work is regarded as inseparable from embodiment. Language and embodied
9 Human consciousness is the most complex object of analysis; any conceptual description should be
regarded as just a model that must be assumed to remain short of encompassing its vastness. This is
not only the acknowledgement of a negligible margin of error between the model and the object of
intellectual knowledge; it the realisation that this margin of error represents infinity itself.
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interaction undergo constant transformation through time but they can also be
observed at the same time to keep a general form which we can identify. In order to
concretise the difference between these kinds of knowledge and to define how they
are relevant to human life, we must define types of time and types of language
(verbal structures) that are used by human experience in order to structure the
immediate and boundless reality in front of us.
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Chapter li.
Time and Language in Legitimate Reality
In this work, religions and institutions are regarded as analogous to each other
because they dictate the notion of legitimate reality, and this is reflected in the ideal
principles expressed by prevalent discipline. I will argue that in contemporary
modern interaction, the quality of order is different from that of the order of what is
explicitly sacred by virtue of its relationship with time and language. In the West this
difference is traditionally construed through a relationship to time that is progressive
and that contemplates a movement from the reality of the sacred order at the centre
of human interaction to the reality of human rationality at the centre of human
interaction as a positive and desired transformation. But this modern self-
interpretation, in the rejection of the sacred roots to reality, refuses to see that this
progressive construal itself is sustained in human action (or non-action), emotion,
and imagination by those sacred (mythical) roots themselves (see appendix A).
My argument is that the locus of legitimation is the relevant experience of
time and language for either of the three ideally typical views of reality and their
institutionalisation as disciplines; even as the different types of time and language
that are identified here are essential to the pragmatic organisation of any culture that
can be identified as such empirically. This is the reason why in this work
legitimation is related to institutions and not to organisation: institutions, like
religions, portray the ideal 'form' of the discipline that human beings engage with in
order to interact with experience; while organisations are a pragmatic mixture of that
form with the unavoidable spontaneity of life. The ideal form of the discipline exists
mainly in human emotion and imagination and this is related to the creation of belief
in legitimate institutions and disciplined human interaction.
We come across a contemporary tale that has not been 'written' but which is
told and enacted by the current structures of world interaction as soon as we watch
television, open up a news paper or a magazine, or engage in meaningful and
informed conversation about 'what is going on in the world', or what is the
historically relevant order of things right now. My approach towards the "reality" of
this tale is the same as Northrop Frye's approach to the Bible in his The Great Code;
he does not use strict doctrinal or historical criteria, but imaginative criteria. To say it
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with Frye, I realise that in doing this "I am not, of course, claiming that imaginative
criteria have a monopoly of truth or relevance, only that they are the only ones
consistent with my specific assumptions" (Frye 1982:xxii). From this standpoint, I
hope to be able to direct a critique of the doctrinal (ontological) and historical-factual
(epistemological) criteria generally used by our discipline to analyse present
assumptions of knowledge1.
This thesis is an exercise of analysis oriented towards the state of affairs in
world interaction. This realm of interaction is lead or organised by the Western
institutions which have already been assimilated and undergone synchretic
transformation in every cultural setting where they have been placed, and so I make
use of notions that are part of the cultural inheritance of the West2. We may all agree
that humanity has a common inheritance (innate, organic, psychological, conscious);
but, as Frye says, it is doubtful that a common inheritance of any kind can be reached
by-passing the distinctive qualities of our own culture (1982:xviii). And so, I attempt
an analysis of contemporary Western "mythology", through the Western tradition of
knowledge3.
1 I am aware that mine is a critique that bites its own tail because, in our tradition, fact and method are
essential. Nevertheless, what I argue is that we should be aware that any form of knowledge cannot
escape the myths of its own cultural tradition.
2 This has to do with my own personal relationship to the dichotomy centre/periphery, according to
which the Western world is generally assumed to be at the centre, and the non-Western world at the
periphery. In the concrete world of interaction and in relation to this dichotomy, however, there is an
'in between' state of non-wholly-modern nations, which are already Western; the ones that Merquior
called "the other Occident", and it is from this twilight realm of consciousness that this critique is
launched.
3 Following the intuition that the results may produce a lighter reception of this mythology in a
country like Mexico, whose origin, fate and institutional transformation is already unavoidably tied to
the Western world.
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II. 1. Time: Synchrony and Diachrony
A 'view of reality' emerges in embodied experience, emotion, and imagination, from
the immediate need of our human consciousness to interact with each other and with
the world. Through consciousness and embodiment, this interaction produces
knowledge of various kinds which may be differentiated, on the one hand, according
to each view of reality, and on the other, according to the legitimate experience of
time within that view of reality. In the two holistic views of reality, the relevant
experience of time for the purpose of legitimation lies on simultaneity
(synchronicity): the mimetic identification of ritual wholeness and the eternal present
moment of mystic enlightenment. In the divided view of reality of the
Western/Christian type, the relevant experience of time that legitimises expectation
of eschatology or a constant 'not yet'4 of the project of modernity is sequential and
highlights past and future (diachrony): the means-ends sequence, the coherence of
sequential, rational disquisition, and the consciousness of history as a domain of
reality that is relevant for a universal humanity. We owe the original distinction
between synchrony and diachrony to the Sassurean structuralist analysis of language:
synchrony is his axis of simultaneities and diachrony that of successions (Wilden
1972:50, Merquior 1986). But here, I use the difference between synchrony and
diachrony to be analogous with the difference between conscious and embodied
awareness of simultaneity and the (human) experience of sequence either in natural
events or in social ones. I will argue that while the Western tradition has succeeded
in showing the importance of the legitimate experience of time as progress and
history, it should also look into the relevance of simultaneity within the organisation
of its own tradition. I will resort to Jaspers' (1953) construction of a historical axial
age to illustrate this point.
4 Quoted by Laurence Coupe from Frye's Anatomy ofCriticism where he sees "the 'apocalyptic' vision
as the permanent possibility which inspires the secular imagination. Thus by 'apocalyptic' he means,
not the literal expectation of catastrophe, not even a religious doctrine, but the imaginative anticipation
of the not yet" (Coupe 1997:166).
60
Time may be experienced as a continuum of simultaneity that is comparable
to space (but not identical with it)5 and which connects everything to everything else,
but it may also be experienced as movement that is witnessed by the constant change
and restlessness of everything that surrounds us. To human consciousness time is
only identifiable through contrasts because otherwise its essence would be
experienced as a mere flow of substances in nature: We need relevant marks that
allow us to distinguish past from future in that endless flow. Human marks on time
are produced in relevant experience of simultaneity that establish meaningful points
of reference in the flow of occurrences in the otherwise undifferentiated continuum.
This makes us aware of two realms of time: synchrony and diachrony, the former
denotes simultaneity and the latter, the movement from past to future. Synchrony is
rooted in the present instant of human consciousness and diachrony is related to the
relevant realms of past and future interaction with each other, with the world, with
the sacred realm, or with eternity (transcendence).
This distinction is held by the three types of view of reality, in the sense that
they are three types of human experience that we can distinguish currently. The
Western tradition of legitimate knowledge is attached to a representation of time as
(diachronic) progress and this displaces it from considering the synchronic realm of
experience as a realm that can be legitimately considered as time-like6. Nevertheless,
in order to clarify their realms of application to our concrete experience and
perception, the opposition between synchrony and diachrony may be regarded as
analogous to the opposition between being and becoming; but not as the Hegelian
categories of Absolute reality, but as the position in which ordinary human self may
find him/herself with respect to her/his experience. My contention is that, in the
Western idea of reality, the realm of ordinary being is not relevant in its suchness to
our everyday living, we are mostly in chase of what it is that we are becoming (See
5 This is only a metonymic resource because to assume that the eternal present moment of time is the
same as simultaneity in space is what Nishitani calls "bad infinity", or when the finite goes on
infinitely.
6 Synchrony has generally been considered as a kind of "stasis" artificially subtracted from the flow of
time, like a photography, a view that was a source for the demise of structuralism (Merquior 1986).
Here, synchrony is unavoidably linked to diachrony where both notions are seen as perspectives on
time and both move and rest, in their own ways, at the same time. Yet the observer can only consider
one of them at a time in a way that is analogous to the uncertainty principle of measuring the position
and the momentum ofmicroparticles in physics (see chapter V, section 2 below).
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also Maturana & Verden- Zoler 1995).
In the previous chapter I spoke about the need to see the Western tradition in
the position of the 'other'. I will argue that the only temporal grounds from which this
can be done is the synchronic realm of present experience. This is because an
intellectual enquiry into the validity of other types of knowledge, is couched on
historical and evolutionary evidence that is itself already a structural feature of the
Western tradition of legitimate knowledge. If we stop looking at diachrony, out of a
methodological artifice, we realise that progress, evolution, universal history, and
any other kind of diachronic tale, is constructed for the sake of the present moment
ofmeaningful experience; for the possibility of present synchrony in functionality, in
purpose, in understanding, in love. The only basis to launch a critique that unveils
the Western mythology is to regard diachronic human history, progress, and
evolution as disciplined explanations —based on evidence— that we build in the
present for the sake of present synchrony. This does not invalidate the diachronic
tales themselves, but it allows us to contemplate their mythical aspects in their
primary sense, which show what is really important for the culture under analysis,
our Western globalised culture... which is already humanist.
And so, a synchronic perspective can help to create a space to point at the
mythological assumptions entwined with the diachronic structure of time itself —like
the modern obsession with a constant kind of change that is supposed to wipe out the
past progressively and unavoidably. In global interaction, universal history is
relevant to every nation in the world and even if it was originally produced by
Western/Christian symbolism and empire, it is already part of the mythical
conditioning of everyone that is in touch with the global realm of interaction.
Historical relevance is organised and selected according to a specific set of values
dictated by the prevalent conception of reality (see Weber 1949). Its source, the
Christian view of reality, considers both world and transcendence real, but
essentially separate, for the latter is fettered beyond the world. This is the root to a
divided universe which would base interpretation of experience in a conceptual
dichotomous relationship of opposite cosmological forces. This dual relationship in
the Western tradition has been transformed into a methodological interplay of
concepts that take place in an indefinite linear progression from the unknown to the
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unknowable7. But it was originally based on belief in a circular cosmology that
originated in Genesis and would end in Apocalypse.
The factual reality of the Bible myth here is irrelevant, because there remains
a sense for a collective moral progress of humanity as a whole which, with all the
potential beauty it holds, also makes cosmological assumptions that are relevant to
the present idea of human consciousness, its development as a species and its
universal history. In his monumental work Order and History Eric Voegelin
suggests that modernity represents, as well as a break with its religious past, an
unintended symbological continuum with Christianity in its notion of the unfolding
of time in universal human history. This religion sets the institutional present for
itself in a "once and for all" event --the coming of the Messiah and the interaction
with the divinity (theophanic events). "We have not moved so far away from
Christianity as the conflict between the church and modernity would suggest", says
Voegelin (1974:269). Modernity sets the absolute originality of its own present in
symbols that Voegelin considers as deformed versions of the original Christian
symbols produced by the theophanic events.
Theophanic events take place at the level of experiencing consciousness
simultaneously with divine consciousness, which reveal the "dynamics of
transfiguration" from darkness into light. This spiritual transformation was already
embedded in the emotional and imaginative sources of the philosophers of the
European Enlightenment, and was used as an important symbol for a rationalistic
transfiguration in the same kind of synchronic "once and for all" event: the age of
reason. According to Foucault, in his 1784 text What is Enlightenment?, Kant
regards the Aufklarung as an event where philosophy problematises its own
discursive contemporaneity in whose meaning, value, and philosophical particularity
it finds "both its own raison d'etre and the grounds for what it says" (Foucault
1988:88). And yet, following Voegelin, I suggest that this construction of a
contemporaneous (to Kant) rational self-awareness bases its "alternative"
consciousness about historical reality and its progress on transformed symbols of the
Christian reality, which it transforms and deforms in order to reject the religious
undertones at same time (see appendix A). According to Voegelin, all the subsequent
7 As Frye puts it: "The universe may have started off with a big bang billions of years ago, but the
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efforts to ground a philosophy of history beyond the Pauline tale only succeed in
deforming the theophanic symbols of transfiguration into what he calls "egophanic"
symbols where the thinker engages in a narcissistic contemplation of his own sphere
of ownness:
The variations on the theme of transfiguration still move in the differentiated
form of the eschatological myth that Paul has created. This is an insight of
considerable importance, because it permits one to classify the ideological
"philosophies of history" as variations of the Pauline myth in the mode of
deformation. The symbols developed by the egophanic thinkers in the self-
interpretation of their work, such as "Wissenschaftslehre", "system of
science", "philosophy of history", "philosophic positive", or
"wissenschaftlicher Sozialismus", cannot be taken at their face value; they are
not engendered by bona fide analytical efforts in the noetic and pneumatic
fields; they rather must be recognised as mythical symbols in a mode of
degradation. The "history" of the egophanic thinkers does not unfold in the
Metaxy, i.e., in the flux of divine presence, but in the Pauline Time of the
Tale that has a beginning and an end. (Voegelin 1974:269)
The efforts around the construction of a unified world-church transformed the notion
of transfiguration into collective expectation of an age of perfection, of the Spirit,
one "beyond the establishment of church and empire" (Voegelin 1974:268). But the
original Tale was conceived in contemplation of divine presence, and even if we
concede to regard it as myth, it gives sense to our present secular conception of
progress, evolution, history, and moral conscience.
The notion of the contemplation of divine presence is important here in order
to establish its link to the realms of synchrony and diachrony. I have mentioned that
Voegelin regards the Christian symbol of spiritual transfiguration from darkness into
light as the root to Western dichotomous relationships. However, this symbol of
transfiguration is also present in the other transcendentalist type of idea of reality
(Eastern/mystic), and takes the shape of one or another symbol for spiritual
Enlightenment, but it does not produce a philosophy of universal history in the
Western sense. I will discuss some reasons for this in the chapter IV, below.
Nevertheless, the specifically Christian symbol of transfiguration serves as an axis
that gives sense to diachrony in the Western world-view of a before and an after; but
the transfiguration itself is a symbol that grounds its importance in synchronic
experience and leaves a mark in time for centuries to come. The Christian tale of
question of what happened before that goes on nagging" (Frye 1982:71).
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beginning and beyond describes a full cycle in the construction of spiritual
consciousness, that was contemplated as a historical cycle for all of humanity. But
this Christian cycle rotates around the synchronic figure of the Son of God who is
also the historical figure of Jesus ofNazareth.
In order to see how the above symbol organises the whole conception of
history and humanity throughout the ages, diachrony and synchrony must be placed
in a relationship of direction with respect to each other. Synchrony is centripetal,
establishing simultaneous relationships in human experience; diachrony is
centrifugal determining relevant difference (Frye 1982). The human experience of
simultaneity contains the possibilities of symbolising relatedness, and therefore, the
ability to establish relevant marks in a continuum of flowing time that would
otherwise remain undifferentiated. Synchrony and diachrony remain two aspects of
the phenomenon of time as experienced by human beings. But even though these two
dimensions of time depend on each other to be distinguished (experientially), they
cannot be thought of at the same time (analytically). Going back to the typology of
ideas of reality and types of knowledge outlined above, it is clear that the holistic
views of reality (pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic) legitimise themselves in a
continuous experience of the synchronic aspect of time and the Western/Christian
idea of reality legitimises its divided view of cosmos in diachronic experience that
unifies its divided idea of reality. "This is the basis", says Frye, "for the common
place that Biblical religions have a distinctive sense of history" (1982:83). Primary
and spiritual knowledge are legitimised at the same time as they are experienced in
synchrony; intellectual knowledge, that depends on the sequentiality of the symbols
that disclose it, is legitimised in diachrony. It could be said that the (primary)
mythical tale has a sequentiality of its own, but as it is not engaged in faithfully
describing objective and factual knowledge; but in directing mimetic experience,
synchronicity is kept through simultaneous human engagement of emotion,
imagination, and embodiment with the tale at the moment of its enactment.
Nevertheless, the basis for a symbol of transfiguration (Christian or
otherwise) remains an idealised synchronic moment in time according to which the
rest of the events —historical or irrelevant— may be organised in our factual idea of
reality. It is an axis that the Western view of reality displays in religion, but that is
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necessarily hidden in the privacy of one's own mind in secular reality. The
centripetal pull of the synchronic symbol defines sameness with transcendence, the
divine example of the spiritual master, or sameness among human beings, and the
centrifugal push defines difference and lays down a series of examples that spell out
its doctrine and disciplinary precepts. Historically, this axis is the coming of the
Messiah in Christian cosmology, and the age of reason in European Enlightenment in
the cosmology of modernity. But the need for a historical axis is also exemplified in
useful constructions like that of the "axial age" proposed by Karl Jaspers who in his
Origin and Goal of History transformed the particular Christian symbol of
transfiguration into a historical age of spiritual enlightenment and discovery of
transcendence which unavoidably kept the Christian shape of the Pauline tale. In
order for the historical time perspective to acquire dimensions of universal human
history, an event or an age serve to organise its unfolding in a meaningful manner.
This is where the axis of historical universality lies: it encompasses everyone on
earth and gives each soul and nation a place in a cosmos that maybe spiritual and
eternal, or secular and constantly changing, supposedly subject to human agency but
also to human fallibility.
According to Jaspers, it was not until the axial age that diverse cultures in the
world discovered the universe. What this means is that these cultures —or specific
individuals scattered around these cultures— managed to conceive transcendence,
not only as a symbol or an intellectual concept, but as a certainty. Certainty is
understanding as well as faith; this discovery therefore founded and laid the
foundations for the great transcendentalist religions of the world whose practice
survives to this day. After this age, various kinds of practices developed that strove
for spiritual transcendence. The axial age contains the seeds of "humanity as we
know it today" (Jaspers 1953:2); when individual human beings developed the
possibility of consciousness about 'being' in universal union with the rest of
humankind; when, faced with their own material and physical limitations, they
strove for redemption and transcendence. The axial age that Jaspers speaks about is a
period around 500 BC:
The most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Confucius and
Lao-tse were living in China, all the schools of Chinese Philosophy came into
being, including those of Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu and a host of others;
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India produced the Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole
gamut of philosophical possibilities down to scepticism, to materialism,
sophism, and nihilism; in Iran Zarathustra taught a challenging view of the
world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine the prophets made
their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero-
Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance of Homer, of the philosophers --
Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato—, of the tragedians, Thucydides and
Archimedes. (Jaspers 1953:2)
However, this historical construction organised around the human conception of
transcendence ignores other major epochal spiritual outbursts which are relevant
specifically to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Toynbee criticised Jaspers' conception
of an axial age saying that to be able to regard this era as determinant he had to leave
the stories of Moses and of Jesus out (Voegelin 1974:4-5). Nevertheless, while
Jaspers embraces the shape of the Pauline tale and finds a spiritual axis that is
common to all humanity (or a good proportion of it), Toynbee points at Judeo-
Christian elements that have been displaced by Jaspers' construction and should not
be left out for their importance. Both authors are preoccupied with either the form or
the content of the Judeo-Christian relationship to historical facticity. In contrast to
this, Voegelin's critique conceives Jaspers' "axial age" as an attempt to force the
operations of the spirit into one historical line within what he calls the
historiogenetic function of "speculation on the origin and cause of social order"
(Voegelin 1974:60); in this case, a world-social order based on Jaspers' humanism,
with Christian shape and ancestry.
We should be able to acknowledge that in all attempts at grounding any kind
of chronology (tribal, imperial, or global), the origin and cause is inevitably linked to
some form of divine realisation, even in the global secular realm. Jaspers' type of
historiogenetic speculation ignores the symbolic importance of the Pauline
projection of the cycle of spiritual realisation onto the historical cycle of collective
humanity. "Both Jaspers and Toynbee", says Voegelin, "treated hierophantic [sz'c]
events on the level of phenomena in time, not letting their argument reach into the
structure of experiencing consciousness" (1974:5). Therefore, in this work I refer to
the consequences of an axial age in order to highlight the importance of hierophany
in the construction of universal forms of social interaction, even though the shape of
the tale of an axial age is already determined by the Western/Christian symbolisation
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o^?an essential division between 'world' and 'transcendence'. The relevance of the
axial age in human history and the relative simultaneity of the hierophanic events
that comprise it —which Jaspers highlights— lies in the discovery (or invention) of
transcendence in its original sacred relationship to human beings.
Nevertheless, experiencing consciousness is an activity that remains in the
synchronic realm of human life, we can relate to diachronic representations only
from the fleeting present instant of meaningful experience. For example, the story of
the life-cycle of the spiritual master is generally raised as universal example in
religion, because of present interaction with divine experience in hierophany. In it,
historical time, or any kind of chronology, is suspended for reality to be re¬
interpreted in various symbological efforts that will generally promise to inaugurate
new eras of wider consciousness of the spirit through discipline, as explained by the
master and the followers. It is important to bear in mind, though, both the
mythopoietic potential of symbolic systems, but also the universal possibilities of the
hierophanies that ground them for teaching transcendence. Myths, stories, and
explanations may create doctrinal enslavement, but the symbol of transcendence
gives grounds to civilised social interaction through the creation of what Voegelin
calls a "language of truth" that tends to universality. As will be discussed below, this
language takes various shapes in its prevalent verbal structures.
Voegelin warns us to take "meditative precautions" in order for a
"doctrinization of symbols" not to "interrupt the process of experiential reactivation
and linguistic renewal"(Voegelin 1974:56). Our Western tradition of scientific
knowledge has the mechanism of constantly doubting itself as an in-built defence
against such doctrinization; but one of its effects is that it constantly breaks the
intellectual disciplines down into a wide range of specialities. This produces a
centrifugal movement of scientific 'progress', which is already part of the scientific
discipline itself, whose explanations of 'aspects' of reality become diluted in the
atomisation of a cosmos that is supposed to work along perfectly universal lines.
"When the symbol separates from its source in the experiential Metaxy, the Word of
God can degenerate into a word of man that one can believe or not" (Voegelin
1974:56). Universal human history is situated within a language of truth that finds it
very difficult to question its own grounds because they are veiled by the European
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enlightenment's drive to re-invent social collective reality rejecting the doctrinal
symbolic assumptions of Christianity, but inadvertently also embracing the divided
cosmology that was its source.
Nevertheless, a "language of truth" in consciousness of transcendence is at
the basis of the development of creeds, which in social interaction bring about
religions, disciplines, and institutions as stable sets of rules with general, and so,
ideal applicability. In a pragmatic sense, though, the universalistic or otherwise
spiritual institutions (rituals and religions) and their practices produce a common
material milieu within which they can flourish; this milieu is the material
organisation, experienced within the spontaneity of everyday life8. The major
transformation in various societies that underwent spiritual outbursts of the kind
described in the Jasperian axial age is related to "the emergence, conceptualisation
and institutionalisation of a basic tension between the transcendental and mundane
orders" (Eisenstadt 1982:294). This tension is equivalent to the tension between
mind and body in our secular tradition and therefore the analytical difference
between institution and organisation is equivalent to that between consciousness and
embodiment. The co-creative relationship that exists between these two human
characteristics will be clarified in the second part of this work. It is enough to say at
this stage that the relevance of the hierophanic events in human experience is
revealed by their effects on the immediate institutional and organisational settings of
several major civilisations.
Our own Western civilisation, with its love of intellectual knowledge, has
produced a diachronic cosmology that describes, or attempts the description, of our
origin, our nature, our history and evolution, and in some constructions, the fate of
humanity. Western cosmology though strives to its completion but is never
completed, because its own structure leaves space to infinite speculation for the
progress and advance of science and knowledge. This realisation may strike us as the
positive consequence of an infinite openness of society, in Popper's sense (1962,
1966). However, as Erikson argues, "the values associated with indefinite progress,
just because it strains orientation as well as imagination, are often tied to
unbelievably old-fashioned ideas" (1968:33-4). An infinite type of openness can also
8 Or what could be regarded as parallel to the more modern concept of bureaucracy.
69
render negative consequences when it is dissociated from transcendence because of
its unavoidable nihilistic consequences. According to Nishitani, "to be infinitely
finite, or in other words, for the finite to continue on infinitely, is "bad infinity"
(,schlechte Unendlichkeit, as Hegel calls it), a concept that logic usually treats as a
stepchild" (1982:170); but this type of infinity is often resorted to when experiencing
factuality (see Block et al. 1997). The linear diachronic time ofWestern cosmology
was produced by assuming the universe to be a mechanical whole with
interconnected laws. This is a cosmology that is relevant to the way in which we
interact today and, even if it has been questioned by academic intelligentsia, its
nihilist doubts have only marginally reached the functional realm of world
interaction, if at all. Western notions about evolution and historical and economic
progress are embedded in the culture and cosmology of contemporary global
interaction.
From a contemporary perspective of world interaction then, the elements of
progressive betterment have already been transformed from being laws of nature, to
being purposive goals of humanity. The latter assumption is inscribed in the
structures and practice of science and of economic and moral interaction in the
world. While situating ourselves in the cosmology of cur own tradition, and
assuming the deepest concerns of our academic discipline, one can only evade the
importance of these issues either through naive optimism or cynicism. This is one of
the reasons for pointing at other two possible views of reality from our own cultural
perspective in order to expand it towards awareness of a wider spectrum of human
experience for the Western tradition of knowledge9. In this work, these issues are
taken on board as a matter of balance: progress as a law of nature is already regarded
as a myth in the sense of it not being factually real to an informed observer, yet it is a
myth that defines what is important for the modern mind in global interaction as a
culture and should not be regarded as "not real" in the same sense as "not objectively
real". Progress is a myth and also already objectively real in our experience, because
we have structured our interaction and disciplined practice around this notion and
9 The epistemological basis of this work assumes that this kind of expansion cannot ever complete a
full spectrum; as will be discussed in the seccond part of the thesis, one of the most remarkable aspects
of the emerging paradigm of complexity is that we must learn to live with paradox and deal with
uncertainty.
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reproduced it socially for ourselves. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that
this grand Western cosmology also rationalises primitivity as its own past —present
today either in unconscious and wrong (dark) psychological fixations or in distant
lands— and spirituality as a private business. This perspective fails to grasp from a
synchronic perspective that primitivity and spirituality are also alive in the midst of
the civilised Western culture itself and in the embodiment and personal development
of the disciplined observer her/himself.
However, the notions of progress and diachronic movement in time that we
can record in human history are part and parcel of the way in which the world
interacts currently. In the scientific tradition itself it is next to impossible to escape
them, basically due to the way in which this tradition is structured. We "stand on the
shoulders of giants" to borrow one of Sir Isaac Newton's favourite quotations. This
means that while we refute some aspect of this tradition's vast assumptions, we must
also take on board everything else that it considers as knowledge. The latter in our
tradition is intellectual knowledge and is therefore faithfully described by conceptual
language as a requisite of the discipline. This product is essentially diachronic, even
if in producing it there are essential synchronic elements. This is the reason why,
throughout this work, historical accounts of the way universal humanity has
developed and "progressed" in consciousness are resorted to. This does not mean that
this is the direction that it necessarily followed in their original synchronicity, but
that this is the direction for the present order of things that it was important to realise
that it followed. Synchronic interaction is a boundless maze of happenings which
history orders in sequence according to their order of relevance in the observer's
conscious subjectivity; but also according to the order of relevance of the happenings
in the observed society. The historian's evidence is tied to this autonomous order and
it therefore describes something that is relevant to our discipline. On the grounds that
they are relevant to a our present construction of reality, I will therefore use
diachronic accounts of "what happened" under the light of the above considerations
and also taking into account that both synchrony and diachrony may be regarded as
separate legitimate bases for institutional discipline, but their distinction depends on
each other and therefore they are inseparable in any type of reality that we may
construe and experience.
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The three ideal types of views of reality outlined in the first chapter manifest
themselves empirically in both immensely diverse and converging ways of
representing the experience of time in its simultaneity and its sequentiality.
However, for the sake of construing useful analytical tools, we will say that both
synchrony and diachrony are organisational aspects of any belief system, while the
institution and discipline practice is legitimised in only one of the two ideal aspects
of time identified here (either synchrony or diachrony): The pagan/primitive
legitimate type of time contemplates the cyclical essence of natural environment, tied
to the earth's fertility, human calendars, and the myths that produced various versions
of ritual repetition of the act of creation in illo tempore (Eliade 1955), at the origin of
the world. This type of time frames the experience of duration of human events and
their cyclical renewal; duration is sequential and diachronic, renovation is
synchronic and the producer of legitimate authority10. The Western/Christian
legitimate type of time is progressive, in contemplation of the past, but with a
qualitative difference based on an axial event —a transcendental jump in
consciousness— which projects the life of humanity as a collective "body" towards
its future perfection in history. In Christianity, the synchronic Divine moment is
represented as God's presence in Genesis and Apocalypse, and in factual real history,
as the axial events of Revelation or the coming of the Messiah; time is experienced
as a tension between the Creation, the origin of history in sin, one's own deeds, and
imminent Judgement; and the legitimate essence of this experience is diachronic. In
a secular world-view, the realm of legitimate reality and authority is also diachronic
experience as human history; here, individual personality is essential, and creates the
disciplined habit of contemplating the history of human personalities as responsible
agents. The Eastern/mystic type of legitimate time is the eternal present of the
"here and now", the moment of Grace or Spiritual Enlightenment whence perfect
union with the Divine collective mind is accomplished: the synchronic source of
authoritative legitimacy. In the practice of the spiritual path, though, diachrony is
represented as the duration of the path to Enlightenment, always regarded as an
illusion of the world of forms, but nonetheless seen as an important organisational
10 I. M. Lewis follows R. A. Knox (1950) to say that in contemporary studies of Shamanic and
primitive religions, it has been observed that "religious leaders turn to ecstasy when they seek to
strengthen and legitimise their authority" (Lewis 1989:29).
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notion in the practice of spiritual discipline. In the Eastern/mystic view of reality,
mundane time is seen as a burden of cosmological debt in an eternal wheel of rebirth
which can only be escaped through spiritual Enlightenment". All three types of
reality represent both types of time organisationally and cosmologically, but only
one of them is legitimate in authoritative institutions and disciplined practice.
" I will discuss this Eastern notion of karma in chapter IV, section 2 below. About it Nishitani says:
"Being obligated to the infinite drive from the homeground of the self itself to be constantly engaged
in doing something and consequently being obligated also to keep entering into relation with others
and co-determining the self with others endlessly, but yet remaining forever incapable of taking leave
of the self that presses onerously down upon us—this, it seems to me, is by and large the state of affairs
that has arisen to awareness through the concept of karma. It can be termed a self-awareness of the
essence of existence in time, conceived as a dynamic nexus of being, doing, and becoming" (Nishitani
1982:242).
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II. 2. Language: Metaphor, Metonymy, and Description
Besides the embodied and conscious experience of time, human beings also interact
in language. But language is structured as an identifiable nexus of references in
synchrony, yet in constant change in diachrony. Northrop Frye follows Giambattista
Vico in order to attempt a classification of verbal structures which are observed to
rise and fall through history —diachronically—, which can also be regarded as
prevalent in different degrees of cultural ascendancy in different human forms of
interaction in the world right now —or synchronically. Nevertheless, these verbal
structures cannot exist in isolation from each other even as they characterise different
historical stages or different present particular cultures. Frye identifies
(diachronically) three different stages of cultural ascendancy of specific verbal
structures: the hieroglyphic stage, dominated by metaphoric verbal structures; the
hieratic stage, dominated by metonymic verbal structures; and the demotic stage
where the descriptive verbal structures are dominant. My own perspective
concentrates on the synchronic (contemporaneous) aspect of language in the sense
that it contemplates all three types of verbal structures as present and relevant for the
organisation of language in any experienced culture right now. I will argue that each
of the types of verbal structures described by Frye (Vico), ideally, corresponds to
legitimate language in the three views of reality proposed: metaphoric language is
legitimate in the pagan/primitive view; metonymic language in the Eastern/mystic
view; and demotic language in the Western/Christian view. Empirically, though,
either of them can be observed to be only prevalently legitimate in various cultural
settings, as they co-exist in mutual complementarity and dependence on each other.
Following Vico's typology of distinct ages in a conception of history that is
cyclical, Frye describes a typology of prevalent verbal structures throughout Western
history which has already dropped Vico's historicist structure. Nevertheless, while
Frye's idea of history is not cyclical in a determinist fashion he borrows Vico's
notion of ricorso to describe renewed ascendancy of any of the types of language
that he describes:
According to Vico, there are three ages in a cycle of history: a mythical age,
or age of the gods; a heroic age, or age of an aristocracy; and an age of the
people, after which there comes a ricorso or return that starts the whole
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process over again. Each age produces its own kind of langage, giving us
three types of verbal expression that Vico calls, respectively, the poetic, the
heroic or noble, and the vulgar, and which I shall call the hieroglyphic, the
hieratic, and the demotic. (Frye 1982:5)
What Frye means by the use of this "cyclical" typology of pre-eminent language is to
say that these types of verbal structures are always present in any community of
human beings, and that the particular life of the group brings either of them to
ascendancy in their cultural relevant exchanges. Even though Frye regards
progressive accounts of history as the mythical expectation that "contemporary
events are proceeding towards their own antitypes in the future, toward a state of
human existence that will make what is now happening intelligible as a series of
signposts pointing in that direction" (1982:86); he cannot evade to take on board a
similar Spencerian view of progress as gradual differentiation and complexification
when it comes to the issue of the gradual emergence of human consciousness and
communication. Even if history and nature cannot be mixed in our tradition, there is
a cosmological point in the past when they are supposed to have bifurcated. This
point will be dealt with at length in the second part of the thesis. As I have argued,
though, the idea of evolution and progress is so persistent because it is already a
constitutive aspect of our conception of how history unfolds and it is also confirmed
in the empirical observation of biological development.
Nevertheless, Frye also assumes that people live in mythology even now and
have done so since the beginning of times, or since there has been discernible human
interaction and communication. "In its early stages", says Frye, "it is difficult to
separate or distinguish the various aspects of mythology, but as society becomes
more complex, different areas of culture —literature, religion, philosophy, history,
science, art— become increasingly distinct from one another" (1982:51). From a
synchronic standpoint, though, we can say that it is important for our modern culture
to separate and record in a discursive and descriptive fashion all these different areas
of interaction and so we look for this differentiated feature in the past and we do not
find it because it might not have been important to our ancestors. When we look at
the past to find out what was relevant for people then, we always have to do it
through what is relevant for us now. The sense in which Frye refers to mythology, in
a generic manner is as mythos, narrative, plot, or the general sequential ordering of
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words; but he also distinguishes the more archaic type of myth, (story or tale) from
history:
In our culture, some narrative dealing with personalities run parallel to a
sequence of events external to themselves; others are based on a sequence of
events that seem to be constructed for its own sake. This distinction is
reflected in the difference between the words "history" and "story". The word
"myth" [...] has tended to become attached only to the latter, and hence to
mean "not really true". This is a vulgarism for many reasons, apart from the
fact that it so often assumes a judgement on factuality long before we are in
any position to make one. (Frye 1982:32)
Frye also considers that, in history, the sequence of events is only partly external to
the narrative about personalities —its account obeys a factuality sanctioned by
discipline practice— but it is also linked to substantive rationality, to values, to what
is important for the discipline to know (see Weber 1949). Data must be selected and
arranged subjectively by a historian and therefore the shape of the sequence does not
wholly come from outside. According to Frye, to think that it does is "an illusion of
projection".
Going back to Frye's typology of verbal structures, then, I will say that our
particular contemporary modern "mythology" compels us to interact through
objective reality. In this reality, the separation of object and subject is relevant to our
culture and our discipline in scientific disquisition and it is therefore a relevant
category in order to investigate verbal structures in other mythologies (where the
factual may have a degree of relevance that may not be pre-eminent). However, in
the synchronic awareness that a complete separation between subject and object is
impossible, the clear divide between subject and object becomes an illusion of
abstraction that lacks factuality. This does not make it into a myth in Frye's story-for-
its-own- sake sense, but it makes us aware that it is a principle of disciplined
observation for the sake of the discipline. The myth of objectivity is an unattainable
ideal that sets the whole discipline rolling in its structurally progressive fashion: its
progress depends on the human impossibility of achieving complete objectivity.
However, the subject/object divide is our cultural inheritance and our cosmological
basis to access other types of cultural inheritances. From the present perspective of
an observer who stands on uncertainty in the synchronic moment of meaningful
interaction, objectivity and subjectivity are entwined experiences that cannot be
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differentiated at the same time as they are experienced: according to the
phenomenological approach, they can only be differentiated one at a time in
diachronic sequence.
Nevertheless, sequential signification (diachrony) achieves its meaning
through the simultaneous presence of an essential net of references (synchrony) with
paradigmatic and syntactic functions. Within this Sassurean framework, Anthony
Wilden (1972) describes the difference between analog and digital communication:
the former conveys the message through an operation of similarity or contiguity,
while the latter conveys the message through arbitrary signifiers based on custom
and convention. Analog and digital communication are cybernetic terms that
illustrate the difference between synchrony and diachrony: analog implies a
continuum and digital involves yes/no computations (conveyed in the binary code of
one and zero in computers). In analog communication the message is concretely
'performed', the distinction flows from the centre of the meaningful object of
communication and therefore its borders are not identifiable; in digital
communication the message is 'signified' this requires discrete and clearly defined
boundaries at the borders of the objects of communication. This is the basis for
Wilden's distinction between meaning and signification: analog communication is
engaged with meaning through similarity and contiguity, and digital communication
is engaged in factual signification through abstract identity. Nevertheless, digital
communication is useless on its own, signification depends on meaning through
similarity and contiguity of signifiers —their paradigmatic and syntactic synchronic
functions. Wilden believes that the analog/digital distinction helps us clarify
scientifically the difference between meaning and signification: He gives a
mathematical example, where 2/3 and 4/6 are identical in signification whereas their
meaning is necessarily different due to the distinct referents used. Meaning is thus
related to concrete interaction between embodied entities in the domain of symbolic
exchange, while signification belongs to the realm of pure abstraction. Nevertheless,
while the distinction is useful, it is never complete except in imagination or in the
abstract world of digital diachronic communication. This is illustrated by the
difficulty that Wilden expresses in order to define a line between analog and digital
signification; thus, he allows for signals and signs in analog communication and for
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signs and signifiers in digital communication (Wilden 1972:184). Here, signals refer
to physical and embodied messages that may be symbolic of concrete referents; signs
are symbolic, but related to relevant referents that may be concrete or abstract; and
signifiers are wholly abstract and arbitrary, and correspond to the world described as
an image in a mirror corresponds to what is reflected.
Analog and digital communication are similar to the synchronic and
diachronic realms of time in that they refer to the distinction between simultaneity
and sequentiality; but this is a convenient distinction for heuristic reasons in abstract
explanation. In abstract explanation, though, the borders of the objects of
communication are clearly defined, but in phenomenological observation, these
borders are blurry and not really there. This paradoxical predicament will arise all
through this work in order to highlight the synchronic realm of experience, and it is a
structural feature of the way in which I use Frye's typology of verbal structures;
which he means to extend throughout Western history (diachronically) and I mean to
map onto ideal types of contemporary views of reality (synchronically). Frye's
hieroglyphic, hieratic, and demotic periods are relevant in Western/Christian
diachronic history; which I identify with my ideal-typical views of reality that are
relevant to contemporary synchronic world interaction righf now: pagan/primitive,
Eastern/mystic, and Western/Christian respectively.
Frye identifies a clear hieroglyphic (pagan/primitive) period in the poetic
language of most Greek literature before Plato, in the pre-Biblical cultures of the
Near East, and in much of the Old Testament. He uses the term "hieroglyphic",
not in the sense of sign-writing, but in the sense of using words as particular
kinds of signs. In this period there is relatively little emphasis on a clear
separation between subject and object: the emphasis falls rather on the
feeling that subject and object are linked by a common power or energy.
Many "primitive" societies have words expressing this common energy of
human personality and natural environment, which are untranslatable into our
normal categories of thought but are very pervasive in theirs: the best known
is the Melanesian word mana. (Frye 1982:6)
But words refer to concrete things, to physical and emotional involvement with them
in imaginative production of stories that, on their own, are a human mimicry of
relevant experience in connection to embodiment and the world. The relevant feature
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of this type of verbal structure is the metaphor that we recognise as such from our
own cultural perspective.
As we think of words, it is only metaphor that can express in language the
sense of energy common to subject and object. The central expression of
metaphor is the "god", the being who, as sun-god, war-god, sea-god, or
whatever, identifies a form of personality with an aspect of nature. (Frye
1982:7)
Metaphors work by similarities and, in factual language, they are analogous to
Wilden's linguistic signals', where the message is contained in what is physically
done and concretely experienced.
Frye's second phase of language is hieratic, whose verbal structures are
congenial with those in my Eastern/mystic ideal type. The hieratic phase starts with
Plato and its name comes from the explicit assumption that this language is produced
by an enlightened elite of the post-axial age type and is therefore given a special
authority by its society. Here, subject and object become more clearly separated, not
necessarily with respect to factuality, but with respect to a separation between
emotion and imagination. In Western culture, this gradually lead to the ascendancy
of intellectual and rational imagination, tied to observation of the phenomenal world;
but the Eastern hieratic forms of verbal expression are structurally displaced from
conceiving the world as a reliable source of evidence. In hieratic verbal structures,
abstraction becomes possible through separation between feelings and imagination
and this defines clear distinction between valid and invalid relationships between
them:
What Homeric heroes revolve in their bosoms is an inseparable mixture of
thought and feeling; what Socrates demonstrates, more especially in his
death, is the superior penetration of thought when it is in command of feeling.
(Frye 1982:7)
This separation is produced by awareness of a reality that lies above and beyond
mundane life; the emergence of hieratic verbal structures is determined by
symbolisation of transcendence. This symbolisation depends on language that is
mainly metonymic to define distinction, in contrast to metaphor which defines
identity. Words must convey an order that cannot be described through identity of a
common energy between things and the inner reality of human, but through a
transcendent order that is above and beyond. "Thus", says Frye, "metonymic
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language is, or tends to become, analogical language, a verbal imitation of a reality
beyond itself that can be conveyed most directly by words" (1982:8). Nevertheless,
hieratic language benefits from the use of metaphoric structures, already embedded
in people's emotion and imagination, in order to perform relevant metonymic
distinctions where the latter have primary authority, as in the use of fables, parables,
or allegory; or in synchrctic assimilation of local goddesses and gods into a
transcendental cosmology. Metonymy is analogous to Wilden's portrayal of
The present phase of culturally ascendant demotic language —Frye's third
phase— contains the whole development of Western verbal structures up to our
modern present: the paradigmatic and syntactic need of both metaphor and
metonymy to describe and demonstrate factual 'objective' knowledge. Mathematics,
Frye tells us, has obvious metonymic features: when we draw a line, "which
necessarily has some breath" (1982:9), we are really only putting a drawing in the
place of the conceptual line, which cannot 'exist' in concrete physical reality because
it represents the concept of length without breadth.
One feels that some of the pre-Socratic and atomic philosophers, such as
Anaxagoras or Democritus, were moving more directly from metaphor
toward what we should think of as science, from gods to the operations of
nature, and that Plato turns away from this direction, toward a transcendent
world rather than an objective one. (Frye 1982:9)
But objectivity is a mixture of both of these sources (metaphorical and metonymic)
that only needed the Aristotelian theory of multiple causation to produce a technique
"for arranging words to make a conquering march across reality, subjects pursuing
objects through all the obstacles of predicates, as the Macedonian phalanxes of his
pupil, Alexander, marched across Asia" (Frye 1982:9). Plato's sense for a superior
transcendental order which could only be conveyed by words was identified as logos
in the later Classical period. In Christianity logos was seen as the means to unite
humanity both 'spiritually and temporally', which gave shape to its institutional
structure. A distinct sense of history in Biblical cultures is inherited from the
importance of historical interpretation in Judaism, which merged with the power of
sequential disquisition based on legitimate evidence of 'compelling assent'. This is
the basis for the legitimacy of diachronic symbols in the Western/Christian idea of
reality.
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In distinguishing symbols phenomenologically, we may say that
Eastern/mystic and pagan/primitive symbols have an intrinsic sense of
immediateness: metaphor and metonymy work through similarity and contiguity
respectively. The metaphorical function is analogous to that of a signal, where what
is done is what is meant. The degree of abstraction that the metonymic function
acquires is directly related to an ordering of thoughts and emotions through
categories of validity; it is analogous to linguistic signs: the message itself is what is
meant. There are metonymic elements in Habermas's love for perlocutions, where all
affectual tendencies to falseness and manipulation should be firmly controlled by
rationality (Habermas 1989, 1990); but also in the Buddhist use of contradictory
statements (koans), which should effect a spontaneous dissolution of emotional
attachment to concepts in the pupil. Both metaphor and metonymy imply the
involvement of physical, emotional, and imaginary human experience in the
conveying meaning; but in factual description, the word used has only an imaginary
relationship to the denoted thing. The degree of abstraction in the descriptive
function is complete: the signifier is an arbitrary symbol that stands wholly for the
signified (Wilden 1972, Merquior 1986). Objectivity depends on the pre-eminence of
this function of language where the absence of emotional involvement is
compensated by the factuality rendered by concrete evidence and sequential
argumentation. It is less evident, though, that objectivity also depends on metaphoric
and metonymic verbal structures to be grounded in anything at all (see Lakoff &
Johnson 1980).
Our current responsiveness to factual reality, however, is firmly based on the
belief that, in descriptive-demotic language, isolated words are signifiers, or pure
arbitrary abstractions that have no magic power of their own or a shared substance
with the signified. The scientific factual and functional power, to us, lies in the
internal coherence of substantiated rational disquisition, where the substance is
concrete experience of effective functionality. One of the premises of scientific
disquisition is that the isolated word has no power to be anything but a word; but the
verbal structure that is built through them must convey the order of nature. The inner
coherence in scientific explanation must map onto, or 'mirror', what we can
experience physically (sec Rorty 1980). Its magic is the confirmation of the proposed
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scientific mechanism through repetitive testing. Poetry embraces the emotional role
of magic in the Western tradition of knowledge, but it is based on novelty, contrary
to the repetitive essence of the magic spell12. "Poetry", says Frye, "does not really
lose its magical power thereby [through novelty], but merely transfers it from an
action on nature to an action on the reader or the hearer" (1982:25). Thus scientific
factual magic is based in systems of words of coherent explanation that may be
reproduced, and not in repetition of isolated magic words13. Frye gives the example
that in Biblical metonymic language, where we assume that the Word is analogous to
God or His power, John's statement "And the logos became flesh", according to the
internal structure of Christian assumptions, is "an intelligible statement of the type
"And the boy became a man", or "And the ice became water". But within a
descriptive framework of language it can be only an unintelligible statement of the
type "And the apple became an orange"." (Frye 1982:18-9).
Nevertheless, as I have argued above, even if the descriptive type of verbal
structure is accorded pre-eminent objective validity because of effective explanation
of sequential diachronic causality, the inner coherence of the scientific account itself
depends on the analogical functions of metaphor and metonymy, which are
eminently synchronic. In the hieroglyphic phase (pagan/primitive), words and things
are entwined by a common powerful 'substance' or energy inherent in the natural
order, miming that order in ritual produces relevant synchronic enacted events
according to which order is 'mapped' and produced at the same time. In the hieratic
phase (Eastern/mystic), the sense for a synchronic experienced awe for divinity
becomes part of the cosmological account of a higher reality as transcendence, and
how the inner coherence of a verbal structure can convey this reality.
Hence the medieval fascination with the syllogism and the great medieval
dream of deducing all knowledge from the premises of revelation. Later we
have the "I think therefore I am" of Descartes, where the operative word is
12 Some socially detrimental effects of the dark side of a perverted kind of poetry are generally
abducted by the industry of entertainment/advertisement, which, through sheer mechanical repetition -
-equivalent to the 'evil eye' of the primitive spell— contemporarily engrave our vulnerable minds that
run after desire with patterns that may enslave and obsess. In transcendentalist spiritual disciplines the
magic repetitive power is 'purified' in the direction of transcendence by its invocation in mantras and
prayers.
13 Although science has revealed the wonders of the natural world, Frye says that "there is a curious
restiveness about this kind of revelation, some feeling of what Blake calls "the same dull round, even
of a universe". What is dull is not the universe but the mental operations prescribed for us in observing
it" (1982:21).
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"therefore", because before we can accept the proposition we must accept the
cogency and reality of therefores. (Frye 1982:11)
Non-verbal oriental Mysticism and the Western mystic tradition emphasise the
inadequacies of any type of verbal account to convey the experience of
transcendence in hierophany (Sogyal 1992, Kulananda 1997, Underhill 1995).
According to Frye, in the Dawning of European culture transcendental metonymy, or
hieratic language, remained culturally ascendant14 due to the cultural and political
necessity of preserving authority "down to the time of Kant and Hegel, after which it
became increasingly specialised and academic. One of its culminating points is the
metonymic universe of Kant, where the phenomenal world is "put for" the world of
things in themselves" (Frye 1982:12). Our sense for descriptive factual reality is
rooted in the metaphoric and the metonymic functions of language, and is also rooted
in the physical and psychological involvement of the observer.
As described above, the cultural ascendancy of any of the three types of
verbal structures —metaphoric, metonymic, descriptive— are shown to coincide with
Vico's and Frye's three phases of language in Western history of development; but
also with their pre-eminence in my three types of ideas of reality —pagan/primitive,
Eastern/mystic, Western/Christian— in contemporary interaction in the world.
Nevertheless, as in the ideas of reality, the verbal structures are complementary with
each other and do not exist purely on their own —at least in current world-interaction.
To say that either of the functions emerged earlier that any other, I believe, is an
illusion of the idea of 'progress' in its teleological story-myth mode. But this myth is
already relevant to our way of knowing and of doing history and, in this factual way
of knowing, even if we concede that the other verbal structures were already
functionally present in human language from the beginning, their cultural
ascendancy is liable to be traced historically. This does not mean that there is
necessarily a linear progress, or a cyclical one like in Vico, but to use Vico's figure
of ricorso as Frye does, shows that they achieve different degrees of pre-eminence in
different distinctive times throughout history. It also depends on what culture we are
analysing and what the verbal structure expresses in the particular social hierarchy of
14 In spite of the simultaneous rise of a vernacular ricorso of metaphoric verbal structures in popular
rhyme and alliteration.
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that culture. On this point, Frye's phases refer to the view of order that emanates
from the centres of legitimate authority that both discover and produce knowledge
about 'reality' at the same time; from my synchronic perspective, these verbal
structures refer to the view of order that may emanate from any group of people in
the simultaneous process of creating and being created by their culture (family, team,
tribal, organisational, national, continental, global).
Legitimation, therefore, is linked to the culturally ascendant idea of reality in
that the latter determines the type of verbal structures that produce the authoritative
shape of concrete human organisation. Institutions (religion, spirituality, ritual,
discipline, moral principles) acquire an aura of distance from concrete organisation
in that institutions dictate an authoritative idea about patterns of behaviour for the
human self (human identity). With respect to my three ideal types of reality, the
culturally ascendant institutions dictate an idea of self that is ideally collective for
the pagan/primitive and the Eastern/mystic type, and one that is ideally individual for
the Western/Christian type. This is due to the feature that both the pagan/primitive
and Eastern/mystic views are based on an idea of reality that is whole: either the
world or transcendence are the locus of holistic reality respectively; while in the
Western/Christian view both the world and transcendence are real simultaneously
and therefore reality is conceived as essentially divided and in a quest for unification
with a beginning and an end in Christianity, but that becomes linear and indefinite
progress in the secular West. Institutionally, then, the locus of legitimacy lies on the
synchronic realm of time for the pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic views of reality,
while the locus of legitimacy for the Western/Christian view lies on the diachronic
realm. Nevertheless, organisationally, in concrete human experience, both
synchrony and diachrony are given sense and representation and, as I will argue in
the second part of the thesis, are mutually dependent features of concrete human life
(even if either of them is seen as irrelevant or illusory in the domain of institutional
legitimacy).
The centripetal/synchronic organisational functions are expressed in
metaphor and metonymy —the paradigmatic and syntactic functions of language
(Jakobson 1956, Wilden 1972)—, the centrifugal/diachronic organisational functions
are expressed in the descriptive function of language. Frye illustrates the two
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functions in language through two ways of half-reading or misunderstanding a
subject, a technical treatise, or a cultural Gestalt. One is through incomplete
knowledge of referents, as when reading in a language that we know imperfectly; the
other is when the organised effort to unify the referents syntactically is poor: "Failure
to grasp centrifugal meaning is incomplete reading; failure to grasp centripetal
meaning is incompetent reading" (Frye 1982:58). This is an example of pure types
with heuristic objectives, in experience, incomplete and incompetent reading are
obviously linked to each other. Nevertheless, it shows a relevant relationship
between linguistic functions that also applies to the centripetal and centrifugal
features of synchrony and diachrony in human order, or in the organisation of
particular ideas of reality.
Organisationally speaking then, I have said that in the Western/Christian
view of reality there are clear synchronic symbols of centripetal function, like the life
of Jesus or the figure of transfiguration from darkness into light, or a distinctive
sense for a human type of consciousness. But it is also true that, in this
organisational sense, in the pagan/primitive and Eastern mystic views there are also
diachronic symbols of centrifugal function, like sequence of events in the mythical
tales and the spiritual progress of the mystic initiate. I will therefore argue that,
beyond the institutional legitimacy of either of these kinds of symbols, it is necessary
to consider the organisational factuality of both of them in a scientific spirit of
enquiry. It would seem like this is an attempt that may be contradictory with the
structure of our own discipline; but it will not be so from a present perspective that
attempts to give legitimacy to the synchronic symbols that produce a distinct sense
of ethos in the ideas of reality that are not culturally ascendant in world interaction
today. It is only through an imaginative effort that this can be achieved in language;
and its significance to global interaction lies precisely in highlighting how this
distinctive ethos may contribute to the contemporary problematic and limitations of
the modern sense of morality in global interaction. I believe that this effort is also
substantiated by relatively recent scientific evidence (in this century's physics,
mainly) that, after all, subject and object are not factually divided.
The thought suggests itself that we may have completed a gigantic cycle of
language from Homer's time, where the word evokes the thing, to our own
day, where the thing evokes the word, and are now about to go around the
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cycle again, as we seem now to be confronted once again with an energy
common to subject and object which can be expressed verbally only through
some form ofmetaphor. (Frye 1982:15)
In the Western/Christian view of diachronic collective progress as cycles and "leaps
of being", this image is very suggestive; but in the pagan/primitive and
Eastern/mystic view of synchronic consciousness that legitimises itself in an ecstatic
continuum of life/death or spiritual enlightenment, the thought suggests itself that
collective progress might be a relevant myth as an illusion of factuality.
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Chapter III.
Mythos and Historical Consciousness
This chapter explains the theoretical relationship between the pagan/primitive view
of reality and the Western/Christian view of reality as well as the structure of their
difference. In the Western tradition, it is generally assumed that progress takes place
from primitivity to a higher form of Western civilised awareness; but it is not as
common to consider how the Western development of a historical consciousness also
depends on the emotional relevance of mythical reality, or mythos, as plot or
narrative (Frye 1982). The Western idea of progress is related to myth as much as it
is to transcendence within the Christian cosmos of reality. In secular history,
myth remains the shape of sequential facticity, while transcendence is transformed
into the eternal 'not yet' of the project of modernity. Their difference lies in the
primitive awareness of the wholeness of the world (where 'beyond' is construed in
terms of the world or 'other-world') and in its identification of life with death in a
seamless flow, a continuum. In contrast to this, the Western view considers the
beyond as a transcendence that exists in constant tension with the world within which
a universal humanity progressively moves. Its cosmology, according to Eric
Voegelin (1974), emerged through an imperial thrust that encompasses several
cultures and is forced to discover or create its own sacred roots to existence
(historiogenesis). I argue that, from a diachronic perspective, historical reality and
mythical reality do not converge as their pre-eminent verbal structures cannot
establish a dialogue: they are incommensurable with respect to each other in their
sequential coherence, as is illustrated by the historical and fictional genres.
Nevertheless, from a synchronic perspective (the present moment of awareness), they
can be observed to overlap and complement each other in the course of interaction at
a local level as well as at a global one.
Contemporary Western legitimate reality is structured by diachronic
descriptive and factual symbols that embrace an emotional detachment from
experience while pagan/primitive legitimate reality is structured imaginatively and
emotionally in synchronic symbology, metaphorically expressed. There is a contrast
between the modern production of artificiality and the primitive one: the former is
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materially embodied in the city and its mechanical dependencies while the latter is
embodied in cyclical ritual and cosmological dependencies. In modern Western
experience, artificiality is construed as an actual and material distance from nature (to
the extent to which human and nature may become estranged from each other), while
in primitive experience nature is enacted as a container of human life. In what
follows, I will contrast the origin of ideally-typical Western/Christian diachronic
symbols leading to factual representation of universal human history with those of
the ideally-typical pagan/primitive synchronic symbols that lead to diverse
metaphoric representations of the embodied human relationship with the mysteries of
life, sex, and death.
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III. 1. Historical Reality
Both the Western/Christian and Eastern/mystic views of reality articulate and
represent transcendence while the pagan/primitive one is articulated only with
respect to the world, transcendence remains unexpressed explicitly. The
symbolisation of transcendence conveyed a cosmological transformation as well as
an organisational one where human order was to be aligned with the reality of the
imagined transcendental realm. But this transformation took place alongside the need
to justify imperial rule which, in the Western tradition is seen as historically
transformed from cosmological kingdoms into the Christian ecumene. The
immediacy of Apocalypse was solved institutionally by the church while its
symbolisation of humanity as one "body" in faith produced the awareness and
possible inclusion of other peoples through conversion. Both the Western and
Eastern views of reality contemplate a transhistorical perspective from which an
awareness of historicity may arise (discussed in the next chapter). But the
pagan/primitive view of reality lacks such explicit realm, which is nevertheless 'lived'
as an intuition in its ritual mimetic oneness with the cosmos. Historical reality is thus
here portrayed as a consequence of the symbolisation of an experience of
transcendence, which secular reality transforms into relevant symbols of individual
consciousness and value.
The modern mind regards the primitive kind of tales as 'unreal' myths, and
this is because lived experience ofmodern life does not confirm them as real:
For us moderns, a myth is only a myth because we can no longer connect that
time with the time of history as we write it, employing the critical method,
nor can we connect mythical places with our geographical space. This is why
the myth can no longer be an explanation; to exclude its etiological intention
is the theme of all necessary demythologisation. But in losing its explanatory
pretensions the myth reveals exploratory significance and its contribution to
understanding, which we shall later call its symbolic function —that is to say,
its power of discovering and revealing the bond of man and what he considers
sacred. Paradoxical as it may seem, the myth when it is thus demythologised
through contact with scientific history and elevated to the dignity of a
symbol, is a dimension of modern thought. (Ricoeur 1967:5)
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In other words, there is a dimension of modern thought that is also mythical, on
which modern life is sustained. But the sequence of its story does not converge
diachronically with any other particular myth —and yet it is an assumption of this
thesis that various particular myths can only converge synchronically (in the present
moment of awareness). Modern life, though, is sustained by taking an artificial
distance from nature that can never be complete due to embodiment. As a matter of
fact, most of the modern ethos is built on giving value to this distance which is also
embedded in the secular Western view of reality and its accompanying rational
myths, for example, that of objectivity. We have said before that any view of reality
has its own cosmological myths and therefore, a mythical basis is not really the
principle of differentiation between what I have called mythical reality and historical
reality. Myths encompass whole universes which can only converge at present (in
synchrony) because each tale follows the structural form allowed by the sequence of
the tale (in diachrony) or by the particular cosmos that it shapes.
Therefore, what ideally differentiates the pagan/primitive view of reality from
the Western/Christian and Eastern/mystic ones is that the former lacks a clear
representation of transcendence. The cultures that managed to represent
transcendence also produced a new axis on which social life would be organised. The
explicit symbolisation of transcendence brought about organisational consequences
in society. When the idea of transcendence was discovered (or created) a religious
frame of order was set up, that would bring humanity closer to consciousness about
this transcendental reality. In axial age civilisations, "there was a concomitant stress
on the existence of a higher transcendental moral or metaphysical order which is
beyond any given this- or other-worldly reality" (Eisenstadt 1982:296). The new
awareness about universality and transcendence posed the problem of bridging the
gap between the two levels of existence in human life, and therefore, also in the
legitimate idea of social order. In post-axial age societies, the emergence of a new
elite took place, the carrier of the new models of social order that institutionalised the
perception of the basic tension between the transcendental and the mundane levels of
existence. "Examples would include", says Eisenstadt, "the Jewish prophets and
priests, the Greek philosophers and sophists, the Chinese Literati, the Hindu
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Brahmins, the Buddhist Sangha [...]. It was the initial small nuclei of such groups of
intellectuals that developed this new transcendental conceptions" (Eisenstadt
1982:298).
Cosmological kingdoms became empires in their drive to conquer. Their
cosmology and emperor lied at their centre and organised them in an hierarchical
imperial form, like the Chinese, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian empires. "A
cosmological empire", says Voegelin, "is more than one type of political organisation
among others. In its self-interpretation, imperial rule is the mediation of divine-
cosmic order to the existence of man in society and history" (1974:93). This
awareness of imperial order brought about the need to stabilise and legitimate its
creation in historiogenesis, or historical speculation based on current pragmatic
knowledge as well as in myths, symbols, beliefs, and values that contemplate an
"extrapolation of pragmatic history toward its cosmic-divine point of origin"
(Voegelin 1974:101). However, Voegelin also speaks about the role of imperial
catastrophe, that produced the need to create order out of political chaos. According
to him, the newer empires like the Persian, Macedonian, and Roman "originated, not
in a ferocious will to conquer, but in the fatality of a power vacuum that attracted,
and even sucked into itself, unused organisational force from the outside; it
originated in circumstances beyond control rather than deliberate planning"
(1974:117-8). The resulting society under empire held a mixture of values and beliefs
that historiogenetic speculation had to take into account in order to base ecumenic
history on a cosmic-divine origin1. This brought about what Voegelin calls
historiomachy (See Voegelin 1974:109-113), the phenomenon of cultural
' Voegelin uses the term ecumene to signify humanity unified by awareness of each other through
imperial expansion, which became a term to refer to unified humanity in the Christian cosmos. The
imperial drive that is the root to Western supremacy is linked to an eclectic creation of human history
that is based on pragmatic knowledge and evidence, but also on values and beliefs: "No single
society, but the whole geographical and civilizational horizon of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern
peoples, from the Atlantic to the Indus, becomes the theatre of pragmatic history. This new
phenomenon requires a new terminology, for one can no longer speak of societies and their order
when the events converge toward their destruction. What takes their place is the ecumene. The term
ecumene, which originally means no more than the inhabited world in the sense of cultural
geography, has received through Polybius the technical meaning of the peoples who are drawn into
the process of imperial expansion. On this Polybian stratum of meaning could later be superimposed
the meaning of the mankind under Roman Jurisdiction (Luke 2:1; Acts 17:6; 24:5), and ultimately of
the messianic world to come (Heb. 2:5)" (Voegelin 1974:124).
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competition for the historical tale that was most relevant for the human extended
group now forming the ecumene:
When the older cosmological empires were conquered by the ascending
ecumenic empires, a new constellation of problems formed, for the older
symbolisms, though they continued to be cultivated, were now forced into
competition with one another for ecumenically representative rank. (Voegelin
1974:109)
These movements in social organisation transform the general understanding
of human nature: The qualitative jumps from tribal society, to city-state, to empire
produced a differentiated consciousness of the human self and the symbology of the
sacred origin of a kind of order that is shared by all human beings. "Through the hard
reality of empire, there begins to shine forth, as the subject of history, a universal
mankind under God" (Voegelin 1974:95). The Greek philosophers had developed a
new style of universal truth, on the one hand, through their differentiation of noetic
symbols that made intellectual speculation and knowledge possible beyond the
compact symbols of mythic tradition, and on the other, through a unique Hellenic
interest in making the whole of humankind the subject of history. Israel's own history
is based on the exodus of Yahweh's 'chosen people' from a historical setting that
enslaved them, into freedom reified in a sacred covenant with God. This produced
the possibility of seeing cosmic-divine order as a direct relationship between God
and the believer, not mediated by a cosmological emperor, but by universal law.
Christianity, in its institutional drive to world-conversion, appropriated both the
Jewish and the Greek sources into its dogma and gave shape to an extended concept
of ecumene that encompassed all peoples and all epochs in progress to an eternal
Heaven through history and Apocalypse:
Setting aside the fact that Christian faith is by far not the only root ofWestern
philosophy of history —Israel and Hellas also have something to do with it-
there still remains the hard fact that philosophy of history has indeed arisen in
the West and nowhere but in the West. There is no such thing as a non-
western philosophy of history. For a philosophy of history can arise only
where mankind has become historical through existence in the present under
God. Leaps in being, to be sure, have occurred elsewhere; but a Chinese
personal existence under the cosmic tao, or an Indian personal existence in
acosmistic illumination, is not an Israelite or Christian existence under God.
While the Chinese and Indian societies have certainly gained the
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consciousness of universal humanity, only the Judeo-Christian response to
revelation has achieved historical consciousness. (Voegelin 1954:23)
What Voegelin calls a "leap in being" is what I have referred to as the discovery and
symbolisation of transcendental reality in a Western "style". While in the East this
discovery was embraced as the only level of reality, regarding the world as an
illusory effect of consciousness, a dream from which one awakens in spiritual
Enlightenment; the West took both the world and transcendence to be real and
arranged them in a progressive order with a beginning and an end for the whole of
humanity in Genesis and Apocalypse. Beyond Christianity though, the secular West
has generally been the recipient of a mixture of symbolisms that have mixed
synchretically (Nederveen Pieterse 1994) and have expanded the frontiers of a
beginning and a beyond incommensurably by an embodied mind. The embodied
mind, the one that lives the relevance of the subject-object divide, conceives of its
vastness abstractly and imagines it through infinite space. But this is the kind of
infinite finiteness that Nishitani calls "bad infinity"; an artifice achieved by
separating space and time in abstraction to produce awareness about the factual level
of reality in a mechanistic cosmos that does not end and that displaces awareness of
transcendental infinity to oblivion.
The effect of the discovery of transcendence in the West —and its relationship
with the world— produced a symbolism of time that made possible a projection of
human existential concerns into the future. "The typological structure and shape of
the Bible", says Frye, "make its mythology diachronic in contrast to the synchronic
mythology characteristic of most of the religions outside it" (Frye 1982:83).
Following Frye, the idea of causality was transformed from having effects
horizontally, on the same temporal level of duration with respect to the past and
renovation in the synchronic moment of the cyclical ritual; to a movement that was
both horizontal and vertical in a diachronic "leap" that brought about the
progressivist perspective of the development of collective embodied humanity as a
universal humanity. But this "mechanism" could only come about in a culture that
considered both the world and transcendence to be real in the present before God,
while assuming that there was an imminent end of the world. This imminence in
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primitive Christianity produced an everyday life expectation of death as an event that
would be organised within a wider frame of the personal place in the sacred history
of the human progress towards spiritual perfection.
The idea of imminent collective death through the horrors of Apocalypse was
eventually "solved" or postponed by the Augustinian institutionalisation of the
sacraments and their absorption and administration by the church as the "body" of
Christ. Modernity transformed this Christian belief into progress towards ideal
rational understanding and peaceful interaction between all human beings, and it
framed this progress in universal human history with civilised rational interaction at
the apex of the historical tale that it was creating. But the modern version of progress
is in line with the Augustinian tale of collective spiritual progress:
In Augustine, intellectual child of the Greeks as well as of the Jews, to this
day preeminent theologian in Christian history, there are all the essential
ingredients of the modern idea of progress: the vision of an unfolding
cumulative advancement of the human race in time —a unified, single human
race, be it emphasised— a single time frame for all the peoples and epochs of
the past and present, the conception of time as linear, single flow, the use of
evolving stages and epochs in the history of humanity, belief in the necessary,
as well as sacred character of mankind's history as set forth in the Old
Testament, and, finally the envisagement of a future, distinctly Utopian end of
history when the saved would go to eternal heaven (Nisbet 1994:xiii).
However, various secular versions of this tale got rid of the spiritual element and
found their own sense of reality in factual historicity. They situate their past and
future in a purely mundane setting, ignoring that the qualitative jump into conception
of human history was brought about by contrast to the discovery (or invention) of
transcendence. The originally Christian idea of progress of humanity as one "body"
towards spiritual perfection in history and Apocalypse became transformed into an
experienced unfolding of time as "natural" evolution and indefinite linear factual
history; as well as deformed into material capitalist and political progress of the
nations with respect to the Enlightened ideals of modernity.
The Gnosis of progress toward the reason of the eighteenth-century
bourgeoisie, which Voltaire tried to substitute for the Augustinian historia
sacra, could be applied to the interpretation of phenomena only under the
condition that nobody would raise the fundamental question where and how
the symbolism of an historical mankind had originated. (Voegelin 1954:16)
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Modern universal human history kept the same shape of the Christian symbology
without explicitly acknowledging it due to its rationalistic rejection of religion. It
also kept its basic cosmological divide between world and transcendence that fetters
the latter in superior imminence and relegates the world to an inferior kind of reality,
as chaos that must be controlled.
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III. 2. Mythical Reality
A kind of experience with various consequences for social order is the experience of
being embodied as a specimen of the human race, either male or female, with a
cultural personal story attached to embodiment. We differentiate this experience from
mere animal experience through consciousness of the self; although there is no
intellectual way of knowing the kind of consciousness that the other animal species
(and living entities in general) have. But even though it may seem to us that our
degree of consciousness about the self is more articulate than that of the rest of the
animal kingdom, human beings are also animals. The contemplation of the self must
take this into account in order to attempt a model of reality than can accommodate
and value its own primitivity. From my contemporary synchronic perspective, the
human being is seen as essentially primitive despite any level of civilisation. "[Ijt
apparently takes social scientists", says Frye, "much longer than poets or critics to
realise that every mind is a primitive mind, whatever the varieties of social
conditioning" (1982:37). I am using the Western concept, "primitivity", in order to
point at a human characteristic that never left us, not even in modernity. Even if we
either dress, trim, decorate and perfume our bodies, or deny them, we are still
embodied. Sustaining our own embodied condition organises most of our activities
throughout the day, and to abandon this mundane preoccupation is regarded as
ascetic practice that seeks some kind of state where the body is not. The Western
tradition assumes a bodiless kind of consciousness: abstraction that takes the position
of the objective 'vantage point'; a necessary aspect of our methodology (ritual). But
we must never overlook our own embodied existence —although this is easy in
artificial environments— because it is the source of our experience. Embodiment and
the consciousness of self are intricately entwined, as expressed by cosmologies that
have not symbolised transcendental reality explicitly.
The pagan/primitive view of reality, ideally fettered in the world, portrays
synchronic time in the mimetic rituals of renovation and diachronic (sequential) time
in the duration of the cycles that do not symbolise a transcendental "leap in being".
The source of legitimation for this type of reality is synchronic cyclical renovation
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where the entwinement of life and death are brought to practical consciousness (the
kind of consciousness we share with animals, which will be discussed in the second
part of this thesis). The primary experience of the cosmos is aware of an "intangible
embracingness" that signals the simultaneous organic union of all things and is also
practically aware of the dependence on collective human life for the integrity of
individual embodiment. In this reality, the self that we relate to personally is thus
conceived as a collective self. However, the synchronic experience of time is also an
important organisational principle through contemporary modern interaction because
its cosmology is sustained both in myth and in history at the same time and the
people who interact through it are also already modern and still primitive
simultaneously. Primitivity is closely related to the animality that the human animal
embodies, even if the essence of human interaction is not conceived by us as purely
animal. But, a human being cannot survive without primary knowledge; its practical
consciousness about his/her own animality, which is here portrayed as the ideal-type
pagan/primitive view of reality.
In the modern world, the quality of our daily life is quite dependent on the
functionality of our urban artificial environments. Modern urban life may keep our
attention from focusing on the extreme circumstances to which living in nature may
produce; unless we observe nature as spectators within an artificial environment on
which the modern person's life has come to depend (our cities, offices, houses, TV
rooms). This life-style takes place within a view of reality of diachronic time and
material 'progress' that modern people experience, but it is determined by the creation
and maintenance of extreme artificial environments and descriptive factuality —
which can produce horror stories as well as naively optimistic ones. In the ideal-
typical pagan/primitive view of reality, human life is ideally closer to the natural
world and to embodiment, this also produces mythical tales and beliefs, yet their
expression is eminently based on metaphoric verbal structures.
I will emphasise the notion of "death" as an experience that every embodied
being can relate to as "certain fate", which is a cornerstone of social life in the
primitive type of view of reality, and which the Western belief system ideally
displaces from public life. My argument here will be that, although modernity has
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managed to tame raw nature -to an extent— in daily life, its dependence on the
distance of human beings from nature displaces the immediate awareness of death
from this way of living, and it becomes a neglected aspect of human reality in the
realm of modern belief. Further, death becomes a dreaded ghost standing in the dark
which modern people find quite difficult to incorporate into their view of reality.
This contrasts with the pagan/primitive ability to incorporate this notion in everyday
life through its extended pool of primary knowledge. Pagan/primitive archetypes and
the cyclical conception of time as duration and renovation are based on the
experience and contemplation of raw nature and embodiment, where life and death
are intimately bound to each other. Death, as the end of a life-cycle of an
individually embodied human being, is one of the clearest situations in which a
person —modern or primitive— must unavoidably face raw nature, and it is important
to consider how this experience (that of dying as well as that of seeing someone die)
affects human consciousness and therefore, how it affects cultural creations or
different kinds of knowledge. In order to do this it is important to clarify first how it
is that time is conceived of, prior to a clear symbological representation of
transcendence.
The conception of time in the ideal pagan/primitive view of reality is here
organised around the idea of duration and renovation, following Mircea Eliade. He
has argued that the primitive (he calls it archaic) idea of reality is manifested "as
force, effectiveness, and duration. Hence the outstanding reality is the sacred; for
only the sacred is in an absolute fashion, acts effectively, creates things, and makes
them endure" (Eliade 1955:11). This accounts for what has been regarded as the
pragmatic character of the primitive mind (see Radin 1953, Mumford 1967).
Although the effect of sacred ritual is experienced as finite, its reality is rooted in the
constancy of the natural cycles that are symbolised in an enacted renewal and
repetition of cosmogony. The temporal duration of experienced effectiveness is made
2 These archetypes have been related to fertility rituals of Neolithic origin (see Levy 1948). But the
primitive roots of symbology in the shape of the cycle of life and death remain present in
transcendental notions: a Beginning and a Beyond in Christianity or the endless circle of birth and
rebirth in the East. The transcendental "leap in being" is organised either around the notion of a
collective humanity or with respect to that of the individual life-span of a human being that seeks
spiritual Enlightenment (see chapter IV below)
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real by the lived and enacted ritual of renovation. In a social context, this acquires the
ritual cyclical characteristics of constant renewal of life in the world, which cannot
make do without constant representation of death as a necessary step for renovation
of life.
However, as Ricoeur has argued (1967), before symbolisation of
transcendence, primitivity must also have already been physically conscious of
separation. To Ricoeur, their myths signified a plenitude that was only "aimed at" in
symbolical intention, to him, in symbology, unity is only an intuition "from which
man is not separated" (1967:167); while the phenomenologists of religion (Ricoeur
mentions Eliade, Van der Leeuw and Leenhardt) believe that primitivity is an
experience of indivisible plenitude where nature and psyche have not yet been
separated. I will argue that Ricoeur's point must be considered seriously because
primitivity, as undifferentiated experience, is a kind of'unconsciousness' that is given
a romantic essence of continuous harmony and plenitude. However, moving away
from Ricoeur's line of argumentation, I will also argue that while the collective union
in plenitude is not a constant experience, it is experienced in primitive mimetic ritual,
and this experience and its symbolisation informs the rest of the diachronic
experience of time as duration (with no explicit "leap in being"). In primitivity, it is
transcendence which is only an intuition, plenitude (embodied and enacted awareness
of simultaneity) is cyclically lived in mimesis with the environment during sacred
festivity, and in the experience of magic.
Magic may be construed as real only in myth or explained away by an
observer as sham or as contingent coincidence of ritual with expected events; but it is
experienced as real by the participants and this experience informs their daily view of
reality. The ideally-typical pagan/primitive view of reality is experientially linked to
both sides of temporality: one of duration where everyday life and functionality takes
place, and one of renovation and unity in the psychological and mimetic effect of
natural cycles in bodily rhythms (life, sex, death), magic, festivities, and sacred ritual
in the participant. According to Paz, the religious festivity is much more than just a
date or an anniversary: "It does not celebrate, but reproduces an event: it opens up
into two the chronometrical time so that, during some incommensurable hours, the
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eternal present reinstates itself. The festivity makes time creative. Repetition
becomes the act of conceiving" (Paz 1993:228)\ and he compares this primitive
instant to that of poetic creativity. Legitimation for this view of reality lies on the
realm of unity, experienced as collective meaningful synchronic pauses in the
continuum of time4. In primary accounts of reality, life and death are not as clearly
differentiated from each other as in the modern perspective, they are entwined: life
gives rise to death and death to life. This is one of the most important pragmatic
teachings that the moderns can obtain from the pagan/primitive world-view: the
experience of being alive as an individual embodied entity is also the constant
experience and contemplation of death in public interaction around the mysterious
experience of life/sex/death.
In a primary awareness of reality, the individual entity is not regarded as
important as in the Western one. As transcendence is not made articulate, the
abstract-ideal individuality of a living human on his/her own is not as relevant.
Awareness of the cycles of life and death of the whole group sustains awareness of
the relevance of an extended collective self. But this collective self emerges from
individual consciousness, which is an important side of the constant creation of
culture. Following Anthony Cohen, individuality (as opposed to individualism) is a
biological and psychological fact, it is a pragmatic feature of being alive and
embodied; but in primary awareness of self, individuality is endured: survival of
individual entities depends on the survival of the group —and this is a human fact that
often escapes the awareness of the individualistic modern mind. In ideal primitive
reality, a cyclical relationship is established between individual self and collective
3 "La Fiesta es algo mas que una fecha o un aniversario. No celebra, sino reproduce un suceso: abre
en dos al tiempo cronometrico para que, por espacio de unas breves horas inconmesurables, el
presente eterno se reinstale. La fiesta vuelve creador al tiempo. La repeticion se vuelve concepcion"
(Paz 1993:228)
4 Yet it is important to stress at this point the need to contemplate the pagan/primitive view of reality
also as part of present modern life in a colonised fashion. 1 have said that it is a myth of our times —of
the cosmological kind— that the modern person has left her/his primitivity behind. Primitivity is not
part of our irretrievable past. It may have manifestations that may appear to be crude and horrible to
conceptions of reality that conceive of transcendence or morality; but it also constantly manifests
itself in beautiful and fresh creativity and spontaneity, one that has not been tamed by the rigours of
formality. In colonised primitivity, the sacred rituals of renovation may become systematic and trivial
breaks in the continuity of time, or mere chores of non-sacred, disenchanted functionality —especially
in highly artificial environments—, but they nonetheless mark the rhythms of life and reality.
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self, the former providing spontaneity and creativity, and the latter providing
experience of the cosmic reality5. The collective life of the human group compensates
for the embodied separation of the living entity. The inner longing for wholeness of
human existence is not translated consciously into transcendence, but into ritual
worship that brings about awareness of organic union between the members of the
collectivity and of the constant flow of the cycles of life and death.
In the pagan/primitive view of reality, there is an experienced relationship
between life and death and the discipline of enduring embodiment through a kind of
work that crude natural circumstances impose6. We, as modern individuals, can
afford to ignore the need for this kind of existence in extreme natural circumstances
because we have created artificial environments (cities) that help us forget about (or
deny) our embodied condition (and gives us a vantage point from which a typically
Western intention arises to save less fortunate human beings from their primitive
condition). However, nature catches up with us at the moment of individual death: it
reminds us of our own embodied individual existence, our futility in human history.
In the progressivist intoxication of the eighteenth century Kant raised the
sober question what interest a generation of man at any given time could have
in the progress of mankind toward a cosmopolitan realm of reason. Even if a
man should consider the labors of his life a step of mankind toward
perfection, the fruits of his labors would be enjoyed by men of a distant
future. Hence, the meaning of history is not the answer to the question of
meaning in the life ofman (Voegelin 1954:4)
The symbolism of personal efforts in the modern view of reality is either framed
within the Western myth of personal success (Berman 1992, Maturana and Verden-
In his book Self Consciousness, Cohen argues that there is a common anthropological mistake in
assuming that cultures determine the individual selves of their members, and he suggests that it is
more like a dance: "1 think of society and the self', says Cohen, "as dancing an improvised pas de
deux: each tries to cover the moves of the other; sometimes they merge, at others they separate"
(Cohenl994:7l).
6 Although modern life in the cities is artificial enough for us to be able to ignore the natural cycles of
the earth (besides, maybe, concern about the weather), and this artificiality may also dull perception
of the personal cycles of being embodied; perception of the need for work to survive is very much
alive. Yet the need for work is perceived to be created by the social system, which organises work in
the most differentiated environments. But when an intricate social system is absent, raw nature
demands work and constantly improvised creativity for the human collectivities to survive. An
important part of the Marxist cosmology is based on observation of this pragmatic feature of human
experience.
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Zoler 1995) and diluted in human history, or denied a place in any kind of cultural
representation of togetherness beyond the family circle (which tends to shrink in the
West). In these cultural circumstances a late awareness of death in the moment of
personally facing it may be faced with horror after a life-time of individual assertion.
Primitive experience of embodiment organises social interaction around
perception of the natural cycles (of the earth as well as of the human self: birth, sex,
and death), and represents them in metaphorical stories, symbols, and myths. These
stories have human archetypes that belong to the collectivity; they portray collective
emotion —attraction and aversion— and, at the same time, are part of every embodied
human in awareness of the collective self. The power contained in both greatness and
lowliness of these archetypes symbolises cyclical movements of constant creation,
destruction, and renewal, which finds its prototypical perfection in the imagined very
first act of creation in illo tempore (Eliade 1955:4). Octavio Paz, evoking Van der
Leeuw (1940), says that this prototypical beginning, "contains all beginnings and
introduces us in the time that is alive, where everything really begins at every instant.
By virtue of the ritual that realises and reproduces the mythical tale, that of poetry
and of fairy tales, man enters a world where all the contraries merge into each other"
(Paz 1993:229)7. But this kind of power is also contained in human awareness of
creativity, of collective life that produces symbols as a means of self-representation.
In primitive awareness this self is collective, and therefore its power of creation
belongs to every embodied entity alike. The link between the unborn, the living, and
the dead is an organic and spiritual continuum; and therefore, also the link between
the mortals and the gods. In this view of reality, history -the realm of the past and the
future beyond the life-death cycle— is unimportant. As Paz says:
Mythical time, contrary [to chronometric time], is not a homogeneous
succession of equal quantities, rather, it is impregnated with all the
particularities of our life: it is as long as eternity or as brief as a sigh,
inauspicious or propitious, fertile or barren. This notion admits the existence
7 "contiene todos los principios y nos introduce en el tiempo vivo, en donde deveras todo principia
todos los instantes. Por virtud del rito que realiza y reproduce el relato mitico, de la poesia y del
cuento de hadas, el homhre accede a un mundo donde los contrarios sefunden" (Paz 1993:229).
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of a plurality of times. Time and life merge and form a single block, a unity,
impossible to split. (Paz 1993:228)8
Ritual sacred celebrations —and the mysteries they bring to the fore (sex, life,
death)— make it possible in this ideal view to produce human awareness organised
around the celebration itself. Human imagination constantly portrays this
consciousness emotionally in immensely diverse and particular tales and myths that
"stand for" somatic mundane human experience. The pre-eminent feature of the tales
is their metaphoric verbal structure that express synchronic similarities between
emotion and imagination in ecstatic ritual and somatic exploration of the mysteries of
consciousness; here Frye's hieroglyphic language is culturally ascendant9. "The
intracosmic areas of reality, one may say, provide one another with analogies of
being whose cosnrological validity derives from the experience of an underlying
intangible embracingness, from a something that can provide existence,
consubstantiality, and order to all areas of reality even though it does not itself
belong as an existent thing to any one of these areas" (Voegelin 1974:72). The
absence of an explicit representation of "universe" allows these representations to
coexist, merge, and reinvent themselves constantly in what in the West we would call
a cross-cultural manner.
Although the principle of universality is not articulated explicitly in the
primary experience of the cosmos, the experience of an "underlying intangible
embracingness" accounts for its presence as intuition, in an "embryonic" form, even
if it has not been differentiated and given a unifying symbol to represent it. Only
when consciousness of transcendence has become a differentiated experience, then
'universe' is represented in abstraction.
Obviously, the metaphysical concepts of the archaic world were not always
formulated in theoretical language; but the symbol, the myth, the rite,
8 "El tiempo mitico, al contrario [del liempo cronometrico], no es una sucesion homogenea de
cantidades iguales, sino que se halla impregnado de lodas las particularidades de nueslra vida: es
largo como una eternidad, o breve como un soplo, nefasto o propicio, fecundo o esteril. Esta nocion
admite la existencia de una pluralidad de tiempos. Tiempo y vida se funden y forman un solo bloque,
una unidad imposible de escindir" (Paz 1993:228).
0
Svnchronically speaking, from a contemporary perspective, this is observable in modern societies as
pop sub-cultures, with the prefix 'sub-' because they lack legitimacy to order interaction. And yet, they
inform the majority of people's cosmology in urban everyday life, or a vernacular view of reality,
through the "not-really-true-life" realm of the industry of entertainment/advertisement.
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express, on different planes and through means proper to them, a complex
system of coherent affirmations about the ultimate reality of things, a system
that can be regarded as constituting a metaphysics. [...] It is useless to search
archaic languages for the terms so laboriously created by the great
philosophical traditions. [...] But if the word is lacking, the thing is present,
only it is "said" —that is, revealed in a coherent fashion— through symbols
and myths (Eliade 1955:3).
In the absence of an explicit symbol for the human transcendental identity, 'universe'
is not symbolised discursively but it is lived as an enactment of the organic union of
everything that is alive and dies in ritual representations of the cosmos.
The best term that represents this kind of 'lived' ritual symbolisation is
mimesis. This has generally been translated as 'imitation', but this notion does not
wholly convey the unification in perception of symbol and experience in
pagan/primitive ritual. "The term mimesis is chosen by Plato as the one most
adequate to describe both re-enactment and also identification, and as one most
applicable to the common psychology shared both by artist and by audience"
(Havelock 1963:60). In his book Preface to Plato, Eric Elavelock explains why it is
that Plato in the Republic directed such an aggressive attack on the Greek tradition of
poetic representation. Plato's axial hierophanic experience made him point the way to
transcendent reality and, as discussed in the previous chapter, opened the door to
what Frye describes as the hieratic phase of a culturally ascendant language
dominated by metonymic verbal structures. Their pagan present was being rejected
as a means of public education due to its inherent inability to represent universality;
its inability to teach the discipline of separating emotion and imagination from lived
experience to arrange them in an order that is congenial to the reality of
transcendence. "Changes [in the cosmogony created by the 'primary experience of the
cosmos']", says Voegelin, "can come only through noetic advances which let more
compact symbols appear inadequate in the light of more differentiated experiences of
reality and their symbolisation" (1974:71). From a contemporary perspective, the
disciplined ability to perceive reality through a sophisticated system of differentiated
symbols eventually brought about the 'observer' of the Western tradition: the capacity
to appreciate art and religion as subjective aesthetic experience and science as an
objective search for truth. This transformed Hesiod and the Homeric classical tales
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into 'literature'; and yet they were produced by an oral and mimetic pagan cosmos of
ritual; "Homer", says Auerbach "[...] knows no background. What he narrates is for
the time being the only present, and fills both the stage and the reader's mind
completely" (1953:4-5)
Mircea Eliade has argued that this kind of mimetic fusion of symbolisation
and experience of cosmos is an archaic defence against the irreversibility of historical
time:
Insofar as he allows himself to be influenced by history, modern man feels
himself diminished by the possibility of this impersonal survival. But interest
in the "irreversible" and the "new" in history is a recent discovery in the life
of humanity. On the contrary archaic humanity [...] defended itself to the
utmost of its powers against all the novelty and irreversibility which history
entails (Eliade 1955:48).
However, novelty and irreversibility can only be conceived of in an experience of
time as progression towards some kind of transcendence; where the somatic
experience of cyclical renovation is already irrelevant. This is either through spiritual
experience of a different higher domain of eternal reality that lies beyond the
changing nature of the earth and the body, or through abstract mythology. The former
takes shape of faith and spiritual discipline, and the latter has created artificial
environments —abstract and material— of interaction, systems, that absorb the cyclical
side of time and produce linear-time progression.
We have said that the transformation of Western cosmology into history has
the same shape as the Augustinian cosmic tale with a beginning and a beyond
through Apocalypse that has been secularised into social indefinite progress, either
through the mythical consequences of 'social revolution', or through the myth of
purposive human construction of rational institutions. However the transformed
modern tale, based on global wealth expansion, has pushed aside the primitive
fullness of life (but also consciousness about transcendence) without realising that its
view of reality is based on the Christian displacement of transcendental reality into
an eternally imminent realm that produces the linear time-progression. This produces
an artificial reliance on descriptive abstraction as the only source of knowledge and
relegates the organic root of human existence to a second-hand kind of reality.
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In contrast to this, primitive awareness of the close relationship between life
and death is sustained in collective synchronicity in mimetic ritual of an experienced
organic background, and this produces an inarticulate trust in the union of all things.
According to Voegelin, in this view of reality, "the cosmos is not a thing among
others; it is the background of reality against which all existent things exist; it has
reality in the mode of non-existence" (Voegelin 1974:72). But this trust in cosmology
is not articulated as faith, it is an experienced reality that is lived in organic
'awareness', it is intuitively known as a characteristic of embodied humanity.
Voegelin calls this knowledge the "primary experience of the cosmos", which
embodied existence is unable to leave behind and which is often rediscovered in the
midst of unspoilt nature:
The cosmos of the primary experience is neither the external world of objects
given to a subject of cognition, nor is it the world that has been created by a
world-transcendent God. Rather, it is the whole, to pan, of an earth below and
a heaven above —of celestial bodies and their movements; of seasonal
changes; of fertility rhythms in plant and animal life; of human life, birth and
death; and above all, as Thales still knew, it is a cosmos full of gods. [...] This
togetherness and one-in-anotherness is the primary experience that must be
called cosmic in the pregnant sense (Voegelin 1974:68-9).
It is quite significant that Voegelin uses the figure of pregnancy to describe the
primary experience of the world of conscious humanity. The original human
experience of wholeness, although inarticulate, can be described as the life of the
foetus in the womb in organic union with the mother. Morris Berman says that
"much of what we call mysticism today could be no more than a kind of bodily
memory [of the time spent in the womb]" (1992:9).
The pagan/primitive view of reality conceives of this cyclical wholeness as
the sacred provider of existence, and worships it accordingly. If we allow ourselves
to slip into our modern — legitimate-diachronic— and progressive conception of time,
in the Spencerian sociological idea of progress as development from compact
symbolism into differentiation (discussed in part two below); we can arbitrarily
imagine how the primary experience of cosmos without factual representations
would bring awareness of'self as the human community, and the 'other' as what lies
outside it. Berman says that the original source of the contrast between the self and
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the 'other' was animal otherness, and this awareness produced a sacred celebration of
this relationship in the form of worshipping of totems (1992:49-90). The Palaeolithic
representations that combine hunter's and artist's knowledge united the primary
consciousness of those human groups with their whole body of ritual which brought
the participant "to an exaltation of the ideal species unattainable by individual
experience" (Levy 1948:42).
The archaic representation of the mysterious provision of life, sustenance, and
death has been traced as evolving from totemic into anthropomorphic symbolisation
(Levy 1949, Berman 1992). The divine source as human —divine human identity and
experience— has some initial representations as female, the life-provider, biologically
based in the motherly womb; but also as scary warner-redeemer through death and
the natural forces of destruction (Levy 1948, Clendinnen 1991, Leeming & Page
1994). An emotional and personal relationship is established with physically enjoyed
care from the hands of a mother; but also with the suffered blemishes of infectious
evil, the messengers of death —the initial symbolisations of defilement, according to
Ricoeur (1967). Representations of the human divine source of embodiment are
initially expressed as the female:
It seems reasonable to imagine that the makers of those statuettes [female
images of fertility] had also passed beyond the stage of localised relationship
with the archetypal beasts [totems], to the conception of a pervading
principle, not in this case their own creative power, but a life-substance
through which that power could act, conceived already in the human form of
maternal fecundity (Levy 1949:62).
The relationship with totems expanded and goddesses emerged in their human shape
as sacred symbols of the experienced source of birth and embodiment —the
mysterious "container" of human life. Embodiment can be seen as endured in
awareness of bodily separation from one another, but also lived as organic-collective
union with the world and experienced in mimetic ritual and social order (however
small to our cosmopolitan awareness —the family, the tribe).
A primitive type of social order can be seen as a nexus between the unborn,
the living, and the dead. In primary awareness, social order and embodiment are
inextricably entwined, and in retrospective, we can give this concept (embodiment)
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to the realisation of female as life-provider (and therefore also linked to death);
inarticulate as such, yet explicit in the ritual worship of the female deity and in their
metaphorical representations. "This anthropomorphic shape", says Levy, "marks a
further stage in the clarifying of human personality, for before men can raise
themselves above the animals they must perceive the divine in human form"
(1948:63). In the collective consciousness of embodiment in the primary experience
of the cosmos, the creative powers of the world and nature itself are acknowledged
and lived as exalted characteristics of human experience.
We must assume in principle that in the remote past the processes considered
imitable included those in the sky. In dance, on other cultic occasions, such
imitation could be produced, such similarity manipulated. But if the mimetic
genius was really a life-determining force for ancients, it is not difficult to
imagine that the new-born child was thought to be in full possession of this
gift, and in particular to be perfectly moulded on the structure of cosmic
being (Benjamin 1979:161)
It is important to bear in mind that, as Levy's portrayal highlights, we are
dealing with personality and this is a particularly important Western symbol as it is
used in our discipline of knowledge. The reality of the human personality is relevant
as a source of legitimate factuality and responsible agency -the one that makes
historical factuality possible at all. Factual personality is relevant to our discipline
because this notion is an experienced feature of our view of reality, it is essential to
our Western tradition of intellectual knowledge in order to organise references and
factual evidence, it is moreover, an important feature of our consciousness of self.
This does not mean that personality is not an experienced reality in other views of
reality or other cultures and traditions, but that its individual factuality is not as
relevant for those traditions; their (primary or spiritual) traditions of knowledge
survive quite comfortably within the ambiguous verbal structures of prevalent
metaphor and metonymy. As argued in the preceding chapter, it is important to
appresent that the roots to our own discipline are tied to a mythology of progress if
we are to produce an analytical methodology that is critical of itself. But this
mythology is built around the importance conferred to diachronic experience of
factual personality, the one that also organises legitimate rational institutions and
political life.
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What is gained by this type of mythology is an abstract unification of all
peoples as "humanity" and its universal history. But if symbolisation of time as
history and linear progression is the only one allowed, a sense of the spiritual value
of the particular embodied individual existence is lost in factuality. This is why
Eliade (1955) perceives the pagan/primitive synchronic conception of time as a
'defence' against the experience of diachrony in time. An ordered representation of
history as factuality is part of the Christian tradition, which allows for disciplined
perception of the irreversible and the new, the past and the future, and what it is that
we keep selectively as relevant history (personal or universal). As we will see in the
next chapter, this exercise entails a whole array of values that have evolved from




The "Leap in Being": Consciousness of Transcendence
In this chapter I explain the theoretical relationship between the Western/Christian
view of reality and the Eastern/mystic view of reality as well as the structure of their
difference. Their relationship is posed as the common awareness of a transhistorical
realm that is conceived as transcendence. It is through this realm that consciousness
of factual historicity is possible in both transcendentalist views of reality.
Nevertheless, the structure of their difference is relevant to understand why the
Eastern awareness of historical facticity never developed into a full philosophy of
history, or into what the West conceives of as the historical consciousness of a
universal humanity. Both types of cosmology contemplate the reality of a
transhistorical realm, but while the Western tradition situates it in a "far side", a
beyond, where the personality of God abides, the Eastern one places it in a "near
side", a here-and-now, where the divine essence of human abides.
The difference between the Eastern, primitive, and Western views of reality
can also be expressed in terms of different types of fault experienced which lead to
an idealised self that tends either to the collective self (mystic and primitive), or to
the individual self (Western). But the idealised individual self is logically displaced
from reaching the "far side" transhistorical realm and the importance of personality
and individuality is emphasised in the nihilistic awareness of this displacement. In
contrast to this, the Eastern spiritual notion of Absolute emptiness provides a useful
perspective in order to organise a methodology of phenomenological observation of
different views of reality that are present at the same time, that is, synchronically.
This can only be organised by consideration of a "near side" transhistorical realm as
an ideal type of perspective —also present in our own Christian tradition— that is
equivalent to the typical God's eye view of the "far side" perspective. It is only
through this that love and compassion as religious love can be brought to the fore at
the same level of universalistic importance as the principle of a transcendental
subject that is an end in itself. Following Keiji Nishitani, I will argue that it is only
from a radicalised experience of emptiness —Absolute emptiness or sunyata— that the
transhistorical realms become one and the same. This pure synchronic perspective
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though is essentially spiritual and cannot be described except ideally, yet it is only
here that the transhistorical "near side" and "far side" realms can be made to overlap.
IV. 1. The Transhistorical Realm of Historicity
It is in the transhistorical realm of historicity that the two transcendentalist views of
reality converge, even if in Christianity this realm depends on a personal relationship
with God, while in the East, it depends on a relationship with the universe within
humaaln his book Religion and Nothingness, Keiji Nishitani formulates this
difference in terms of a Western "far side" and an Eastern "near side" transhistorical
realms. In Christianity, this transhistorical far side is the abode of God, the Father,
towards whom a continual spiritual progression of humanity is attempted through the
Christian institution of the church. In secular reality, the rational institution inherits
the mission of organising human progress, even if it is not conceived as a spiritual
type of progress. In contrast to this, the Eastern tradition is aware of newness and
impermanence from a transhistorical perspective that is situated in an absolute near
side which discloses historical facticity (a kind of diachrony that does symbolise a
transcendental "leap in being"). But Eastern disciplines of spiritual enlightenment set
this historical consciousness aside as an immediate illusion, in favour of a distinct
notion of progress towards transcendence in the present moment of disciplined
practice. According to Nishitani, the Western schools of thought that have been
closer to bringing the transhistorical "far side" to the "near side" are the existential
and nihilistic ones, but have failed due to an extended relationship with the personal
and individual ego, regarded as the root to reality.
As has already been discussed, in this work, transcendence is regarded as a
spiritual discovery that takes place when a human being merges in consciousness
with her/his divine root to existence. The notion of universality is conceived drawing
from particular symbolisation and experience of what has come to be regarded as
hierophany. I will argue that the difference between the sacred and the non-sacred
defines the structure of legitimate human order, even if in secular interaction the
sacred realm loses its synchronic essence and becomes diachronic and rational.
Nevertheless, as has already been suggested, one of the main assumptions of this
work is that the notion of legitimacy is imaginatively and emotionally cognised.
Ideas about reality are legitimate because they structure the experience and habits of
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the ones who interact in them and whose interaction is engaged in imagined and
emotional relationships with people, things, principles, missions, gods, values: They
are like highways of interaction at the same time as they are experienced in an
intimate relationship to the self that is cognised emotionally. In the previous chapter I
discussed how legitimacy of authority lies in the synchronic moment of renovation
for the pagan/primitive idea of reality as opposed to the diachronic one of the
Western historical perspective. Now I will discuss how legitimacy ofmoral authority
differs in the two transcendentalist views of reality and why it is important that they
be allowed an area of convergence if the Western tradition is to remain loyal to the
spirit of tolerance that made a necessity for intellectual knowledge to become
estranged from Christianity. Our Western cultural development concentrated on the
spiritual importance of a personal relationship with God, which was then secularised
on the basis of the importance of human personality and of the history of a unified
universal humanity. The Eastern tradition concentrated on the universe within human
—which lies both within and beyond time simultaneously. Moral authority in the
Western tradition lies on diachronic experience of time, and in the Eastern one, on a
synchronic experience of spiritual Enlightenment.
In the divided universe of Western reality —between world and
transcendence— boundaries are defined with respect to typical Judeo-Christian
categorisations of good and evil. This structure of belief is based on the Christian
collective spiritual practice as one body in the 'church' (ekklesia)\ The political
organisation of the church was very powerful in a universal world-order because, as
opposed to all other empires based on cosmological kingdoms, it empowered an
impersonal organisation to act for God through the people in its ranks.
The central royal metaphor —that we are all members of one body— was
expressed in terms of unity and integration, as the unity of a social body into
which the individual is absorbed. The Church claimed to be the continuing
Body of Christ in history, and as early as the letters of Ignatius we are
completely in the atmosphere of the Church Militant, with its emphasis on
1 The concept of church belongs to the Christian tradition and describes a form of religious communal
life, inherited from Hellenic political organisation. "The ideals of the political philosophy of the
ancient Greek city-state entered the discussion of the new Christian type of human community, now
called the church, but in Greek ekklesia[...] originally meant the assembly of the citizens of a Greek
polis" (Jaeger 1962:15).
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military analogies and its disciplined organization, where no authority is to be
followed except what comes through the bishop. (Frye 1982:99)
When this organisational principle became secularised and put into the hands of
liberal democracy, an aura of distance, congenial with the idea of a gaze from the "far
side", was given to the institution of the 'State' in the continental political tradition, or
of the 'Law', in the Anglo-Saxon one. The transcendental origin of this aura makes
the Western figure of the 'institution' a very powerful one in terms of producing
social order. The way in which the globalised order of today conceives of institutions
is tied up with the Augustinian institutional arrangement. The Augustinian tale,
however, in its transcendentalist implications foresaw a city of God of perfect justice;
this tale was transformed into a secular one in which the spiritual quest is out of
sight. In its place, there remains the discipline of a modern ethos that poses the
individual human self as an end in itself and organises morality as a private quest for
a personal prehension of the self.
However, as has been mentioned, the modern mind rejects the Christian tale
that is the root of modern institutions and exchanges it for a new tale of eternal linear
progress in domination of the material world through morality in universal history
and knowledge in science. In its rejection of Christian dogma, the Western
enlightened rational discipline downplays the fact that its intellectual notion of
infinity is rooted in the Christian notion of an omnipotent and transhistorical God.
"Although the views of history found in Christianity and in the Enlightenment
represent diametrically opposed points of view", says Nishitani, "they both concur in
recognising a meaning in history" (1982:211). A universal historical consciousness
cannot escape the element of infinity opened up at the very root of being in the
world. As will be discussed, this is illustrated by how the predicament of nihilism
haunts the modern contemporary mind.
Nishitani calls the infinity of historical consciousness the "transhistorical
view" needed for a history that can be truly universal, and he says that it is
unavoidably linked to a "religious prehension of history" (1982:213). In this
prehension, the transcendental realm of existence (eternity, infinity) comes about as a
certainty and may be said to be analogous with hierophany, or interaction with the
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divine root of existence. Certainty is religious faith and it comes about in the life of
human as what Nishitani calls the Great Reality:
To be sure, this reality is not something merely objective and separate from
ourselves; if it were, we should still be on the field of consciousness2. When
we ourselves are thrown into the reality of evil or faith in such a way as to
become ourselves the realization of their realness, a conversion takes place
within reality itself with us at the hinge: we have a real change of heart.
(Nishitani 1982:30)
The transhistorical view is analogous to the synchronic sacred moment of renovation
of the natural cycle celebrated in archaic ritual; but here it is of a "higher order" that
moves symbologically (and not only intuitively and experientially) in the direction of
transcendence; it is the awareness and explicit representation of the new and the
irreversible that contemplates infinity and therefore the uniqueness of the present
moment:
The idea of a stratified formation of simultaneous time systems necessitates
the idea of an infinite openness at the bottom of time, like a great expanse of
vast, sky like emptiness that cannot be confined to any systematic enclosure.
Having such an openness at its bottom, each and every now, even as it
belongs to each of the various layers accumulated through the total system, is
itself something new and admits of no repetition in any sense. The sequence
of "nows" is really irreversible. Accordingly, in the true sense, each now
passes away and comes into being at each fleeting instant. (Nishitani
1982:219)
Nishitani observes that this transhistorical realm lies at the centre of the Eastern
notion of time and, while it produces an immediate kind of historical consciousness -
-the present view that history has no beginning and no end—, it does not unfold into
the mature science of factual and descriptive history as it does in the West.
Nishitani's discussion shows that the transhistorical is itself radicalised in the East as
Absolute emptiness as the root to reality which discloses facticity as illusion; while
in the West it is radicalised as the human transcendental identity in personality,
initially, in a personal relationship with God conceived as a wilful "being" in a
: Nishitani refers to the field of consciousness as the perspective where we relate to objects without
from a position within the subject, where "self and things remain fundamentally separated from one
another. This standpoint of separation of subject and object, or opposition between within and
without is what we call the field of "consciousness". And it is from this field that we ordinarily
relate to things by means of concepts and representations" (Nishitani 1982:9).
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transhistorical dimension; and then transformed into a secular relationship between
the universal human self and human personality, its freedom, and its will.
Here, it is important to pay attention to the culturally ascendant verbal
structures of both traditions; While the Eastern/mystic realm of transhistorical time
defines a domain of synchrony that legitimises the notion of a collective mind; the
Western/Christian realm of historicity and its relationship with the Will of God
defines a domain of diachrony that legitimises the notion of universal humanity as a
collectivity advancing towards the end of times or towards moral awareness which
legitimises the notion of an individual mind; its uniqueness being a feature of
infinity, an end in itself. In both views of reality, and in awareness of a religious
prehension of history, the dominant verbal structures are metonymic as either
synchronic or diachronic legitimate symbols of time that are "put for" a
transcendence that is both immanent and imminent.
Nishitani argues that in the Western tradition, the legitimate realm of
transhistorical reality is placed at the "far side" of ordinary consciousness;
when Plato conceives of a world of Ideas as the far side of this sensible
world, the beyond he has in mind is only beyond to the extent that it is
something like a celestial world. It is a far side viewed perpendicularly from
the earth upward. [...] Similarly a personal God who is thought to reveal
himself vertically from heaven down to earth, as commonly represented in
Christianity, is considered to be seated beyond, on the far side. Since in this
case we speak of a revelation from beyond, the far side is more to the far side
than it was with Plato. (Nishitani 1982:104)
The distance placed between God and human is meaningfully represented in
diachrony and, as we will see, also in the notion of sin as an anthropological root to
human existence. But this absolute breach between God and human can be
represented as a metonymic "unrelatedness" in a rational philosophical plane of
dialectical thought: "an unrelatedness can be represented as a sort of relationship of
"unrelatedness", that is, as a "dialectical" relationship" (Nishitani 1982:105). In
secular facticity, this unrelatedness is translated into a cognising subject and its
object of analysis; but here, the prevalent verbal structures are descriptive. The
object/subject relationship enfolds both the Western occularcentric tradition of
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science and the Western moral mission of knowing the self who does the cognising;
always keeping the diachronic division that allows for cause and effect to be clearly
seen and for sequential explanation to be performed by the discipline. It could be said
that secular history attempts to shift the "far side" of the transhistorical realm to the
"near side" of the cognising subject —and as Nishitani argues, this was best achieved
by the nihilists in the West— but we will see that it fails to accomplish the absolute
near side because it is still couched in, and determined by, the duality of a divided
reality. In contrast to this, in the Eastern tradition, the legitimate realm of
transhistorical reality is placed at an absolute "near side", one of Absolute emptiness
from which being emerges, where "both the abyss of nihility and the personal
relationship of God and man can come about [...] and be represented" (Nishitani
1982:105).
To be sure, the absolute near side of the Eastern tradition is also metonymic
and is put for immanent transcendence; but one that enfolds salvation and nihility,
heaven and hell, and that is displaced from judgmental reason and distinction
between absolute good and absolute evil. What Nishitani calls religious Love {agape)
or Compassion {karuna) illustrates this notion of the near side —also present in the
religious Western tradition— where love is absolute and impersonal as in the
Buddhist "Great Compassionate Heart [maha-karuna], the essential equivalent of the
biblical analogy that tells us there is no such thing as a selfish or selective sunshine"
(Nishitani 1982:60). Similarly with Jesus' injunction to love one's enemies as one's
friends and the Buddhist virtue of "non-differentiating love beyond enmity and
friendship" (Nishitani 1982:58). This is the prevalent absolute near side of
transhistorical reality in the Eastern tradition. Discursively, its compact metonymic
symbolism of experience allows for factual ambiguity, and fails to organise a
descriptive sense for universal history; but in disciplined practice, a factual historical
awareness is organisationally necessary in an immediate sense with respect to one's
own present life and situation, one's own particular emotional attachments and lived
predicaments. This is a near side that becomes personally pressing and, according to
Nishitani, must break through the field of nihility which lies beyond the horizon of
the field of consciousness; or that of self as cognising subject, ego, or personality.
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Nishitani's considerations on a philosophy of being "take their stand at the
point that traditional philosophies of religion have been broken down or been broken
through. In that sense they may be said to go along with contemporary existential
philosophies, all of which include a standpoint of "transcendence" in one sort or
another" (1982:xlix). Nishitani considers the nihilistic philosophies of Sartre,
Heiddeger, and Nietzsche, as well as the religious existentialism of Kierkegaard, in
order to find a Western common ground with Eastern concerns about nothingness.
But he also considers how, even these Western existentialist problematics are still
very much couched within the assumptions of the traditional philosophy of
Christianity. A radical change of heart in these cultural conditions, in the sense of
conversion to a "Great Reality" (discussed above), has produced either the negation
of the existence ofGod as a wilful personality (an atheistic humanism), or in the case
of Kierkegaard, a philosophical-spiritual vocation.
Traditional Western thought is based on the reality of the personal self, and
therefore, on the reality of its division from the world 'outside' itself. The Cartesian
"cogito, ergo sum expressed the mode of being of that ego as a self-centred assertion
of its own realness" (Nishitani 1982:11). But according to Nishitani it is an ego that
seeks its own realness and mirrors itself in what it finds at every turn. This kind of
self-centredness is displaced from looking at itself beyond the actual fact that it
considers itself as real. As I will argue in the second part of this thesis below, this has
to do with the multiple emotional interactions in which the ego is engaged; which
gives shape and consubstantiality, objective reality, to the "integument of culture"
where it lives. But according to Nishitani this field of consciousness must go through
an existential doubt in order to contemplate its own non-reality as impermanence,
and experience the grounds on which it stands as emptiness.
Only when the self breaks through the field of consciousness, the field of
beings, and stands on the ground of nihility is it able to achieve a subjectivity
that can in no way be objectivized (Nishitani 1982:16)
This "standing" though is existential as well as intellectual knowing. According to
Nishitani, this is the only comprehensive standpoint for modern human because, in
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every other standpoint contemporary human is shattered into little abstract pieces that
separate consciousness from mortality, the unavoidable return to nihility (death).
According to Nishitani, the problem for this existential modern position is
that it does not radicalise the experience of emptiness, but remains couched in its
intellectually cognising discipline that depends on the reality of the subject itself.
This is why the Great Reality of Western existential nihilism does not perform a
complete conversion into a religious quest, even if it is seems closely related to it in
its certainty about the absence of a Presence —atheism— a certainty that is,
paradoxically, analogous to a faith. Nothingness as the ground of existence in
nihilism still sees the self as poised on some kind of objective grounds:
[T]he nothingness that means "there is no ground" positions itself like a wall
to block one's path and turns itself into a kind of ground so we can still say
that "there is a ground". Only absolute emptiness is the true no-ground
(iUngrund). Here all things —from a flower to a stone to stellar nebulae and
galactic systems, and even life and death themselves— become present as
bottomless realities. They disclose their bottomless suchness. True freedom
lies in this no-ground. Sartre's freedom is still a bondage, a kind of hole that
has the ego projected into it like a stake driven into the ground for the self to
be tied to. (Nishitani 1982:34)
In atheistic nihilism, individual human selfhood is defended with religious zeal as the
source of freedom and autonomous will. In the Western forms of existential nihilism,
the "far side" transhistorical realm is attempted to be brought to the "near side" by the
transcendental identity of human, but it fails to do so because this identity is couched
in the personality of the cognising self who is displaced from prehending infinity
existentially.
To say it with Nishitani, an excessive identification of the Self (collective or
individual) with the particular personal selfhood or ego is precisely the predicament
in which modern culture finds itself: "If we grant that Cartesian philosophy is the
prime illustration of the mode of being of modern man, we may also say that it
represents the fundamental problem lurking within that mode" (Nishitani 1982:19).
The abyss of nihility that opens up at the bottom of self brings out infinite
nothingness that human personality on its own is unable to deal with because of its
own inherent finiteness. A tension between a transcendental identity (infinity) and
119
the individual personality (finiteness) of human arises in the symbolism of the
Western tradition, and this tension organises the legitimate factuality of universal
history; in contrast to the East where individual personality is not so sharply defined
and infinity does not appear divided into individualisms. Nevertheless, in the East
infinity itself produces awareness of a universality, not only with respect to other
human beings, but with respect to any type of consciousness. This fails to produce
universal symbolism of factual human historicity because the infinite vastness of
time for all forms of consciousness (animals, plants, even objects!) cannot possibly
be represented factually, but it can be understood (and represented in metonymy) in
the search for the present mystical moment of Absolute emptiness, where it is
apprehended. Nihilistic nothingness still shows the bias of objectification in which
the self, cognised as an ego, regards nothingness as a kind of objective "thing".
In contrast to this, the Eastern standpoint of Absolute emptiness is the
immanent "near side" of the transhistorical realm needed for consciousness of
infinity with no beginning and no end. But this is not simply a cyclical predicament
because in cyclical time, recurrence signals fmiteness, and the beginning and end can
be organisationally arranged according to that finiteness. Nevertheless, the "once and
for all" essence of factual reality, that which cannot be repeated and is therefore
unique, can only be expressed in realisation that the beginning and end are contained
in the present moment of existence:
Kierkegaard speaks of a "transcendence" in the "moment" and along with that
of a "simultaneity" coming to be in the "moment". In fact, past and present
can be simultaneous without "destroying" the temporal sequence of before
and after. Without such a field of simultaneity not even culture, let alone
religion, could come into being. We can encounter Sakyamuni and Jesus,
Basho and Beethoven in the present. That religion and culture can arise
within and be handed down historically through time points to the very
essence of time. (Nishitani 1982:161)
We will say for now that the Eastern "near side" transhistorical realm of absolute
emptiness, conceives of an immediate kind of factual historicity based on the
simultaneity of newness and impermanence experienced in time. From that point of
experience, self is simultaneously non-self; it is one with emptiness and therefore
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free of all horizons of objective cognition, where emptiness is identical with being. I
will attempt a clarification these notions further below.
We are now in a position to say that the development of a historical
consciousness depends on the symbolisation of the notion of universality. Historicity
therefore depends on a symbological dimension that is transcendental or
transhistorical either on a "far side" or on a "near side" with respect to the human
self. But while the legitimacy of the Eastern "near side" as Absolute emptiness
remains synchronic and a present spiritual dimension, as it seeks personal morality to
point metonymically towards the experiential reality ofwhat Nishitani calls 'religious
love' (agape) or 'great compassion' (Maha-karuna); the legitimacy of the Western
"far side" embodies the metonymic dialectical symbol of a divided reality between
world and transcendence arranged diachronically with respect to each other. This was
originally expressed in our Western tradition as the Tale of Genesis and Apocalypse,
and later in secular historicity, as the division between subject and object where the
former is an end in itself and seeks factual knowledge and causal explanation about
the latter. As we have said, the transhistorical or transcendental realm in the Western
tradition is positioned in the "far side" or the 'not yet', and through this, diachronic
factual historicity acquires its institutional importance. To be sure, this experience of
movement in time is also represented organisationally in an ideal Eastern/mystic
view of reality, but it does not acquire institutional legitimacy as reality; immediate
facticity (samsara) is contemplated as an illusion and as a burden that is given up in
spiritual Enlightenment (nirvana).
As we shall see in the next section, in Christianity, legitimacy of diachronic
time comes from the institutionalisation of both a group relationship and a personal
relationship with God; which in secular reality becomes a universal kind of morality
(or the Western values) that should be internalised through history by all rationally
enlightened individual selves. The ancestry of this kind of legitimacy goes from
religious exegesis, to a personal conscience, to academic factual analysis. In the East
the organisational role of diachrony is to regard the phenomenal world as mere
illusion of forms and is therefore not engaged with its factual analysis as if it were
legitimate reality. But it does produce interrogative thought about the factual
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relationship between past intentions, the present personal situation, and future
expectations. Therefore, historicity as a relevant category for the realm of human
order is better disclosed for our purposes in the notion of human fault. In their
diachronic and synchronic considerations of a transhistorical (transcendental) realm
the Western and Eastern symbolisations of fault can illustrate the tension between, on
the one hand, sinful humanity and a personal relationship with God, and on the other,
worldly suffering and the transcendental realm of nirvana.
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IV. 2. The Notion of Human Fault
It is in the formation of distinctive types of ethos that the notion of fault becomes a
relevant object of analysis. Following Paul Ricoeur's study of the Judeo-Christian
symbolism of evil and Nishitani's considerations of the Eastern notion of fault, I have
distinguished three types of fault to which the human self can relate for each view of
reality: the pagan/primitive view conceives of fault as defilement; the
Western/Christian view as sin and guilt; and the Eastern/mystic as karma and worldly
suffering {karma). The notion of fault is constant in any cosmology and it clarifies
how each view of reality tends towards an ideal individual self or to a collective self.
Defilement and karma highlight the importance of a collective self, either embodied
in community or conceived as a sacred collective mind, while the Western/Christian
notion of fault (especially in guilt) tends towards individuality as the locus of self
conceived as the responsible agent either in the religious imputation of fault or in the
secular one. Symbologies of fault can only be overlapped and compared from a
phenomenological perspective, in present awareness, because their prevalent verbal
structures produce imaginary paths that do not converge symbologically through
time conceived as past and future: they unfold into the shape of the relevant mythical
tale, the transmigration of souls beyond the individual life-time (the wheel of birth
and rebirth), or factual history. From this perspective, guilt and sin are observed to
open up an unavoidable abyss between the self and the "far side" realm of
transhistorical reality; while the Eastern notion of emptiness reconciles the self with
the transhistorical realm in an absolute "near side" of spiritual love.
In his Symbolism of Evil, Paul Ricoeur carries out a phenomenological
analysis of the experience of fault. His three stages —defilement, sin, guilt— represent
the symbolic evolution of the West towards deeper awareness about the responsible
individual self. But I will take his first stage, that of defilement, to be an ideal type of
symbolism of fault for my pagan/primitive ideal-type view of reality, one that is lived
and cognised right now as a mixture of emotion and imagination and expressed in
metaphoric-poetic language. From defilement, the phenomenological path towards
sin and guilt defines the symbological development of the Western/Christian view of
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reality; while the notion of fault as karma defines that of the Eastern/mystic
apprehension of a "leap in being" towards transcendence. Ricoeur identifies the
symbolic evolution of the West that goes from the experience of defilement, to sin, to
guilt:
"Guilt", in the precise sense of a feeling of the unworthiness at the core of
one's personal being, is only the advanced point of a radically individualised
and interiorized experience. This feeling of guilt points to a more
fundamental experience, the experience of "sin", which includes all men and
indicates the real situation of man before God, whether man knows it or not.
It is this sin of which the myth of the fall recounts the entry into the world
and which speculation on original sin attempts to erect into a doctrine. But
sin, in its turn, is a correction and even a revolution with respect to a more
archaic concept of fault —the notion of "defilement" conceived in the guise of
a stain or a blemish that infects from without. Guilt, sin, and defilement thus
constitute a primitive diversity in experience. Hence the feeling involved is
not only blind in virtue of being emotional; it is also equivocal, laden with a
multiplicity of meanings. This is why language is needed a second time to
elucidate the subterranean crises of the consciousness of fault. (Ricoeur
1967:7-8)
In this symbolism of fault, Ricoeur also identifies a movement in language, from an
elementary language of confession (metaphorical), to the elaborated language of
gnosis and counter-gnosis (metonymic). He also says that there is a heavy emotional
involvement every time there is explicit description of the personal or collective
experience of fault; which is therefore emotionally cognised. Ricoeur's three
categories are thus a typology that is determined by emotional response to the
Western relationship with God's interdiction who has a personality and a divine Will.
The most archaic or basic type of fault, that of defilement, is generally
expressed in metaphorical verbal structures of disease and pestilence in order to point
towards exclusion from the human group, originally constituting the human self. In
synchronic legitimation of time and reality, the locus of the self is the known human
group and its verbal structures are arranged as artistic representations of reality
cognised physically and emotionally. Defilement is seen as offence against the
human group, the collective self, human personality represented as gods and
goddesses who engage in cosmic dance and play and produce the experienced reality
of newness and impermanence, and is expressed in compact symbolism of mixed
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emotion and imagination. This dance and play is the most archaic form of divine
human identity as lying beyond the world in the shape of absolute joy; but in a
similar manner, this other-worldliness is also lived emotionally in an absolute
manner in the despair and experienced physical pain reified in the symbols of
defilement. Our embodied experience constantly conveys the nuances between
extreme joy and extreme pain, going through boredom and indifference, but that are
physical or emotional —or both— and that most strongly express the relationship
between what is allowed and what is forbidden, what is expected and what is a
necessity for individual embodiment to be and to produce. The human emotional
development through ontogeny3 carries the most basic and archaic relationship to
self as goddesses and gods, even if these symbols become emotionally and
intellectually differentiated and transformed into legitimate self as personality
couched in a transcendental identity or into self as Absolute emptiness.
Defilement is related to the boundaries of permissiveness; "we have to
transport ourselves", says Ricoeur, "into a consciousness for which impurity is
measured not by imputation to a responsible agent but by the objective violation of
an interdict" (1967:27). Under this regime, the list of faults is vast while it is poor
when it comes to considering the intentions of the agent. Here, evil and misfortune
are still associated; "the ethical order of doing ill has not been distinguished from the
cosmobiological order of faring ill" (Ricoeur 1967:27). To us, this lack of
differentiation on the side of intentionality is irrational because it connects physical
contingency with fault. Defdement is typically symbolised as a form of impurity by
contagion that infects from without, "but this infectious contact is experienced
subjectively in a specific feeling which is of the order of Dread" (Ricoeur 1967:28).
Taboos, which define primitive boundaries of permissiveness, are basically
punishments emotionally anticipated in transgress of cosmological interdicts. There
is an archaic relationship between defilement and vengeance which, according to
1
Ontogeny is a concept that 1 borrow from biology which means: "The course of growth and
development of an individual to maturity" (Lincoln, Boxshall & Clark 1982:174). The domain of
facticity to which awareness of a transhistorical "near side" realm gives birth is essentially related to
the particularity of a human life-time. As I will discuss in Chapter V below, this is relevant for a
synchronic perspect've of an observer who is aware of his/her own embodiment.
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Ricoeur, is the oldest and most primitive form of representation of fault. From a
primitive need for vengeance emerged the first human modes of expression of order
in the language of retribution.
When this expression discovers the symbolic direction of transcendence,
verbal structures become preeminently metonymic to point towards transcendental
infinite joy and freedom, but at the same time, to the infinite abyss of despair and
nihility; also generally used to point to divine punishment or cosmic debt that is also
eternal, and so, absolutely terrifying. This is the reason why the symbolism of
defilement is actually never left behind because it is the most explicit one in physical
analogies and metaphors, and it is resorted to in every type of symbolism of fault.
It is because the symbolism of defilement still clings by its manifold root
hairs to the cosmic sacralizations, because defilement adheres to everything
unusual, everything terrifying in the world, attractive and repellent at the
same time, that this symbolism is ultimately inexhaustible and inerradicable.
As we shall see, the more historical and less cosmic symbolism of sin and
guilt makes up for the poverty and abstractness of its imagery only by a series
of revivals and transpositions of the more archaic, but more highly surcharged
symbolism of defilement. The richness of the symbolism of defilement even
when this symbolism is fully interiorized, is the corollary of its cosmic roots.
(Ricoeur 1967:12)
The kind of language used to represent fault appears in mixed symbology, so the
difference between the categories of fault is phenomenological rather than linguistic
or historical; and it is progressive only in the sense that it points to the discovery and
representation of transcendence in human social order.
The Eastern notion of karma keeps the connection to the primitive language
of vengeance and retribution, but transforms it into a cosmic burden of infinite
embodied debt in pain and attachment that can only be absolutely paid through
spiritual Enlightenment. It keeps the archaic relationship between doing ill and faring
ill. but gives it an ethical arrangement that trusts in fate as a "learning device" that
arises as the product of our own actions:
This force of destiny is not a destiny in the ordinary sense of something that
simply rules over us and controls us from without. Nor is it merely something
like blind will. It is a destiny that appears only in the shape of the acts we
ourselves perform, only as one with our own actions. (Nishitani 1982:104)
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This is why the realm of historicity that this notion of fault discloses is immediately
related to factual consciousness of individual self ontogenetically; and not to any
legitimate realm of universal human history. The notion of karma transforms the
archaic trust in cosmology towards the direction of transcendence as a trust in
contingency as fate. This Eastern trust in contingency as fate is displaced from the
critical discipline of factual historical analysis, it defines an intuitive attitude of
submission to experience and contemplation of the cosmobiological links between all
things in the particularity of the present situation.
The Western opposition to this kind of trust may be said to lie in personal
responsibility about acts and the cosmological impossibility of the notion of samsaric
"transmigration" (eternal birth and death), which is secularised as a "once and for all"
unique individual life. However, it can be argued that the root of this attitude
originally lies in the personal relationship with a God that dwells in a transhistorical
"far side" and that relates to His chosen people through prophetic indignation and
historical exegesis as the expression of His Will. This is illustrated in the
anthropological myth of the fall and the figure of the serpent, which is told as an
event that took place "springing up from an unknown source, it furnishes
anthropology with a key concept: the contingency of that radical evil which the
penitent is always on the point of calling his evil nature. Thereby the myth proclaims
the purely "historical" character of that radical evil" (Ricoeur 1967:252). In the
Christian view, radical evil is contingent in history, in the world, even in the flesh but
it is not the sole nature of human, and humanity's only mission is to overcome evil
through its transcendental identity. Under this circumstances of reality, it would be
irrational to trust in contingency, as radical evil may at any time spring out of
nowhere in the course of historical time. This defines an attitude that must be
intentionally active, dominating evil, controlling circumstances and finding proof of
success in the world.
The Hebrew representation of an avenging God is rooted in an archaic
representation of order. The emergence of Yahweh as the only God of the universe
with a "chosen people" was originally symbolised as a collective relationship with a
local sacred entity who would lead them to historical success. "What there is in the
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first place", says Ricoeur, "is not essence but presence; and the commandment is a
modality of the presence, namely, the expression of a holy will. Thus sin is a
religious dimension before being ethical; it is not the transgression of an abstract rule
—of a value— but the violation of a personal bond" (1967:53). Revelation transformed
this localistic relationship into the figure of the Covenant, and gave it its
transcendental possibilities. It is with respect to the Covenant that the notion of sin is
defined: sin is an unavoidable human characteristic according to the myth of the fall,
the awareness of which unites the chosen people before God's judgement. But this
judgement is expressed as an infinite distance between God and man, between His
transcendental power and the deeply rooted human evil. This distance is expressed in
the form of prophetic accusation, indignation, and the wrath of God:
The initial situation of man as God's prey can enter into the universe of
discourse because it is itself analysable into an utterance of God and an
utterance of man, into the reciprocity of a vocation and an invocation. Thus
this initial situation, which plunges into the darkness of the power and
violence of the Spirit, also emerges into the light of the Word. It is in this
exchange between vocation and invocation that the whole experience of sin is
found. (Ricoeur 1967:51-52)
The figure of the Covenant, of unlimited demand and finite commandment,
defines a dialogue between God and man from which an unavoidable collective
experience of sin emerges. The law teaches man how he is already a sinner and this
accusation deepens the experience of being oneself, but alienated from oneself: "Sin,
as alienation from oneself, is an experience even more astonishing, disconcerting,
scandalous, perhaps, than the spectacle of nature, and for this reason it is the richest
source of interrogative thought" (Ricoeur 1967:8). While alienation from oneself in
defilement —the primary experience of the cosmos— is alienation from the
community; in sin, this kind of alienation is related to exile from the transcendental
realm symbolised in Paradise: it defines the worldly human condition that must
struggle to defeat evil till the end of times. Sin is thus universalised as a condition
that, as it were, unifies humankind. This condition is symbolised in the terror that the
prophets experience when they must face God:
[T]he religion of Israel is imbued with this conviction that man cannot see
God without dying. Moses at Horeb, Isaiah in the temple, Ezekiel face to face
128
with the glory of God, are terror-stricken; they experience in the name of the
whole people the incompatibility of God and man. This terror expresses the
situation of sinful man. (Ricoeur 1967:63)
The infinite demand of God and the finite command of the ritual codes create
a tension with which the sinner is never finished. When there is pardon as
deliverance, it is symbolised in a theology of history for the whole of the people of
Israel; otherwise pardon is never reached in actual personal deliverance. It is,
however, lived in the punishment that the ritual codes prescribe because, in it, sin
loses its aspect of irrevocable condemnation: "pardon does not abolish suffering but
grants a respite which is interpreted as a horizon determined by divine patience"
(Ricoeur 1967:79). In the language of the confession of sins, this symbolism of fault
provides the grounds for interrogative thought in the personal relationship with God,
which is symbolised as a whole in the Covenant:
[I]n addition to mitigation of the punishment, pardon appears as the
transformation of an obstacle into a test; punishment becomes the instrument
of awareness, the path of confession. Pardon is already fully evident in this
restore capacity of knowing oneself in one's true situation in the bosom of the
Covenant. (Ricoeur 1967:79)
Sin is therefore individual and communal at the same time, and it is entwined with
the "Day of Yahweh", the historical events, and their penal interpretation by the
prophets. Prophecy joins the promise of salvation to the threat of calamities, there is
a double imminence of catastrophe and deliverance. "This double oracle", says
Ricoeur, "keeps up the temporal tension characteristic of the Covenant" (1967:68).
Ricoeur speaks of a crisis that came about due to the deepening of the feeling
of sin. The experience of evil in the self as a deeply rooted human characteristic,
symbolised in the fall, produced constant contemplation of the individual self in
obeisance to the Law of God. But this relationship to ritual finite law is always
experienced as emotionally attached to the infinite demand of God himself. This is
the symbology of historical time of man before God, or the root to the experience of
being seen by God:
[T]he primordial significance of this seeing [being-seen-by-God] is to
constitute the truth of my situation, the justness and the justice of the ethical
judgement that can be passed on my existence. That is why this seeing, far
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from preventing the birth of the Self, gives rise to self-awareness; it enters
into the field of subjectivity as the task of knowing oneself better; this seeing,
which is, lays the foundation for the ought-to-be of self-awareness. (Ricoeur
1967:85)
The emergence of personal guilt occurs when sinful man interiorises and personalises
the experience of fault, not only as responsibility in being the cause of a violation of
interdiction, but now as being the author of ethically wrong deeds in the eyes of the
divine gaze. "That is why", says Ricoeur. "the consciousness of guilt constitutes a
veritable revolution in the experience of evil: that which is primary is no longer the
reality of defilement, the objective violation of the Interdict, or the Vengeance let
loose by that violation, but the evil use of liberty, felt as an internal diminution of the
value of the self' (1967:102).
When interdiction is not only ritual but becomes ethical, human beings are
radically called to a perfection that goes beyond their objective obligations, it
becomes a subjective assumption of responsibility. It is in this internalisation of fault
and in this awareness of being seen by God that man faces the alternative "God or
Nothing" (Ricoeur 1967:103). When all possibilities are reduced to this simple
alternative, human beings must look at themselves as the authors of their acts
together with the motives of their acts; this "raises up, over against itself, a subjective
pole, a respondent, no longer in the sense of a bearer of punishment, but in the sense
of an existent capable of embracing his whole life and consider it as one undivided
destiny, hanging upon a simple alternative" (Ricoeur 1967:103).
According to Ricoeur, at the time of the Jewish prophets of the Exile, when
Jerusalem had fallen to Babylon, a historical situation took place which corresponds
to the change from communal sin to individual guilt:
The preaching of sin had represented a mode of prophetic summons in which
the whole people was exhorted to remember a collective deliverance, that of
the Exodus, and to fear a collective threat, that of the Day of Yahweh. But
now that the evil hour has arrived, now that the national state is destroyed and
the people deported, the same preaching which had been able to appeal for a
collective reform has become a cause for despair; it has lost all the force of a
summons and become nihilistic in its import. (Ricoeur 1967:105)
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Ezekiel, who had been brought captive into Babylon before Jerusalem was taken,
preached for the individual responsibility of fault. No communal choice was open,
collective sin had become a symbol of failure according to which the wrath of God
had already condemned a whole people. Hope could therefore only be found on the
individual side of sin; this took place in the same kind of preaching as accusation,
which produced a solitary experience in the form of individual guilt. Nevertheless, if
sin was now individual, so would salvation be: "Even if the Exodus from Egypt
could not be repeated in an exodus from Babylon, even if the Return was to be
indefinitely postponed, there would still be hope for each man" (Ricoeur 1967:105).
It is in the subjective emergence of the experience and symbolisation of fault,
that the notion of "conscience" as individual and solitary conscience emerges in the
Western tradition. As a religious experience, and in an intimate relationship to sin, it
is lived in the presence of a higher spiritual order on the "far side" of transhistorical
reality from which the human being is displaced, and which observes him/her.
However, it is in the assumption of a transcendental identity that human makes the
ethical choice to take the side of this divine presence and judge her/his own deeds.
The experience of a complete cleavage between sin and guilt can be, then, formulated
in the emergence of an individual conscience that judges the doings of the mundane
self from a transcendental standpoint of either the Law or the personal 'law' or
principles, one's own judgement and critical mind; which in secular reality may no
longer be transcendental qua God, but it is still transcendental qua part of the human
identity.
Let the "I" be emphasised more than the "before thee", let the "before thee" be
even forgotten, and the consciousness of fault becomes guilt and no longer
sin at all; it is "conscience" that now becomes the measure of evil in a
completely solitary experience. It is not by accident that in many languages
the same word designates moral consciousness (conscience morale), and
psychological and reflective consciousness; guilt expresses above all the
promotion of "conscience" as supreme. (Ricoeur 1967:104)
In the Western tradition, the basis for this "conscience" is individual due to the
fragmentation of symbolism of the human self. Self is conceived as pre-eminently
collective in primitive fault as defilement; in the Judeo-Christian tradition, it is
alternatively collective and individual in consciousness of fault through original sin
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and the personal relationship with God; and ends up being constructed as pre¬
eminently individual in the hope for salvation and the reality of mundane evil as
guilt. In secular modern reality and moral behaviour it is conscience as guilt —either
projected or assumed— that shapes morality, which becomes a supreme entity liable
to be worshipped in the temple of personal individuality and the private realm: the
transcendental identity of a subject who is cosmologically divided from its object of
cognition and holds an emotional relationship and attachment to that division.
In contrast to this, the notion of karma is emotionally grounded in a view of
reality that situates itself wholly in transcendence, which does not lie in a "far side"
but that becomes radicalised, especially in Buddhism, as an absolute "near side" of
emptiness. Karma is existentially cognised as the worldly field of causality that ties
human action to human fate indissolubly and that is identified as taking place in an
"endless sea of suffering", samsara, which is ultimately illusory, but which is
"grasped in a keenly existential fashion" (Nishitani 1982:169). This experienced
suffering is described as ontologically illusory for the practitioner who seeks absolute
redemption or liberation exemplified by the Enlightened masters; diachrony is
"aspirationally" illusory for the seeker.
[W]hen we speak of illusory appearance, we do not mean that there are real
beings in addition that merely happen to adopt illusory guises to appear in.
Precisely because it is appearance and not something that appears, this
appearance is illusory at an elemental level in its very reality, and real in its
very illusoriness. (Nishitani 1982:129)
Here, the realm of history is unimportant as an institutional program that would
embrace the whole of humanity in a universal tale of a beginning and an end.
Nevertheless, the notion of factual historicity is an important organisational
principle in Eastern cosmology, that each particular embodied individual
contemplates as a personal story of causality. As has been said before, Eastern
apprehension of the universal realm of being concentrates on the universe within, and
therefore, every practitioner who strives for redemption from the sea of suffering
does so, not only for his/her own benefit, but primarily for every other "sentient
being". To seek redemption for one-private-self, is still regarded as a form of slavery
to the illusory nature of embodiment in samsara, when the universe within, in
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identity with every conscious being, has not yet been apprehended. In order to grasp
the ontological priority of universal wholeness, an apprehension of Absolute
emptiness is required through experience; where any notion of individual human
identity or self is dissolved into the infinite ocean of non-being. This transhistorical
realm of being-non-being is the absolute "near side" that discloses a universality that
goes beyond the boundaries of Self as human self, it apprehends existence as non¬
existence and merges in consciousness with the universe itself. It is the absolute
emptiness that in Mahayana Buddhism, Nagarjuna calls sunyata (Absolute
emptiness) which must be experienced to be known.
IV. 3. Absolute Emptiness
Even if Absolute emptiness cannot be described, here I refer to it as a useful "sign
post" to organise a universally relevant realm of morality as compassion and care,
which to be authentic must have a concrete manifestation in particular experience to
be known. Absolute emptiness or sunyata is a spiritual vivid existential experience
that takes place, through the field of nihility (the awareness of nothingness as the root
to existence), into the idea that a radicalised emptiness is the root source of newness
and impermanence, of both the positive and negative aspects of life. While in the
West evil is wilfully expelled through repression into a mythical realm of eternal
damnation, in the East evil is appropriated in the midst of the transcendental source
of experience. Elere, the self is not related to the embodied personality, but to the
collective human sacred mind —the essence of Eastern selflessness or non-ego. While
in the Western tradition, oneness is the negation ofmultiplicity and differentiation is
a dialectical opposition of concepts; in the Eastern tradition oneness and multiplicity
are enfolded in an absolutely empty unity which must be cognised existentially
through the field of nihility. In Absolute emptiness infinity is conceived as the
spiritual entwinement of all things, where things are contemplated in their suchness.
If we move from Absolute emptiness to the Cartesian 'field of consciousness' where
things are cognised qua objects; we realise that sunyata can still be considered in the
present moment of meaningful experience as an ideal signpost of a "near side"
transhistorical realm to organise experience, just like the Western "far side"
transhistorical realm. In this manner, the Eastern historical consciousness can be seen
to organise an "ontogenetic" type of historical facticity (close to our own particular
life path), while the Western historical consciousness can be seen to organise a
"phylogenetic"4 type of historical facticity (the life path of a universal humanity).
The Indian philosophical duality that precedes the notion of absolute
emptiness is couched in the oneness of Brahman and atman, which could be
4 Similarly to ontogeny, phylogeny is a biological concept that means: "The evolutionary history of a
group or a lineage" or "The origin and evolution of higher taxa" (Lincoln, Boxshall & Clark
1982:192).
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considered as analogous to the Western notions of Divine Being and the self, but
where the oneness of Brahman and atman is expressed only in negative terms "as the
seer who cannot be seen and the knower who cannot be known" (Abe 1985:125). The
Western duality is symbolised by Plato in the "mystery of being as existence between
the poles of the One (hen) and the Unlimited (Apeiron)" (Voegelin 1974:184). But in
Greek philosophy, non-being is merely a privation of being (Abe 1985:122);
Christianity took over this idea and saw in it the Godly Being from which everything
emerges in all its multiplicity. Western secular philosophy kept the clear divide
between absolute or a priori reason as the knower and the phenomenal world as the
object of cognition. In any case, the positive side of being is stressed and the negative
is expelled to oblivion or to a realm of 'wrongness', which effectively constitutes a
domain of darkness that human is engaged in dissolving through intellectual
knowledge and substantial rationality:
To sum up, in the West such positive principles as being, life, and the good
have ontological priority over negative principles such as non-being, death,
and evil. In this sense, negative principles are always apprehended as
something secondary. By contrast, in the East, especially in Taoism and
Buddhism, negative principles are not secondary but co-equal to the positive
principles and even may be said to be primary and central. This is so in the
sense that the realization of negativity is crucial to reveal ultimate Reality,
and in the sense that the nameless Tao or Emptiness is realised as the root-
source of both positive and negative principles in their relative sense. (Abe
1985:133)
Emptiness at the root of both positive and negative principles discloses a realm of
historicity that does not constitute itself as a factual universal program for the union
of humanity; but that produces a fertile ground for personal contemplation of fault in
present suffering and about redemption in the experience of legitimate present
compassion.
The field of sunyata is displaced from description, but a field of immediate
ontogenetic historicity —regarded as illusory-- is disclosed around this transhistorical
realm of legitimate reality, situated in the absolute "near side" of self (or no-self). It
therefore discloses a realm of morality that the secular universal program of human
historicity expels to oblivion in its institutional and factual diachronic structures, but
which is present in the religious Western tradition as agape or Divine love. In karma,
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the immediateness of personal involvement with everything else that is, with one's
own factual fate but also with that of all other beings —which involves one's own
constant actions, emotions, and thoughts— puts emphasis in a factual universal
historicity, that nevertheless, is not legitimate reality. This realm of immediate
factual historicity, however, acquires consubstantiality with respect to Absolute
emptiness as the ultimate legitimate reality; the source of all that we experience and
that carries the universe within, where ego or personality are experienced as unreal:
"In the Existenz of non-ego, non-ego does not mean simply that self is not ego. It has
also to mean at the same time that non-ego is the self (Nishitani 1982:251); or that
"I am the universe" where "I am" is not "me" qua ego. This experience is therefore
absolutely humbling and absolutely empowering. Experience is therefore real in its
existential realness\ but its source is the universe itself, not mediated by a sacred
personality or a monotheistic God, and even less by subjective or objective cognition
of the individual self. Experience as universe is also experience as particularity at the
same time and this simultaneity can only be lived in the hierophanic discovery of
transcendence, the mystic moment of union to the divine root of existence, or
Absolute emptiness (,sunyata); all of which are essentially the same thing. According
to Nishitani, this is illustrated in the mysticism of Meister Eckhart: "Absolute
nothingness signals, for Eckhart, the point at which all modes of being are
transcended, at which not only the various modes of created being but even the
modes of divine being —such as Creator or Divine Love— are transcended" (Nishitani
1982:61).
The Eastern "near side" of a transhistorical realm as Absolute emptiness and
legitimate reality in non-objectifiable, as it transcends the "subjectivistic nihility" of
Western existential nihilism (Nishitani 1982:98) and acquires the dimensions of what
can only be considered as an ideal type of pure subjectivity from an objectivist
discipline like ours. This pure type of subjectivity cannot be found in empirical
reality, not because it not be actually experienced or lived by humans, but because it
is displaced ontologically from being observed scientifically, just like love. It can
nevertheless function as an ideal type, a "middle path" that is unachievable through
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an objectivist discipline, but that should be considered conceptually as an ideal-type
axis between legitimate views of reality.
Absolute emptiness as sunyata or as the point where all modes of being are
transcended is an absolute abyss, "an abyss for the abyss of nihility" (Nishitani
1982:98). In that field the self as ego is unreal, and therefore we could use a
metonymic verbal structure to say that self in sunyata is analogous, but not identical,
to being essentially a collective self. This notion is manifested in the experienced
actuality and connection of all things. But sunyata is a spiritual realm immanent to
the world, where difference is unreal, yet experienced in its substantial manifestation
—the degrees of diversity of things is irrelevant. This is how self is collective: in
connection with all other things. This is not only an anthropomorphic self as
personality, but one for whom experience and universe are the same thing and so are
multiplicity and oneness. To illustrate this position in the Western tradition, Nishitani
resorts to the figure of St. Francis of Assisi:
The case of St. Francis may be rather exceptional in Christianity, but it serves
us with at least one example of religious Love overstepping the boundaries of
the human to reach out to all things. (Nishitani 1982:281)
For the anthropomorphic self the end in itself is the human self, the
transcendental subject, the one that lives in historical universal human time. This
standpoint defines the limits of the integument of culture with respect to nature (and
inadvertently also with respect to other less "civilised" cultures), with the intention of
excluding nature. It corresponds to the archaic metonymic definition of borders
between the sacred and the profane, only in the shape of the human and the natural —
or culture and nature— in secular reality. This movement defines for Nishitani an
essentially dogmatic point of view that shelters a self-contradiction in the
relationship between the "thing in it self' and objective "reality":
[T]he Kantian critique with its split between two completely irreconcilable
modes of being, phenomenon and noumenon, came to be advocated. On the
standpoint of sunyata, where these two irreconcilable modes of being are
pushed to their limits, they are both seen to come about as one and the same
mode of being of the thing. (Nishitani 1982:138-9)
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As discussed above, oneness in the Western tradition is defined as the
negation of multiplicity and differentiation is defined as a dialectical opposition;
while the Eastern tradition enfolds both oneness and multiplicity in an absolutely
empty unity. What this means is that before uniting them in an intellectual
relationship, oneness and multiplicity must be cognised existentially through the field
of nihility. This involves the knower into questioning her/his own existence, and
moves from the realm of intellectual knowledge or historicity to that of spiritual
knowledge:
The questions brought up by nihilism, at first heeded by only a few gifted
thinkers, have since come to haunt us in modern life. In Nietzsche, and in
more contemporary figures like Heidegger, for instance, nihilism is dealt with
on the horizon of the so-called "history of being".
This sort of situation does not exist in the East. Still, the East has achieved a
conversion from the standpoint of nihility to the standpoint of sunyata.
(Nishitani 1982:168)
This is a spiritual realm because it is directly related to the prehension of one's own
death or of one's own self as standing on nihility, leading to what Nishitani calls a
conversion to "Great Reality". It depends on a "religious quest" that awakens in
human beings when tragedy, disillusion, or even closeness to death quicken one's
awareness and preoccupation with things religious; "when death, nihility or sin [...]
become pressing personal problems for us" (Nishitani 1982:3).
Only from the field of nihility can the ego be posed as non-ego, and then be
reassumed as the spiritual knowing of non-knowing; where there is absolute
autonomy (freedom) as the absence of autonomous identity. In the mystic Christian
tradition, this nihility is spoken of as the "dark night of the soul", the existential
detachment from ego experienced as "the whole being's surrender to the All"
(Underhill 1995:400). Nihility is an essential step to Absolute emptiness of the self
because, even if we may posit objective things as independent of our own immediate
consciousness, they cannot be seen as independent of nihility:
No thing, whatever it be, can be divested of nihility. Sooner or later all things
return to nihility. Things cannot be actual without being deactualized; things
cannot really exist except as unreal. Indeed it is in their very unreality that
things are originally real. Moreover, in nihility the existence of existing
things is able to be revealed, questioned, perceived. (Nishitani 1982:109).
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Only from a nihility that can only be known existentially, is self able to move on to
an Absolute emptiness that is also known existentially, where self can contemplate
itself at one with the universe. It is in this contemplation that infinity can be
apprehended. "True infinity as reality", says Nishitani, "refuses to be encountered
anywhere but along the path of Existenz" (1982:177).
Sunyata, then, is described as a "field" of absolute emptiness only
metonymically and for heuristic purposes, because it is experienced as having its
centre everywhere and its circumference nowhere:
For multiplicity and differentiation to become truly meaningful, then, the
system of being is seen as something that opens up nihilitiy as its ground, and
not merely as a system of being. The circle must not be looked at from within
the circle itself, but as something that includes tangents at all points on the
circumference. In so doing, it becomes apparent that all those points imply an
absolute negation of the orientation to return to oneness at the center (the
orientation given to them as properties of a circle), such that each point
implies an orientation toward infinite dispersion. They then cease to be
merely the defined loci of points situated equidistant from a common center.
Of themselves, these points are not merely uniform and undifferentiated.
They do not sink into a One that has had all multiplicity and differentiation
extracted from it. Instead, each of them displays an orientation toward
pluriformity that absolutely denies such a reduction to oneness, an orientation
toward infinite tangential dispersion. And these orientations, showing up as
they do in a unique manner at each particular point, as belonging only to that
point, bring about an infinite differentiation. (Nishitani 1982:144)
This kind of infinity refers to the entwinement of all things qua objects in time both
simultaneously and sequentially; and to their spiritual entwinement with each other.
This does not include only embodied humans, but all the orders of things great and
seemingly insignificant.
Even if the field of sunyata describes its discoveries with respect to the
substantial things that we posit as such from the field of consciousness, things are not
experienced as having the same kind of substantiality as they do in objective reality
because here the self is still a subject. Substance becomes a measure of reality when
things are grasped eidetically, according to Nishitani, the field of objective reality;
"on the one hand, it is the field on which things come to display what they are in
themselves; and on the other, the field on which we grasp what things are in
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themselves. Such are the distinguishing features of the field of logos or reason"
(1982:113). From the field of Absolute emptiness, though, knowledge and praxis are
indistinguishable, this is where things are known in their absolute suchness. Here, the
existence of things is not cognised as how they appear to us; rather, it is experienced
as the mode of being of things as they are in themselves, which means to say, how
they are in their own "home-ground".
To give us an idea about the notion of the home-ground of things, their
suchness, from the standpoint of sunyata, Nishitani resorts to the metonymic
language used in Buddhism to point towards the emptiness that entails the
knowledge of non-knowing. He refers to the old sayings according to which 'fire
does not burn fire', 'water does not wet water', and 'the eye does not see the eye'; and
goes on to argue that these things sustain their own being in their intrinsic suchness
by not being able to overstep themselves: being is sustained by non-being.
Just as the essential function of the eye, to see things, is possible by virtue of
the selfness of the eye, whereby the eye does not see the eye itself; and just as
the fact that fire burns things is possible by virtue of the selfness of fire,
whereby the fire does not burn itself; so, too, the knowing of the subject is
rendered possible by the not-knowing of the self in itself. Thus we can say in
general that the self in itself makes the existence of the self as a subject
possible, and that this not-knowing constitutes the essential possibility of
knowing. (Nishitani 1982:156)
It is only in this field that the self can be experienced as absolutely subjective and
free from objectifying reality. But this does not mean that the substantial
manifestation of things disappears, only that our existence in time becomes
radicalised as a synchronic awareness of things in themselves because we identify
with them at their home-ground, in a negation of being that is no mere nihility; but an
Absolute emptiness that is an absolute fullness at the same time. Such is spiritual
knowledge, which is essentially non-discursive, since verbal structures can only point
at such knowledge but may never aspire to convey it on their own.
In the field of consciousness though, which is the field where science dwells,
sunyata may be posed as the "near side" transhistorical realm needed for any form of
historicity in the form of an ideal type that cannot be experienced from the field of
consciousness; but that can nevertheless be posed as an aspirational ideal. This
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discloses an immediate personal historicity in awareness of synchronicity with the
existence of all other things and beings in a deeper way than that that of the Western
tradition, where the self separates itself ontologically from the object of cognition to
produce its own judgement; just like its "far side" transhistorical realm. Nevertheless,
the subject-object divide is an important principle of our objectivist discipline and
should still be considered as relevant in order to produce intellectual knowledge; but
this is done in a recognition that this disciplinary principle must be based on some
form of mythos, just like that of any other discipline. What we are left with is two
disciplinary realms that are helpful to establish the relationship between synchrony
and diachrony from the present moment ofmeaningful experience.
Two concepts that emerge from evolutionary biology are useful to illustrate
the kind of historicity that emerges from the Eastern and Western transhistorical
realms: ontogeny and phylogeny. Ontogeny denotes the individual lifetime of living
beings, and phylogeny, the evolution of their species through time. If we translate
these biological concepts into historical ones, giving them the relationship between
personal history and universal human history respectively, we could relate ontogeny
to our embodied present as living beings and phylogeny to the known history of
humanity. We could also say that the historical facticity of the Eastern tradition tends
towards ontogeny; while that of the Western tradition tends towards phylogeny.
Nevertheless, this arrangement can only be done phenomenologically and
synchronically, that is, from the present moment of meaningful experience. The
whole organisational symbology of both traditions cannot be overlapped
diachronically onto each other because they follow divergent symbological paths in
human imagination.
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IV. 4. True Equality
The contemplation of the "near side" perspective as a transhistorical realm
overcomes the typically Western attitude of necessary objectification of the 'other'
sustained in a postcolonial world-order (where the master objectifies the slave
through exploitation and the slave objectifies the master through desire). The
relationship between the self and the 'other' is complementary from a synchronic
perspective of phenomenological observation. It is in this sense that Luce Irigaray
considers that only the gaze of the Buddah in a "selfless, nurturant relation to the
world" escapes the dialectics of domination (Jay 1993:538). These dialectics are
framed in a diachrony of progress towards the unified goals of "universal" humanity.
The contemporary modern crisis of an 'end of history' is unable to unify those goals
beyond wealth expansion without resorting to a Judeo-Christian kind of morality as
judgement. This kind of morality can be very self-destructive when it comes to the
question of blame. The Western peoples inherit their view of reality and,
paradoxically enough, collective allocation of blame simply extends the primitive
belief in cosmobiological tribal responsibility and inheritance of either virtue or
disgrace, and worse, the drive to vengeance and retribution. This same attitude also
perpetuates belief in the 'delayed' quality of the underdeveloped peoples as the
collective 'other'. So it is important not to be too ready to fall for the typically
Western 'guilt trip' for its ancestors having colonised and oppressed the rest of the
world systematically. Allocation of historical responsibility is useless beyond telling
the historical tale, which has already been told. From this perspective, one can only
reconsider one's own belief system... unless it is one's own chosen path to engage in
endless critical struggle with the world.
An alternative to this is the synchronic perspective that includes an absolute
"near side" of transhistorical reality as agape (Love) and karuna (Compassion);
regarded as able to forgive and let go of blame. Nevertheless, in our intellectual
tradition —even from this synchronic perspective— the diachronic tendencies of the
"far side" transhistorical realm are also needed for a work of differentiation of
phenomenal domains. There is a need to expand our objectivist view
142
methodologically in order to portray all views of reality that we can conceive of as
relevant to human interaction and life. Through this exercise of convergence,
scientific observation may learn to overcome its own fundamentalist claims over the
legitimate nature of reality. Nevertheless, the Western tradition has created the
possibilities of contemporary global coordination and, while this "achievement" is
not without its terrible vices, it is also a tangible outcome of the Western tradition
and culture which is already a global tradition and culture.
The Western/Christian view of reality and its supremacy over the world in
globalisation, today effectively divides nations by their progress in the Western
scientific cosmological tale (first world/third world, developed/underdeveloped);
which after secularisation and mechanisation in the global capitalist market, has
become progress in wealth expansion. However, there is a need to take a closer look
at this tale and its accompanying "rational" mythos. For example, the "laws of the
market", which are seen as natural and set free by omnipotent and rational processes;
yet the liberal thrust of globalisation has proved to have had devastating
consequences for the poor of the world. State protectionism struggles with this side
of the mechanisms of "wealth expansion"; but even if neo-liberal national-States
commit themselves to keep an eye on the interests of the people, they stick to the
liberal future promises of wealth expansion for all; while present existence before the
"invisible hand" makes the rich richer. The rich take advantage of the cheap human
labour and resources coming from those who lack power in the world-order, while
the prevalent contemporary discourse sustains that the poor must modernise
themselves (work harder) to have access to the wealth that is claimed to be
expanding. In this way, the Western/Christian perception of time as a future 'not yet'
is very helpful to the political arbitrariness of the powerful. But mythical tales of this
sort, like that of social Revolution, may also become quite useful for organised
opposition to the establishment which at the same time as being critical, may also
become very destructive.
In the Western cosmology 'universality' is conceived of as an intellectual
abstract category, not as experienced actuality. This means that scientific intellectual
knowledge has in-built limitations due to its dependence on local and particular (in
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space and time) empirical evidence. Although it must keep the concept of
universality as a disciplinary constant, the models of reality that science produces are
only statistical truths, or mere approximations to universal reality that only succeed
in explaining local phenomena. In the embodied existence and at a local level, these
models have proved to be very powerful... but the borderline between powerful and
destructive can be crossed —and has been crossed— especially in the contemporary
abstract linear scientific and technological incrementally progressive race that clashes
with the earth's organic cycles. Also, the divided universe of the Christian cosmology
that science inherits is unable to conceive of universal union with the 'other' because
it sees the realm of wrongness as real, and its existence is regarded as a border
horizon with 'otherness' —even if there is an assumption, in the notion of progress,
that this horizon will eventually disappear. It is important to bear in mind that this
division came by through a 'particular' cosmological mythos and a culturally
determined vivid awareness of individual responsibility.
To lose faith in the divided universe of Western science is a movement
similar to losing faith in the universality of Newtonian physics: a unified universe is
able to see the practical usefulness of the latter, but does not see universal truth in
them (even as the methodological principle of contemplating the universe is
sustained). The relevance of Apocalypse in this work is seen as a spiritual symbol
that signals the end of history in Absolute emptiness (forgiveness in Love and
Compassion), the absolute "near side" of transhistorical reality with respect to the
self (individual or collective) is seen as an ideal-type signpost around which the
synchronic perspective of phenomenological observation can be organised. This
synchronic perspective is built here with respect to the "near side" as well as "far
side" transhistorical realms, which as we will See in the next part of the thesis, can
be regarded as principles of methodological observation, or as ideal-typical signposts
that mark different perspectives of a tendency to 'universe'. The "far side" tendency
describes complex multiplicity following the disciplinary mandates of factuality; the
"near side" tendency points towards transcending physical separation and regards
human mind as an ideally collective spiritual universe. It is only in the wholeness of
that collectivity that the divided modern self of humanity may be healed, yet will
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remain infinitely diverse in its embodied character. In the intentional union of the 'I'
and the 'other' particular experience can reflect universality in its uniqueness;
however, this is a spiritual union that does not take place discursively —but it leaves
its marks on ordinary human interaction, in the synchronic figures of forgiveness and
trust. The latter are human emotions pointing to the ideal transhistorical "near side"
beyond existential nihility; that of Divine love {agape) and compassion (karuna).
This is what Nishitani calls the structure of religious love:
Here the absolute self-negation that sees the telos of the self not in the self but
in all things and the absolute self-affirmation that sees the original selfness of
the self in all things are one. (Nishitani 1982:277)
When Absolute emptiness is an ideal of disciplined interaction, one sees oneself in
everyone else, each conscious self becomes a monad that will reflect oneself in the
constant expansion of consciousness: the 'other' is everyone that I perceive as an
embodied self and interaction should lead me to the realisation of the illusion of
'otherness'.
In a phenomenological manner, awareness of embodiment allows for
diversity in the modality of "appearance", as the world becomes the "world-
perceived-in-the-reflective-life":
The descriptive spirit and the requirement of constitution tend to meet but fail
to blend into each other for according to the idealistic requirement of
constitution, the Other must be a modification ofmy Ego and according to the
realistic character of description, the Other never ceases to exclude himself
from the sphere of "my monad". (Ricoeur 1967a:130)
This work is therefore an exercise where science is regarded as a discipline that
should learn to overcome its fundamentalist claims over reality. It attempts to reach
out to the two sources of universality in the transhistorical realms that tend to the
directions of the "far side" and the "near side". And yet, this theory does not claim
universal application; its validity rests —like in the pagan traditions— on a trust in
cosmology: the symbological links that various human experiences of order may
produce between the three cosmologies. They produce symbols that organise human
perception of reality and therefore, determine the shape of its social order. Unlike
postmodern theoretical constructs, that deny existence to this universal dimension,
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this theory for organisational analysis considers that universality is a symbol that
conveys a spiritual-human value that cannot be ignored or taken as illusion in the
contemplation of 'world views'. If the realm of the universal is rejected, the link
between particular experience and any claim of further validity is lost. And yet the
claims for validity of this theoretical framework can only be seen in its usefulness as
an analytical tool for a narrative approach to the qualitative analysis of human order.
It is important to say that, despite this work's critique of the Western tradition,
I am aware that this belief system has created the possibility of global coordination
through the figure of the secular institution. This figure might inherit a charismatic
aura from its sacred ancestors, but in the practice of a spiritual discipline of self-
reflection and awareness, it can be observed that institutions sustain and coordinate
global interaction by the synchronic organisational notion of trust (a kind of intuitive
submission to experience), just like this same notion sustains the practice of the
scientific discipline (Shapin 1994). However, it is important to stress that the
Western symbolisation of its view of reality is an essential step in the development of
human creativity. The moral individual, even if produced by contrast to evil, is a gem
of the Western tradition in its universalistic responsibility towards the rest of
humanity, in its ideal clarity about intentionality, in its intellectual discipline, and in
its formal organisational possibilities. The Western possibility of internalising the
concept of 'universe', even as an abstract conception, creates awareness of a shared
ideal as the basis of civilised interaction that is able to transcend nations and creeds.
This kind of refined interaction is produced by belief in this universal ideal; but it is
only through synchronic trust that the ideal can be reified in experience. Its new
disciplinary chore is to stop judgement upon the 'other', which according to
phenomenological metaphysics, is only a constant judgement upon the T; if the 'I'
and the 'other' are not embraced as one, the moral individual remains a nihilistic,
solitary "unhappy consciousness".
"History symbolically ends," says Frye, "at the point at which master and
servant become the same person, and represent the same thing" (Frye 1982:91). In
the Christian historical symbolism, this possibility has a "once and for all" quality in
the life of Jesus Christ, the perfect Son of God, who took the form of a historical
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character and walked the earth; but it is based on the expectation of an end of times
(and the world) in Apocalypse. From a synchronic perspective, it is possible to
conceive of this kind of love without the need of a factual Second coming; yet with a
symbological one in the acceptance of a transhistorical realm located on the "near
side" of the self. From this standpoint, every object of historicity has its origin in
Absolute emptiness and the notion of self is extended to everything and everyone.
From this standpoint, no intellectual or positive criteria may be defined in order to
rule interaction and equality. This is why it still needs the "far side" transhistorical
realm to differentiate human rules and agreements that change constantly.
Nevertheless, the "near side" is an ideal realm of self from which the most authentic
kind ofmorality emanates without falling into the problems of legalism, it is an ideal
realm of true equality:
True equality is not simply a matter of an equality of human rights and the
ownership of property. Such equality concerns man as the subject of desires
and rights and comes down, in the final analysis, to the self-centered mode of
being of man himself. It has yet to depart fundamentally from the principles
of self-love. And therein the roots of discord and strife lie ever concealed.
True equality, on the contrary, comes about in what we might call the
reciprocal interchange of absolute inequality, such that the self and the other
stand simultaneously in the position of absolute master and absolute servant
with regard to one another. It is an equality in love. (Nishitani 1982:285)
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If they ask you, 'From where have you originated?' Say
to them, 'We have come from the light, where the light
has originated through itself.' If they ask you, 'Who are
you?' Say to them, 'We are His sons, and we are the
elect of the living Father. 'If they ask you, 'What is the
sign of your Father in you?' Say to them, 'It is a
movement and a rest'.






The Present Moment of Meaningful Experience:
A Synchronic Perspective on the Study of Human Order
This chapter describes a theoretical perspective that is based on both the Western and
Eastern notions of transcendence in order to try to overcome, from a synchronic and
phenomenological perspective of observation, the traditional objectification of people
and their beliefs. This is achieved by taking into account the spiritual dimension of
human consciousness at the background of present observation, in a constant
awareness of the transcendental roots to the discipline of scientific observation. The
perspective makes use of the two transcendentalist notions of transhistorical "realms"
in order to embrace the Western intention of contemplating the universe; but this is
done in the awareness that, if universe or infinity is apprehended, this is a spiritual
experience that can never be fully described. Nevertheless, our Western tradition of
knowledge is based on description from a transhistorical "vantage point" of
observation, deeply rooted in the construction of traditional scientific generalisations.
I will propose an imaginary "vantage point" of observation, which is related to the
emerging paradigm of complexity, in order to organise useful scientific
generalisations that can accommodate views of reality other than the strictly Western
one at the same level of significance to human life.
As has been argued, an intellectual description from this perspective cannot
be done without resorting to metaphoric structures that are linked to the emotional
attachment and knowledge of existing symbols with mythical grounds. This is the
reason why, even if our theoretical perspective is engaged in describing reality with
respect to ideally transcendental or transhistorical realms, the mundane scene of
methodological application should be aware that theory is essentially based on myth,
and constitutes at best a useful metaphor for understanding. From this awareness, the
Eastern insights about transcendence are taken on loan in order to expand the
Western intellectual tradition towards the direction where 'oneself and the 'other'
cannot be clearly distinguished in phenomenological observation. And so, the
"present moment of meaningful experience" is one that lies within a synchronic
conscious area of overlap between the three ideally typical views of reality. Elowever,
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it is important to bear in mind that this centre of consciousness is imagined from the
Western tradition of knowledge and cultural inheritance, and so, its universalising
theoretical conclusions should be regarded --at best— as useful impositions of ideal
essences on empirical reality.
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V. 1. Complexity and Phenomenology
From a "present moment" perspective, the outcome of observation is recorded
through phenomenological observation, which through eidetic reduction, embarks
upon the intellectual discovery of the unfolding of a richly textured complexity.
Nevertheless, I assume that the perspective of spiritual simplicity is always present
with the observer, its experience is part of her/his own moral and/or spiritual path —
necessarily silent. The "present moment" perspective discloses simultaneity, and so,
its essence is synchronicity. Complexity in this work is defined as a way of looking
at any phenomenon that can also be experienced and observed in its sheer simplicity
and that, as such, can be the source of any kind of knowledge. Nevertheless, for there
to be knowledge, there must also exist the possibility of convergence among human
beings, which our scientific tradition of knowledge symbolises as intersubjectivity. I
consider the much debated notion of "intersubjectivity" as an ideal type of perfect
communication that is unachievable intellectually in its absolute purity. Nevertheless,
intellectual intersubjectivity may be empirically observed as an area of convergence
that is experienced in interaction and that is defined practically and culturally. In
order to disclose this complex intersubjective realm of interaction, a methodological
area of convergence between the Western "far side", the Eastern "near side", and
primitive mythology (the resulting tale) is proposed for the three types of knowledge
(intellectual, spiritual, primary) to coexist theoretically. It is possible to define this
area only synchronically because, as has been pointed out in previous chapters, these
three areas of experience do not converge symbologically in diachrony. The area of
simultaneous convergence is defined through a phenomenological approach to
observation of complexity in human interaction as an analytical tool that "stands for"
the boundless immediacy of experience. Within this area, complexity coexists and
overlaps with simplicity.
This is a methodological way to deal with what has recently been identified as
"complexity" in embodied human interaction, which is not the same as
"complicated". Complication arises within abstraction itself in its often intricate
patterns of explanation. The notion of complexity found in cognitive sciences and
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physics is regarded more as a perspective on world phenomena than a visible feature
of the world; and I argue that this perspective allows a more dynamic analysis of
social structures of order. This perspective arises as an alternative to deterministic
views of the world, which only managed to portray very complicated solutions to
problems of scientific observation. The "complicated" is already a product of human
conceptual representation, while, as Le Moigne puts it, "the surprising part of
complexity is the invisibility of its content. [...] The 'very complicated' may not be
'very complex', and the 'very simple', such as a grain of matter, may prove to be very
complex" (Le Moigne 1984:37). This is clarified when we consider that complexity
is a perspective to observe phenomena that are posed as elements of systemic
interaction. As Edgar Morin puts it:
If we could imagine a paradigm of complexity, it would be a paradigm
uniting distinction, which is necessary to grasp objects or phenomena with
conjunction, which is necessary to establish links and interrelations. It would
not reduce the complex to the simple, but would integrate the simple within
the complex. A paradigm of complexity would be a paradigm where thought
would not be controlled by logic, but logic would be controlled by thought.
More specifically it would be a dialogical principle. The word dialogical itself
establishes the limitations and possibilities of knowledge. Why limitations?
Dialogical means it is impossible to reach a sole principle, or master a word,
whatever it is; there will always be something irreducible to a single
principle, be it chance, uncertainty, contradiction, or organisation. But at the
same time, dialogics, while it contains an intrinsic limitation, also includes
the possibility of bringing concepts into play among themselves. (Morin
1984:65-6)
In the observation of complexity, the observer finds him/herself within the
phenomenon that s/he observes, in interaction with it, in the same social
environment: S/he finds him/herself in a position where every interaction with the
object of observation transforms the object of observation itself. Subjectivity is
therefore identified with individual present awareness of meaningful order, while
objectivity can be regarded as a discursive social construction of causality in past
and (possibly) future (planned) interaction which allows the observers to have
conversations with each other and build a factual cosmology, map our scientific view
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of reality with respect to the world, 'touch the elephant'1. According to Jean-Pierre
Dupuy, in complex theory, "the law which governs phenomena may itself be the
product of the phenomena, without, however, ceasing to be the law" (1984:257). The
observation of complexity assumes an intertwining of cause and effect which is
particularly relevant in the study of human social phenomena: In this work the latter
is regarded as both discursively created by embodied humans and practically creative
of the consciousness of self of every individual human; and both realms are
dimensions of human consciousness.
The present moment of meaningful experience that I propose, in contrast to
the ideal transhistorical realms of the "near side" and the "far side", is lived in the
immediate environment of present consciousness. This environment is lived
subjectively and functionally by the individual self who finds her/himself in the field
of consciousness. Here, environment refers to an area of reality that our tradition
identifies as the objective 'outside' realm that embodied people enact and perceive
and can agree about as being (our notion of) the immediate "objective" reality in
which we interact; one that we can describe with a degree of precision, the realm
where science is most effective (to the point of being dangerous). In what we call
"objective reality" particular people interact through common elements of their views
of reality through which interaction is structured and in which interaction structures
itself. This simultaneous created and creative realm of interaction is experienced as
the realm of potential agreement between human beings. The concept of
intersubjectivity can be useful in this kind of constructivist practical manifestation of
experienced agreement.
The traditional ideal realm of intersubjectivity for the "objective" mind is an
ideal of collective perfect interaction on the basis of intellectual knowledge. But
intersubjectivity is unachievable qua intellectual ideal because, on the one hand, it
1 The fable of the blind men attempting to describe an elephant is a favourite metaphor resorted to in
order to describe the efforts of making sense of organisations (see Waldo 1961). This is also the
case in interdisciplinary research groups. In his book Understanding Religion, Eric Sharpe uses it in
order to illustrate how the different definitions of religion come to be; the elephant being the
complex phenomenon under analysis: "One touches its trunk and describes it as a snake; another
touches its ear and describes it as a winnowing-fan; another touches its leg and describes it as a tree;
another its tail and describes it as a broom" (Quoted by Bennett 1996:13).
154
implies perfect cognition of what goes on in the head of the human other, which is
contradictory with the idea that what goes on in subjective experience cannot be fully
expressed discursively; and on the other, its transcendental symbological source is
situated in the transhistorical realm of the "far side", inaccessible to the embodied
particular person. But the realm of intersubjectivity may be posed here as a cultural
realm, as the experienced area of agreement for synchronic functionality of the
present moment of interaction. Nevertheless this work does not pose a mere
constructivist idea of intersubjectivity, because I consider it here as bootstrapped
back to the people who generate their view of social reality, which generates their
consciousness of self back. And so, we constantly 'grasp' what we are and 'get caught'
by this grasping simultaneously.
However, even though intersubjectivity is unachievable in its intellectual
ideal purity, assumption of an 'ideal' intersubjective realm is essential to our
discipline. It is important to bear in mind though, that the symbological roots of
intersubjectivity are transcendental: when Husserl has to bring the
intermonadological intersubjectivity back to the res cogitans, he falls into the same
Cartesian trap and fails to convince us that intersubjectivity remains transcendental in
our embodied experience of intellectuality (see Luhmann 1995). It points to
transcendence and is therefore a realm of spiritual experience, not of intellectual
experience. The intersubjective realm, then, can be posed for the purposes of theory
as an ideal type that can only be achieved imperfectly through constantly changing
culture and/or through the abstract tools of intellectual knowledge. But it is through
this intersubjective realm of collective discipline that we can agree as observers on
what is "objective" and factual experienced reality.
And so, within this created and creative notion of disciplined observation,
"objectivity" is based on factual (legitimate) evidence that can be organised as a pull
towards one's personal and embodied present consciousness and a push towards a
tale of beginning and beyond that may be cyclical or linear, or a combination of both.
The factual historicity of the present moment of meaningful experience needs to
consider both of the transhistorical realms described in chapter IV above. They can
be considered as ideal "sign-posts", with the "near side" at the centre (the ideal and
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radical subjectivity of Absolute emptiness) and the "far side" at an infinite distance
from it (the ideal and radical objectivity of God's eye-view), to organise itself as
either individual particular life span (ontogeny) or universal history (phylogeny). The
'pull' towards personal consciousness is necessary in order for the observer to be
continually aware that her/his own realm of experienced awareness is conditioned by
his/her own personal life-story and cultural inheritance for interpretation of reality.
The resulting story that the observer tells "objectively" about reality, even as it must
be couched in honest observation of factual evidence, is nevertheless only a useful
mythological tale: the descriptive symbols of intellectuality are displaced from being
able to apprehend the diverse infinity of complex phenomena that lie between the
transhistorical "near side" and the infinitely distant "far side". I regard this as
congenial with the Weberian epistemological tradition according to which, on the
one hand, "objectivity" in the social sciences is constantly tied to our own
subjectivity (Weber 1949); and on the other, ideal-typical constructions should
always be measured against relevant empirical reality because they in themselves are
mere Utopia (Weber 1987).
This perspective is proposed here for the phenomenological observer of
complex order to construct her/his eidetic explanations. My theoretical construction
implies that complexity and simplicity are intimately bound to each other and are
experienced simultaneously; yet can only be distinguished intellectually from each
other from different perspectives, and one at a time. The relationship between the
spiritual and synchronic "near side" and the intellectual diachronic "far side"
perspectives is mediated by a sea of complexity that is also simplicity at the same
time; the "far side" organises a centrifugal tendency of diachronic complexity and
intellectual differentiation while the "near side" organises a centripetal tendency of
synchronic simplicity and spiritual convergence of consciousness. The difference
between this construction and the relationship between the Western notions of the
One {Hen) and the many (.Apeiron) lies in that the complex perspective does not
emanate from convergence of multiplicity in homogeneous simplicity. That is,
complexity and simplicity do not emanate from each other; rather, they emanate from
human consciousness: the centrifugal push of intellectuality or the centripetal pull of
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spirituality, and constitute possible transhistorical perspectives that coexist
simultaneously. The complex intellectual perspective defines what it is that
differentiates the borders (or circumference) of observed things (even as they overlap
with one another), while at the same time, their centres converge in spiritual and
silent simplicity. In this sense, both complexity (intellectual) and simplicity
(spiritual) are observational perspectives and not "objective" characteristics of the
described reality; and so, the notion of complexity is no more (and no less) than an
'ideal' and a useful analytical tool.
It is important for this work to emphasise that complexity and simplicity are
only perspectives of observation and that, in our intellectual tradition of knowledge,
simplicity remains silent. This is an necessary point for a change in perspective from
diachrony to synchrony, because in organisational theory, complex organisation is
identified with the "advanced" type of modern organisation in contemporary post-
industrial service-based economy (Giarini 1984), whose immediately previous form
of conception was defined around the Weberian legal-rational type of domination
(Morgan 1986, Czarniawska-Joerges 1992). In the next chapter, I will point at the
past "path dependency" of this traditional notion of complexity on the Victorian
progressivist assumption that complexity gradually emanates from simplicity through
differentiation and specialisation. While it is true that this movement can be observed
in present "post-industrial" societies, it is misleading to consider that more traditional
societies are "simple" or lacking in the complexity of social interaction and meaning
formation and interpretation. It could even be argued that the service-based economy
type of complexity observed today could be seen as a "return" to spontaneous
interaction after the original rigid formality of legal-rational ("scientific") or industry-
based organisations failed to adapt to changing circumstances2. Besides, this view of
complexity is necessarily diachronic, set in human history, and displaced from
converging with other traditions of knowledge and cultural imagination. What in
traditional organisational theory is identified as a diachronic tendency of modernity
2 For a discussion on how "complex" organisations are a combination of the bureaucratic paradigm
and traditional practices and how this contributes to their complexity, see (Czarniawska-Joerges
1992).
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towards "complexity", can be regarded as a mere consequence of the "complication"
of modern life from the synchronic perspective. From this perspective, or the present
moment of meaningful experience, complexity is necessarily a transhistorical
perspective of observation; that is, an analytical tool of observation that should not be
imposed as an aspect of the reality that we observe.
We must take into account that the observer him/herself is culturally situated.
This is the perspective of a phenomenological analysis where the observer also
observes her/himself and his/her own embodied condition. From this perspective,
subjectivity is seen as a universal experience of consciousness while objectivity is
particular to a specific kind of group, a socially constructed view of reality (see
Berger and Luckmann 1966, Czarniawska-Joerges 1992, Searle 1995). The observer
must situate her/himself in the scientific world view and be aware that only couched
in its cosmological language, can s/he have a conversation with other observers. It is
only by being aware of his/her own discursive intention that the observer can achieve
any kind of "objectivity": The disciplined practice of the observer not only includes
the contemplation of her/himself but, as Weber (1949) insisted, it is directed by this
contemplation. Objectivity in the social sciences (as well as that of any other kind) is
based on trust in the honesty about factuality of the observer as a synchronic
principle of practice, but also on the collective nature of the scientific discipline
(Shapin 1994, see also Czarniawska 1998). And so, in this discipline, the notion of
observation itself bears past path dependencies on cultural unde'ofqndings.
According to Martin Jay, the Greek philosophical tradition favoured the sense
of vision in order to achieve knowledge which was conceived as "the state of having
seen" (Snell 1953:198)3, and this permeated the subsequent Western philosophical
history. He follows Hans Jonas (1982) to say that sight may be considered as the
noblest of the senses because it is pre-eminently perceived as the sense of
simultaneity:
Intrinsically less temporal than other senses such as hearing or touch, it thus
tends to elevate static Being over dynamic Becoming, fixed essences over
3 Quoted by (Jay 1993:24).
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ephemeral appearances. Greek philosophy from Parmenides through to Plato
accordingly emphasized an unchanging and eternal presence. (Jay 1993:24)
In modern epistemology, it was the French philosophical tradition. Jay tells us, that
produced an explicit shared suspicion of sight as a supposedly privileged sense for
knowledge:
In the case of philosophy, three changes must be singled out for special
mention. The first concerns what can be termed the detranscendentalization of
perspective; the second, the recorporealization of the cognitive subject; and
the third, the revalorization of time over space. (Jay 1993:187)
However, even if perspective is not seen as eternal Presence, being disenchanted and
given to an embodied observer in time, it is still linked to the original symbolisation
of transcendence in the Western tradition of knowledge. And yet, perspective can
also become a disenchanted conceptual aid to separate phenomenal domains. The
perceptual phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty as opposed to the transcendental one of
Husserl poses just this alternative; phenomenology could "mean something besides
searching for pure essences through eidetic intuition; it could mean as well exploring
impure existence, which resisted reduction to the object of a gaze, phenomenological
or otherwise" (Jay 1993:268). And so the division of the continuum of time is set
against the differentiation between static absolute perspective and movement; which
can be described as two realms of our experience of time.
And so, in our scientific tradition, nature is observed in its most minute detail
and recorded in descriptive symbols that demonstrate an objective "world" order, or a
natural order. But for us to be able to conceive of the world as a measurable and
observable entity, transcendence was displaced beyond this world as an omnipotent
gaze which set the human observer (and worshipper of truth) in a mimetic discipline
of objective observation in the place of God as an Absolute Observer. Hierophany is
not a meaningful symbol or activity within science, but it is important to remain
aware that in the practice of disciplined observation. Divine Presence never really
disappears entirely as a structural assumption of the discipline. Divine Presence is
then projected on the world as the perfect mechanics of the universe —that was
originally a celebration of Divine Creation— and embodied by the transcendental
identity of the scientist, and even if this transformation and mimesis of divine
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Presence is not currently necessarily regarded as symbolic of the Divine —it is more
readily ignored and assumed as a disenchanted mechanism— it produces an
environment for objective observation. The original philosophical fervour of this
. transformation is left without representation in current science though, and therefore,
its transcendentally divine essence becomes trivial. What is left for the scientist is the
joy of adventure and discovery once the world is disenchanted, and even this
eventually becomes trivial too. But the symbolisation of transcendence itself within
the structure of the scientific belief system is not trivial methodologically, and the
practice of disciplined observation which this cosmology requires shapes many of the
instances in which modern people perceive the world today. Throughout this century
in the European academic circles, it is true, this perspectivalism has been challenged;
but it is only challenged on the basis of its own cosmological assumptions, and
therefore, the demolition of cosmology is never complete (as in the main myth of
modern rational "enlightenment" and in all of its subsequent "post" rejections and
critiques), it is only reinvented along the same lines according to what is important
contemporarily.
In my theoretical model, the phenomenological embodied observer stands at
the centre of her/his own subjectivity and observes his/her own present situation with
respect to past and future. And yet s/he is aware that this perspective is perfectly
subjective and may only be shared intellectually as imperfect intersubjectivity
(particular and culturally determined objectivity). Synchrony and diachrony are two
ways of symbolising the experience of time, but are not absolute categories. They are
useful, as in literary criticism, to differentiate between simultaneity and sequence and
also point towards perceived spatial domains of closeness and distance. Synchrony's
tendency is centripetal while diachrony's movement defines a centrifugal direction.
They are categories of time that make sense both within our scientific belief system
and our embodied experience, and are thus useful conceptual tools... but their
symbological relationship to transcendence and to an essential divide between the
latter and the world in our tradition of knowledge cannot be obliterated. Myhtos is
always the basis for discipline.
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Bearing this in mind . and from a synchronic perspective, then, the method of
observation is necessarily phenomenological and its eidetic constructions from
observation have the symbolic orientation of descriptive complex factuality. In
phenomenological analysis, the reality of the world remains bracketed as appearance
(eidetic reduction); and if combined with a transhistorical "near side" of simplicity,
particular personal experience can be seen as reflecting the universal level of things.
Even if this experience of seeing universality in particularity cannot be described for
being spiritual; it can be posed as a relevant ideal type to guide observation.
Reduction in phenomenology is a state of mind that suspends the abstract assumption
that there is an outside reality as opposed to the Kantian assumption that can never
know the thing in itself, but that is based on the ontology of an outside reality (the
subject/object divide). Reduction is, of course, an artificial resource that allows for
reflective contemplation of the sphere of ownness, insulated from anything other than
itself, where "any apparent relation between oneself and anything else [is construed]
as solely a property of one's own subjective experience, a 'mirroring' of what is
included in one's monad and not a perceiving of something outside" (Hammond et al.
1991:211). Although Husserl's use of the concept of'monad' is methodological, and
not essentially endorsing Leibniz's metaphysical notion4, the use of his methodology
always involves a metaphysical decision.
When distinguishing between the method practised and the philosophical
interpretation of this method, in no way do I mean to exclude the well-known
phenomenological reduction. To do so would be to reduce phenomenology to
a rhapsody of lived experiences and to baptise as "phenomenology" any
concern for the curiosities of human life, as is too often the case. The
reduction is the straight gate to phenomenology. But in the very act of
reduction a methodological conversion and a metaphysical decision intersect,
and just at that point one must distinguish between them (Ricoeur
1967a: 176).
I explain the metaphysical decision as the need to include the transhistorical realm of
the "near side" together with that of the "far side". As eidetic judgement poses no
individual essence as the basis for existence, this phenomenological artifice can be
J Husserl explicitly rejects the Leibnizian interpretation of the concept of'monad' in the section 62 of
his Cartesian Meditations "as the ultimate constituents of reality" (Hammond et a!. 1991:211)
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considered as analogous to the ideal "collective" spiritual realm of the "near side"
transhistorical perspective. This spiritual "near side" gives balance to an excess
reliability on the occularcentric perspective of an ideal transcendental subject at the
"far side", inaccessible to the particular and embodied person, and incompatible with
the worldly res cogitans. And yet, at the same time as the observer uses this
transhistorical imaginary "tools" for observation s/he is also aware that, in present
synchrony, the observer is only (but not merely) a particular and embodied person.
But this person's identity lives in the cultural tradition (discipline) and personal
scientific vocation to observe human structures of perception, which constantly
change, but which are (agreed to be) experienced as constantly human at the same
time. I argue that it is only through this metaphysical decision that particularity can
acquire the same level of relevance as universality in observation of human
experience. But even as this relevance is realised emotionally, it should be brought to
embodied awareness and to the experienced impossibility of sharing absolute truth
through any kind of symbolisation of reality.
And so in the present moment of meaningful experience the divide between
subject and object is never complete through consideration of both transhistorical and
necessarily ideal (mythical) realms. In simultaneity, object and subject are
unavoidably entwined and create each other, and the awareness of this, in turn,
produces degrees of uncertainty that science should consider theoretically. As Morin
said, complex thought appears when "knowledge has to negotiate and deal with
uncertainty" (1984:64); which is cut off in the mutilating types of thought that he
calls simplifiers. But he believes that complex thought is not about complete
accounts of reality, knowledge is never complete, but about accounts of reality that
refuse to resort to simplifying mutilations of the reality that they try to describe:
For example, if we think of the fact that we are physical, biological, social,
cultural, psychic, and spiritual beings, complexity is obviously that which
attempts to link or identify these aspects by highlighting the differences
between them, whereas simplified thought either separates these different
aspects or unifies them through a mutilating reduction. (Morin 1984:63)
Resistance to take on board a full analytical division between subject and object is
related to the closeness between human interaction and human life. The former
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would commonly be related to the social sciences and the latter to biology and thus
be separated by different scientific disciplines. And so, I argue that to deal with
human interaction, a paradigm of complexity requires a symbological synthesis of
the traditionally divided grounds of social sciences and natural sciences: the division
can be regarded as artificial, or as a useful epistemic principle of scientific discipline.
Nevertheless, a synthesising perspective is necessary in order to throw some light on
the much ignored realm of synchronicity (where we all are are both natural as well as
social beings at the same time), and on the symbols of unity and trust, as essential
features of human order and life. This synchronic perspective aims at disclosing the
relevance of simultaneity as an essential feature of the practice of our intellectual
discipline in the effort of knowing ourselves... which includes knowing our cultural
inheritance as well as knowing through our cultural inheritance.
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V. 2. Structure and Organisation
Following the theory of life and cognition developed by Humberto Maturana and
Francisco Varela, the model that I propose from the synchronic perspective of
observation (the present moment of meaningful experience), is organised around two
complementary aspects of order: structure and organisation. This is because, here,
organisations are considered as living entities which are kept alive by their being
regarded as legitimately real —even while they might not be regarded as legitimate
politically— by human conscious involvement of embodiment, emotion, and
imagination3. Thus, the 'living' quality of organisations is analogous to their being
operational —not necessarily functional or efficient—, and so, organisations depend on
human life. In this work, organisation is defined as any kind of human spontaneous
or disciplined activity in order to produce social order, which in turn produces human
perception of actuality. This view of organisations is partly based on a relatively
recent interpretative trend for organisational analysis; according to which "[p]eople",
says Czarniawska-Joerges, "not only are in organisations (which both functionalist
and critical theorists assume), but they also create organizations" (1992:11). Yet, this
is only half of the story because while any form of human order and culture is created
by human beings, it is at the same time creative of the human self: We create order
and our interaction with it creates us as persons. This model for human organisation
takes into account how our consciousness and our embodiment are sustained by each
other; while individual embodiment is only a pure type of organic organisation it is
sustained by consciousness of self (the pure type of human social artificial creation),
at the same time as organic embodiment sustains this consciousness. And so, while
the point of observation is the present moment of meaningful experience, this centre
5 This perspective is not based on a purely cognitive anthropology, which Barbara Czarniawska
considers a form of solipsism: "Far from the objectivity of functionalism, past the intersubjectivity
of social constructivism, on the solipsist pole, resides cognitive anthropology, which claims that
culture is located in human kind's hearts and minds, and only there" (Czarniawska-Joerges
1992:117). My perspective includes emotion (heart), imagination (mind); but also, embodiment and
conscious enactment. As Czarniawska says, then, organisations are "socially constructed —and
reconstructed— in everyday actions. Organisations can be also desconstructed by action, but it
would again be a case of social deconstruction. This does not mean that organisations exist only in
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of synchronic actuality is not necessarily only individual, it also includes collective
realms of consciousness of self that emanate from primary and spiritual human
knowledge.
In Maturana and Varela's observations on life, structure is defined as the
changing aspect of the system —as opposed to traditional structuralism—, while
organisation is the "permanent" aspect6. To explain the conceptual difference
between these two notions (organisation and structure), Maturana uses a non-living
(and therefore non-autopoietic) system —a chair— as a straight forward example
(1992:68-69). The variability of chairs in the world depends on the diversity in
structures that there can be, and yet the particular form of organisation of materials
is the one recognised as a chair by an observer. Even if you take a chair and paint it
or drill holes in it, the structure is changed, but if the chair is not destroyed —
operationally "killed"— its organisation remains the same. In interaction, we can
observe the dynamic structural aspect of the entities that we interact with, which is
constantly changing, accommodating itself to the environment and to the needs of the
moment, moving to satisfy its own needs as well as those that it must satisfy for the
other entities that it is related to. But we can also observe the organisational
"permanent" side of this order: a number of qualities that we distinguish as the
identity of the entity that we observe in interaction, or that we interact with; the
organisation of a living entity is only "permanent" during its life-time.
The changing aspect of this model of organisational analysis is constituted by
two structural organic axis and two artificial ones (see Figs. 1, 2, and 3 at the end of
this chapter). In order to describe the "permanent" organic and artificial ideal types of
organisation (see Fig. 4 below), it is necessary first to pay attention at how the model
is structured by the complex perspective in that its structure changes constantly and
our imagination. But if nobody came to work anymore, a factory would become "that old factory
building" "(1992:34).
6 The "permanent" aspect of the model is in inverted commas because this is only an indicative
permanence, which helps us identify difference between entities, yet the changing structure of the
model necessarily produces a changing "permanent" organisation. For example, an individual
human being will be "organised" as a human being all her/his life, this is a permanent aspect of this
entity, yet his/her structure is bound to change throughout her/his life; s/he won't be the same human
being all his/her life. And so organisation allows us to identify permanence while structure allows us
to observe change.
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must necessarily deal with uncertainty. This (changing) structure has two dialogical
and entwined aspects: organic and artificial. The organic aspect of the structure
produces the basis for the observer's awareness of the union of humankind as a
species; the artificial aspect of the structure produces the basis for the observer to
ponder how the human animal is different from the non-human animal. The two
poles of each structural axis constitute a binary opposition of complementary
elements that are indistinguishable from each other without disciplined observation.
If we observe a humanly organised living 'entity' (human consciousness and
embodiment, personal relationships, families, tribes, organisations, nations...) as
being ideally typically organic and artificial at the same time, both aspects can be
observed and described through a sociological kind of "uncertainty principle".
Heisenberg posed this principle in quantum mechanics to solve the paradox
whereby two "canonically conjugate variables" (such as position and speed) "can be
defined more precisely only in an experimental situation in which the other must
become correspondingly less precisely defined. In a certain sense, each of the
variables then opposes the other" (Bohm 1980:74). So in a similar manner, the
different pair of otherwise "canonically conjugated variables" (such as structure and
organisation, the organic and the artificial aspects of human organisation, or any of
the pairs at the ends of each axis in the structure of this model) can be observed as
opposed to each other in the sense that one of them cannot be observed while looking
at the other. A phenomenological observer situated in the present moment of
meaningful experience would distinguish them as two different perspectives while
looking at the same thing. But the observer cannot see them simultaneously, but only
one at a time. They can only be differentiated through the moving perspective of
sequence in the diachronic tale described by the observer (structure, and ultimately
also organisation, are perceived as changing). In the model that I propose, the vertical
and horizontal axis constitute the changing organic structure of the system and the
two diagonal axis constitute the changing artificial structure of the system (see Fig. 1
at the end of this chapter). I will engage in describing the organic structure first, and
then I will proceed to complete the structure of the model by describing its artificial
components.
166
In the organic structure, the vertical axis is formed by the dichotomy
imagination/emotion, and the horizontal axis is constituted by consciousness of
self/embodiment (see Fig. 2 at the end of this chapter). The vertical axis represents
individual subjectivity governed by imagination and emotion, which cannot be
measured, and is a blind spot or an asymptote for this kind of organisational analysis,
but its existence must be assumed. It represents the subjectivity of the observer
him/herself, which Weber (1949) postulated as the only source of "objectivity" in the
social sciences. The consideration of this dichotomy, and its logistics within the
model, indicates personal tendencies that the observer should clarify: only the
observer has access to her/his own subjectivity, to the observer's perfectly particular
perspective. But also, only through this subjectivity does the observer have access to
experience and perception of any kind of order. The axis emotion/imagination can be
seen as the representation of a mirror, where the axis of embodiment/consciousness
of self are seen as the person and his/her own reflection in the observed world. From
the perspective of the consciousness of self, imagination and emotion are seen as
psychological categories of mind-like energy. From the perspective of embodiment,
imagination and emotion are related to the physiology of the brain, as it has been
observed that emotional activity (music and poetry) is localised in the right side of
the brain hemisphere, and intellectual imagination (conceptual thought and speech),
is localised in the left side (Dunbar 1996:139). The difference between embodiment
and consciousness of self is regarded as a difference that can only be construed in
artificial terms, and yet, those aspects together with emotion and imagination are
inextricable aspects of being human that all observers find themselves with. Thus, the
vertical and horizontal axis remain the organic structure of the model.
Our embodiment and consciousness constitute two changing aspects of our
organic human structure that here will be organised along the mind-body divide.
However, this organisation obeys heuristic reasons and is not proposed in a way in
which embodiment is equal to body and consciousness of self equal to mind, they are
not seen as two 'things', assumed to be separate. Rather, consciousness and
embodiment will be seen as simultaneous indistinguishable phenomena. They can
only be observed separately in phenomenological reduction, when the observer
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chooses not to see one of them. Structure is the changing aspect of the system, but
this is not random change or deterministic transformation, it is somewhere 'in
between' randomness and determination and has therefore a complex stochastic
nature whose tendencies can be observed (see Le Moigne 1984, Morin 1984).
In a different heuristic representation, it is useful to visualise the two sides of
the dichotomy embodiment/consciousness of self as two moving concentric circles:
at birth, the circle of human consciousness is already at work in a practical
unreflective manner, but during her/his infancy and early childhood, s/he learns to
differentiate his/her own embodied self with respect to the realm of social collective
human interaction where s/he develops, and becomes discursive and reflexive. To an
observer, it takes the child's development into her/his own consciousness of self and
bodily functionality —according to the particular culture in which s/he grows up—, to
become an adult. In order for this to happen, human consciousness constantly "spills"
beyond the confines of the physical body through imagination —while staying with it
at the same time. But this is not necessarily a purely random "spilling", it is more
generally experienced in every day life (the Husserlian life-world) as guided by our
emotional involvement with the objects that entertain our imagination (either
spontaneously induced or chosen by disciplined practice).
Imagination and emotions are just as natural to us in our everyday operational
life as is our body and the consciousness of ourselves. In this theoretical
formulation, I consider the realms of imagination and emotion as the distinctly
human innate creative aspects of consciousness —the depth of our subjectivity— and
it is through them, in an organic interaction between consciousness and embodiment,
that humans naturally build an "imaginary shelter", or "integument of culture", that
protects them from the environment; which in turn serves as a self-referential
environment for the human self to produce his/her own identity. As Tim Ingold puts
it, "human beings are not simply instruments for the replication of culture; rather they
use their culture (including architecture, costume and language) as a vehicle for
living, for the mutual creation of themselves" (1986:319).The four structural organic
aspects of this model that have been outlined (imagination, emotion, consciousness
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of self, and embodiment) create the basis for the unity of the human self to the fellow
humans of her/his species.
However, as has been said above, the difference between embodiment and
consciousness can only be construed in artificial terms (see Fig. 3 at the end of this
chapter). There are four structural artificial aspects of this model —spontaneity,
discipline, path dependencies, and potentiality— which create the basis for the
difference between the human self and the rest of the living entities that we can
"objectively" distinguish as such. The two artificial axes are arranged orthogonally
with respect to each other, holding the binary oppositions of spontaneity/discipline
and path dependencies/potentiality at their extremes. But these two artificial axes are
arranged diagonally with respect to the organic structure. Thus, the differentiation of
the artificial elements of the structure from the central perspective of the model is
also twofold. Following Tim Ingold (1986), to differentiate the pair
spontaneity/discipline I suggest a phenomenological distinction between practical
and discursive intention. Path dependencies/potentiality are differentiated as past and
future interaction within a present contemplation of the flow of time. In other words,
from the present phenomenological perspective —the central point of the model-
spontaneity and discipline (practice) are manifested and observed in the synchronic
plane of interaction while path dependencies and potentiality are construed in a
diachronic plane, which nevertheless has the present moment ofmeaningful actuality
at its centre. While it is fairly straight forward to deal with past (path dependencies),
present (observation), and future (potentiality) diachronically, the synchronic
relationship between spontaneity and discipline is not so clearly defined. This brings
the need to discuss the relationship between time and experience as it is conceived in
this work. After considering the synchronic relationship between spontaneity and
discipline, I will go back to that between past path dependencies and potentiality. The
following discussion derives mainly from a perspectival disagreement with Tim
Ingold, whose analysis is framed in a strictly diachronic view of time in his book
Evolution and Social Life. However, I find his notions of practical and discursive
intentionality very useful in order to differentiate spontaneous from disciplined
behaviour synchronically, and will therefore integrate them to my model: The
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dichotomy spontaneity/discipline can be dealt with by the observation of Ingold's
practical (spontaneous) and discursive (disciplined) "intentionality".
Tim Ingold situates his analysis temporally in what he calls "real time", or
Bergsonian duration1, to escape the complications of structuralist analysis. The
problem of temporality in Ingold's analysis is linked to the perspective of a second-
order observer. He situates himself outside the phenomenon of the flow of
consciousness, and so, in observing a perpetual 'natural' continuum, the difference
between synchrony and diachrony becomes irrelevant:
[R]eal time —Bergsonian duration— inheres in practical consciousness, which
is one reason why this form of consciousness cannot be comprehended within
the structuralist paradigm, constructed as it is on the abstract axes of
synchrony and diachrony. Discursive consciousness, revelatory of synchronic
structure, is played out in a motionless, extended present and has no essential
time component. (Ingold 1986:301-2)
However, in situating himself outside the flow of consciousness, in the position of a
second-order observer, Ingold ceases to contemplate himself within his own
intellectual discursive awareness of his argumentation, one that is sequential and
necessarily flows. From the perspective of the present moment of meaningful
experience, discursiveness is inherently diachronic in that it needs the sequentiality
of language and tale in order to be reified. But from Ingold's outside perspective and
structuralist frame of mind, the synchronic aspect of experience in discourse is
comparable to static a vessel "a mapping of the regions of the mind as though it were
a container, private to each individual" (Ingold 1986:301).
In contrast to this, inside the experience of consciousness, from a
phenomenological perspective of present observation, discursive (disciplined)
consciousness becomes diachronic while practical (spontaneous) consciousness is
synchronic. From this perspective, the realm of synchronicity is given symbols of a
"permanent" essence that mark relevant simultaneity (spiritual unity, understanding,
7 Moore prefers to translate duree as 'durance', even though its translation into 'duration' had
Bergson's authorisation. "But it seems to me", says Moore, "that the most natural use of this word in
English is to refer to a measurable period of time during which something happens. It is perfectly
true that the French word 'duree' also has this meaning. However, my sense is that the French word
can more readily be applied to the fact or property of going through time than the English
'duration'." (Moore 1996:58)
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trust, empathy, relevant borders in relationships or functional coordination,
autopoiesis, structural coupling...), but discursiveness is experienced together with
the flow of time as movement and sequence —it could even be said that it is our
discursive consciousness that organises this flow as sequentiality. From Ingold's
perspective, one cannot see that a human discursive (disciplined) aspect is already
embedded in the description of practical (spontaneous) consciousness, which from
his second-order observer —outside— perspective, is conceived essentially as a
perpetually unfolding continuum (of diachronic essence). But in the present instant of
the consciousness of being alive, there is a synchronic realm of simultaneity which
was the one that Bergson was trying to point to, but to an extent, failed due to the
diachronic nature of the conceptual and argumentative tools that he was using —
necessarily coherent and sequential. The present instant cannot be symbolised
discursively because it loses its practical (spontaneous) synchronic quality and
becomes absorbed by the sequentiality of tale, language, or description. The only
way that I can find through which its simultaneity can be symbolised within the
diachrony of explanation, is through a sociological type of "uncertainty principle":
As has been said, through this, only one side of the dichotomy can be observed at a
time while the other aspect fades away in observation, but is postulated as wholly
present simultaneously nonetheless.
The problem of a second-order observer perspective is solved by Ingold in
synthesising synchrony and diachrony in a Bergsonian construction of time as a
continuum of the flow of experience; and so favouring indirectly a representation of
time that is strictly diachronic. Flowever, Bergson himself is opposed to this kind of
characterisation in his book Duration and Simultaneity (1922), where, according to
Moore, he celebrates Einstein's theory of general relativity where the abolition of
absolute properties should be "complemented by the kind of absolute awareness of
simultaneity which could flow from [Bergson's] earlier work" (Moore 1996:11).
Bergson's duree was a reaction against abstract constructions of reality that were
"not sensitive enough to that vital substratum of concrete, lived reality available only
to the holistic understanding of the intuition" (Jay 1993:194). His main claim was
that the discreteness of events —somehow "threaded together like beads on a string of
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consciousness" (Moore 1996:55)-- is not real, that time is a continuing flow of
experience. However, even if one would feel inclined to agree with Bergson's view of
time as a synthesis of synchronic perception, in observation of complex simultaneity
where everything is related to everything else, we should take into account just how
this view is constructed.
As a reaction against abstract absolutism, Bergson opposes a perceptual
absolutism and condemns the relevant symbols of his tradition to unreality because
they deny embodied perception. Even though his philosophy has been heavily
criticised due to its lack of formal precision, Bergson contended that his notion of
precision rooted philosophy in the concrete experienced world, otherwise the formal
trappings of precision were vain (Moore 1996:17). The philosophical trap for
Bergson was that the Western tradition of knowledge relies on abstraction, and so
does Bergson's own philosophy; thus, through abstraction, an absolutism of
perception is not wholly apprehensible. In the representation of time as duree,
Bergson opted for a representation of time beyond human history, the bodily-animal,
the one that Darwin gave to nature in general but not to human beings (see the
discussion on Darwin in section VI. 1. below). In this construction of time, he seems
to regard the domain of relevant human events (historical, cultural, mythical, or
otherwise) as unreal. But in the realm of relevant social events, we are emotionally
and imaginatively linked to —created and creating— historical and cultural domains,
or the "beads" on the string of consciousness. However, one could argue that these
realms are unreal in as much as they are emotionally imagined, discrete events may
disappear once they become trivial for cosmology; but they are real to the social
sciences as they constitute relevant domains for concrete experience of interaction
among human beings. Events become symbolised in different types of language in
personal and collective imagination, even if they are illusory, emotionally sustained,
non-concrete ideological and abstract 'things'. Nevertheless, for human beings as
animals, Bergson's construction of time as duree is a real aspect of experience that
traditional philosophy until then had chosen to ignore; mainly because of an
absolutist abstract-transcendental-human-(Western) identity.
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It is posed by Ingold, and convincingly sustained by empirical evidence (see
Ingold 1986), that human and non-human animals share this "animal" aspect of time
in practical (spontaneous) consciousness which, until Bergson, was not considered as
a realm of legitimate experience for human beings. Ingold regards practical
consciousness as "a process, a creative good, which works through a whole series of
fabrications and observations in the course of its unfolding" (1986:298). However, as
I have argued, Ingold's view stands from an outside perspective. From an inside
perspective within the experience of practical consciousness though, the notion of
simultaneity is always present and this amounts to Ingold's own characterisation of
practical consciousness as "the notion of mind as the enfolding of an intersubjective
process" (1986:301). Beyond the problem of perspective, however, Ingold is
engaged in differentiating discursive (disciplined) from practical (spontaneous)
consciousness. In doing so, he surprisingly finds the locus of creativity in the latter,
which we share with non-human animals, thus regarding them as co-creators with
nature of their own business of living and not just as mere Cartesian 'automatons'.
In order to see this, Ingold deals with the "intrusion" of the contrastive term
'the unconscious' which, he notices, is rarely referred to as 'unconsciousness' (Ingold
1986:298); it denotes passivity and is therefore essentially non-creative. In order to
clarify the ambiguity that the unconscious introduces in any discussion about
consciousness, he contrasts Ricoeur's notion of the unconscious to that of Levi-
Strauss': The former sees the unconscious as pulling us back to 'the order of the
primordial' —the Christian inheritance of the tradition of consciousness as a struggle
for light—, and the latter as "the task that cultural human beings live to execute
[which] is itself inscribed in the unconscious" (Ingold 1986:299). This is a very
useful contrast in order to illustrate how the unconscious can become a "catch all"
principle of explanation when it comes to find a place for the spontaneous
manifestations of human life, seen as either negative or positive. This is the reason
why, following Ingold, I reject the notion of 'the unconscious' as a possible realm of
explanation for cognition because it either gets the shape of a deterministic 'black
box' or of a realm of darkness that holds the keys to conscious life:
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The realm of the unconscious, no matter how deeply it reaches into the strata
underlying consciousness, remains after all continuous with the realm of
consciousness and on a dimension where, together with consciousness, it can
become the subject matter of psychology. (Nishitani 1982:153)
I find it more useful to consider the two notions of practical (spontaneous) and
discursive (disciplined) consciousness as complementary realms of the human
conscious life.
Ingold poses the difference between practical and discursive consciousness as
the difference between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. A practical kind of
consciousness is clearly shared by human and non-human animals, but even if non-
human animals may know that they cannot reflect on their knowing that —and we
might not always do. 'Knowing how' is the kind of knowing that Maturana and
Varela refer to when they say that "to live is to know" (1987:174) in organic
autopoietic interaction with the environment. The basis of the difference between the
two kinds of consciousness is generally seen as the distinctively human capacity for
symbolic thought. However, Ingold reviews various studies of non-human animal
'communicative' behaviour and arrives at the conclusion that symbolic thought is no
absolute difference between animals and humans and that whether intermediate
stages cannot be admitted "remains a legitimate subject of speculation" (Ingold
1986:303).
However, he goes on to describe how the identifiably distinctive human
symbolic ability is different from an animal kind of communicative behaviour.
Verbal symbols, Ingold argues, do not only announce an object but rather lead the
subject to conceive it (1986:304). Animals continually emit and receive a dense
amount of signals which "correspond to bodily states and not to concepts" (Ingold
1986:309). In contrast to this, the human kind of symbolic imagination enables us to
speak and think about remote things in space and time, and also about deception,
fantasy, speculation, and hypothetical thought. However, this ability does not guide
our behaviour all the time, we also act spontaneously, in impulsive and systematic,
unpremeditated manners —and this may be destructive, but it is also, and most
importantly, the main source of creativity. This is illustrated by Ingold's examples
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that portray practical consciousness as the one that interacts and has the ability to
disclose disciplined action without discursive deliberation:
Anyone who has learned to speak a foreign language or to ride a bicycle
knows that in the former case, complete fluency comes when the application
of syntactical rules becomes as automatic as for a native speaker, and that in
the latter case, a perfect balance is achieved only when one ceases to
deliberate on the correct way to go about it. (Ingold 1986:300)
This examples serve to illustrate how practical human consciousness has already
assimilated the discursive intention of discipline and has become fluent practice. But
there are also pre-eminently spontaneous human behaviours that are disclosed
without the need for prior articulation of discursive intention and rules, like baby
play, or learning to speak one's native tongue, and to walk (these behaviours also take
place only within an environment that does have articulated discursive intentions and
embodies and enacts the different disciplined practices that are learnt).
The above rationale leads Ingold to consider practical intention, which is
traditionally located in the discursive realm of rational deliberation and only present
as articulated thought before action. Following Searle (1979), Ingold distinguishes
between prior intention and intention in action. "A prior intention", says Ingold, "is
an imaginative representation of a future state that it is desired to bring about, and
differs from memory only in that it precedes rather than succeeds the objective
realisation of that state [...]. The intention in action, by contrast, corresponds to the
experience of actually doing; in that sense it is presentational rather that
representational" (1986:312). According to this, then, intention in action is not
necessarily discursive, nor is it necessarily only human; non-human animals have a
spontaneous presentational intention in the realisation of the acts of living; even if
they do not construct a stable representational notion of self that is aware of realising
them, one that is taken to be only a human experience based on our discursive ability.
The confusion of the categories practical and discursive in consciousness may lead to
denying both consciousness and intention to animals, while at the same time it
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ascribes them a representational quality built inside the mechanics of their brain
about which they are supposed to be unaware or unconscious*.
The axis discipline/spontaneity of the artificial structure of my model
represent the discussed duality of discursive intention and practical intention in
human interaction, which in the present moment, are experienced at the same time —
in synchrony— but in phenomenological observation, are divided into their
synchronic and diachronic consequences for human behaviour and interaction.
Speaking from the point of view of discipline, intention is always construed
discursively either before or after the action, and it therefore has an in-built
diachronic quality. Yet, in practice, discipline is a manifest aspect of the present
moment of consciousness, which is also ruled by spontaneity. In human experience,
the present moment is neither only spontaneity or discipline; it is the immediate
human life-world that needs both to be produced and to produce human identity at
the same time.
Humberto Maturana and the psychologist Gerda Verden-Zoler in their book
Amor y juego (Love and Play 1995), locate the emotional construction of the
imaginary realm of culture in the spontaneous process of development of the child, in
play, while it grows up (discussed in section VI. 2. below). However, during its
development, the child is also simultaneously disciplined by its interpersonal
relationships and emotional ties to move adequately in the social imaginary particular
world in which it develops. As it grows up, the child learns to master disciplined
behaviours as well as physiologically determined ones. The disciplinary training
involves bodily behaviour as well as learning the language used for communication
in its particular cultural environment —and it may involve training in many
languages. This training takes place both spontaneously and in a disciplined manner
at the same time, and these two kinds of behaviours are indistinguishable from each
other in the present moment of experience. But in phenomenological observation and
description, spontaneity can be seen as the familiarisation of the child with its own
8 I will consider Varela's critique of cognitivism —which equates mind and therefore the function of
the brain with an internal representation of the world— in the first section of chapter VII.
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organic structural sounds and bodily rhythms in play, and discipline is observed as
the learnt patterns of behaviour in language and culture.
We are now in the position to go back to the diachronic structural axis of the
model (path dependencies/potentiality) which is disclosed in the relationship that
takes place between the present moment of experience and the diachronic aspect of
time that continually shapes interaction (see Fig. 3). According to Maturana and
Verden-Zoler, the organic unity between consciousness and embodiment produces an
imaginary and enacted "social relational space" grounded in emotional ties
(1995:94). In the development of the individual human being, his/her relational space
keeps growing and producing both a personal identity and a story with respect to the
relationships that s/he gets involved with throughout her/his life time (personal,
functional, and cultural)9. This relevant personal story includes the development of
our own embodiment, and is also embedded in a series of relationships with concrete
objects and embodied people (or disembodied personalities who either have died or
were never born as embodied people) as well as distinctive collective practices in
constant transformation that have a degree of permanence in their systematicity and
in the collective belief in them.
Path dependencies are construed as the structure of past interactions that has
formed the present organisation of embodiment. Non-human and human animals'
perception of the world is structurally determined by their actual embodiment, even
as it engages in its own conscious production through practical intention. But humans
also produce a notion of self attached both to embodiment (physical development)
and to the cultural groups where we belong to (families, tribes, nations, governments,
clans, empires, organisations). Human path dependencies are built from a present
perspective that has been determined by past interactions. It looks on the past to
organise its relevant features according to present necessities, which for humans, are
both organic and artificial. Here is where the human identity that is produced by our
9 This imaginary "relational space" may expand to include transcendental concepts and experiences
which might even overcome the initial local quality of the space in the notions of "universality",
"eternal", "infinity" or "divine". Whole life times may be dedicated to apprehend, through
disciplined spontaneity, these kind of concepts as experience and justify their existence as
meaningful symbols.
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relational space is able to consider its own potentiality as well as that of the relevant
group that it belongs to. Potentiality takes over to organise present discursive
intention which is projected into the future. The pair path dependencies/potentiality is
therefore essentially diachronic, but it is built on the basis of present meaningful
experience. From the present perspective, this meaning is reified symbologically and
sequentially, and makes the phenomenological observer possible at all with her/his
discursive and particular distinctions. It is important to stress yet again that this
observer is necessarily human, but most importantly, s/he is a human person shaped
by the Western tradition of knowledge and cultural inheritance.
Human embodiment and organisation are both passive creations and active
producers of actuality in a spontaneous organic dance that can only be spoken about
by stopping it provisionally by artificial discipline and its human marks on time. The
unfolding of its continuous simultaneity and flow would otherwise be experienced,
but would remain without description. Autopoiesis is a term that comes from the
biological theory of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela that contemplates all
living entities as conscious and creative in experiential practical (spontaneous)
intention —the production of themselves in an intelligent manner. It finds intelligence
as an intrinsic characteristic of nature and this takes the place of the classical
Darwinian creative 'natural selection' that would direct and select the unconscious
organisms, outside human time, towards their evolution and fitness. This is the basis
for Maturana and Varela's disagreement with the current adaptationist program of
biological research, based on the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis (discussed in
section VI. 1. below). But we would forget to look at ourselves if we did not consider
that as we speak of organic autopoiesis, we are also living in a discursive, very
human, integument that other animals cannot perceive in the same way. They might
participate practically and even be involved in the disciplinary human order, but this
involvement is never wholly autopoietically discursive.
What this means is that the human identity is discursively involved both in
being created by and in creating the "conversation" (Maturana 1990) or the
meaningful and legitimate present order, which can then be projected unto the past
and future. The term autopoiesis was adopted by Niklas Luhmann (1995) in his
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theory of meaning in order to describe how social systems are involved in the process
of producing themselves. But he does not consider how it is that these systems also
contribute in creating the individual identity of the embodied people who interact
through these systems. People in Luhmann's theory are construed as "psychic
systems", who are linguistic entities, collections of varying conscious states with no
emotional involvement, dysfunctional morality, and an imagination that randomly
jumps from state to state of consciousness. While Luhmann succeeds in describing
the post-modern condition of Western life, and also of theory —with no symbology
for transcendence and universality— he downplays the importance of human
consciousness for the social sciences and its theoretical absence cannot be sustained
empirically. He believes that social systems are self-creating and self-sustaining,
without realising that their functioning and existence depend on human practical
(spontaneous) and discursive (disciplined) consciousness; human life.
Nevertheless, his theory of meaning is very useful in order to illustrate the
structure of the human discursive kind of consciousness as it is experienced by an
observer. This is because Luhmann's perspective is situated phenomenologically in
the subjective experience of meaning. He does not consider how this perspective may
shape the consciousness of self, because he speaks about social systems, without
taking into account that they can only be produced by the human presence that is in
the position to operate and live in them, describe them, and be defined by them. The
autopoiesis of linguistic social systems is bootstrapped to the organic autopoiesis of
embodied human beings, not located apart from the consciousness of embodied
human beings as Luhmann would have it. We are left with the idea that human
beings or persons are both producers and products of our environment in discursive
consciousness; but it is also important to consider that at the same time, in practical
consciousness, we are engaged in the process of producing ourselves and are already
the embodied organic product of this process simultaneously. In this second type of
immediate synchronic practical intentionality, the diachronic discursive one
intervenes only through the conscious practice of a meaningful discipline, which is a
human trait.
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The following chapters are organised around two ideal types of order, organic
and artificial, that are seen as two manifestations of the same phenomenon. The
construction of two ideal types of human order is based in a phenomenologically
transformed version of the subject-object divide: synchronically, in the conscious
present moment, these two realms cannot be distinguished from each other; but
diachronically, in the sequential, time of discursivity, they are clearly —yet
arbitrarily— differentiated. This is the reason why they are ideal types, they cannot be
found in absolute purity in empirical reality and cannot be differentiated in present
synchronic experience, only in discursive diachronic explanation. But this
differentiation is always imaginary, descriptions are only possible in the sequential
experience of time as duration or as past and future. Language and sequential
explanations are therefore displaced from being able to convey the meaning of what I
call the present subjective moment ofmeaningful experience, which is an existential
experience. From this moment we may look into the past history of meaningful
interaction that produces the structure of our path dependencies; and towards the
future of plausible meaningful interaction that produces the structure of our
potentiality; but both instances are manners of describing the present moment, and
cannot be seen at the same time but must be considered alternatively. These two
realms are produced through meaningful mental images, grounded in emotional
energy, that are constructed both collectively and individually, and that we can
describe. But access to the present subjective moment of meaningful experience is
perfectly confined to each individual self. And yet, as we will see, human beings
engage in sharing the present moment of subjectivity socially and culturally in order
to produce an identity of self. This sharing takes place both spontaneously and in a
disciplined manner, even if humans must translate subjectivity into symbols and
gestures, and share it imperfectly. In these terms, intersubjectivity, as has been said,
is never perfect or complete, but is always present in human interaction; "objectivity"
is therefore a particular social construction.
And so, it is important to stress that the abstract essence of any method of
observation is wholly discursive: the present moment of meaningful experience is not
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located in Absolute emptiness (sunyata) or in a moment of eternal Being10. Even if
the present moment where the observer locates him/herself must consider the
transhistorical realms as ideals or "sign posts", as discussed in the previous chapter,
from this present moment the observer should be able to describe her/his
surroundings and describe him/herself and is therefore aware of her/his own
embodiment and of nihility as his/her source and destination. This observer is
conscious of her/himself in a discursive manner, but also in a practical one. If we
attempt a disciplinary artifice through which to provisionally stop looking at the
moving and changing structure of the suggested model, we see two symmetric parts
that both reflect and complement each other, which constitute the model's
organisation (see Fig. 4 at the end of this chapter). Both parts are ideal types because,
in human interaction, they cannot exist on their own. The two ideal types of
organisation represent tendencies of human order that is both expressed in an organic
one that we share with animals and in an artificial one that is a particular feature of
our species, part of our human way of living. But it is an excess of abstraction to
think that through the powers of the intellect alone, or through some inherent process
of complexifization, we could be without either of them or 'advancing' from one to
the other.
10 Unless spiritual Enlightenment had dawned on consciousness in complete apprehension of the
transhistorical realm, in which case the observer would not be in the position to describe anything
qua observer.
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The Organic Ideal Type of Human Organisation
In this chapter, I will go back to the cosmological implications of the two
experienced notions of human time. However, while in the first part of the thesis, the
two notions of time defined the prevalent and legitimate type of view of reality; here,
I will consider that both of them are already part of the organisation of cosmology in
any view of reality. I situate this work within the Western/Christian cosmology and
its transformation into the Darwinian factual cosmology that prevails today when
considering the origins of life and of the human kind of consciousness. I will argue
that this scientific cosmology has a path dependency on the Christian symbol of
transfiguration from darkness into light to explain the emergence of human
consciousness in diachronic explanation, and it also depends on its traditional
assumption of human patronage over the rest of nature. Nevertheless, in the adoption
of a synchronic perspective of observation, we can realise that these explanations —
just like any other kind of cosmological tales— are produced for the sake of present
contemplation of the human notion of self and of its place in the universe. From a
present perspective, a more viable way of basing an observed difference between the
human animal and the non-human animal (or the rest of the living beings on earth) is
that the human species develops a belief system and relates to it, and to fellow human
beings, through imaginative and emotional personal relationships. That is, human
beings develop a belief system, as a shelter or "integument" of vast plasticity, within
which to live as a species. Nevertheless, the modern mind has deepened its awareness
of this "shelter" to the extent to which it has become "alienated" from nature (only in
an emotionally imagined sense though, experientially, we do remain made of organic
and natural substances and dependencies); and it holds an ontological divide between
human and nature (the modern city is its most dramatic experience) that is analogous
to the subject-object divide for scientific observation. Only by seeing the lack of
factuality in this divide but by using it as a useful metaphor can we assume a constant
co-determination between the embodied observer and her/his environment; that is,
the subject-object divide is ontologically false but epistemologically useful.
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The problem of the diachronic shape of the Darwinian cosmological tale is
that it discloses the division between human beings and other animals in a
hierarchical and moral dimension, which includes an automatic assumption of
patronage of civilised man over the savage entity that lags behind in this tale of
evolution as optimisation. In the present contemplation of this cosmology, this
assumption is only implied and hidden behind heavy veils of political correctness
that assume the currently relevant humanist principle of equality among human
beings. Yet, the abyss of conscience that is perceived between humanity and any
other kind of consciousness remains as an ontological principle of observation. The
Hegelian "peoples without history" remain encased in the chase for an ideal modern
progress and a present 'not yet'; within a consciousness that is simultaneously
regarded as already human, but underdeveloped. It is only from a synchronic
perspective that the abyss of consciousness between humans and non-humans (or
underdeveloped humans) can be obliterated in order to liberate the necessary stage of
savagery for humanity, and realise that civilised humanity is also animal and
primitive at the same time as it is historically aware and "civilised". If we regard
human beings as animals and the rest of the living entities as conscious in an
equivalent way to human consciousness, we can start to set the basis for what it is
that makes humanity different from the rest of the natural world without assuming a
necessary human patronage over it. To be sure, this is an arbitrary move, but no less
arbitrary that the traditional assumption of a separation between humanity and nature.
I will attempt a brief explanation of an alternative notion of evolution by
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela as "natural drift" which postulates the
classical Darwinian continuity with our animal ancestors, but also a present organic
continuity with, and dependence on, the natural world. The notion of "natural drift"
embraces the idea of evolution but tempers its deterministic conclusions (most
clearly expressed by the adaptationist program, based on the modern neo-Darwinian
synthesis with Mendelian genetics). Rather, evolution as "natural drift" is posed as a
stochastic complex process that is not wholly random and not wholly deterministic,
but something in between. The division between humanity and nature is displaced by
the synchronic awareness of a division between system and environment, based on
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the subject-object divide as an epistemological principle. From this perspective,
living organisms —embodied humans included— are organisationally closed to the
environment but structurally coupled to it at the same time. This simultaneity is
expressed by Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoiesis that guides the idea of
evolution as "natural drift", but also the cognitive involvement of the living organism
in its practical conscious business of maintaining itself alive.
And so, the organic ideal type of human organisation is related to the human
biology and its evolutive specialisation on a big brain and a particularly expanded
nervous system. In this sense, human embodiment determines a stochastic human
dependence on living within what Maturana and Varela call "conversations", which I
consider commensurable with particular cosmologies, or even views of reality. This
structure of interaction is determined by the "phylogenetic" path dependencies of the
species as well as by the "ontogenetic" particular path dependencies of human lives
that simultaneously sustain the view of reality in which they live. In the organic ideal
type of organisation this animal-practical consciousness and intentionality of human
beings is highlighted, together with the spontaneity in which it is produced. Maturana
and his psychologist collaborator Gerda Verden-Zoler, locate the basis of
spontaneous human life in learning to live in conversation through the spontaneity of
play since infancy. This in turn produces an imaginative and emotional involvement
into the production of persons through relationships, which they regard together with
Tim Ingold, as the organic essence of a human conception of self.
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VI. 1. Cosmology and the Human Animal
We can recall that the construction of three ideally typical views of reality —or
legitimate belief systems— in the first part of this thesis was based on the distinction
between two kinds of temporality experienced by human beings where the legitimacy
of a conceived 'reality' is located: past-future diachrony and present synchrony.
However, beyond institutions (religions and disciplines), all three views of reality
consider these two dimensions of time (sequentiality and simultaneity)
organisationally because they are dimensions of human experience. In the belief
systems of my theoretical construction, synchrony is construed as unity, but it may
be experienced as plenitude in the sacred moment of renovation, or as the eternal
mystic present moment, or as harmonious coordination, and symbolised as trust,
Grace, or Being. Diachrony is construed as separation, but it is experienced as
movement and flow, in the duration of cycles, or towards spiritual progress; it may
be symbolised as teleology: divine future purpose which at the same time points at
divine origin, or as past and future in the general process of becoming, or as universal
human history. I have argued that, while the locus of legitimacy for the
pagan/primitive and the Eastern/mystic ideal type views of reality lies on synchronic
experience and symbology; that of the Western/Christian type lies on diachronic
symbology and experience. However, any view of reality always contemplates both
realms organisationally, as two aspects of the same humanly experienced
phenomenon. As I will argue below, Western secular cosmology has transformed the
realm of spiritual unity and synchrony into a realm of morality where all human
beings are expected, ideally, to converge. This is what in this construction is regarded
as the synchronic realm of trust which, due to the legitimacy of time as diachronic
movement in the West, is not legitimately regarded as time-like and it is hard to
describe its synchronic essence.
Nevertheless, both realms of temporality are organisationally represented and
experienced in the life and practice of all three ideas of reality. Pagan/primitive time
as duration and renovation is cyclical, but for the cycles to be meaningful, it must
distinguish experientially between the duration of the cycles where everyday life
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takes place, and the sacred moment of ritual renovation. The latter synchronises in
mimesis the perception of time in order to produce an experience of collective
beginning that legitimises the meaningful realm of reality or 'cosmos'. This is the
reason why cosmological tales describe a mythical beginning of time that, according
to Voegelin, transcendentalist representations of the Beyond cannot dispense with
(1974:10). Its experience of time as duration may not be symbolised in a clear
conception of a "leap in being" as transcendence (Voegelin 1957:3), and does not
produce a diachronic idea of progress (spiritual, teleological, or historical), but it is
part of the organisation of human primitive experience as a sequential continuum that
expresses itself in mythical tale.
Eastern/mystic synchronic time as the eternal present moment of Oneness and
reality does not regard duration as real. However, mystic practice contemplates
diachronic time as a measure of progress towards individual spiritual enlightenment
which, it is assumed, will contribute to awareness and spirituality of the ideal
"collective" mind. The movement of individual progress through mystic practice is
contemplated as an illusion of the world of forms or of the senses; when one is
awakened to spiritual enlightenment one should realise one's own identity with the
universe. In this view of reality, human beings are seen as already immanently
enlightened and have only to remember their divine origin through discipline during
their illusory worldly life. "It is as if one were born already knowing how to play the
violin and had to practice with great exertion only to remove the habits that
prevented one from displaying that virtuosity" (Varela et al. 1991:251). And so,
mystic individual progress to spiritual enlightenment is also a kind of regress —
speaking strictly in terms of direction and not in terms of the transcendental "leap in
being". But even if this kind of movement is not given legitimate substance in the
mystic view of reality, it is organisationally acknowledged and represented in the
discipline, in the methods of practice, simultaneously leading to an enlightened
origin and destination. This is a kind of teleology that is nevertheless seen as a
metaphor, in the Eastern/mystic view of reality, origin and destination can only be
seen as such through the illusory nature of phenomenal time and life in the world.
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The Christian spiritual conception of time conceives of the world as real and
its Beginning and Beyond in Genesis and Apocalypse, as the extremes of real
historical time from divine origin and fall, through suffering and Atonement, to
progress towards salvation. Humanity as one body, represented by the church, should
move through conversion and pious life towards the end of times where the elect
ought to be differentiated from the non-elect. But both world and transcendence are
conceived as real at the same time, the latter being displaced to a higher realm
beyond the world, and the world constantly chasing after it. In a comparison with the
other belief systems, the Christian time of progress contemplates both the sacred
pagan/primitive circularity —made universal and real for all peoples at all times-
combined with a mystic representation of the only God at the beginning and the end
of times as well as His appearance (contingent to His Will) through Grace on earth.
The highest point of hierophany in Christianity is, of course, the coming of Jesus
Christ; which works as an axial symbol of transfiguration from darkness into light —
when God Himself walked the earth— or a universal point d'appui to move the lever
ofworld history.
However, in the Western tradition, spiritual progress was eventually
substituted by scientific progress, which, it was assumed, would produce a more
"truthful" —rather, more legitimate— description of reality through rational
disquisition and observation. The creationist story of the book of Genesis was
eventually substituted by a legitimate scientific theory based on observation and
factuality. The secular visions of reality in the Western tradition displace the sacred
personality of God from the centre of attention with 'natural laws' or mechanisms
which expand the circle of divine origin and destination into infinite dimensions.
This turns the circle into a straight line of progress, which may or may not pack
transcendence in hypothetical moral teleology that substitutes for Grace (seen as
either possible or impossible), or in some kind of deformed symbolism1. Along this
1 I will use the idea of "deformed" symbolism in the same way as Voegelin (1974) uses it to mean
sacred symbolism that has been transformed into some material counterpart that is taken to be more
plausible within a transformed view of reality (see Appendix A).
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secular line of eternal becoming, the experience of time becomes diachronic and, for
humans, its legitimacy is represented as human time in universal human history; and
for the rest of the natural universe, as a perpetual continuum of transformation. This
diachronic view of time and events is clearly sequential; its experience and
explanation is produced by an observer (the scientist or the historian), which may
prevent him/her from noticing and symbolising the synchronic realm of experience in
a legitimate and meaningful way. In supporting a Heideggerian critique of Jasper's
present moment of "unclarified" eternity, in a strict diachronic conception of time,
Farrellkrell states that the present moment "preserves its authentic present from
complete dispersal precisely by holding onto its past and future" (1986:23).
However, in the Western tradition, even as the sacred circle of beginning and
end is transformed into a secular line of perpetual becoming, this formulation cannot
help to remain symbologically faithful to the mystery of the idea of Christian
transfiguration from darkness into light mentioned above and needs an axial point (or
a period of time) of unity in world synchrony: a Messiah, an axial age, or the gradual
emergence of human consciousness from animal consciousness. In secular
cosmological accounts, the mystery of transfiguration is particularly clear when it
comes to explain how our ancestors became humanly conscious... as opposed to
conscious in a mere animal way. To scientists, the dawning of the human kind of
consciousness remains a mysterious feature of life. It is held beyond doubt that,
gradually, throughout evolution our species woke up to human consciousness,
making it essentially different from all other species of animals. But the essence of
this different consciousness is not easily grasped. It has been generally posed in our
Western tradition as the human capacity for intellect, language, and for making tools
—homo sapiens and homo faber. But, as Tim Ingold argues (1986:303-332), these
criteria are problematic when it comes to define a clear difference between the non-
human and human animal kinds of consciousness. I will engage in a discussion of his
arguments in the next section of this chapter.
1 will now concentrate on the conceptual problems related to the definition of
a human kind of consciousness that is not merely animal as the basis of our
cosmology. These problems are related, on the one hand, to our scientific zeal for
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precision; but on the other —and most importantly for the present discussion— to the
problem of cosmology created by Christian baggage that determines assumption of
human patronage over the rest of nature. The basis for this type of differentiation
between the human and non-human animal lies in a secular view of the universe that
defines itself by rejecting —and is engaged in the effort of forgetting— the roots of its
own sacred origins. Distinctively, human beings do represent reality in a discursive
way, but before their own representations become intellectual and trivial and before
their ideas of reality give them a sense of mastery over nature; human naked
consciousness —like that of a newly born baby— needs to produce for itself a coherent
view of the environment (social and natural) in which it finds itself, amid a sense of
awe about it —about its horror and its beauty. The difference between human and
non-human consciousness may be posed in terms of intellectual ability (highly
valued in the West), consciousness per se, intention, or mere functional artificiality;
however, as I will argue below, the difference is better posed in that humans develop
a system of beliefs in order to engage in interaction, either social or with the
environment (Frye 1982, Maturana 1990). This is a characteristic of the human
species, the constant creation of a sense of self either individual, spiritual, or
collective, and it is basic to sustain our human biology. This characteristic is only a
characteristic, and not the proof of human superiority.
I will argue that belief systems have an organic function, they are like
surrogate "wombs" that receive human babies, which are born as embryos —
completely vulnerable— and they remain as such for the first nine months of life
(Gould 1977:72)2. I use metonymic language when referring to belief system or
world view as a protective "womb", "shell", or "cultural integument" (Frye 1982) for
human life, because it is qualitatively different from any material kind of non-human
animal protection. Its plasticity is such that it may be expanded to include
experiences and perceptions that produce concepts such as infinity or universe; and
this is related to how our evolutionary specialisation —the human brain and nervous
2 According to Gould, the reason for our being born as embryos is related to our evolutionary
specialisation on a rather large brain: "Human brains [..] are so large that another strategy must be
added for successful birth —gestation must be shortened relative to general development, and birth
must occur when the brain is only one fourth its final size" (Gould 1977:75).
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system— operates according to Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela3. In the
emotional cognition of environment and in the continual construction of ideas of
reality in which humans interact among themselves, meaning and legitimacy are
linked to each other; and therefore, symbols and beliefs converge to represent the
view of reality's sacred or ethical realm as posing the relevant or legitimate
dimensions that produce our reality (even in the scientific discipline). And so, the
relevant "tales" that we tell about reality have the very important organic function of
sustaining human life in every different tradition of knowledge.
In our scientific tradition, the Darwinian theory of evolution (a legitimate
"tale" about reality) dominates the discussion of probable explanations about the
origins of the human species; which, to us, remains evidently different from non-
human animal species. Darwin postulated a universe of observable natural laws: "If
Darwin needed to invoke a Creator it was only (as for Newton and Flutton) to set the
ball rolling, after which He could leave His Creation to look after itself' (Ingold
1986:132). Tim Ingold (1986) argues that, in his Origin ofSpecies, Darwin decidedly
rejected teleology in nature. However, it can be deduced from Ingold's discussion
that at the same time as Darwin rejected a telos in nature, he saw it in culture. In
Darwin's less celebrated and Eurocentric work The Descent ofMan, a moral telos
was situated in human history in the faculties of intellect and culture and he "was
convinced that their improvement could be judged on an absolute scale, that natural
selection would inevitably generate progress along this scale, and that this underlies a
universal movement of mankind from savagery to civilization" (Ingold 1986: 51).
Even if the terms of this movement have greatly changed in academic circles, to this
day, the best explanations about the difference between the human animal and the
non-human animal remain linked to human culture and the intergenerational
transmission of culture —even if there is still no consensus about the mechanisms of
transmission (Ingold 1986, 1989; Varela et al. 1991, Sober 1993). Darwin separated
his biology from his "socio-anthropology" in two books; while one of them failed in
3 This specialisation is regarded as the product of a "natural drift" as formulated by Maturana and
Varela, and not that of an adaptationist conception of evolution. The difference between these two
notions of evolution will be clarified throughout this first section of the chapter.
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giving him a name in sociology and anthropology, his biology remains today a
founding theory that dominates any serious scientific discussion about the origins of
life.
It is useful at this stage to consider the basic postulates of Classical
Darwinism. According to Varela et al., they are:
1. Evolution occurs as a gradual modification of organisms by descent; that
is, there is reproduction with heredity.
2. This hereditary material constantly undergoes diversification (mutation,
recombination).
3. There is a central mechanism to explain how these modifications occur: the
mechanism of natural selection. This mechanism operates by picking the
designs (phenotypes4) that cope with the current environment most
efficiently. (1991:185 my italics)
The scientific and measurable principle of natural selection substituted the archaic
idea of a sacred cosmic telos of creation; yet even though the principle depends on
diversification that feeds on variability and chance, its essence remains linked to the
theistic idea of an 'invisible hand' doing the selection5. However, this is not, in
Darwinian terms, a divine involvement in the selection of fit organisms6. It was only
through the replacement of this kind of involvement for a mechanical principle that
the study of life could be withdrawn from the realm of Creation and be studied
systematically by the scientific method.
The term evolution was popularised by Herbert Spencer and not by Darwin.
According to Ingold, in 1857, Herbert Spencer published an article entitled:
"Progress: Its Law and Cause", where progress is seen as an organic law that rules all
nature:
With one sweep of his cosmic pen, everything from the earth through all
forms of life to man and human society was brought within the scope of a
4 Physical characteristics.
According to Hodgson, the dominant Political Economy of Darwin's times in general and Adam
Smith in particular influenced him in the elaboration of a principle of order that emerged
spontaneously from chance and diversity: "Essentially Smith and the Scottish School gave Darwin
the idea of order and regularity being based on a chaotic multitude of individual units, and emerging
without common intention or conscious design" (Hodgson 1993:58).
6 According to Waters (1986:207-8), Herbert Spencer was the one who invented the slogan 'survival
of the fittest', not Darwin. After the first edition of the Origin ofSpecies had been published in 1866,
Darwin's friend, Alfred Russel Wallace, persuaded him to use Spencer's phrase in key parts of the
work, rather than 'natural selection'. "The word 'selection', Wallace argued, implied the existence of
an agent doing the selecting, and some could take this agent to be God" (Hodgson 1993:81-2).
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single principle of epigenetic development, as applicable in astronomy and
geology as in biology, psychology and sociology. Shortly after the
appearance of this article, Spencer decided to substitute 'evolution' for
'progress' on the grounds that the latter entailed too anthropocentric a vision.
His celebrated definition of evolution, appearing in First Principles (1892),
ran as follows: 'Evolution is definable as a change from incoherent
homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of
motion and dissipation of matter'. The grandeur of this conception captured
the Victorian imagination. Before long, Spencer had a considerable
following, and evolution had become a catchword. It still is, yet Spencer and
his voluminous works are today all but forgotten. (Ingold 1986:4)
It is generally believed that his works on biology are forgotten mostly because his
teleological theory of evolution lacks an adequate explanation of the evolutionary
process and its transmission mechanisms, and is described as a matter of dogma
(Hodgson 1993:92). But it can also be argued, following Ingold, that his view of the
universe was too unified along a 'cosmic' telos for science to embrace it legitimately.
Spencer did not have the good sense to separate his biology from his social sciences.
Nevertheless, he was giving expression to the belief of his times, and the kind of
Victorian progressivism that he championed was also present in Darwin as a 'social
scientist'.
It has been argued rather insistently that Darwin resisted the term 'evolution'
due to its teleological implications in nature. "Whatever the substance of these
arguments", says Hodgson after a brief consideration of their assumptions, "it is a
fact that Darwin did not introduce the word until the sixth edition of the Origin of
Species, and then only sparingly. Darwin preferred phrases like 'descent with
modification' to 'evolution' " (1993:81). Besides the scientific need to displace the
divine telos from nature, it can also be posed that Darwin's resistance to the term
evolution in Spencerian optimistic progressive tones might have been due both to the
influence of Malthus's Essay7 and to his observation of conflict and death as the
source of indeterminate variability, which constitutes the basis for an infinite
unfolding of life on earth with no limiting telos in nature. "Although the precise
7
The complete title is: An Essay on the Principle ofPopulation, as it Affects the Future Improvement
of Society, with remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet and other Writers.
(Hodgson 1993:66)
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extent of Malthus's influence is open to dispute", says Hodgson, "it is rash and
relatively rare to ignore it entirely" (1993:63). According to Hodgson, many of the
interpreters of Darwin's notebooks agree that Malthus provided him with a vivid
picture of "crowding and struggle" as the motor of natural selection. Through this
observable fact of nature, natural selection was not teleological; it was a principle of
order that fed from chance.
However it is important to consider what lied behind this mechanism because,
as Hodgson puts it, there is much more to Malthus than a mere mechanism of the
divergence between arithmetic and geometric series of reproduction of food and
people; and the source of his sordid image of scarcity lies in his natural theology and
his critique of the 'invisible hand' ideas of equilibrium and harmony of the political
economy of his day. According to Malthus's natural theology, the loving and
righteous God allowed the existence of suffering and constant struggle on earth in
order for humanity to always strive for virtuosity: "the intended role of evil is to
energise us for the struggle for good" (Hodgson 1993:65). Without diversity and
struggle there would be no force impelling God's creation to constantly improve
itself; and therefore, for Malthus, the idea of a progressive natural teleology was out
of the question, and the laissez faire assumptions that the market forces should be left
to themselves for an overall good was mere Utopia: "for Malthus, neither self interest
nor the invisible hand had unqualified virtue" (Hodgson 1993:67). Death and
suffering remained a natural feature of life, this natural "evil" that should be resisted
was a divine test on Creation. Some echoes of this view, not without moral
transformation, persist in recent Darwinism. George Williams, one of the most
important theorists of social Darwinism has tried to disclaim this kind of theory's
logical conservative conclusions by speaking of natural selection as "an "evil"
process, so great is the pain and death it thrives on, so deep is the selfishness it
engenders" (Wright 1994:40). Darwin's cosmology takes into account both the
contingent side of the transformation of life in struggle and death, and its ordered
output in heredity, diversification, and natural selection.
According to Hodgson, Darwin's scientific esteem reached a low ebb around
1900 mostly, it has been claimed, because a synthesis between the Mendelian
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mechanisms of genetic inheritance and Darwin's theory was produced later (the
modern neo-Darwinian synthesis) (Hodgson 1993:281). However a measurable
scientific mechanism is a criterion for the superiority of a scientific theory if it is
produced at the same time as the mechanism is producing explanations. It is more
relevant to consider that, at the beginning of the century, the popularity of Spencer's
progressivist alternative to Darwin's unpopular view of life as struggle had been
grounded on its agreement with the belief system of those times (which nevertheless
today continues to be progressivist in many areas of Western social and political
imagination) (see Trigger 1998). But Spencer's most enduring contributions to
science in general and to social science in particular are his views on what may be
identified with the modern idea of progress in society, which he called evolution. To
Spencer, "evolution meant a tendency towards increasing specialisation and
differentiation, combined with sufficient functional integration to ensure the
coherence of the system" (Hodgson 1993:83). Spencer lost all repute as a biologist
with the creation of the modern neo-Darwinian syntheses of evolutionary biology,
even if he remained influential in the social sciences; as can be seen, for example, in
the current use of the term "complexity" as applied to large modern organisations
(see Perrow 1979, Morgan 1986, Czarniawska-Joerges 1992).
From the perspective of legitimacy, however, the superiority of Darwin's
theory over that of Spencer about the evolution of life, lies on their different
cosmology. Darwin's theory achieves a better separation of the scientific endeavour
(legitimated by the scientific ethos), from the Christian view of reality. Spencer's
symbolism about nature remains too clearly linked to Christian symbolism, where a
pre-planned perfection of nature and society as the objective of progress is known
from the outset. This, theoretically, leads progress to an eventual stand still; and
while this has been admissible in theories of future political harmony in the social
sciences8, in nature, this kind of teleology is not sustained by empirical grounds. This
8 Teleology has taken the shape, to name a few examples, of historicism in Hegel, of communism
through revolution in Marx, or of progress towards the ideal speech situation in Habermas. In the
social sciences, though, the persisting symbol of telos has been transformed from a telos of God into
a telos ofMan (one that is seen as possible but not deterministic): purposive intentionality, the need
for substantive rationality, morality, and the modern value of freedom.
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difference can be seen as linked to the idea that, in modernity, humanity is
considered as the producer of its social order, while nature is characterised by the
absence of history and moral values. History and moral values are only human —or
legitimate realms of social reality for the Western mind— and take place only in
diachronic human time.
Where Kant saw everywhere the creative hand of time bringing forth new
forms and configurations in nature, for Darwin time was merely a backdrop
against which things happened. In Kantian cosmology, as in Lamarckian
transformism, time was immanent in the evolutionary process; in Darwinian
descent with modification it was wholly extraneous to it. The difference is of
course related to Darwin's rejection of teleology in nature: Each individual is
construed to exist only in and for the present, not as a moment of purposive
conveyance of past into future. (Ingold 1986:131-2)
To be sure, Darwin's cosmology is also linked to the Christian tradition, but it
subtracts nature from divine teleology by substituting this symbol of origin and
destination by a simultaneous double awareness of mechanical principles of
contingency —death, struggle and variability— as well as principles of order —the
survival of the fittest and natural selection. Maybe Darwin had a clearer scientific
grasp of the need to separate the phenomenal domains of nature and society in order
to pose a proper scientific natural non-teleological mechanism of transformation of
life. But it is important to bear in mind that this division of phenomenal domains is
related to a hypothetical clear divide between humankind and the rest of nature. And
even if it is clearly arbitrary to us to ascribe teleology to nature, the arbitrariness of
separating humanity from nature in the scientific discipline is not always clearly seen
in its full arbitrariness, mainly because it has been a legitimate separation in our
belief system for a long time.
However, it is important to consider that the disciplined observer is a living
organism at the same time as s/he observes. From the synchronic perspective of
observation, this is not only an intellectual or biological kind of awareness, it is an
existential awareness of the predicament of being embodied at the same time as one
is trying to observe the business of human life "objectively"9. This issue is linked
9 This existential predicament will come to a closer scrutiny in the description of the artificial type of
organisation, which is the one in which human beings tell relevant "tales" or explanations about
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with a number of questions that have been posed in the various disciplines of our
Western tradition that study human directly (religion, philosophy, social sciences),
and indirectly in the human-observer perspective that the "hard" natural sciences hide
in their anthropocentric-universalistic assumptions: The question of what is the
human self and what is its place in the universe. Christian cosmology has an answer
to this question that is stated in its myth of creation: God created the world for man
to dominate and govern. This is the symbological origin of the Western identity,
which has now permeated and merged with local symbols all over the world; and
even if it has been transformed through the emergence of what Voegelin calls
historiogenesis10, the discursive shape of the Western identity was formed by its
symbological past "path dependencies". One of the most celebrated American child
psychologists, on whose work Anthony Giddens bases his reflections on trust
(Giddens 1990, see also Misztal 1996), Erik H. Erikson, wrote:
How did man's need for individual identity evolve? Before Darwin, the
answer was clear: because God created Adam in His own image, as a
counterplayer of His identity, and thus bequeathed to all man the glory and
the despair of individuation and faith. I admit to not having come up with any
better explanation. The Garden of Eden, of course has had many Utopian
transformations since that expulsion from the unity of creation —an expulsion
which tied man's identity forever to the manner of his toil and of his co¬
operation with others, and with technical and communal pride. (Erikson
1968:40)
The Western scientific pursuit of knowledge eventually rejected the mythic language
as a literal explanation for the origin of the human kind of consciousness; even if as a
principle of differentiation from animals in world cosmology it kept a kind of
globalised (more by Christianity than by modernity) communal pride about the
reality. An "existential" observer is needed as a principle of methodology because this observer is
engaged in producing explanations about the existence of explanations, and so the grounds for
him/her to explain anything are those of the field of nihility or of "groundlessness" (see chapter VII,
section 2. below).
10 "If historiogenesis is a speculation on the origin and cause of social order, it must be considered a
member of the class to which also belong theogony, anthropogony and cosmogony. All the varieties
of the class have in common the quest of the ground. As from the experiences of participation in the
divine, human, and cosmic areas of reality there arise questions concerning the origin of the gods,
man, and the cosmos, so from the experience of the social realm there arise questions concerning the
origin of society and its order; besides symbolisms expressing the mystery of existence that puzzles
the explorer of divine, human, and cosmic reality, there develops a symbolism that expresses the
same mystery with regard to the existence of society" (Voegelin 1974:60).
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human (Western) transcendental ability to be moral. This pride has justified many
atrocities, from genocide to systematic pain for sentient beings on the grounds that
they are not conscious in the same way as we are. Today, science still assumes
methodological principles of domination and control over its object of analysis. This
century, however, the scientific discipline has started to question the human upper
hand over the rest of the natural world. In contemporary 'green' rhetoric, this has
happened most notoriously in an evident critique construed as the destructive
environmental consequences of untempered technological control over nature. But
also in political economy, methodologically, due to the growing margins of
uncertainty observed in the global arenas of interaction (Giarini 1984).
On the basis of a critique of cosmology, I will argue that the emerging
paradigm of complexity should not be regarded as the product of any kind of
progress, but as the corollary of simplicity, one that is able to escape the
cosmological mechanics —and oppressive mythological consequences— of the
movement of time as diachronic sequence of events. This century's physical
discoveries about the smallest known elements of matter bear witness to a new
convergence between human time and natural time —one that Bergson described as
real time (or duree) to stress its relevance for human beings, and which Darwin
managed to separate from human time to the specialising advantage of biology. What
this means is that the realm of Western morality and values is moving towards our
relationship with the natural environment, observable in the growth of 'green'
movements and parties. About this, Gerard Delanty says:
[Njature has remerged as a new theme in natural and social sciences in recent
years in response to the ecological crisis. Nature is increasingly being seen as
a social construction. Social science can no longer suppose the objectivity of
nature as an unchanging essence. In other words, the ontological distinction
between humans and nature is breaking down. Both nature and society can no
longer be conceived in terms of a model of time. (Delanty 1997:5)
This model entailed an ontological divide between animal and human time. But the
convergence between them also means that, in the synchronic realm of Bergsonian
time as simultaneity, human beings themselves may be regarded as pre-historic
(primitive) entities as well as transhistoric ones (spiritual) at the same time as
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historical (intellectual) entities: the three ideal types of world views described at the
beginning of this work also describe three plausible ways in which all human beings
may experience reality legitimately.
From a synchronic perspective, Darwin's view of time as a backdrop against
which life enfolded (evolved) implied an explanation of how human beings emerged
from animality to civilised history. Civilised human beings are assumed to be
'conscious' as an ontological principle for the scientific observer to exist. In early
modern historiogenesis, Western morality was clearly and experientially shown as a
principle of differentiation from other human beings who were in the process of
emerging from the primitive stage, which Europe regarded as its own past.
Unfortunately, this principle of differentiation emerged at the same time as power
relations inadvertently defined it. But today, modernity is a socially 'real' and
legitimate realm of experience for the whole world through global interaction. There
arises a cosmological problem of identity among the intelligentsia of the peoples who
are shown a cosmological inferior place in a hierarchy of nations that was fixed as
such by universal human history. In the present world scenario, this cosmology
sometimes overlaps with local scenarios of deep emotional links to stories of pride
and retribution that seem archaic —as in the ex-Yugoslavia— but due to their
visibility, are really more contemporary than ever before in the modern world. To
this day, bootstrapped cause and explanation remain in place producing more
empirical evidence that there is, in fact, a pre-modern world. But it is posed either as
distant (in more archaic lands) or unconscious (in dysfunctional, evil-mad and angry
freaks who live in our cities and are given serious attention in the public sphere).
This righteous stance —which must be moral and judgmental— explains uncertainty
away but does not help us face it and deal with the deep human-animal fear that it
produces. I believe that this is one of the deepest predicaments for the contemporary
modern self, and the only way out is to contemplate the inherent creativity that also
lies in uncertainty.
The creative aspect of uncertainty is necessary in the synchronic practice and
experience of trust that lubricates power relationships and that sets wealth expansion
rolling. It is clear that current world-power politics and its hierarchical order do not
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disappear from this perspective, they remain an "objective" part of the social global
environment. However, in Darwin's XlXth century's type of legitimate symbology,
the changing social environment appeared to be naturally as it was observed (and
therefore made) to be: It was only through the definition of the human 'other', the
savages, that humanity could be reintegrated with nature, yet different from it in a
hierarchical moral fashion". Ifwe accept that in the XXth century the human 'savage'
other is no more a legitimate principle of differentiation, as anthropology is already
succeeding in doing, human consciousness re-emerges as one of the most compelling
mysteries that we must live with in the synchronic present moment of experience.
The present mystery of human consciousness can be placed in two distinctive
dimensions of cosmology: It may be regarded as the problem of how it emerged in
the human species in the evolution of the world; but it can also be posed as a
recurrent phenomenon in the individual conscious lives of human beings, our birth,
the development of the child into adulthood, and unavoidable death. As has been
mentioned in the first part of the thesis, ontogeny is the development of a particular
individual organism throughout its life time; and phytogeny is the ongoing evolutive
history of a population, which includes changes in its genetic pool (Hodgson
1993:40) and the descent from ancestry that takes it back to the common point of
origin of all living organisms, the present species forming a branch in the lineage of
the common "tree of life" (Maturana and Varela 1987). And so, the mystery of
consciousness can be observed as emerging in human phylogenetic evolution
(traditional Darwinian cosmology), or as an ongoing phenomenon in present
recurrent human ontogeny. Consciousness, then, involves the cosmological position
of any human being with respect to the reality that s/he sees, or rather 'lives', and
his/her social position in the community where s/he grows up: Her/his view of reality
and his/her consciousness of self. But the two latter categories are reflections of the
organic role of both the human collective social realm and the human embodied
" It is true that 'otherness' has been rebuilt symbologically to temper the racist undertones in the
contrast between civilised and savage peoples. But the current difference modern/pre-modern is
historically linked to the non-politically correct one civilised/savage. The difference is still artificial
and attached to power relations: it is cultural and European in its modern origin, but in current
differentiated and specialised interaction, modern culture has become global.
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biology. I will now turn to a discussion of how, as opposed to Darwin's theory,
Maturana and Varela's theory of life and evolution open the possibility to consider
humanness as the present embodied experience that we share with other members of
the our human species. But they pose this awareness of humanness while assuming
that human beings share the gift of consciousness with other living organisms at the
same time; we can be aware of difference without the need for a cultural
cosmological-moral divide. This theoretical difference is based on the notions of
time that are emphasised: Darwin's theory is eminently diachronic while Maturana
and Varela's is couched in the synchronic temporal realm of what they call
autopoiesis. As will be explained in the next section, autopoiesis means that living
organisms are engaged in a practically conscious production of themselves.
However, for the purposes of assimilating evolution from a synchronic perspective of
observation, I will concentrate on autopoiesis as the simultaneous organisational
closure of an organism with respect to its environment while it keeps a structural
coupling with it. Through this synchronic perspective, the notion of evolution or
history —or of any other kind of human cosmological tale— is seen as a characteristic
of our species which lives in myth or explanation, a way of our being in the world,
analogous to the swimming of the fish and the flying of the bird.
It could be said that Darwin conceived his specific notion of secular evolution
by postulating individual biological entities (assumed as already adult, i.e. being able
to reproduce) and their contribution to the collective evolution of their species.
Darwin set the model in motion through natural selection that fed from variability
and chance fuelled by reproduction (sex) and death. In his theory of evolution,
Darwin symbolised both the development of the individual organism (ontogeny) and
the development of its species as a whole (phylogeny). It is useful to consider the
concepts of ontogeny and phylogeny again in order to explain the distinctive
contribution of Darwin's account of evolution to how it is debated today. The
difference between ontogeny and phylogeny is marked by reproduction and death,
and this is the reason why Herbert Spencer's view of evolution was a model based on
the life and development of individual organisms, a mere kind of optimistic
"ontogeny writ large" (Ingold 1986:14). However, even if Darwin set the basis to
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differentiate between these two realms in the life of a species, his mechanisms for
evolution related ontogeny merely to an organism's reproduction and death. The
bigger cosmological picture of phylogenetic evolution and the image of the tree of
life (that assumes the common ancestry of all living entities) are the most relevant
aspects of Darwin's theory (Sober 1993:7). But the mystery of ontogeny is
downplayed (Oyama 1985). Ontogeny and phylogeny are construed diachronically,
even if nature is not regarded as historical in the human sense; and the modern neo-
Darwinian synthesis organises a deterministic role for the principle of natural
selection that cannot avoid but to produce a cosmology which, while not teleological,
cannot avoid being deterministic. This will be illustrated by the explanation of the
adaptationist perspective and research program that Maturana and Varela —together
with other biologists— criticise and oppose.
The account of evolution by Maturana and Varela differs from the Darwinian
tradition in their perspective on time. It has been stressed that by producing a
common evolutionary origin and a tree of life for all living organisms, Darwin put
human beings and all other living organisms in the same family (Gould 1977:50,
Maturana and Varela 1987)). He accepted strict organic continuity between our
animal ancestors and human beings; but separated them again in the sociological and
historical implications of the human ability to be moral —even if this morality was
grounded in Darwin's uncompromising philosophical materialism. Moral capacity is
necessarily construed as something that emerged along the diachronic tale, which
held the 'savage' other as an intermediate stage between animal and human in the
development of civilisation. In contrast to this, Maturana and Varela's emphasis on
synchrony dispenses with past progressive stages and concentrates on the problem of
consciousness as it is lived presently, assuming organic continuity with our animal
ancestors as well as conscious continuity with the living organisms with which we
share the earth right now. Any differences between human and non-human
consciousness may be construed as distinct characteristics of our species and are
liable to be studied as such.
This transfers the Western symbological split between human and animal,
mediated by moral or cultural capacity, to one in which human stands on the same
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temporal grounds as any other living organism, and the split is projected between the
living entity and its environment. But this is not an alienating split, the organism is
bootstrapped back to the environment through "structural coupling". Maturana and
Varela's theoretical construction of evolution as natural drift is stochastic in that it
does not pose an entirely random or entirely deterministic path for evolution,
displaying the essence of complex uncertainty. It has been observed by them —and by
a number of other biologists who also resist the neo-Darwinian authoritarian views
on natural selection (Jacob 1977, Stearns 1982)— that this "path" is more accurately
situated somewhere in between deterministic laws and random drift. The alternative
posed by Maturana and Varela includes the biological-cognitive involvement of the
autopoietic living entity in its ontogenetic development and its structural coupling
with an environment that triggers changes in it.
Maturana and Varela want to emphasise the synchronic and simultaneous
essence of life. Darwinian natural history is relevant to the synchronic observer in
order to explain how it is that the structural present came to be shaped, but a
mechanical assumption along diachrony as to how evolutionary change takes place is
seen by the two biologists as eminently deterministic. Maturana and Varela's theory
differs from the Darwinian tradition in its perspective on time, which emphasises the
cognitive involvement of the living autopoietic organism in its own ontogeny and
development. In other words, while the Darwinian tradition emphasises the
observation of change in diachrony and holds this transformation through time as the
essence of evolution, Maturana and Varela hold that this is a construction that is
convenient to explain the "history of interactions" that led to the present structural
actuality of the organism12. But this history is only a construction for the sake of the
observer, the essence of life is not its observed phylogenetic evolution but its present
constant change. Nevertheless, Maturana and Varela's account of evolution as
"natural drift" remains faithful to the Darwinian basic non-teleological formulation
and incorporates the explanatory principle of 'natural selection' as portrayed in the
l: A notion that is analogous to what i have called "path dependencies", following the historical neo-
institutionalist insights about present dependence on context and particularity (see Hall and Taylor
1996).
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modern neo-Darwinian synthesis. But this principle is regarded as only one of the
factors that describes ongoing change in phylogenetic evolution among a number of
other principles (mutation, migration, units of selection, random genetic drift, stasis,
pleiotropy, genetic recombination) that should be considered in order to escape
reductionist accounts of evolution (see Ingold 1989:213, Varela et al. 1991:188-193,
Sober 1993:18-9).
The current discipline of biology is based on Darwinian non-teleological
cosmology, which basically substituted creationist and teleological accounts. But it is
important to stress at this point that modern (contemporary) evolutionary biology
remains divided with respect to the role of Darwinian 'natural selection' and its
modern synthesis with genetics, which has become —at least to the adaptationist
school— the single most important mechanism in explaining evolution. Maturana and
Varela are engaged in a critique of the latter position mainly due to its deterministic
implications about the phenomenon of life.
[Classical Darwinism became neo-Darwinism during the 1930's as a result of
the so-called modern synthesis between the Darwinian ideas based on
zoology, botany, and systematics on the one hand and the rising knowledge in
cellular and population genetics on the other. This synthesis established the
basic view that modifications occur by small changes in organismic traits
specified by heritable units, the genes. (Varela et al. 1991:185-6)
Through natural selection, the fit survivors are seen to contribute to the gene pool of
the observed phylogenetic development of a population in constant change. It could
be said that the Darwinian paradigm suppressed grand teleological claims about
nature by naturalising teleology (Sober 1993:83). What this means, according to
Sober, is that adaptation is analysed a posteriori as an effect of natural selection of
advantageous traits in the ancestry of organisms. In other words, the telos is seen as
the function of the observed trait, it is observed in the present adaptedness of fit
organisms. Even if no grand teleological cosmic objective is posed, small local
tendencies of optimising fitness selections are assumed. This feature of evolutionary
biology, together with the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis, very often produces a
deterministic attitude in the convinced adaptationist biologists about the creativity
inherent in 'natural selection'.
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This kind of neo-Darwinism is generally known as adaptationism (congenial
with socio-biology) and, according to Sober, it is a thesis about the "power" of
natural selection (1993:119). Adaptationism is not teleological because it speaks of
fitness in terms of the fittest trait actually present in the observed population, and not
the fittest of all the traits that we can imagine. But adaptationists adjudicate a creative
force to natural selection that guarantees an optimising natural trend in that the fittest
observable trait will evolve; their models explain phenotypic traits through natural
selection and all other non-selective important evolutionary processes are ignored
(see Varela's el al. discussion 1991:188-193). This is an extreme position that will
serve to illustrate Maturana and Varela's objections to the general attitude of
unquestioned determinism inherent in the assumption that the genetic make up and
observed phenotype of an organism are the main vehicles of ontogenetic
development and phylogenetic evolution1'. This view is also being currently
criticised in its most reductionist assumptions —by various other biologists14— that tie
phenotype to genotype through the 'creativity' of natural selection, where this
principle keeps an aura of autonomy that is accepted a priori, in a similar fashion to
the 'invisible hand' of Smith and von Hayek in political economy.
According to Maturana and Varela, this view misrepresents Darwin's
celebrated non-teleological views on evolution.
He [Darwin] states it was "as if" there were a natural selection, comparable in
its separating effect to the artificial selection that a farmer makes of the
varieties that interest him. Darwin himself was very clear in pointing out that
he never intended to use that word as anything other than an apt metaphor.
But soon after, as the theory of evolution began to spread, the notion of
"natural selection" came to be interpreted as a source of instructive
interactions from the environment. (Maturana and Varela 1987:101)
13 The first part of the next chapter will engage in a discussion of how the adaptationist program,
central to most recent evolutionary biology, is related to the representationist paradigm of cognition
that Maturana and Varela's theory of life criticises. Both adaptation in evolution and representation
in cognition assume that nature "instructs" living entities according to a deterministic mechanism
that implies some kind of a priori objectivity in nature and unconscious —yet precise— mechanisms
somehow engraved in living entities.
14 "Although the reductionist tradition remains strong", says Hodgson, "there have been further
moves against genetic reductionism in biology in recent years. These are found in the works of
Niles Eldredge, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin and Ernst Mayr, among others" (Hodgson
1993:244).
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They consider the notion of selection as a metaphor or a productive mind exercise for
the biologist (or interested scientist) who wants to understand the process of living;
but not as an essential element of the process: "the whole body of changes that the
observer sees as possible exist only in his mind, even though they are possible for
different histories [of structural change]" (Maturana and Varela 1987:101).
Darwinian descent with modification is still part of Maturana and Varela's theory of
life, but it is essentially non-deterministic, as opposed to adaptationist accounts.
Determinism still manages to apply to Darwin's metaphor of natural selection in
adaptationist accounts of evolution because it is construed as a creative agent, a
mechanism that feeds from chance and death, but that is able to display intelligent
behaviour without being embodied by anything but the mystic corpus of a principle.
It is commonly asserted by biologists of eminence and repute, that the truth of
natural selection is now proven beyond any shadow of doubt, and that we can
confidently expect the future of biology to consist of footnotes to The Origin
ofSpecies. Over the years these assertions have become increasingly strident
and doctrinaire, as the thesis that Darwin modestly proposed to account for
adaptive modification has been elevated into a total, all-embracing
explanation for the phenomena of life. Alternatives that cannot be
accommodated within the neo-Darwinian paradigm are consigned, along with
creationism and other nonsense, to the waste-bin of what Dawkins calls
'doomed rivals'. (Ingold 1989:287)
It is an example of scientific dogmatism to claim that the neo-Darwinian paradigm
has been proven beyond doubt, mainly because there remain many unanswered
questions that the paradigm does not address on the grounds that the future ('not yet')
advance of scientific theory and technology will eventually answer all questions
(Varela et al 1991:189).
Maturana and Varela suppress deterministic principles in their complex
theory of life by postulating a stochastic mechanism of transformation. The latter is
not 'selected' in the general direction of optimisation, but it 'moves' or changes with
life's dynamism. As I have briefly mentioned above, their theory postulates that
living organisms are organisationally closed to the environment in their constant
autopoiesis and structurally coupled with it at the same time15. This makes the
15 The notions of autopoiesis and structural coupling and their proposed mechanisms through which
they are sustained in conscious life will be dealt with at length in the next section of this chapter.
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element of randomness an aspect of coupling, and the element of structural
determinism"' an aspect of closure; two aspects that act simultaneously and can only
be separated artificially.
[W]e have no unified picture of how the evolution of living beings occurs in
all its aspects. There are many schools of thought that seriously question
understanding evolution by natural selection; this view has prevailed in
biology for more than sixty years. Whatever new ideas have been bruited
about in terms of evolutive mechanisms, however, those ideas cannot
discount the phenomenon of evolution. But they will free us from the popular
view of evolution as a process in which there is an environmental world to
which living beings adapt progressively, optimizing their use of it. What we
propose here is that evolution occurs as a phenomenon of structural drift
under ongoing phylogenic selection. In that phenomenon there is no progress
or optimization of the use of the environment, but only conservation of
adaptation and autopoiesis. It is a process in which organism and environment
remain in a continuous structural coupling. (Maturana and Varela 1987:115)
In contrast to adaptationist diachronic accounts of phylogenetic evolution, living
autopoietic systems preserve their integrity in organisational closure, the change of a
system is determined by the structure of the system itself and not by the environment
choosing anything "naturally". However, being structurally coupled to the
environment, random changes in the latter "trigger" changes in the organism that are
nonetheless determined by its own structure. "To an observer", says Mingers, "it may
appear that an event in the environment has brought about a structural change, but in
reality, the structural change will have been concerned with maintaining autopoiesis"
(1991:320).
From this perspective, the observer is in the position to make an artificial
distinction between two independent organisations: the organism and the
environment; which can be construed as independent only by an observer who
separates them artificially, as they remain structurally coupled. Only through their
actual unity, can the organism keep its own internal dynamics and its autopoietic
16 "The fact that a structure-determined system is deterministic", says Maturana, "does not mean that
an observer should be able to predict the course of its structural changes. Determinism and
predictability pertain to different operational domains in the praxis of living of the observer.
Determinism is a feature that characterises a system in terms of the operational coherences that
constitute it, and in terms of its domain of existence as it is brought forth in the operations of
distinction of the observer. Accordingly, there are as many different domains of determinism as
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integrity. This integrity depends on the organisational closure of the organism with
respect to the environment, but the unity of environment and organism in autopoiesis
depends in their keeping structural congruence, or the unity disintegrates. This
congruence is not "instructive", but it illustrates how the organism is simultaneously
closed and coupled to the environment while there is autopoiesis:
In the interactions between the living being and the environment within this
structural congruence the perturbations of the environment do not determine
what happens to the living being; rather, it is the structure of the living being
that determines what change occurs in it. This interaction is not instructive,
for it does not determine what its effects are going to be. Therefore we have
used the expression "to trigger" an effect. In this way we refer to the fact that
the changes that result from the interaction between the living being and its
environment are brought about by the disturbing agent but determined by the
structure of the disturbed system. The same holds true for the environment:
the living being is a source of perturbations and not of instructions. (Maturana
& Varela 1987:95-6)
Both notions of autopoietic closure and structural coupling have consequences for the
transgenerational level of interaction, that of phylogeny, where evolution leaves its
marks.
Structural coupling and autopoietic closure make chance and variability
feasible in an analogous way to how the notions of competition (struggle) and death
made it in Darwin's theory. However, without the deterministic undertones of the
neo-Darwinian synthesis, they claim to favour a view that is more congenial with
Darwin's own non-teleological principle of descent with modification (see Maturana
and Varela 1987). Heredity and variation are two corollaries of the sequential
phenomena of reproduction and death, but also of the synchronic moment of
reproduction through simultaneous autopoietic closure from, and structural coupling
with, the environment and the parents.
Those aspects of the initial structure of the new unity which we evaluate as
identical to the original unity are called heredity; those aspects of the initial
structure of the new unity which we evaluate as different from the original
unity are called reproductive variation. For this reason, each new unity
invariably begins its individual history with structural similarities and
differences in respect to its forbears. (Maturana & Varela 1987:68)
domains of different operational coherences the observer brings forth in her or his domain of
experiences" (Maturana 1990:70).
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Reproduction is described as a living unity that experiences a fracture that results in
two unities of the same class: "In order for a fracture to result in reproduction, the
structure of the unity must be organized in a distributed and non-compartmentalized
way. Thus, the plane of fracture separates fragments with structures capable of
embodying independently the same original organization" (Maturana and Varela
1987:61-2). The closure of autopoietic systems makes that the reproductive
"fracture" between two organisms of the same class preserve organisation during
ontogeny while giving rise to structural variation through reproduction and death in
phylogeny.
Phylogenetic evolution or "natural drift" is described as a longer history of
interactions (constructed by the observer with respect to evidence) defined by death
and reproduction. "A phylogeny is a succession of organic forms sequentially
generated by reproductive relationships. The changes experienced throughout the
phylogeny constitute phylogenetic or evolutionary change" (Maturana and Varela
1987:103-4). Phylogeny describes the most common and accepted (scientifically
justified) speculation that explains how life started on earth through unicellularity17.
From the perspective of the observer, though, interaction, variation, heredity, and
structural change is perceived as sequential in a diachronic temporal dimension that
stops in death for the individual organism, but that goes on through reproduction for
the species. But this sequentiality is necessarily artificial and constructed for the sake
of the observer: "Living beings (with and without a nervous system) [...] function
always in their structural present. The past as a reference to interactions gone by and
the future as a reference to interactions yet to come are valuable dimensions for us to
communicate with each other as observers; however, they do not operate in the
17 "[Cjellular reproduction", say Maturana and Varela, "presents a special phenomenon: autopoietic
dynamics is what makes cellular fracture take place in the reproductive plane. No external agent or
force is needed. We can presume that such was not the case with the first autopoietic unities and
that, in fact, reproduction was first a fragmentation that resulted from the bumping of these unities
with other externalities. In the historical networks thus produced, some odd cells underwent
reproductive fracture as a result of their internal dynamics. These variants possessed a dividing
mechanism from which derived a lineage or stable historical succession. It is not clear how this
occurred. These origins are probably forever lost to us. But this does not invalidate the fact that cell
division is a special case of reproduction that we can legitimately call self-reproduction" (1987:66)
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structural determinism of the organism at every moment" (Maturana and Varela
1987:124). This type of structural determinism is embodied by the organism's
structural actuality or "path dependencies", it is an important realm of explanation for
the observer to base her/his observations; but it is not congenial with the determinism
of the adaptationist program: it is simultaneously structurally coupled to the
environment and this illustrates an organism's unavoidable existence within ongoing
uncertainty. Structural determinism in Maturana and Varela's theory is rather an
illustration of how organisms keep their integrity in a closed autopoiesis that is
coupled to the environment. Living organisms practically and consciously determine
themselves through engaging in the natural business of keeping organically whole.
This happens simultaneously in the ontogenies and co-ontogenies of living entities;
and the disciplined observer positioned in a synchronic perspective should be
existentially aware of his/her own practical involvement with the production of
her/himself at this organic and biological level.
According to the biological theory of autopoiesis, "to live is to know"
(Maturana & Varela 1987:174). As will be explained in the next section of this
chapter, this cognitive bottom line is meant to illustrate that living beings are
structurally involved in the production of themselves with practical (spontaneous)
intention, and human beings share this structure.
That living beings have an organization, of course, is proper not only to them
but also to everything we can analyse as a system. What is distinctive about
them, however, is that their organization is such that their only products is
themselves, with no separation between producer and product. The being and
doing of an autopoietic unity are inseparable, and this is their specific mode
of organization. (Maturana & Varela 1987:48-9)
Every system with organisation that cannot be seen as organically created, is
distinctively an artificial human creation, an allopoietic system (a machine). By the
same token, it is important to remember that everything that can be distinguished as a
"living system" has received the projection of an in-built human ability to distinguish
order. For example, a cat will have its cattish life independently of a human scientific
observer identifying it as a living system or not. It is the observer who creates the
representation with systemic characteristics; while at the same time the observer
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engages in the embodied practical enactment of a mutual co-determination between
him/herself as the subject and her/his object of study.
It is important to regard the ontological separation between humanity and
nature as a useful fiction, an artifice for scientific observation; while simultaneously
making it a tempered basis for epistemology and heuristic objectives. Along the same
lines of argumentation, the subject-object divide may be seen as a useful metaphor
while bearing in mind that it is an ontological illusion of "objective" actuality. This
divide can be reclaimed on the grounds that it defines a legitimate and meaningful
realm of scientific disciplined practice and phenomenal experience. But it is
impossible to take the divide on board again without tempering its ability to describe
reality to us: it is eminently sequential, and in the exercise of concentrating its
descriptive powers of precise explanation of -so-called— universal natural laws, it
ceases to look on the rest of the universe. Scientific explanation may be functional in
an observational specific way, and very useful as a consequence of this principle, but
it remains limited and displaced from explaining reality without imposing arbitrary
and totalitarian assumptions about the universe that it intends to explain —just like
any other type of universalistic view of reality. It is in this sense that scientific
explanation remains a very powerful cosmological tale; mainly because it produces
the methodological means for a provisional consensus, which is always only
potentially universal. According to the arguments used throughout this work,
consensus is culturally constructed, and cannot be but provisional.
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VI. 2. Spontaneity, Embodiment, and Path Dependencies
It is clear that knowledge is constantly produced by discipline; but it is not always
apparent to us that spontaneity plays an equally important role in the production of
human knowledge. It seems like discipline is easier to pin down because it is set out
sequentially in the formal descriptions of its methodology and in the principles of its
systematic application in practice. Yet the synchronic works of spontaneity are
already as embedded in the formal description of the discipline, as in the actual
application of the principles of order. In the present moment of experience,
spontaneity and discipline are inextricably entwined. Just how spontaneity constantly
shapes discipline is a question that begs for attention18. But it is important to realise
that even if we cannot uncover a systematic mechanism by which to pin down
spontaneity (the attempt itself would kill it), we can observe it in the present moment
of experience even if only by contrast to discipline —and intricately entwined with it.
This entwining is analogous to that between life and death in the pagan/primitive
world view. In their own way. both dichotomies constantly produce experiences of
power and vulnerability, and, while we are alive and embodied, perception throws
our notion of self either way. This might make some people strive for an ideal middle
path of permanent metaphysical trust; however, even in the more mundane realms of
functionality and organisation, the spontaneity of trust holds in the background the
systematicity of human interaction. I will argue that this systematic, unreflective type
of trust in human interaction comes from awareness of a present structure shaped by
"path dependencies"19; or how the particularity of past interaction inheres in present
perception and interpretation of reality that are analogous to biological mechanisms
for the development of organic structures. The organic ideal type of organisation
18 Especially in the contemporary kind of awareness about the globalised arena of interaction: It is
becoming increasingly apparent that the more integrated the transnational systems, the more
vulnerable to spontaneous transformations due to global contingencies.
19 As has been pointed out, the term "path dependencies" emerges from the new institutionalist
historical approach to the study of social phenomena (see Hall & Taylor 1996). Here, I take this
term and make it analogous to the organic "history of past interactions" that determines the
structural actuality of a living entity in Maturana and Varela's (1987) theory of life, evolution
(natural drift), and cognition.
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theoretically described here considers the spontaneity of human embodiment, and
the structure of its path dependencies (see Fig 4 above).
We can identify a trusting behaviour in the present moment of experience,
even if displayed by an animal. But in the latter case this is only spoken of
metaphorically, for trust is a human emotion related to our way of interacting with
each other. New born babies trust completely in a way in which only a human kind of
environment allows them to; they are born from the organic womb into the "womb"
of relationships that allows the baby to produce a notion of self. The process of
creation of this notion of self is far from safe in the same sense as a womb is to the
foetus (and we do not know if the foetus feels as safe as it appears to us). The human
baby faces both the hardship and the comfort of dependence at the same time: From
the moment that it leaves the womb it is immersed in a psychological relationship
with its environment and the people in it; if there is no people in its environment, the
baby dies (as it is born as an embryo, see Gould 1977). Barbara Misztal refers to
Giddens's notion of 'basic trust' "which illustrates how the development of trust in
infancy determines the core of our ego identity" (Misztal 1996:91, see Giddens
1990). This brings about the psychological need of security that is based on the
formation of trust in human relationships.
In human interaction, from a present perspective, the experience of successful
social coordination is based on trust, and even if we may refer to it in diachronic
accounts of human life, its experiential substance lies in synchrony. Misztal also
refers to a variation of trust in Giddens's discussion which seems to suggest that this
variation, 'elementary trust', is more related to security in the social environments.
The notion of trust that we are familiar with may be construed as an emotion or as a
value that allows for vulnerability in interaction, depending on who trusts and if this
entity is emotionally linked to a notion of self. It can be a personal kind of trust if
people know each other and have a history of past interaction (basic trust). But it can
also be impersonal, a kind of mechanical trust that goes to the traditions and
institutions that sustain coordination (elementary trust); this type is congenial with
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Luhmann's functional notion of trust that reduces complexity20 (see Luhmann 1979).
Trust is a human dimension of interaction because, while living entities other than
human may at times seem to handle a distinct notion of self (mostly when they
interact with humans or have complex forms of social life); the development of an
emotional link with a notion of self requires a distinct domain of human coordination
which may be observed as having the biological role of sustaining our way of staying
alive. Maturana and Varela call this domain the domain of "language and self-
consciousness" (1987:176).
The theory about life and cognition of Maturana and Varela, which has been
described as having "potentially far-reaching consequences" (Mingers 1991:319), is
couched in a synchronic perspective of time, and therefore, the observer identifies
with her/his animal object of study: a living entity like one self. But from the
perspective of this identification, differentiating principles are distinguished that help
the observer explain how his/her own self differs from other living entities qua
observer; that is, as a human being that is embodied and that also has an emotional
link to her/his particular type of notion of self. This is a discursive ability which only
human animals display to the extent to which not only do we develop a notion of
self, but also an emotional relationship with that notion. Nevertheless, we should
remain aware of our embodied condition, which brings us back to awareness that
human beings are also animals, and therefore, that language is an organic aspect of
human life.
The organic ideal type of order that I will describe is constituted by
embodiment as its central axis, by the living entity's path dependencies in terms of its
20 According to Misztal, Luhmann's notion of trust is "roughly analogous to the idea of public good"
because it "rests on a 'presentational' base. It ensures that everything seems in proper order, which,
in turn, increases our 'trust in trust' " (1996:75). However, consciousness is not a relevant category
to be considered in systemic interaction according to Luhmann (1995). And this is why it is only
roughly analogous to a public good, because from the perspective of public goods we would be
speaking about civil society with its accompanying assumptions about subjects, agency, and even
rational choice. By the same token, Luhmann's notion of trust would seem roughly congenial with
the type of consciousness that, following Ingold, I have here characterised as "practical
consciousness", the one that we share with animals in its "presentational" nature instead of a
"representational" discursive one. But as consciousness is not an issue in Luhmann, his notion of
trust remains too conveniently couched in assumptions of functionality as a mechanistic and
systemic phenomenon. We can argue with Misztal that his complexity reducing function for trust
does not succeed in explaining the actual formation of trust (Misztal 1996:74).
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past structural definition, and by its ability to improvise, or adapt itself and drift
spontaneously as an entity that is structurally coupled to its environment. This
describes the organic organisation of an ideal human entity which is ideal because,
following Tim Ingold's discussion about intentionality, we will only consider its
practical intention in the organic type. This allows us to contemplate the human
animal at the same level of consciousness as the non-human animal; and realise that
its language has a systematic every day life coordinatory use which, even in a
discursive mode, displays practical (spontaneous) intention. For example, when one
learns to speak fluently as a child, the discursive intention of speaking is not part of
that learning; when, through conversation, one may unwittingly either inflict
emotional pain as a consequence of careless speech, or provide emotional support
without this being the explicit subject of conversation; these are all practical
intentionalities that may become discursive only a posteriori. As observers, we might
distinguish practical from discursive elements in the living entity or in the
environment, but they cannot be distinguished presently from the perspective of the
embodied human that lives them. And so, the purely organic human ideal-type does
not represent the world discursively to itself, it already knows it structurally (by the
embodied history of its past interactions, its present structure), it acts its practical
intention and lives.
This is a kind of'embodied knowledge' present in the synchronic theory about
life that Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have produced: It is a description
of how living beings are constituted that defies the traditional assumptions of the
biological discipline as it is currently taught. In this theory, even if they themselves
do not formulate it in these terms, there is a symbological interplay of a dichotomy
that describes the essential need of life to constantly move and constantly rest. In the
sequentiality of time as movement, this is experienced as the unavoidable need of
sleeping and waking, breathing in and out, living and dying; but in the perpetual
present time —here and now— there is a world-overall living mixture of individual
particular events —which can only be seen as being constituted by discrete events in
description. The simultaneity of life on earth is seen as sustained spontaneously with
astounding intelligence by an immense variety of living organisms and a changing
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environment right now, and this is the essence of a complex perspective of
observation.
Maturana and Varela coined the term autopoiesis in order to describe how
living beings are organised to engage in the process of the biological production of
themselves. The order of things that they want to describe is framed in a basic
conceptual dichotomy, which refers to two aspects of the same holistic phenomenon.
In living organisms, one of its sides —organisation— is "permanent", while the other -
-structure— is in constant movement. The organisation of a living being is
accompanied by its structure that engages in the constant dynamics of the processes
that produce its integrity as a living entity. In explaining this kind of constitution in
the cell, they speak of the relations that are established through chemical
transformations:
On the one hand , we see a network of dynamic transformations that produces
its own components and that is essential for a boundary; on the other hand,
we see a boundary that is essential for the operation of the network of
transformations which produced it as a unity. Note that these are not
sequential processes, but two different aspects of a unitary phenomenon.
(Maturana & Varela 1987:46)
The integrity of these processes is sustained in living organisms as operationally
closed systems; that is, their organisation is closed to the environment, but their
structure is coupled to it. We could still see them as "open" in that they do interact
with the environment, but their closure entails that they can only do it in their own
particular structural ways.
The simplicity of the unitary cell allows us to identify organisation directly
with a boundary that "contains" life; but in multicellular living beings organisation is
not simply a boundary, it is the form of the structural relations in constant change
which makes it possible for observers to distinguish living entities and classify them
as diverse species21. Living beings differ from each other in their structure (which is
always individual, a unique event) and they are alike in their organisation; but their
structure is characterised by its constant dynamic processes. This incessant
:1 But this business of classification is not without its deep and unsolvable paradoxes (see Gould
1977).
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movement, what Maturana and Varela call "the throbbing of al life" (1987:100), is
the constant autopoiesis of living beings (without forgetting the equally constant
presence of death or disintegration). Autopoiesis can be imagined as happening as
sequential events that we can consider discrete and ordered in the passage of time in
past and future; but also as simultaneous in living beings at this present moment in
world synchrony.
However, what Maturana and Varela want to emphasise is that the production
of life and autopoiesis is most importantly situated in this present synchrony, and that
sequentiality is essential only to the present description of that condition of life:
The fact remains that we are continuously immersed in this network of
interactions, the results of which depend on history. Effective action leads to
effective action: it is the cognitive circle that characterizes our becoming, as
an expression of our manner of being autonomous living systems. Through
this ongoing recursiveness, every world brought forth necessarily hides its
origins. We exist in the present; past and future are manners of being now.
Biologically there is no way we can put in front of us what happened to us in
obtaining the regularities we have grown accustomed to: from values or
preferences to color qualities and smells. The biologic mechanism tells us that
an operational stabilization in the dynamics of the organism does not embody
the manner in which it originated. The business of living keeps no records
concerning origins. All we can do is generate explanations, through language,
that reveal the mechanism of bringing forth a world. (Maturana and Varela
1987:241-2)
History is "hidden" in the organism, yet present in our form of explanation of the
living phenomena. But the latter explanation is part of the discursive human
dimension as a dimension of interaction that non-human animals do not display;
what any living organism does display presently (including humans) is its actual
structure acquired throughout its development from being born, and this structure has
its own particular past path dependencies. The epistemological consequence of this
assertion is to say that the present moment of life is all there is, past and future are
structural characteristics of our way of explaining phenomena, of our way of
knowing now (and of living in that explanation, using it as an imaginary shelter or an
'integument'). Explanations are only symbological human dimensions; they are not
actual characteristics of experience qua explanations, only qua acquired structures
through path dependencies.
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This kind of explanation about life is a very useful change in perspective,
because it dissolves the traditional subject-object divide in its 'given', matter-of-
factual realist assumption. But this approach appropriates the divide again in a
phenomenological fashion, where everything is appearance and one cannot
distinguish between subject and object in simultaneous observation, but only in
explanation. This predicament arises especially when the living being under
inspection is the human being:
If everything is ultimately specified through its appearance to us, then so is
the knowing subject. Since the subject can represent itself to itself, it becomes
an object for representation but is different from all other objects. Thus in the
end the self becomes both an objectified subject and a subjectified object.
This predicament discloses the shiftiness, the instability of the entire
subjective/objective polarity. (Varela et al. 1991:242)
In this perspective, the living entity is no longer considered just as a passive object
that 'lives' and that the scientist describes as a structure of sequential processes that
'happen' and give its object of study the quality of being alive. Rather, in autopoiesis,
the living being is described as the producer and the product of such processes at the
same time.
By differentiating the synchronic-present "time logistics", as it were, of all
living entities from our human observer-like need to exist in sequential explanation,
they point at what makes human beings different from the rest of living organisms —
the explanations themselves— without allowing the observer to stop seeing
him/herself as an embodied animal in her/his abstract reverie. The observer is also a
living autopoietic system, and his/her manner of living, perceiving, and "bringing
forth" the world is part of the human form of biologic organisation in general and
her/his structure in particular, his/her physiology; which is also a product and a
producer of the social realm of interaction where the observer finds her/himself at the
same time:
[Ojur experience is moored to our structure in a binding way. We do not see
the "space" of the world; we live our field of vision. We do not see the
"colors" of the world; we live our chromatic space. Doubtless [...] we are
experiencing a world. But when we examine more closely how we get to
know this world, we invariably find that we cannot separate our history of
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actions —biological and social— from how this world appears to us. It is so
obvious and close that it is very hard to see. (Maturana and Varela 1987:23)
For the sake of the observer, then, the living system is identified as an autopoietic
embodied entity with a history of past path dependencies that constitute its structural
actuality; and this means that its consciousness will give this entity the practical
(spontaneous) intention to live its ontogeny.
This brings us back to the present moment of interaction and to the ontogeny
of organisms, including us. Maturana and Varela see the relevance of speaking about
phylogenetic evolution to explain the emergence of different lineages of living beings
and their history of structural drift, their path dependencies. But this is an explanation
that is relevant to the observer, in living experience, phylogeny takes place at the
same time as ontogeny; and the latter is currently taken to be as unimportant to
biology as the particular personal life-stories are unimportant to universal history.
"The classical approach that is still alive in most textbooks? say Varela et al. ^simply
jumps from genes and gene frequencies to phenotypes and reproductively able
organisms" (1991:189). According to Sober, the area of ontogeny or development
poses various problems which remain unsolved in biology (Sober 1993:22). As has
been said before, Maturana and Varela's theory addresses just this area by
highlighting ontogeny instead of phylogeny. Susan Oyama also engages with the
problem of the implied biological assumption according to which some development
follows genetic rules and some does not, an assumption that "undergrids the
opposition of biological to cultural processes, the mare's nest of biological
determinism and the whole nature-nurture complex" (Oyama 1985:11). According to
Oyama, then, the form of the organism is not transmitted through genes or contained
in the environment, it is constructed in developmental processes, in ontogeny.
There is an important commonality between ontogeny and phylogeny; the
primeval unicellular point of origin for phylogenetic evolution is also the point of
origin for the ontogeny of all multicellular living entities. The individual ontogenetic
history of an autopoietic organism takes place as an epigenetic process.
In spite of their amazing and apparent diversity, they all [multicellulars]
conserve reproduction through a unicellular stage as a central feature of their
identity as biologic systems [epigenesis]. This common element in their
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organization does not interfere with their great diversity, because this takes
place in structural variation. This situation does permit us, however, to see
that all this variation is a variation around a fundamental type, which results
in different ways of being in the world, because it is the structure of the unity
that determines its interaction in the environment and the world it lives in.
(Maturana & Varela 1987:83-6)
Even though multicellularity represents variation around one type, it is a vast kind of
variation. Multicellularity as a past path dependency opened the possibility of many
different lineages, much more diverse than the unicellular ones. In the animal
kingdom, the one that humanity belongs to, this variation is based on the organism's
natural drift to acquiring motility (on which feeding and reproduction are based) and
a nervous system22.
Taking into account cognitive involvement in autopoiesis, new sources of
variation are discovered in the synchronic dimension that Maturana and Varela want
to emphasise:
[T]he behaviour of living beings is not an invention of the nervous system
and it is not exclusively associated with it [...]. What the nervous system does
is expand the realm of possible behaviours by endowing the organism with a
tremendously versatile and plastic structure. (Maturana & Varela 1987:138)
This versatile structure is related to movement and to a notion of behaviour that, in
the more general use of cognition23, is "assumed to be limited to organisms with a
(fairly advanced24) nervous system" (Mingers 1991:321 my italics). What makes the
nervous system so versatile is the physical nature of the connections that it
establishes. On the one hand, they connect cells that are often distant from each
other:
" According to Maturana and Varela, behaviour and cognition can be observed in all living
organisms, "for the observer will see behavior when he looks at any living being in its environment"
(1987:138). As we have said before, in their theory, the "notion of cognition is extended to cover all
the effective interactions that an organism has" (Mingers 1991:321). To Maturana and Varela,
behaviour and cognition are not limited to second-order (multicellular) autopoietic organisms with a
nervous system; but as human beings are this kind of organism, behaviour and cognition will be
considered in this work only for multicellular autopoietic organisms with a nervous system.
23 The more general use of cognition regards it as the process of acquiring and using knowledge by a
nervous system whose role is generally taken to be the collection of information that will allow the
organism to survive. This view is heavily criticised by the theory of Maturana and Varela, as will
become clear later on in the discussion.
24 'Advanced' in the sense of'closer' to the human nervous system.
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What distinguishes neurons is their cytoplasmatic ramifications in specific
forms which extend for enormous distances, reaching tens of millimiters in
the largest ones. This universal neuronal characteristic, present in all
organisms with a nervous system, determines the specific way in which the
nervous system participates in the second-order unities that it integrates by
placing in contact cellular elements located in different parts of the body.
(Maturana & Varela 1987:153)
On the other hand, neurons are seen as special cells that put in contact sensory and
motor surfaces and, therefore, the nervous system is associated to movement and to
behaviour in an animal sense25. The neuronal system is embedded in the organism
and it works as a network of electric neuronal interactions with the cells of the
surfaces of perception and movement. "Neurons couple, in many different ways,
cellular groups which otherwise could be coupled only through the general
circulation of internal substances of the organism" (Maturana & Varela 1987:153).
Even though neurons are still affected by chemical changes, their universal means of
interaction to establish connections with each other and with other cells is through
electric impulses (Mingers 1991:322). Through this simple mechanism of distant
coupling between sensory cell surfaces and motile effects, Maturana has found an
extended source for possible diversity of behaviours according to the varied patterns
of the impulses generated in relative neuronal states of activity that can be observed.
However, it is important to stress that nerve cells in constant change respond with
definite "transfer functions"26, that arise synchronically and spontaneously within this
continuous change, to classes of spatio-temporal configurations of impulses that also
keep arising. These impulses are not recorded or engraved patterns in any part of the
cell anatomy (Maturana 1970:23-4).
Another important characteristic of neurons must be outlined at this point,
which has to do with the autopoietic closure of the nervous system and its plasticity.
25 Five kingdom of living beings have been differentiated: monera, proctitis, animals, plants and
fungi (Margulis 1982). 'Behaviour' is generally associated to the animal kingdom, but Maturana and
Varela find it hard to establish a clear basis for differentiating behaviour from observation of any
living organism in its environment (see Maturana and Varela 1987, chapter 7).
The transfer functions of the nerve cell involve the communication of impulses from its collector
area (dendrites, and in some cases, also the cell body and part of the axon) through its distributive
element (the axon, and in some cases, also the cell body and main dendrites) to its effector area (the
terminal branching of the axon) (Maturana 1970:18).
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The nervous system itself is engaged in its constant autopoiesis and this means that it
is not a static highway of connections, but an active producer of itself. The body in
which it is embedded is its environment and it responds to its "triggers" by
modulating its internal structural dynamics. "[T]he nervous system does not "pick up
information" from the environment as we often hear. On the contrary, it brings forth
a world by specifying what patterns of the environment are perturbations and what
changes trigger them in the organism" (Maturana & Varela 1987:169). As the
neuronal system is in constant autopoietic activity, its collector and effector surfaces
are coupled to its environment in interaction, this produces a structure of behaviour
that we can observe, but the nervous system is not really connected to the
environment organisationally (only coupled structurally and dynamically):
The plasticity of the nervous system lies in the fact that neurons are not
connected as though they were cables with their respective plugs. The points
of interaction between the cells are zones of delicate dynamic balance
modulated by a great number of elements that trigger local structural changes,
and that are produced as a result of the activity of those cells and of other
cells whose products are released into the blood flow and wash the neurons.
(Maturana & Varela 1987:168)
These zones are the synapses, very small gaps "across which chemicals called
neurotransmitters can flow, triggering an electrical exchange" (Mingers 1991:322).
This characterisation of the nervous system will lead us to language and self-
consciousness as the domains of interaction that are characteristic of human beings
(Maturana 1990). They constitute the grounds for the artificial ideal type of human
organisation that will be described in the next chapter. Nevertheless, as I have
pointed out before, in Maturana and Varela's theory, language also has a biological
dimension for human beings as embodied animals and autopoietic systems.
Mingers (1991) explains how, in the theory of Maturana and Varela, our
practical interaction and our human type of language is a product of the continual
structural change (plasticity) of the nervous system, its autopoiesis and its internal
structure. The nervous system's generalised response to electrical impulses leads to
the development of internal neurons that connect only to other neurons. "These
interneurons are particularly important as they sever the direct relationship between
sensor and effector and vastly expand the realm of possible behaviors of an
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organism" (Mingers 1991:322) As the child grows up (or as the species drifts to its
present state), the relations that take place in experience at the collector surface of its
nervous system, are transferred by classes of spatio-temporal configurations of
nervous activity that we can observe. However, interneurons grow and so, eventually,
these configurations do not have a direct effect on the motor surface but are already
part of the structure as a perturbation for the internal structure of the nervous system
itself. It is important to stress, though, that these configurations of nervous activity
are not 'instructions' for the patterns of behaviour themselves, this would entail a
representationist view of cognition which Maturana and Varela criticise. They are
configurations that emerge as classes of behaviour but that remain electric impulses
that arise at every moment in a constantly changing environment. They describe the
structural characteristic of the nervous system as expanding the system's domain of
its changes of state. In synchrony, these changes follow a course contingent upon
both its structure and the environmental triggers. As the nervous system puts in touch
cells that are physically separate in the organism, the organism's changing structure
displays behaviours that are coupled with the autopoietic nervous activity, one that is
structurally able to establish relations between events27.
When behaviour symbolises something other than itself, organisms 'orient'
each other's behaviour in co-ontogeny; this is what Maturana calls 'languaging' that
other social animals also display. The success of orientating behaviour depends on
the common cognitive domain of the organisms which can be either physiologically
specified, sustained by common experience, or sustained by a separate domain of
language. Non-human animals 'language' only through physiologically determined
traits or through a common cognitive domain based on experience. Human beings
use both of the latter domains of coordination and the separate one of language as a
characteristic of the species. In us, interneurons outnumber sensory/motor neurons by
a factor of 100,000 (Mingers 1991:322). "The human brain is vastly more responsive
to its own internal structures than it is to its sensory/effect surfaces" (Mingers
27 Otherwise, with no nervous system, as in the behaviour of an amoeba, only the physico-chemical
effect of autopoiesis in an environment can be observed. While this example is not without its own
vast perspectival complexity, the amount of observable behaviours of this living entity is
comparatively reduced at the level of the observation of its motility.
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1991:325). It is important to realise that the expanded domains of possible
behaviours for human beings are seen as relative relations between configurations of
neuronal activity and not as the patterns themselves as if they were static
representations of the world, like "pictures" or "engrams" (Varela et al 1991/
The human nervous system interacts synchronically with vast different states
of neuronal activity, and this in turn produces more relative patterns of neuronal
activity to be considered independently; the recursiveness achieved by this eventually
leaves us with vast domains of possible co-relations in the plasticity of the human
nervous system. As Maturana puts it, "although language does not take place within
the bodyhood of the living system, the structure of the living system must provide the
diversity and plasticity of states required for it to take place" (Maturana 1990:100-1).
But this immense diversity of states takes place simultaneously, they are all present
at the same time as we produce language. The latter is not 'embedded in our brains'
physically, it has an autonomy that can only be sustained collectively. And this is the
essence of the organic nature of language, its autonomy depends on the creative
involvement of a group of organisms bringing forth the world in which they interact;
one that they create and that creates their sense of self back. The human species of
the animal kingdom sustains its autopoiesis through physiologically specified,
experiential, and autonomous communication. We can therefore 'language' about
behaviours that are never enacted, that are supposed to be enacted, that may never be
enacted, or that cannot possibly be enacted; but we also definitely 'language' through
physiological and experiential common cognitive grounds as the basis for the
autonomous domain of language to emerge in our consciousness.
Language is therefore a product of human co-ontogeny originally based on
physiological communication and a common domain of experience while growing
up. In every individual, our communicative abilities eventually grow beyond our
physiology and the direct-experience cognitive grounds, towards interaction through
the separate realm of language (the other two are never left behind though); which
can be regarded as an autonomous domain of interaction. Nevertheless it is not
determined by its own poiesis —language is autopoietic only in that symbols are self-
referential (see the discussion of Luhmann's theory of language below)—, rather it is
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part of the organic autopoiesis of human beings that interact through it. Maturana
says that we find ourselves, as living systems, immersed in it:
In the explanation of language as a biological phenomenon, it becomes
apparent that languaging arises, when it arises, as a manner of coexistence of
living systems. As such, languaging takes place as a consequence of co-
ontogenic structural drift under recurrent consensual interactions. For this
reason language takes place as a system of recurrent interactions in a domain
of structural coupling. Interactions in language do not take place in a domain
of abstractions; on the contrary, they take place in the corporality of the
participants. Interactions in language are structural interactions. (Maturana
1990:94)
When Maturana refers to corporality here, he is not referring to abstract engrams
embedded in our brains as pictures or representations of reality; he is speaking of our
embodied involvement in the action (or non-action) of interaction. According to
Maturana, in the realm of simultaneity of embodied interaction through language,
cognition has no abstract content as a biological phenomenon. The observer creates
this content, as the observer sees it embodied structurally by our physical
involvement in interaction, or what Varela calls enaction2*.
However, to Maturana, this physical embodied involvement also unavoidably
involves a psychology: the emotional standing of the human that interacts. It is at this
point that a thorough philosophical materialism of the kind of Darwin's cannot be
wholly embraced in Maturana and Varela's account of life. Imagination and emotions
are not seen as a product of the brain itself, but of the dynamic and plastic structural
coupling of the brain and nervous system with the social domain of interaction. This
does not entail that they immediately embrace a wholly vitalistic account of life, but
their explanations lie somewhere in between a purely materialistic account and a
purely vitalistic one in the consideration of autopoiesis and consciousness as the
substance of life. Tim Ingold clarifies the link between embodiment and
consciousness in the human domain by distinguishing between interactions and
relationships: "To dissolve a relationship into its constituent interactions is to drain it
of the very current of sociality that binds them as moments of a process, and that is of
28 This concept and its cognitive consequences for human interaction will be dealt with in the first
section of the next chapter.
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its essence. The creative unfolding of relationships, however, is also a becoming of
the persons joined by it" (Ingold 1989:222). The human co-ontogeny that Maturana
sees in language is emotionally sustained in what he calls "conversations" which are
analogous to Ingold's relationships; and from an even wider perspective, are
analogous to cultures or world views.
Humberto Maturana and the psychologist Gerda Verden-Zoler explain this
perspective in their book on child development Amor y juego (Love and Play 1995),
which is congenial with Ingold's (1986) view that persons exist as embodiments of
relationships. From the perspective of the observer, they say, that:
[WJhat we see when we distinguish emotions in us and in other animals are
domains of actions, classes of behaviours, and in our living we flow from one
domain of actions to another in a continual emotioning that is entwined with
our languaging. To this entwining of languaging and emotioning we call
conversing and we hold that all human life takes place in networks of
conversations. (Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:9)29
Only in abstraction can individuals be seen as ready-made entities who interact
through the impulsion of their separate natures, this characterisation breaks down in
considering human beings as animals that must develop organically within networks
of emotioning and languaging, or within psychological relationships. Individuality
may itself be seen as the product of an emotional relationship with a culturally
produced idea of self. As Ingold puts it, "[w]e rather start with social life, as
progressive 'building up' of relationships into the structures of consciousness. This
'building up' [...] is equivalent to the generation of persons" (Ingold 1989:222)
According to Maturana and Verden-Zoler, the first stage in human
development and ontogeny is dominated by spontaneity in play, while the child
grows up. In order to highlight the spontaneous side of growing up, Maturana and
Verden-Zoler heavily criticise the instrumentality of Western discipline and its
detrimental consequences for the self-respect of growing child; and they argue for
letting children live the full spontaneity of play. While I can see the point of their
29 "[L]o que distinguimos cuando distinguimos emociones en nosotros y en otros animates , son
dominios de acciones, closes de conductas, y que en nuestro vivir fluimos de un dominio de
acciones a otro en un continuo emocionar que se enlrelaza con nuestro lenguajear. A este
entrelazamiento de lenguajear y emocionar llamamos conversar, y mantenemos que todo en vivir
humano se da en redes de conversaciones" (Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:9).
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critique of instrumentality and the stress-related problems of modern society's
extreme functional ism, a purely organic infancy and childhood could hardly be
regarded as human at all. The artificial side of being human does not take place
within our embodiment, as Maturana has pointed out, but this embodiment must
provide the kind of structural plasticity required for it to interact by means of its
artifices'10. Therefore, while artificiality is not produced by organic processes; the
environment where it develops is necessarily organically-based human life. The
organic and artificial ideal types of human organisation are two aspects of our
structure that exist together in simultaneous structural coupling and autopoietic
closure as a characteristic of the human species.
Infancy and childhood are elementary aspects of human development that I
consider here as only mostly spontaneous during infancy because the disciplinary
side of social interaction is already present in the background from birth, and is
already an aspect of human ontogeny. The relevance of discipline to the shaping of
practical (spontaneous) consciousness through practice grows as the child grows into
adulthood. As we will see, discipline is the corner stone of the artificial ideal type of
organisation in this work, but it is relevant to our discussion of the organic ideal type
in the same way in which spontaneity is relevant during full adult operative
disciplined interaction. Awareness expands through disciplined practice, but also
through the spontaneity of discovery. And so, the process of growing up is never
really finished in the practice of any kind of discipline. Our early ontogeny, as part of
our history of interactions shapes spontaneously the initial practical production of
ourselves with respect to the world in which we live; but it also teaches discipline,
which is not only learnt within family life —the rest of society also contributes— and
is already a realm of living in society.
10 "The higher human functions", says Maturana, "do not take place in the brain: language, abstract
thinking, love, devotion, reflection, rationality, altruism, etc. are not features of the dynamics of
states of the human being as a living system, nor of its nervous system as a neuronal network, they
are socio-historical phenomena. At the same time, history is not part of the dynamics of states of a
living system because this takes place only in the present, instant after instant, in the operation of its
structure in changes that occur out of time. History, time, future, past or space, exist in language as
forms of explaining the happening of living of the observer, and thereby partake of the involvement
of language in this" (Maturana 1990:100).
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Nevertheless, in the ideal organic type of human organisation we concentrate
on the spontaneity of growing up, which is linked to the simultaneous structural
coupling and autopoietic closure of the nervous system with respect to the rest of our
embodiment. This brings us back to the "mechanisms" through which human beings
engage in the business of "bringing forth" their world in ontogeny. Before getting an
idea of the world, the child must simultaneously create and expand its own "psychic
space" that enables it to relate emotionally to people, to things, and to ideas or ideals.
In this process the boy or girl learns the emotioning and the fundamental
relational dynamics which will constitute the relational space that he or she
will generate in their living, that is, what he or she will do, hear, smell, touch,
see, think, fear, want, and reject, as obvious aspects of individual and social
living as a member of a family and a culture. (Maturana and Verden-Zoler
1995:10)31
Maturana and Verden-Zoler argue that the basic emotional referentiality is built as a
relational space in the intimate life of the baby's bodily contact with the mother or
person that takes care of it. They believe that this intimacy is related to the bodily
rhythms that the foetus is used to during the time of pregnancy. To them, intimacy is
an innate side of being human that springs in complete trust and acceptance of the
natural relationship between the child and its parents, or the people who feed, caress,
rock, speak, lull, and put the baby to sleep (Maturana and Verden-Zoler 1995:93).
Human embodiment lives in a continuous transformation of its structure
determined by this present structure, but contingent to its coupling with the
environment. As observers, we can speak of its history of transformation that takes
place in ontogeny from its embodied point of origin: the undifferentiated stage of
unicellularity in the epigenesis of the foetus. Verden-Zoler uses this notion to
illustrate how the baby's consciousness is in a similar state of undifferentiated
awareness at the moment of being born; and how, in the spontaneity of play, it begins
an analogous process of differentiation which will enable it to develop its full
conscious human potentiality. And yet, this differentiation is complemented by the
31 "En este proceso el niho o niha aprende el emocionar y la dinamica relacional fundamental que va
a constituir el espacio relacional que el o ella generara en su vivir, esto es, lo que el o ella hard,
oira, olera,, tocara, vera, pensara, temera, deseard y rechazara, como aspectos obvios de su vivir
individual y social como miembro de una familia y una cultura" (Maturana & Verden-Zoler
1995:10).
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balancing side of unification that brings the child back to its own intimate
relationships. But this is done through a 'languaging' of the kind that we share with
non-human animals in spontaneous physiological and experienced common cognitive
grounds, in touch, gestures and the fulfilment of primary needs, not only
physiological, but also —and most importantly to the ulterior conservation of
autopoiesis— emotional needs.
What in daily life we recognize as emotions when we observe animal
behavior (human or non-human) are, as biological phenomena, bodily
dynamic configurations that by specifying every instant the possible course of
changes of states in an organism, they specify in it a domain of possible
actions. (Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:91 )32
According to Maturana and Verden-Zoler human consciousness arises from bodily
rhythms and the flow of the sensory-motor configurations of coordinations in the
close bodily contact that the child must undergo with whoever raises it during its
infancy, but also during childhood in spontaneous play with adults and other
children. These configurations, according to Verden-Zoler's research, are simple and
basic rhythmic abilities of balancing in order to produce symmetry and movements
of equilibrium about a central point. These movements arise in the child "as a process
of orientation and spontaneous bodily handling in the freedom of play" (Maturana &
Verden-Zoler 1995:94)33.
Going back to the structure of the organic ideal type of organisation, it is
important to point out the relationship between embodiment, spontaneity and path
dependencies in the production of a present structure of relationships in constant
change. From the perspective of the observer, this structure is reflected upon through
language, but it is also embodied in organic elements of the human species. The
discursive aspect of language as an autonomous domain of interaction —which
nonetheless has a biological role and a domain of intentionality which is eminently
32 "Lo que en la vida diaria distinguimos como emociones cuando observamos la conducta animal,
humana o no humana, son, como fenomenos bilogicos, configuraciones corporales dinamicas que
especificando en cada instante los cursos posibles de cambios de estado de un organismo,
especi/ican en el en cada instante un dominio de acciones posibles" (Maturana & Verden-Zoler
1995:91).
33 "... como un proceso de orientacion y manejo corporal espontaneo en la libertad del juego..."
(Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:94)
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practical— will be considered in the next chapter. But before a degree of coherent
discursivity is achieved by the growing child —before it finds its place in its own
society— the stage of infancy and childhood is dominated by practical (spontaneous)
consciousness.
Maturana and Verden-Zoler consider that before language, in human
ontogeny, the child must develop the cognitive configurations of sensory-motor
coordinations that will enable it to distinguish practically its own embodiment from
other similar embodiments that surround it. The biological role of discursivity in this
context, would be to help the child locate its own embodied presence within the
ongoing "conversation" (culture or idea of reality) where it is born. This kind of
consciousness is developed practically at first, it provides the matter-of-factual
certainties on which practical human life and consciousness depends. It is not
unconscious but received and enacted without the discipline of self-awareness, one
that can only be practised after a sense of self is achieved by the growing child
(individual or collective self, most commonly experienced as something 'in between'
in human relationships). This is why they say that: "When the baby is born it is only
an embryonic possibility of consciousness and of reflection about itself' (Maturana
& Verden-Zoler 1995:102)34. For this to happen, the infant must first detach its first
notion of self from the embodiment of the adult (or adults) who they used as theFT
first point of reference. This is an embodied as well as a psychological detachment,
when the child has 'constructed' its surrounding world as coherent and operative
sensory-motor correlations:
The child at this point in the process of growing up has already lived the
sensory-motor experiences that are a pre-requisite the constitution of
human consciousness: free movement in a social domain as a realm of spatio-
temporal relations in the acceptance of itself and of others. (Maturana &
Verden-Zoler 1995:103)'5
34 "Cuando el nino nace es aim solo una posibilidad embrionaria de conciencia y de reflexion sobre si
mismo" (Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:102).
35 "El nino en este punto de su crecimiento ya ha vivido las experiencias senso-motoras que son un
pre-requisito para la constitucion de la conciencia humana: el libre movomiento en un dominio
social como un ambilo de relaciones espacio-temporales en la aceptacion de si mismo y de los
otros" (Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:103).
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The result of this detachment is an imaginary world that the child uses as its
first 'approach' to reality. But this is not a 'picture-like' imaginary world, it is a non-
static approach made of structural dynamic correlations that allow the child to
interact at the simplest level of social coordination, in constant structural
transformation and expansion. This transformation and expansion is never finished in
the individual ontogeny of the growing child, not even in adulthood. It is an aspect of
its human autopoiesis and it is contingent to its constant interactions and its coupling
with its environment. At a particular point in ontogeny this imaginary world achieves
a degree of stability that gives grounds for the child to orient itself and 'live' in it as
an organic individual. This stable imaginary world is part of the child's "inner mind"
or an initial sense of reality in ontogeny, which according to Maturana and Verden-
Zoler, is one where the social space is essential and far more important than the
physical space. In that inner mind, the child manages its domain of relationships with
entities who appear to be permanent and separable from the child, who the child
imagines in emotional and experiential correlations. "In other words", says Verden-
Zoler, "the child has become able to see in its mind the Gestalt (configuration) of
human life as its own life in the cyclical movement of advancement and regress that
space and time constitute" (Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:103)36. But just as the
age of the child when this happens is particular to the person's ontogeny, also this
configuration or Gestalt is particular to the 'conversation' or idea of reality where the
child is born and develops; always within the structural possibilities of human
embodiment.
And it is here where the biological relevance of language acquires a new level
of correlations that starts detaching itself from the individual ontogeny of particular
human autopoiesis. As we grow up, we realise that the conversations we hold can be
brought outside the domain of family life to wider realms of interaction that are
essentially collective. Those realms can also be seen as "conversations"
metaphorically, but this is a very civilised metaphor. In those realms, the group might
36 "En otras palabras el niho se ha vuelto capaz de ver en su mente la Gestalt (configuracion) de la
vida humana como sit propia vida, en el movimiento ciclico de avance y retroceso que constituyen
el espacioy el tiempo" {Maturana & Verden-Zoler 1995:103).
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be related by kin, but it can also be related by the (relevant) history of interactions
that produce collective identity and ideas of reality. These may be expanded through
empire to become vast imaginary (coherent or not) realms of correlations which
human life sustains and creates and which end up creating and sustaining human life
back. Language is an important aspect of them; but also religion and belief system.
At some point in human ontogeny the wider realms of interaction become relevant
for the growing person who determines and is determined by them. This is because
this person, in every case, had to be a child and grow in a particular culture and
discipline. Living in society implies some form of learnt discipline that is not
organically produced and yet is based on the organic integrity of people. This organic
base is described by embodiment, spontaneity, and path dependencies that produce a
sense of (ever changing) structural actuality. But this is only an ideal type because
human organisation has an artificial aspect that only human beings can distinguish as
such. This artificial aspect is just an aspect of what it is to be human; it involves
disciplined practice and specific expectations from this practice. It involves a type
consciousness of self that is only achievable through human ontogeny and an organic




The Artificial Ideal Type of Organisation
In the previous chapter, I have referred to order as an organic product of human
interaction (both through embodiment and language) in practical consciousness; or as
the spontaneity of human life in the organic ideal type of organisation. In this
chapter, I will describe the artificial ideal type of organisation and how it sustains the
human consciousness of self through disciplined interaction. In a previous chapter I
have discussed how a too clear idea of the locus of self may produce assumptions
that lack factuality, like the ontological division between subject and object in
science. This does not mean that this separation is necessarily false as a
methodological tool —it organises effectively wide areas of human interaction— it
only means that, according to the criteria of the Western intellectual discipline itself,
it has come to be questioned as an ontological principle that governs universal
reality; even while it remains a useful organising principle of factuality. Factuality is
the basis of our disciplined approach to knowledge about human "reality" and the
language that it uses, its verbal structures, are ideally descriptive: symbols with no
inherent meaning of their own in order to stand wholly for what they represent. As
we will see, this ideal has generally taken to convey literally how it is that meaning is
attributed to descriptive symbols, together with other assumptions about logic in
language and in human perception. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out in this
work, all the verbal structures that characterise the three views of reality effectively
overlap in human interaction, and this should be taken into account in the analysis of
the latter.
In the first section of this chapter, I will refer to some examples of how the
views on language and cognition which have dominated much of the Anglo-
American discussion about linguistics, consciousness, mind, and meaning, have been
questioned under the light of empirical research. This will serve to illustrate how the
human ability to represent and mean something —our discursive consciousness— is
intimately entwined with the human self who perceives itself as embodied and
interacts emotionally and imaginatively. I will illustrate with theoretical examples the
problematic of regarding the human self as essentially individual and divided from
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nature, and the consequences this has for our constructions of conceptions and
explanations of consciousness and mind. I also engage with a problem derived from
those constructions: the avoidance of the slippery subject of human emotions. The
human expression of the latter as trust constitutes probably the single most
outstanding feature that distinguishes human from non-human interaction and it is
acknowledged in Maturana and Varela's theory of language. I will describe some
critiques that have emerged from the field of cognitive science (Winograd and Flores
1987) and that have produced theoretical consequences in the work of Maturana and
Varela and in their biologically based account of language and cognition (see Varela
1991), as well as in the American study of semantics, most clearly summarised by
George Lakoff(1987, 1988).
The above will be the basis for using a transformed version of Niklas
Luhmann's theory of meaning in the construction of an artificial ideal type of
organisation. In this type, language plays a central role, as its meaning structures
organise the particularly human realm of discursive consciousness. The concept of
autopoiesis is a central feature of Luhmann's theory —a term that he explicitly
appropriates from Maturana and Varela's work (Luhmann 1995:34)— which
denotes how meaning refers to meaning and to nothing else. In that sense, I will
argue, language is organisationally closed, yet structurally coupled to human life and
consciousness (an idea that Luhmann does not share, as he believes that language has
a deeper kind of autonomy from human consciousness). I will argue that discursive
consciousness ideally expresses the disciplined systematicity that is a feature of
human life; produces the relevant areas of meaning to project present human activity
towards the fulfilment of intended potentiality, and also organises a changing idea of
the present consciousness of self (individual, spiritual, or collective) (see Fig 4 at the
end of chapter V. above). And so, discipline, potentiality, and consciousness of self
are the artificial aspects of human order, constitute the artificial ideal type of
organisation, which points at how it is that human beings are different from non-
human beings and the former's particular type of organisation of social life as a
species, which is nonetheless only ideal and is always complemented by its organic
path-dependent, embodied, and spontaneous basis.
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VII. 1. Representation and Meaning
In this work, consciousness of self is seen as a changing human experience whose
construction varies according to the present idea of reality as a self that is either
individual, collective, or spiritual. Its main characteristic is its human ability to
interact both emotionally and imaginatively. Human consciousness of self, then,
represents reality drawing from relevant embodied experience and interacts through
emotion and imagination recursively. Language is seen as the realm of interaction
where human discursive intentions may be expressed and from which disciplined
behaviour emerges. In human life (ontogeny), disciplined behaviour may at times or
eventually abandon discursivity (in mysticism for example), but not without going
through learning it in social interaction. This interaction leads the relevant human
group to fix recognisable configurations or symbols as the known cosmology, as
sacred knowledge, as intellectual understanding, as discipline —from making tools, to
myths and rituals, to methodology and science, to poetry and war. Human creates
discipline but the latter creates the prevalent human idea of self back through
interaction; that is, discipline is created and creative simultaneously, but contrary to
what Luhmann sees through social systems, this kind of discursive and
communicative order is not autonomous from human life. This creative endeavour
that characterises humanity is expressed as interaction through language and
symbols; relevant collective figures that represent something, while "meaning"
undergoes constant transformation and is orthogonally linked to human ontogeny
(Maturana 1990).
The link between human disciplined creativity and its consequences for the
creation of an idea of self is illustrated by the scientific discipline as much as by any
cosmology within which human beings may live. It is from this perspective, and on
the basis of relatively recent discoveries in linguistics and the cognitive sciences, that
I will describe the critique of a small group of seekers of new solutions to very old
problems who have grown disillusioned with the lack of factuality in the 'realism' of
the Western paradigm (see Delanty 1997). Varela et al. (1991) criticise what they call
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"cognitivism", Lakoff (1987, 1988) calls it "objectivism" and Winograd and Flores
(1987) call it the "rationalistic tradition". The latter refer to it as:
[T]he tradition of rationalism and logical empiricism that can be traced back
at least to Plato. This tradition has been the mainspring of Western science
and technology, and has demonstrated its effectiveness most clearly in the
'hard sciences' —those that explain the operation of deterministic mechanisms
whose principles can be captured in formal systems. The tradition finds its
highest expression in mathematics and logic, and has greatly influenced the
development of linguistics and cognitive psychology. (Winograd and Flores
1987:14)
What Varela et al. call "cognitivism" has its origins in the field of cybernetics of the
1940's in U.S.A., which had the "avowed intention" to create a science of mind. Its
basic assumptions were that the brain and mental activity operate through logic and
that therefore the brain is regarded as a device whose component elements (neurons)
embody logical principles, and neurons were seen as smaller threshold devices that
were either active or inactive. These ideas were essential for the invention of digital
computers that function on the basis of a binary code, but they also laid the basis for
a scientific study ofmind which eventually crystallised in the "cognitivist paradigm"
(Varela et al. 1991:39).
In this paradigm, intelligence —of any kind— is seen as resembling
computation and so cognition is defined as computations of symbolic
representations:
The cognitivist argument is that intelligent behavior presupposes the ability to
represent the world as being certain ways. We therefore cannot explain
cognitive behavior unless we assume that an agent acts by representing
relevant features of her situations. To the extent that her representation of a
situation is accurate, the agent's behavior will be successful (all other things
being equal). (Varela et al. 1991:40)
The physical symbolic expression of representation here is taken to correspond with
a global and highly distributed pattern of brain activity, not to symbols physically
engraved in the neurons or in specific physical patterns of interaction. The patterns of
brain activity cannot be reduced to particular symbols, just like a meaning cannot be
reduced to its isolated symbolic expression: "in addition to the levels of physics and
neurobiology, cognitivism postulates a distinct, irreducible symbolic level in the
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explanation of cognition" (Varela et al. 1991:41). And this symbolic level is
supposed to both be unconscious (absolutely) and get its meaning from the syntactic
logic within the system. In cognitivism the brain is thus seen as an information-
processing device in a literal sense, not only in metaphor, which has no direct access
to its own mental or cognitive processes themselves; "if such cognitive processes
could be made conscious, then they could not be fast and automatic and so could not
function properly" (Varela et al. 1991:49). As Varela explains, the unconscious level
of which cognitivism speaks entails a literal separation from the level of
consciousness, no access to one's own unconscious level from within one's own
mind. In contrast to psychology, where the unconscious may be brought to
consciousness through therapy and is therefore linked to it —even if thinly and
mysteriously—, the cognitivist assumption of essentially unconscious events allows
access to them only from an outside syntactical and mathematical formal modelling
of that level of events.
The cognitivist paradigm entails the assumption of an essential division
between consciousness and mind; and sees mind processes as governed by
fragmentated subsystems of processes. "The actual subsystems are deemed to be
unproblematic «o«conscious bits of organic machinery, as utterly lacking in point of
view or inner life as a kidney or a kneecap" (Hofstadter and Dennet 1981:12)'. The
problem with those subsystems is that they can only function mechanically, like the
Cartesian animal 'automatons', where spontaneity is taken as an epiphenomenon of
the formalised abstract structure and not as a structural part of the model. As we will
see this is congenial with Lakoffs critique of "objectivism" (1987) or "objectivist
cognition" (1988).
It is useful at this point to clarify the notions of syntax and semantics and how
they are related in cognitivism/objectivism. Syntax is how the symbols are related to
each other and semantics is how they are related to the world; "in a computer
' Quoted by (Varela et al. 1991:50). A kidney or a kneecap might not have a point of view for lacking
human personality, even if people do relate themselves emotionally and deeply with their own
kidneys and kneecaps, and other body-parts, as to let them rule their own personality. But kidneys
and kneecaps may be seen as having an inner life that is definitely rich at a factual level, and from
the Eastern/mystic perspective, also at a spiritual level —i. e. in a consciousness that is congenial
with our own kind of consciousness.
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program the syntax of the symbolic code mirrors or encodes its semantics. In the case
of human language, it is far from obvious that all of the semantic distinctions
relevant in an explanation of behavior be mirrored syntactically" (Varela et al.
1991:42). The syntax referred to here is represented by the algorithmic relationships
established by the programmer. A very strong assumption about the factuality of
logic is being made in assuming that the world may be efficiently mirrored by an
artificial allopoietic creation. The assumption of cognitivism is not that they are
using a useful metaphor and putting it for the experienced world as in metonymic
language; but that it actually and thoroughly replicates it as in descriptive language.
According to Lakoff (1988:123), this is what Hilary Putnam has referred to as the
"God's Eye View" according to which;
reality is structured in a way that can be modelled by set-theoretical models,
which consist of abstract entities (which model real-world entities), sets of
abstract entities (defined by the common properties of their members), and
sets of n-tuples (corresponding to relations among entities). (Lakoff
1988:123)
The objectivist tradition that Lakoff criticises assumes that the essence of
reality is represented by words, literal meaning, and the rules that relates them, that is
by a direct relationship between semantics and syntax. This entails that the symbols
themselves be emptied of inherent meaning in descriptive language to stand wholly
for the thing that they refer to in the world, but it also entails that meaning be most
strongly associated to logical coherence between words. This is supposed to mean
that reason can be modelled through computational algorithms, as in the cognitivist
paradigm that Varela criticises. According to Lakoff, the central claim of objectivist
cognition is that rational thought is "the algorithmic manipulation of arbitrary
abstract symbols that are meaningless in themselves but get their meaning by being
associated with things in the world" (1988: 117).
The doctrines on which the objectivist view of language and semantics is
based consider that 1) the world is formed by entities with fixed properties and
relations and that this structure is independent of understanding; 2) the entities are
naturally divided into categories (natural kinds) which have shared properties; 3) all
properties are primitive and complex and the latter are logical combinations of the
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former; 4) there are objective rational relations between entities and categories; 5)
meaning is based on reference and truth (the doctrine of truth-conditional meaning);
6) truth is based on correspondence between symbols and states of affairs (the
"correspondence theory" of truth); 7) there is one objectively correct way to link
symbols and things in the world; 8) conceptual categories are seen as sets where their
members must be characterised by necessary and sufficient conditions; 9) the
definition of a complex concept is a collection of necessary and sufficient conditions
on less complex concepts (Lakoff 1988:123-36). Lakoff describes how Putnam
criticises this kind of objectivist cognition on the basis of internal contradictions in
the methodology used to support its assumed metaphysics.
There are three formal critiques that Putnam carries out and that Lakoff refers
to (1987, 1988). First, objective reference cannot be organised because the pairs of
the form: 'linguistic expressions' refer to 'objects or sets', are linked by refer, whose
own reference is not clear. Second, reference as necessarily being objectively correct
would require that it "be satisfied by one and only one set of pairs of the form
(symbol of the language, element of the model)" (Lakoff 1988:128). However, a
theory of reference is a sequence of sentences that cannot be satisfied by only one
possibility; and thus "the unique, objectively correct account of reference that is
required to give meaning to the symbols within objectivist cognition is not
mathematically possible, given the proposed mathematical tools" (Lakoff 1988:129).
And third, a fundamental requirement of an adequate theory of meaning is that the
meaning of the parts of a sentence cannot be changed without changing the meaning
of the whole; but if elements of a model have no meaning in themselves, only a set
theoretical structure, it is possible to change the "meaning" of parts of a sentence
without changing the "meaning" of the whole. "Thus, says Lakoff, what model-
theorists call "meaning" cannot be meaning" (1988:129). This derives from his
explanation of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem (Lakoff 1987:232-35) and the
accompanying observation that not only are isolated symbols meaningless in
themselves, but that the models used to describe their relations are also meaningless
structures in themselves. Their relationships are generally interpreted, because
interpretation is unavoidable when meaningless sequences of symbols are matched
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with meaningless structures, but then meaning is imposed by whomever does the
interpretation and does not lie within the structure itself. "It is this fact that Putnam
uses in demonstrating that the pairing of meaningless strings of symbols with
meaningless structures cannot provide a theory ofmeaning" (Lakoff 1987:234).
However, on top of a discussion of the formal critique on traditional
semantics, Lakoff also discusses empirical evidence to counter the traditional view
that conceptual categories are necessarily only structured as clearly defined sets of
concepts even if their borders are construed as fuzzy (as in Zadeh 1965)2. He gives
the example of colour which is considered as a secondary property, one that is not
absolutely objective, so it is not considered a meaningful cognitive category in the
objectivist paradigm because it is not independent of our embodied perceptual and
cognitive experience. And yet it is a meaningful category of mind in human
interaction and, most importantly for Lakoffs argumentation, in human reason. This
is quite relevant for his subsequent discussion about how it is that human
embodiment and imaginative involvement in the production of referential
information should be taken into account for an appropriate theory of meaning. His
position explicitly abandons the arena of an exclusively a priori reasoning in
traditional and formalised models of semantics in order to explore the implications of
embodiment and imagination in meaning.
From a factual perspective, in metaphoric and metonymic language syntax
and meaning may be differentiated easily from each other because the former is seen
as the relations between words (grammatical rules) and the latter as their metaphoric
or metonymic imaginary meaning. In the descriptive language of the rationalistic
tradition though, syntax and meaning should mirror each other, with small margins of
error that are considered to be negligible. A problem arises when we assume that, in
the mathematical cosmos of abstraction, the margins of error can be abstractly
assumed to enfold infinite sequences of fractionate numbers. To use a metaphor
explicitly, we could say that the margin of error holds whole universes of
imagination between its two extremes. Nevertheless, theoretical scientific discourse
2 Quoted and discussed by (Lakoff 1987:21-22, 1988:130)
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is primarily factual, and therefore, it describes things literally. Lakoff criticises this
traditional view of reality in objectivism, which is based in an ontological separation
between subject and object; where the subject relates to the object of cognition
through 'correct' principles of referentiality. He wants to express a new view on
factual rationality which is less rigid and accounts for the imaginative involvement of
the one who does the reasoning:
The traditional view sees reason as literal, as primarily about propositions that
can be objectively either true or false. The new view takes imaginative
aspects of reason —metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery— as central to
reason, rather than as peripheral and inconsequential adjunct to the literal.
(Lakoff 1987:xi)
But where would science be without its myth of separation between subject
and object? Again, this does not mean that because it is based on a particular
mythology of essential separation, the scientific method of objective observation is
false —it has very real manifestations that we live with everyday— but it is only a
disciplined method of looking at the world. As Northrop Frye says, it is important to
be aware of one's own mythological conditioning in order to, on the one hand,
produce scientifically useful explanation or patterning and design of relevant
generalisations; and on the other, avoid arbitrary impositions of universalistic
consequences on oneself and on the world. Here I will take the view that there are
necessary areas of overlapping between the three types of verbal structures and that
all three of them create our idea of self, our rituals or routines: our disciplined
behaviour and the meaningful referentiality that structures human interaction. This
position will be further clarified in the explanation of Luhmann's theory of meaning
further below.
Lakoff speaks about basic-level categories and schematization as the basis for
the study of cognitive semantics, which are very important to my model of human
order, because they become part of a transformed version of Luhmann's theory of
meaning (see next section of this chapter below). Basic-level categories are
considered as cognitively basic because they refer to a level of interaction that our
bodies are familiar with and that is characterisable only in cognitive terms; such as
the experience that category members have similarly perceived overall shapes, or that
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a single mental image can reflect the entire category, or that it is the level first named
and understood by children, etc. (see Lakoff 1988:133). It is not the highest or lowest
level of categorisation, but somewhere in the middle1. He refers to studies of folk
terminology for plant and animals, which corresponds quite accurately with the
biological level of the genus (one level above the level of the species), even in
isolated cultures; specifically, he refers to studies of Tzeltal categorisations by Berlin,
Breedlove, and Raven (1974) and Hunn (1977). At different levels of categorisation,
which are mainly subject to abstract-imaginative and culturally determined domains
of reality (our own "higher" superordinate and "lower" subordinate levels included),
correspondence goes away. Therefore, Lakoffs conclusions include that basic-level
categories may function relatively accurately for objectivist formalised views on
language, but the fact that there is no such accuracy at other levels, makes
objectivism implausible. Further, and most importantly for the present discussion, the
determinants of the basic-level categories are not objectively in the world; they are
more readily related to how human bodies and minds interact with the world (Lakoff
1988:134).
Schematization is a characteristic of the human mind that has been observed
by cognitive anthropology (see Varela et al. 1991). "Schemas" or "frames" is where
most of our cultural shared reality resides, and not in the thing in the world with
which we interact. "The need", says Lakoff, "for such schemas has become generally
accepted throughout the cognitive sciences" (1988:135); and they reflect a cultural
realm of references that is not external to the human mind at all; concepts like 'Wall
street', 'bachelor', 'chess', 'objective', 'June', 'sacred vows', etc. reside simultaneously
in human minds and intricately entwined with something that is perceived as either
abstract (as we imagine it now) or circumstantially external (as we enact it).
According to Lakoff, this gives further evidence that the objectivist paradigm is too
limited to explain the phenomenon of meaning. Lakoff also refers to polysemy in
3 Lakoff uses "cat" as an example of basic-level category: "For example, animal is a superordinate
category for cat, while manx [a variety of domestic cat] is subordinate. The basic level is the level at
which human beings interact with their environment most effectively and process and store and
communicate information most efficiently" (1988:133).
245
order to describe some principles according to which the idea of schematisation can
structure cognitive semantics.
Polysemy is the fact that individual words and morphemes have various
meanings that are related to each other systematically and this relationship may be
said to be determined by certain very natural relationships among experienced
schemas (see also Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Existing concepts may direct and
structure what we experience, but we are already shaped or embodied in a certain
way, which determines presently the human possibilities of concrete experience. This
does not mean that our species might not evolve or drift toward a different shape, but
for now, this one is determinant. Lakoff describes the 'container', the 'part-whole', the
'link', and the 'source-path-goal' schemas, that are not understood as meaning
postulates and their interpretation; rather they are seen as inherently meaningful
because they structure our direct embodied experience: Getting in or out of a room or
a situation (container schema); referring to parts of our body or of ourselves (like my
'arm' or my 'principles'), and therefore, to parts of other wholes (part-whole schema);
physical and abstract connections —the first one in life being the umbilical cord
(Lakoff 1988:143)— (link schema) and directions whose basic experience is bodily
movement (source-path-goal).
From here, Lakoff goes on to say that reason may be viewed as eminently
based on bodily experience as well as metaphorical projections from concrete to
abstract domains, and not necessarily only as a priori rationalisation based on
premises that are abstract to start off with. This goes against the objectivist
assumptions that associate reason with the use of finitary symbols and algorithmic
operations with those symbols. Varela et al. criticise this view further in their
cognitive version of "objectivism", which they call "cognitivism" and involves an
idea of cognitive agents in a pregiven world. They refer to two ideas of
representation a "weak" one, the one we use everyday to function and convey literal
meanings; and a "strong" cognitivist one, which makes epistemological and
ontological assumptions about how it is that we think.
The ontological and epistemological commitments are basically twofold: We
assume that the world is pregiven, that its features can be specified prior to
any cognitive activity. Then to explain the relation between this cognitive
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activity and a pregiven world, we hypothesize the existence of mental
representations inside the cognitive system (whether these be images,
symbols or subsymbolic patterns of activity distributed across a network does
not matter for the moment). (Varela et al. 1991:135)
In order to explain the cognitivist idea of a cognising subject, they use a metaphor,
according to which the subject of cognition is "parachuted" into a pregiven world and
this entity's cognitive capacities are likened to a map (specified innately and
sometimes called a "language of thought") and the task of ontogeny is to learn the
correct use of the map.
Varela et al. contemplate an objection to their metaphoric representation of
cognitivism: Cognitivists would protest that this is a caricature of what they speak
about, cognitivist perception is better conveyed by the idea of an active process of
hypothesis formation and not only as the simple mirroring of the objective
environment. But Varela et al. reply to this foreseen cognitivist objection saying that
they do not want to caricature a sophisticated research program, only to put in the
clearest way possible what it implies. Representation is agreed to be a complex
process by everyone, but cognitivists regard it as the recovering and reconstructing of
features in the environment and outside the cognising agent. Varela et al. reject this
view, but not to embrace the idealist's position where the world is merely a projection
of mental images on a world to which we ultimately have no access; this position
leaves the ontological status of a subject-object divide intact (see also Lakoff &
Johnson 1980). Cognitivists escape this philosophical impasse by shifting their
concern from a priori representations to a posteriori ones; thus naturalising the
concept of representation and still being able to investigate mind and cognition
within the rigours of scientific objectivity4. But this naturalised conception of
representation is still very much linked to the traditional image of the mind as a
mirror of nature. "In some ways", say Varela et al., "cognitivism is the strongest
4 We will recall that this naturalisation of the concept of representation in cognitivism is analogous to
that of the concept of natural selection in adaptationism. There are deterministic consequences in
both movements of naturalisation because the former speaks about a "correct" way of knowing and
dealing with an "outside", "objective" world, and the latter cannot escape its local optimising
assumptions.
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statement yet of the representational view of the mind inaugurated by Locke and
Descartes" (1991:138).
In order to criticise further the deterministic assumptions of cognitivism,
Varela and his collaborators also speak about the "connectionist" paradigm and its
importance in the emerging paradigm of complexity. This paradigm and its
relationship with the ontological status of the subject-object divide is also important
in the critique of Luhmann's theory of social systems, below. Varela et al. point out
that even within the connectionist paradigm where a spontaneous form of order is
observed in densely connected systems, it is hard to escape the consequences of an
"objectivist" world view, that assumes that the world lies "outside" our embodied
consciousness. According to connectionism, what is generally called "emergent
properties" —which have been observed in a wide array research domains5— helps to
transform the traditional view of representation, where mind (or brain for that matter)
is an input-output device that processes information. Here, the role of the
environment as pregiven has moved from being the main point of reference to the
background that enfolds the mind, which has moved to the foreground of research:
"the idea of mind as an emergent and autonomous network of relationships has
gained a central place" (Varela et al. 1991:138). Connectionism poses densely
connected systems that come up with spontaneous orderly patterns of response to the
environment, without a central guiding logic as in the cognitivist paradigm. These
patterns are spontaneously produced emergent properties that are seen to organise
themselves around what has been called "attractors" (See Varela et al. 1991:85-103)
However, according to Varela, even in this new view (connectionism) the old
traditional view of representation is sustained for lack of a better picture of how it is
that cognitive systems interact with their environment at the same time as they are
embedded in it. When they refer to networks of relationships that take place in the
s "There is no unified theory of emergent properties. It is clear, however, that emergent properties
have been found across all domains —vortices and lasers, chemical oscillations, genetic networks,
developmental patterns, population genetics, immune networks, ecology, and geophysics". In these
systems, there is no need for a central processing unit as a guide for the specified operation; they go
from local rules to global coherence, and during the years of cybernetics, it used to be called self-
organisation. "Today people prefer to speak of emergent or global properties, network dynamics,
nonlinear networks, complex systems, or even synergetics" (Varela et al. 1991:88)
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brain, cognitive scientists speak of the processes that carry the brain from state to
state, this they consider mind. But what makes them mind-like is that they are seen as
"embodying" (cognitivism) or "supporting" (emergent properties) representations of
the world that exists independently of cognition and that can act as input of
information for a cognitive system. Information is still a prespecified quantity that
provides the premises upon which a system computes a behaviour or the output. But,
inputs and outputs cannot be specified for highly cooperative, self-organising
systems like the brain (Maturana & Varela 1987, Varela et al. 1991). Even if there is
a flow of energy back and forth, it is impossible to specify when information ends
and behaviour begins (Maturana 1970, 1990). According to Maturna and Varela
(1987), brains use processes that change themselves, that is, the main activity of the
brain is to make changes in itself. In the light of these scientific discoveries, Varela
refers to a necessary shift in cognitive sciences:
This shift requires that we move away from the idea of the world as
independent and extrinsic to the idea of a world as inseparable from the
structure of these processes of self-modification. This change in stance does
not express a mere philosophical preference; it reflects the necessity of
understanding cognitive systems not on the basis of their input and output
relationships but by their operational closure. A system that has operational
closure is one in which the results of its processes are those processes
themselves. (Varela et al. 1991:139)
The essence of this shift is one of perspective, as I have argued in this work;
and I propose that a proper perspective for these purposes is the synchronic realm of
experience in the present moment ofmeaningful interaction. As has been explained
in chapter V, this synchronic moment of observation stands on the existential field of
nihility, which is not Absolute emptiness, and so it can still be an intellectual source
of knowledge. Varela and his collaborators (1991) believe that a disciplined way of
insightfully approaching our own experience and cognition is through the Buddhist
notion of "groundlessness". This lies on analogous "grounds" (the word here used
metaphorically) as nihilist "nothingness", on which an existential awareness of reality
is based. But groundlessness does not follow the path to solipsistic consequences, it
abandons despair aspirationally in striving to learn to let go of the deeply rooted
tendencies to find the grounds for a definite reality "outside" of our consciousness,
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one that we can know objectively "for sure" and in that certainty abolish whole
universes of experienced reality. "We could make a similar point
phenomenologically by saying that groundlessness is the very condition for the richly
textured and interdependent world of human experience" (Varela et al. 1991:144).
It is only from this "groundless" condition that they go on to explain how it is
that their view of cognition as embodied and enactive can represent a genuine
alternative to the deeply rooted notion of cognition as representation6. According to
this, then, cognitive systems do not represent an independent world, rather, they
enact a world as a domain of references and distinctions that cannot be separated
from the sensory-motor configurations that unfold throughout the ontogeny of the
cognitive agent. With respect to their idea of embodied cognition as enaction, Varela
et al. "wish to evoke the point that when we begin to take such a conception of mind
seriously, we must call into question the idea that the world is pregiven and that
cognition is representation" (1991:140). The enactive perspective explicitly seeks a
middle path between realism and idealism, both positions which the authors consider
analogous to the "chicken and egg" dilemma, where either the world or our internal
mind-structure is pregiven, and where the representational paradigm is not essentially
challenged, as cognition is either a recovery ofworld-features ("objectivism") or their
projection by our separate minds ("subjectivism") (see Lakoff& Johnson 1980).
The perceiver is the point of departure of the enactive approach, the one who
stands at the centre of the present meaningful moment of interaction. From the
enactive approach, then, one can
study how the perceiver can guide his actions in his local situation. Since
these local situations constantly change as a result of the perceiver's activity,
the reference point for understanding perception is no longer a pregiven,
perceiver-independent world but rather the sensory-motor structure of the
perceiver (the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor
6 This view of cognition is also tied to ideas of efficiency and optimality where the cognitive agent
manages to learn to read its innate map properly and therefore performs objectively correct
interaction with the environment. As Varela and his collaborators explain, this idea of optimality is
congenial to that of progress and optimality in evolution as adaptation. While "representation in
cognitive science is the precise homologue of adaptationism in evolutionary theory, for optimality
plays the same central role in each domain" (Varela et al. 1991:194); "evolution as natural drift is
the biological counterpart of cognition as embodied action, and therefore also provides a more
embracing theoretical context for the study of cognition as a biological phenomenon" (Varela et al.
1991:188).
250
surfaces). This structure —the manner in which the perceiver is embodied—
rather than some pregiven world determines how the perceiver can act and be
modulated by environmental events. (Varela et al. 1991:173)
The enactive approach allows us to convey a synchronic perspective while we
describe it phenomenologically. However, I have related "present experience" to the
kind of consciousness that we share with animals. Even if their nervous system does
not allow for the kind of recursive interaction that produces human discursivity as a
characteristic of our species, we share a practical kind of spontaneous consciousness
with them.
The problem of consciousness had been provisionally solved for science by
assuming the 'natural' division between mind and body, where consciousness and self
were granted to the one and denied to the other, mainly because the Western self is
identified with intellectual reflection —the Cartesian thinking "I". But in questioning
the legitimacy of the division between mind and body in the present time of
experience, where they are indistinguishable, our perspective of self, mind, life, and
consciousness becomes circular:
Minds awaken in a world. We did not design our world. We simply found
ourselves with it; we awoke both to ourselves and to the world we inhabit.
We come to reflect on that world as we grow and live. We reflect on a world
that is not made, but found, and yet it is also our structure that enables us to
reflect upon this world. Thus in reflection we find ourselves in a circle: we
are in a world that seems to be there before reflection begins, but that world is
not separate from us. (Varela et al. 1991:3)
The Western/Christian divided view of reality (with two 'real' domains:
transcendence and world) provided the cosmological form of reality that would
legitimise the mind-body divide as a plausible symbology elaborated by the
Forefathers of the scientific discipline. But this division is linked to the older
philosophical and theological one, in which the Spirit manifests itself in us through
our mind and not our body (see Warner: 1980). Nevertheless, the mind-body and
therefore subject-object divide provided the disciplined means to organise an
ongoing debate about consciousness in philosophy and psychology; where the
accompanying subject-object divide and its further divisions and classifications of
phenomena made the debate possible at all. In phenomenological analysis we cannot
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dissolve this divide, all we can do is emphasise it as appearance and be aware that, in
our sequential explanations, when we observe the object we stop looking at ourselves
as subjects of cognition and assume a privileged perspective at the centre of
consciousness.
But as I have repeatedly asserted throughout this work the ontological
division between subject and object has been observed to lack factuality, and
constitutes one of science's most useful myths. In the light of this century's
discoveries in Physics7 it has been found legitimate to take into account the presence
of the consciousness of the observer in her/his observations, and how this makes the
experiment itself a much more complex event8; one that is not just simply
deterministic or random, but stochastic; that is, placed 'somewhere' in between
determinism and randomness:
[I]n a sense, the classical world was in opposition to our internal experience.
Today, these new ideas lead to a concordance between the scientific view and
our internal and real experience, and therefore the resulting world view is
perhaps more open and more tolerant of different cultural origins, recognizing
more fully, as it does, a new coherence between subjective experience and the
scientific viewpoint. (Prigogine 1984:117)
But even if consideration about the consciousness of either the object of study or of
the subject itself has produced these newer research trends, the concept of
consciousness itself remains problematic (see Block et al. 1997).
Yet, our own everyday human consciousness may be explored experientially
and empathically in a phenomenological manner —on the paradoxical grounds of
"groundlessness"— to a better degree that any other species of consciousness on
7
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the impossibility to measure two aspects of the same
physical phenomenon at the same time (velocity and position ofmicroparticles): to see one is to lose
sight of the other.
s "We now begin to see new possibilities for understanding natural phenomena", says Ilya Prigogine,
"which we could not perceive before. The first 50 years of the century were dominated by the
discovery of quantum theory and relativity, relating to the extremes of either very small or very
large phenomena. In contrast, the last decade has been dominated by an extraordinary growth of
physics on our own scale: that of the macroscopic physics of dynamic systems. This research is
leading to a much better understanding of our "place" within nature, and we are now discovering
extremely interesting phenomena on our own spatial and temporal scale, without needing to go to
the classical frontiers of science, namely microparticles or cosmology. The shift from simplicity to
complexity is not an ideological shift due simply to some a priori reasoning" (Prigogine 1984:107);
he insists that the shift is based on experimental evidence, which produces complex theory that
cannot be ignored anymore by deterministic (he calls them simplistic) approaches to science.
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earth, because we experience it primarily as human beings. The immediacy of
unreflective experience, however, must go through symbological and coherent
transformation before it can be voiced in discursive conscious reflection, one that is
unavoidably causal, sequential and diachronic, just like any other tale. Consciousness
is at the centre of the mind-body divide, but it is a mysterious feature mixed with
bodily perception because, even though we all experience it and we can intuitively
feel that other species of living beings have consciousness, its present richness cannot
be fully described in the sequential symbols of any type of language. It follows that
representation of specific experiences of consciousness beyond human is impossible
(we can only imagine them in a human way) and representation of a universal kind of
consciousness is best left to artists, mystics, and poets or left without representation
(as in many spiritual traditions).
However, it is important to remember that —in the phenomenal world of our
scientific discipline and tradition— there is a finite amount of variation of species we
can identify with on earth, with organisational limitations that we can observe, even
while we understand that those limitations are artificial impositions of our own
discipline. Nevertheless, experientially, there are shared human meanings that
describe regular features of our physiological and psychological organisation; that is,
we can currently recognise other human beings as members of our own species, even
if there are racial variations (and even if there have been historical situations in which
this was not the case). To be sure, consciousness of self is a subjective experience
with abstract potentially infinite possibilities of structural variation that is
comparable to the abstract potentially infinite structural possibilities of individual
embodiment —this is the basis of the experiential reality of the 'multiverse' posed in
postmodern constructions. But this image can only run to the extreme of its abstractly
infinite conclusions if we see human selves as "disworlded minds"9 (Varela et al.
1991:4). If we are speaking experientially about human perception, it should be
situated within our presently known material limitations in the world we perceive
9 This false image has been built as an excessive idealisation of human freedom, but it can be posed
as a criticism to many postmodern conclusions about the self; while at the same time the false image
of a "disembodied observer" can be posed as a critique of modern assumptions about reality.
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(and this includes embodiment, the particularity of people, and the constant mystery
of our own consciousness and of ever present sexuality and death). Other forms of
consciousness may be seen as factually different from human if the latter is able to
recognise organisationally its own difference from them. And yet, they remain a
point of reference in order to be able to see how human is also unavoidably animal
and structurally coupled to the rest of nature at the same time.
As has been said before, the organic ideal type of organisation shows how
human interaction is also animal interaction; while the artificial ideal type of
organisation describes how human interaction is different from animal interaction.
The basis of this difference has been generally conceptualised with respect to our
discursive capacity, and in this respect, this work is no different from other
conceptualisations. Nevertheless, here, the ontological division between subject and
object has been assumed as a Western myth that cannot be avoided methodologically
in order to produce plausible explanations of factuality. The explanations and
methodology (as well as the mythology) lie within the scientific tradition and
discipline, whose history can be traced through its path dependencies and which has
now a structural actuality that we embrace and transform in the continuation of
discipline and tradition (even if its roots have been repeatedly and explicitly
rejected). As we will see, an essential trust in discipline, even a creatively invented
one, is a major organiser for human interaction.
Trust, belief system, symbology, and the experience of time are bootstrapped
to each other, producing different human experiences of reality. Trust is directly
related to the present structures of belief that allow for spontaneity and discipline to
engage in a constant dance of possible interaction —which often may not seem to be
as harmonious as the mental image of a dance (besides order, destruction and entropy
are always possible). Therefore, the two ideal-typical models of organisation
proposed differentiate human spontaneous organic organisation from human
disciplined artificial organisation. We manage to create these types of organisation
both intentionally and autopoietically —discursively and practically— in order to live
together and sustain our embodied existence successfully, in a human kind of
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awareness of ourselves and of each other, and in the constant management of
potential and actual conflict.
Yet. it is important to point out at this stage, that both types of organisation
are carved in human belief; even if the realist assumptions of our discipline lead us to
believe that the organic side is already 'there', separate from us, and that we wilfully
create the artificial side. This assumption is epistemologically located in the subject-
object clear divide of our tradition, but in a time-frame that is sequential: it sets past
and present in motion in a coordinated manner that allows us to differentiate factual
causality clearly, and therefore allows us to produce scientific explanation. But in the
present moment of meaningful experience, where object and subject are
indistinguishable (except in explanation), the belief that past and present time can be
clearly differentiated vanishes in a stable experience of present structures which we
observe and which we engage in producing —both in discursive intentionality, and by
spontaneity/chance/drift at the same time— as we interact within them (these
'structures' include our own embodiment). And so, the artificial ideal type of
organisation depends on an artificial division of structural features that will be
realised for the sake of heuristic objectives. As opposed to the spontaneity of the
organic type, this one is ruled by discipline, but we must bear in mind that discipline,
as we will see, is both created and creative.
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VII. 2. Discipline, Consciousness of Self, Potentiality
As has been mentioned above, the artificial ideal type of human organisation
constitutes the grounds on which the human animal differs from non-human animals.
But the basis of this difference is not an image of homo faber contriving cunning
tools or of clear boundaries between savagery and civilisation. Instead, it is built
from the perspective of an existential human consciousness of self. This means that
the observer stands on the field of nihility (Nishitani 1982) or on existential
"groundlessness" (Varela et al. 1991); while consciousness stands on the actuality of
meaning. Consciousness of self has traditionally been construed as based on
subjective individuality; where society is essentially an aggregate of wilful conscious
actions of agents. Methodological individualism, even that of Weber, has the
limitations of a sociology that builds a picture of society from the perspective of a
second-order observer who starts "from below"; which regards social interaction as
based on "building blocks" that cannot be divided (individual subjects), but that also
should converge intersubjectively (however imperfectly) without having mutual
access to individual subjectivity. I will argue that consciousness of self, however,
cannot be based solely on individuality per se, as embodied by the individual human
person; but it is also based on the emotional and imaginative structures of interaction
that are enacted or practised collectively. These structures are like "changing
archetypes" of interaction that human consciousness produces and reproduces, a
constant activity that appresents their meaning, our emotional relationship with them,
and our consciousness of self at the same time as they are enacted. From an
existential perspective, consciousness of self can be therefore conceived of as
individual and collective at the same time and thus its construction of society does
not start from an individual "below" or from and abstract "above", rather, it stands at
the centre of consciousness; this is the reason why this perspective is
phenomenological and not objectivist (realism) or subjectivist (idealism).
Here I assume the idea that shared structures of interaction which every
person is aware of are not necessarily intellectually shared, as in the ideal of
transcendental intersubjectivity; but practically shared (see Czarniawska 1992, 1998).
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Nevertheless, in this formulation, structures of interaction are experienced and
cognised through human imagination and emotion at the same time as they are
enacted. Shared structures of ordered behaviour are reified in disciplined practice,
which is continually appresented through practical as well as discursive
consciousness; this is a kind of practical intersubjectivity that is enacted10. But
practical consciousness pertains to the realm of organic organisation which has
already been discussed, while discursive consciousness structures disciplined practice
explicitly, at the same time as there is a constant imaginative and emotional
involvement of human consciousness with symbols and their meaning. The structure
of discursive consciousness is construed as types of language or verbal structures that
co-exist to produce difference, similarity, and sameness in meaning and across
meaning domains. This discursive consciousness and the potentiality of its creations
and constructions is only half of the medium of the constantly changing criteria
according to which there is trust in human interaction (the other half is practical
consciousness). The artificial ideal type of organisation theoretically described here
considers human consciousness of self, its potentiality (seen as its structural
possibilities for the expansion of knowledge -either primary, intellectual, or
spiritual) and the type of disciplined practice experientially observed.
In everyday life, difference, sameness, or similarity get the shape of
imaginary boundaries that are sustained emotionally and through constant enactment
because, linguistically, they disappear as soon as they are used and must be
appresented in enaction constantly while the relevant principles of difference,
sameness, or similarity are legitimately sustained in emotion and imagination".
Emotional grounding is what produces the duration of boundaries (or their
dissolution) and their imaginative enaction; it may produce some of the most
constant human artificial habits —such as war and religion— whose particular form of
10 From this perspective, it is irrelevant to interaction if the shared meaningful structures are not
construed identically by the interacting subjects in their subjective realm of emotion and
imagination every time that they are appresented.
" For example, the frontiers between countries are continually sustained and enacted by the national
governments; but there are different degrees of dedication of resources to the maintenance of an
enacted physical border (generally by a monopoly of violence whose source of legitimacy lies on
the powerful side of the border). For example, the frontier between Mexico and the United States is
enacted in a very different way from that between, say Holland and Belgium.
257
manifestation nonetheless changes with human ontogeny. This constant creation and
dissolution of sameness, similarity, and difference can be observed only from the
perspective of an existential consciousness of self, one that stands on
"groundlessness", which is aware that our everyday human life-world is sustained
through the fleeting present moment ofmeaningful experience.
From the perspective of existential "groundlessness" consciousness arises
from moment to moment out of nothing at all. The phenomenological observer
standing on existential "groundlessness" contemplates his/her own newness and
impermanence as essential aspects of her/his own consciousness. From here, the
observer can see his/her consciousness of self as determined by her/his own
assumptions about the reality that s/he interacts with as an illusion of actuality
(structural present, actually embodied and enacted, shaped by past interaction)12.
From this perspective, the ordinary consciousness of self that is observed stands on
the present moment of meaningful experience produced synchronically, from
moment to moment, and it depends on collective assumptions of who we are and our
place in the cosmos and in the world (the life-world), as well as individual features
that characterise our personality. These assumptions may lie within a spectrum that
goes from the extreme of universal consciousness, through consciousness of smaller
groups of entities, to individuality, to one where we may divide ourselves up into
parts (either functionally or dysfunctionally). In factual explanation, the individual
and the collective realms may be differentiated clearly, but from an existential
perspective of consciousness of self, they are indistinguishable.
References to the cosmos, to time, or to personality, establish an imaginary
nexus of emotional grounding to those references through consciousness of self. The
nexus is confirmed in human interaction which, to consciousness, may at times
appear as external to its own imaginary boundaries and at times inside its enactive
horizons. But the existential observer should always be aware that the "container"
schema of meaning (the 'in/out' schema discussed in the previous chapter) is
12 This illusion is such, not because it lacks factuality, but because, existentially, its source is regarded
as the consciousness and vivid awareness of newness and impermanence; grounded in uncertainty
and contingency and, eventually and ultimately, annihilated by death.
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intimately bound to our particular embodied perception; and also that the objective-
subjective divide of our tradition is organised around this enacted and perceived
schema (therein lies its effectiveness). While it has proved to be an important figure
of space and time in order to set limits on humanly experienced reality (phenomenal
domains); an idea of universal and fixed boundaries that are seen to apply for all
times and at all levels of experience unavoidably becomes a grand tyrant grounded
by emotional ties to certainty. Borderlines can be useful or terrible... and in human
interaction there is only a subtle difference between these two possibilities.
An existential consciousness of self is aware of its own grounds as nihility; its
unavoidable future death in the historical realm of factuality. Existential reality is
newness and impermanence, creativity and irreversibility and so it dares not fix any
boundaries anywhere, except for heuristic objectives. From this perspective, the
phenomenological observer needs the critical discipline of her/his scientific tradition
as well as the vantage point of a transhistorical realm to respond to his/her
commitment to truthfulness (however relative to the changing circumstances). In
short, the perspective still needs both practice and mythos. I speak of myth here, not
necessarily in that the principle lacks experienced reality: its structure itself organises
the social enactment of intentional practice as experienced reality; the shape
(organisation) and structure of the discipline. But the myth itself, its ordered
structure, is nowhere to be found in an existentialist contemplation of reality: this
observation adopts the transhistorical perspective of complexity and realises that any
imagined coherent structure that aspires to explain the observation of synchronic
complexity —even while representing and dealing with uncertainty— is only a
metaphor and can never be fully factual. This is coherent with the Kantian tradition
according to which we have no access to the "thing in itself'... not discursively, I
would add11.
The disciplined type of human organisation differs from other animal social
behaviour in that, structurally, it is not shaped physiologically, but linguistically. It is
13 Access to the "thing in itself' would lie on the field of sunyata or "Absolute emptiness" (see
discussion of Nishitani, section IV. 3. above), which is a spiritual realm that lies beyond factual
explanation.
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shaped linguistically, in as much as it creates a reflexive domain of interaction for
human beings —where a discursive intention may be pondered— that other animals do
not appear to produce.
Human beings are not the only animals that generate linguistic domains in
their social existence. What is peculiar to them is that, in their linguistic
coordination of actions, they give rise to a new phenomenal domain, viz., the
domain oflanguage. (Maturana and Varela 1987: 209)
As has been discussed, other animals do interact by "languaging", determined by the
physiologically possible sounds, signals, movements, and exchanges that they can
perform in structural coupling with their counterparts; they even learn enacted
behaviours. But this has been observed to be a spontaneous organic type of social
organisation; the one that we share with non-human animals.
The sociality of non-human animals depends heavily on spontaneous
"instinctive communicative behaviors, whose stability depends on the genetic
stability of the species and not on the cultural stability of the social system"
(Maturana and Varela 1987:208). This pre-eminently organic type of collective
interaction may result in the creation of particularly determined local "dialects",
which could be compared to disciplined social order in human society (they are learnt
in social animal collective realms of interaction and determined by the history of
interactions of a particular group; e.g., a particular beehive; see Ingold 1983).
Nevertheless, these dialects do not appear to organise whole imaginary or abstract
domains of collective interaction that persist as a characteristic of the species, as in
the human one. "The so-called "language" of bees", say Maturana and Varela, "for
instance, is not a language. It is a mixed case of instinctive and linguistic behaviors"
(1987:208). But human linguistic behaviour does not only include learnt rhythms of
organic coordination in a species, it also includes the constant and simultaneous
creation of symbols and their meaning.
The domain of human language is not only made out of local symbols that
may produce broken and incompatible imaginary realms; it is also integrated in
meaningful ideas of reality, cosmologies, sustained in belief —either practically or
discursively— by emotional ties:
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Man lives, not directly or nakedly in nature like the animals, but within a
mythological universe, a body of assumptions and beliefs developed from his
existential concerns. Most of this is held unconsciously14, which means that
our imagination may recognise elements of it, when presented in art or
literature, without consciously recognizing what it is that we recognise.
Practically all that we can see of this body of concern is socially conditioned
and culturally inherited... One of the practical functions of criticism, by which
I mean the conscious organizing of a cultural tradition, is, I think, to make us
more aware of our mythological conditioning. (Frye 1982:xviii)
But Frye does not intend to eradicate this conditioning, he just wants to make us
more aware of what it is that we have deep emotional ties with; an awareness that
produces horizontal cultural tolerance of different ideas of reality. This point is
particularly important when considering the subject-object divide in our tradition,
which I have regarded as the paradigmatic myth at its foundations; but one that may
be very useful in the production of intellectual and factual knowledge. This is the
myth that Maturana an Varela also both use and criticise in their autopoietic
metaphor for synchronic life; and it is the one that Niklas Luhmann, in his Social
Systems, is also engaged both in embracing and rejecting through his theory of a self-
referential meaning that is bootstrapped to itself. Flowever, while Maturana and
Varela effectively integrate the position of the observer (that entails a diachronic
shape of explanation as a "history of interactions", what I have called "path
dependencies") with her/his awareness that s/he is also an embodied interacting
living organism like the observed one (synchronic ontogeny: the autopoiesis and
structural coupling of the observer him/herself); Luhmann seems unaware that, while
his theory of meaning is based on a phenomenological structure, he also embraces
the position of the second-order observer in his theory of social systems through the
factuality that he claims for his basic assumptions of hierarchies and borders and for
the absoluteness of his functional diachronic and "complex" explanations. His
systematic structures are at times based on the connectionist paradigm of "emergent
properties" and at times on digital communication —cybernetic system theory (see
14 In this work, this kind of assertion about an unconscious realm is interpreted as learnt meaning that
has been assimilated into the structures of practical consciousness and that remains as part of the
enacted (Varela et at. 1991) realm of interaction, either without or after having achieved a reflexive
and discursive awareness about the enactment as such. This awareness comes about as a type of
disciplined approach to interaction.
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Luhmann 1979:6) which, as has been discussed above, fail to fully abandon the
objectivist implications about mind and cognition. I will argue that Luhmann's
perspective only becomes phenomenological in his theory of meaning, a modified
version of which 1 will integrate to my model.
Maturana and Varela speak about the perspective of the observer and cannot
lose sight of it in themselves as biologists, because in their practice, they must use
the scalpel and chop up life in order to study it while, unavoidably, either killing it or
needing to artificially keep it alive (clearly and experientially). In contrast to this, in
his Social Systems (1995) Luhmann's "scalpel" is an abstract knife ofprecise concept
formation, and therefore, can keep dividing or differentiating domains of interaction
without any organic limitation as to where he can stop chopping up life to analyse it
without killing it. He considers that social systems can be construed as a nexus of
communications, and their relationship to human consciousness lies in the
environment of the social system and they are therefore autonomous from human
consciousness autopoietically:
Such environmental relevance for the construction of social systems
constrains what is possible, but it does not prevent social systems from
forming themselves autonomously and on the basis of their own elemental
operations. These operations are communications —not psychic processes per
se, and also not the processes of consciousness. (Luhmann 1995:255)
After having cut off the social system from its source of life (i.e. human
consciousness), Luhmann goes on to say that the communications of social systems
keep multiplying themselves autopoietically, according to principles that are
congenial with insights from the connectionist research project in artificial
intelligence (as has been pointed out, he also turns to the old cybernetic one when he
describes the use of contradiction as a kind of on/off threshold device). With his
abstract scalpel Luhmann carefully cuts the societal communicative layers off the
conscious core (the "black boxes" in Luhmann's Parsonian explanation of double
contingency); and then proceeds to examine social systems analytically, once they're
dead, devoid of consciousness.
I will argue that the major problem with Luhmann's theoretical view of
societal interaction is that he embraces two different perspectives as an observer of
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social systems, while at the same time trying to reject one of them. One perspective,
congenial with this work, is the phenomenological centre of consciousness that
Luhmann adopts for his theory of meaning, the other is the 'outside position' of the
'second-order' observer of social interaction that he adopts in order to explain the
impossibility of Husserlian intersubjectivity through his functional exposition of
double contingency. The problem with this second perspective is that it needs
boundaries and hierarchies as basic assumptions of the theoretical model to begin
with, just like the subject-object divide. In order to avoid this, Luhmann changes
terminology and instead of positing the divide with respect to the conscious human
being, he poses it with respect to systems and their environment, whose borders are
factually 'there':
For a (scientific) observer, where the boundaries lie may still remain
analytically unclear, but this does not justify viewing the bounding of systems
as a purely analytical determination. (Luhmann 1995:30)
But he does not contemplate that social systems are not embodied in anything but
human enaction, emotion, and imagination. As has been discussed, the perspective of
this work eliminates the possibility of positing borders as an ontological
characteristic of the world (of systems or not) and adopts instead the
phenomenological notion of abstract horizons (which Luhmann also uses, but which
inadvertently they also become functional borders). This is because when Luhmann
crosses, analytically, any "factual" horizons he turns them into abstract borders in
human interaction, this entails the assumption of a second-order observer that lets go
of her/his own consciousness as the centre of phenomenological observation —the
world as appearance— to assume that there is, in fact, a world 'out there' objectively
speaking. But this kind of analysis entails that we then take on board objectivist
assumptions without questioning them and that the observer assume a privileged
perspective: an overview of assumptions that organises our own particular discipline,
but that prevents us from considering any other forms of discipline as legitimate
sources of knowledge.
In his theory of social systems, Luhmann substitutes the subject-object divide
—which assumes the 'subject' as conscious— for the system-environment divide:
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If one wishes to retain a "subject" terminology, one can still say: a
consciousness is the subject of the world, alongside which there are other
kinds of subjects, above all social systems. Or that psychic and social systems
are the subjects of the world. Or that meaningful self-reference is the subjects
of the world. Or that the world is a correlate of meaning. In every case, such
assertions burst open the clear Cartesian difference between subject and
object. It is superfluous to try to understand the concept of the subject from
the viewpoint of this difference; the difference, so to speak, subjectivizes
itself. The self-referential subject and the self-referential object are conceived
isomorphically —just like reason and the thing in itself for Kant. And isn't the
concept of self-reference, then, all that is needed? (Luhmann 1995:438-9)
So instead of organising a second-order observer system of referential rules;
Luhmann gives intention —a consequence of consciousness in my model— to
meaning itself and then bootstraps meaning to itself so that it becomes self-
referential, and thus gets apparently rid of the problem of consciousness. From the
perspective of a second-order observer Luhmann connects system and environment
by a realm of interpenetration, which communicates black boxes with each other
through the dense connectivity between self-referential meanings (who intend
themselves) and that produce "emergent properties" as complex patterns of
communicative interaction that, eventually, reach the conscious states of the "psychic
system" as a relativized version of communication through fuzzy "symbolic
generalisation". While Luhmann's alternative complex terminology is a very useful
metaphor to illustrate the flow of functional discursive intentionality, I argue that the
cuts of his abstract "scalpel" include one too many, after which social systems die. I
am speaking of his assumption that social systems operate solely through
communication, and not through human consciousness, as closed self-referential
systems on their own. Luhmann cuts off —in abstraction— the element of human
consciousness in meaningful social systems and puts it "outside" the systems in the
environment but connected to it through his interpenetrative cybernetic borders.
Luhmann substitutes the problematic notion of human consciousness for an
abstract entity of conscious states, the 'psychic system'. He stresses that his "social
systems are nor composed of individuals and cannot be created out of bodily or
psychic processes" (1995:256). Even though this does not mean to him that there are
no individuals in the world of social systems; the latter constitute abstract entities
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with self-referential closure and borders, but that lack consciousness in themselves
and connect to the human realms through their borders in interaction with psychic
systems. For Luhmann, as for Hamlet, man could not be the measure of society as
traditionally supposed; yet the former's lack of trust in human is not existential as in
the latter, it is formulated as the freedom for irrationality and immorality that human
finds in the contemporary functionally differentiated systems of interaction15 which,
as such, Luhmann contemplates as a product of evolution. But Luhmann's notion of
evolution of the social systems is problematic because it poses a deterministic
mechanism of evolution towards the specific direction of functional complexity.
According to this mechanism, the core of actuality of meaning is systematically and
constantly differentiated from itself ad infinitum. This entails that complexity be seen
as a factual characteristic of social systems, and not as a research perspective, and
that we speak of higher and lower complexity in different societies determined by
Western cultural criteria of what it is to be "higher" or "lower". My objection is that
the perspective of complexity is useful in all kinds of present human interaction:
from the complex world of gossip, to complex informality, to organised chaos, to
complex global interaction; which can only operate —and not necessarily functionally
and efficiently— through human enaction and practical involvement.
Luhmann believes that as soon as meaning is available as an "evolutionary
achievement", it proceeds to establish dense connections that increase the system's
capability to handle increasing complexity: "an evolution of meaning as such can be
set going that tests which schemata of acquisition and information processing will
prove themselves (above all, for predication and action) in their quality of making
connections" (Luhmann 1995:69). The problem of this functional approach is that it
assumes its own neutrality on the basis of functionality (as much of science does) but
15 "[T]he distinction between system and environment", says Luhmann, "offers the possibility of
conceiving human beings as parts of the societal environment in a way that is both more complex
and less restricting than if they had to be interpreted as parts of society, because in comparison with
the system, the environment is the domain of distinctions that shows greater complexity and less
existing order. The human being is thus conceded greater freedom in relation to his environment,
especially freedom for irrational and immoral behaviour. He is no longer the measure of society.
The idea of humanism cannot continue. Who would seriously and deliberately try to maintain that
society could be formed on the model of a human being, that is, with a head at the top and so on?"
(Luhmann 1995:212-3)
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it ignores the observer's own emotional involvement with systemic functionality as a
measure of certainty and of what s/he observes as a "higher" form of complexity.
Complexity can be seen as higher or lower only perspectivally and not as a measure
of evolutionary achievement (where are the works of evolution in the complex
observation of a particle of matter?). In positing different ontological levels of
complexity through 'selection' and evolution, Luhmann is unwittingly regarding it as
analogous to complication —the one that emerges as problems to be solved within
specialisation and differentiation of functions in contemporary global-modern
interaction (see Giarini 1984). The paradigm of complexity is construed in this work
as a transhistorical perspective for observation, as much present in the most distant
past as in the most distant future that we can imagine, mainly because it emerges
from a present need for explanation (Morin 1984). Luhmann's idea of evolution is
still based on the Spencerian notion of epigenetic development, albeit not in the
latter's direction of teleological perfection, but still in a deterministic direction toward
further differentiation and complexifization of social interaction; where "meaning is a
general form of self-referential adaptation to complexity" (Luhmann 1995:71).
Despite the above rather lengthy digression into Luhmann's systems theory, I
will not engage with his construction of social systems mainly because of its inherent
perspective of a second-order observer in explaining double contingency where the
difference system/environment separates meaning consciousness from human
consciousness which remains within its "black box" (What else would give
consciousness to meaning?). Nevertheless, I considered it necessary to discuss how it
is that the model of human interaction that I propose disagrees with Luhmann's
model of societal interaction before proceeding to engage with his phenomenological
theory of meaning. If we couple Luhmann's theory of meaning back to human
consciousness, it can be seen as a very useful metaphor that explains the functionality
of systems purposively designed by the modern mind (which cannot be regarded as
wholly allopoietic for being so entwined with practical human ontogeny). And if we
move from there to the perspective of an existential consciousness of self (aware of
newness and impermanence); the functional (ontological) borders of which Luhmann
speaks become fleeting instants of human enactment and dissolution; moving
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horizons within the field of consciousness that we experience as appearance, and
through which other views of reality can come to be accommodated and given
meaning. However, like Luhmann, I do assume that language is self-referential; that
is, autopoietically closed and structurally coupled to human ontogeny; but the
mechanisms of this coupling are those of consciousness itself seen as human
consciousness. In the present theoretical construction of the artificial ideal type of
order, language and meaning are seen as structurally coupled to our consciousness of
self in an analogous way as to how the nervous system is structurally coupled to our
embodiment. But while the nervous system may be observed as a localised organic
substance, the "substance" of language is human enaction, emotion, and imagination
—through which a consciousness of self (collective or individual) is appresented. The
nervous system is a suitable metaphor to describe the domain of language, one that
has autopoietic (self-referential) organisational closure at the same time as is
structurally coupled to human consciousness. This domain refers to what Maturana
and Varela also call "consensual domains of interaction", or "conversations", that are
recursively enacted in the form of local views of reality which, through discipline,
may be enlarged and become as wide as imaginary whole cosmologies together with
their own emotionally explored horizons16.
Maturana and Varela call "cultural behaviour" (1987:201), the nature of the
difference between humans and the rest of the animal species on earth; which
sociology and anthropology call "social imaginary", "culture", "worldview",
"cosmology", etc., and which I have called throughout this work "views of reality"
(see also Geertz 1973, Douglas 1986). As a species, humanity is different from all the
other species in its ability to produce, both materially and symbolically, realms of
interaction that —even if in constant change— persist as "autonomous" realms (in a
linguistic type of autopoietical closure) in the sense that they can be recognised as
such by an observer. This claimed autonomy is quite relative because these realms
produce human consciousness of self autopoietically —with consequences for human
organic integrity. Language as a realm of interaction persists in symbols and families
16 These are not actual borders, but useful and imagined borders, that are emotionally and
imaginatively explored through disciplined observation during their enaction.
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of symbols that have meaning because, on the one hand, they refer to each other in
autopoietic closure; and on the other, and most importantly, because the meaning of
symbols remains "alive" only in as much as it is constantly updated by human
imagination and emotional ties to experience: Present legitimate symbols are
bootstrapped to present human enaction, imagination, and emotion. From a
diachronic perspective, emotion and imagination also determine the history of the
structural changes and path dependencies of the symbols themselves —which
"embody" coherent aspects of specific views of reality— and of the material
organisations set up for interaction. However, material organisations can always be
left to rust, while symbols in the imagination of people are subject to constant
emotional creation, change, interpretation, and deformation. Ideas of reality,
cosmology, universe, its imagined origins, its end, its purpose, the relevance of time
(cyclical, linear, illusory); meta-languages, and languages with various types of
symbology persist in the consciousness of human beings; they need our imaginative
and emotional involvement and our human realms of sequentiality and synchronicity,
they are not embodied by anything that is not human or a human creation, they are
both experienced and enacted by us.
I have referred to Varela's formulation of the synthesis between
consciousness and embodiment as enaction, considered as present at the same time in
the embodiment and consciousness of cognitive systems. I have mentioned that
Varela's approach considers the Buddhist notion of "groundlessness" through the
practice of mindful/awareness in the scientific activity of observing (Varela et al.
1991:143). While this practical notion is very illustrative of how different disciplines
and world-views can be relevant to ours; a theory of the structure of meaning needs a
phenomenological perspective for the observer to position her/himself in such a
realm analytically. Here, I have referred to this realm as an existentialist
consciousness of self in the present moment of meaningful experience, which is
congenial with Varela's views on mindful/awareness (which leads to Absolute
nothingness (sunyata) or the experience of religious love, see chapter IV above).
Maturana and Varela refer to 'love' as the human capacity that gives meaning its
consubstantiality. Maturana refers to the "substance" or vehicle of meaningful
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patterns of interaction as "conversations" and "consensual coordinations of
behaviours" (Maturana 1990, 1995). It is this apparent consensual side of language
that Maturana and Varela single out in order to stress that only love can be seen as
the origin of the social acceptance of others living beside us as an inherent
characteristic of the social process and of humanness:
We have delved into a social dynamics which points up a basic ontological
feature of our human condition that is no longer a mere assumption, that is,
we have only the world that we bringforth with others and only love helps us
bring itforth. (Maturana and Varela 1987:248, their emphasis)
Nevertheless I will argue that, while this shows a disciplinary preference and a moral
position, they fail to refer to darker human emotions that are also meaningful; even
though the above is an important theoretical point —and it should be stressed because
the human embodied need for love, nurture, and care from other embodied human
beings is often ignored (except by feminist theory, see Gilligan 1982, 1988). But the
above formulation of the human language as an epiphenomenon of our need as a
species to live lovingly together remains too harmonious —it is a moral conclusion,
which is often at odds with human experience. This reveals that Maturana and Varela
are not social scientists, who have to deal with the question of conflict and the
critique of power. While it is true that "love" or the consciousness of the other as
oneself (here seen more readily as trust), is an important aspect of human interaction
that needs some light thrown upon; we must also consider the simultaneous
possibility of fear in human interaction (and of a perverted kind of love: hate).
Between love and fear there is a very diverse spectrum of human emotions and
paradoxical situations that often lead to the impossibility of living together, because
human beings also engage in enacting and "bringing forth" emotionally incompatible
imaginary worlds.
Language also represents conflict and even creates the means for conflict. If
we want to concentrate on the realms of order that it produces, we should also be able
to look at how "cultural behaviour" deals with conflict. In the spontaneity of
interaction (within which all animals, including humans, are located) conflict results
in explosive behaviour which (to the human observer) constantly threatens to destroy
the gregarious togetherness on which the human species depends. And so, the duality
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love/fear (in a mixture of intensity which creates different kinds of love —even
perverted love—, attraction, and aversion) is constantly present in any kind of human
order. This is where Luhmann's theory of meaning becomes relevant as it points to a
systemic absence of humanity, which he unwittingly formulates as the absence of
consciousness in the social systems. His is a useful metaphor to complete a theory of
artificial human organisation which must also be functional and which takes into
account the constant creation of boundaries, however imaginary. Luhmann identifies
a structural need to constantly discriminate possibilities through self-referential
communicative structures organised around the notion of difference. To Luhmann,
meaning results from the unity of the difference, which organises functionality and
feeds from disturbances, disorder, and exclusion. But his theory of meaning is
incomplete because his systemic 'automatons' engage in a constant change in the
direction of further differentiation without the possibility of the opposite direction.
At this point I would like to go back to Northrop Frye's view of language and
his classification of verbal structures (see chapter II, section 3 above). This is useful
here before explaining Luhmann's theory of meaning, because his theory is organised
around factuality, and it is therefore intimately bound to the linguistic function of
expressing difference in descriptive verbal structures —one of the three structures that
Frye refers to. As has been explained, following Vico, Frye speaks of different types
of language which have had pre-eminence in the Western culture at different
historical times. However, his classification of language in three types does not entail
the description of a progressive evolution towards a deterministic situation in the
present (however complex it may seem), Frye borrows the cyclical concept of ricorso
from Vico in order to describe their alternating ascendancy. Frye speaks of three
different kinds of language: hieroglyphic (mythic-metaphoric), hieratic (metonymic),
and demotic (descriptive).
In Frye's discussion, there is a sense for the constant presence of the three
types of verbal structure in different degrees of pre-eminence according to their
legitimacy in the situation or period described. Mythic language is very permissive of
an ambiguous mixture of emotion and imagination in its symbols, metaphors express
sameness and therefore allow for overlapping of difference; metonymic language
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expresses similarity and is therefore extensively used in the explanation of
transcendental concepts and how they can be posed according to worldly references;
descriptive language uses symbols that faithfully correspond to what they describe,
either in abstraction or in the experiential world and so, they themselves carry the
characteristics of factual difference. The contemporary structure and assumptions of
philosophy and science makes the latter kind of language pre-eminent in our Western
tradition of knowledge; this is because "this approach treats language as primarily
descriptive of an objective natural order" (Frye 1982:13). It is important to stress that
these types of language are never pure in experience, but in different cultures and in
different social strata, they enjoy different degrees of pre-eminent legitimacy in order
to organise the changing structure of behaviour, which in the artificial ideal type, also
organises discipline (Ideally, metonymic language is pre-eminent in the
Eastern/mystic idea of reality and mythic language, in the pagan/primitive one).
It is also important to stress though, that these three types of verbal structures
depend on each other for the formation of any belief system. It is not always clear
that the verbal structures of description —however pre-eminent— depend on
metaphoric structures that disclose sameness (paradigmatic) and metonymic
structures that disclose similarity (syntagmatic). Through the latter the descriptive
work of differentiation does not end up dissolving consciousness ad infinitum. In
what follows I will explain Luhmann's theory of meaning organised around
functional and descriptive verbal structures, which I will adjust to include the other
two verbal structures considered in order to allow consciousness to expand beyond
(or below) functionality. This will clarify how discipline is handed down discursively
and practically as a part of ongoing human ontogeny, how it is that this enactment
may be organised discursively (diachronically and sequentially) which discloses
potentiality, and how these "artificial" activities of human consciousness may
contribute to the formation of trust as a synchronic aspect of human interaction.
Despite the objections to Luhmann's notion of the absence of human
consciousness within social systems themselves, his functional theory of meaning
unfolds from a phenomenological perspective; that is, from the synchronic
perspective and is therefore very useful to structure a complete notion of the present
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moment of meaningful experience (from which imaginary and emotionally grounded
borders constantly emerge in practice). In order to do this it is important to stress that
the structure of meaning in his theory is based on self-referential unity of the
difference (Luhmann 1995:33) and it therefore corresponds to the meaning of
descriptive verbal structures. In this structures the symbols are emptied of inherent
meaning as they stand wholly for what they represent, and they diachronically "push"
centrifugally to further differentiation (Luhmann's "complex" evolution of meaning
1995). And so, I will complement his phenomenological theory by an attempt to fit
into it the other verbal structures (metaphoric and metonymic) which point to
analogic notions of sameness and similarity that "pull" meaning centripetally to
synchronic unity. I will argue that this whole structure, appresented through human
emotion and imagination, may be useful to organise meaning and constitutes an
explanatory alternative to what Maturana and Varela ascribe to the human capacity of
love (1987); in the consideration that fear is equally possible.
A phenomenological description of meaning views it as the focal point, or
centre of intention, within a horizon of possibilities that is as broad as complexity
itself. Following Husserl, Luhmann regards meaning as the centre of intention
surrounded by an infinite horizon of potential possibilities.
The phenomenon of meaning appears as a surplus of references to other
possibilities of experience and action. Something stands in the focal point, at
the center of intention, and all else is indicated marginally as the horizon of
an "and so forth" of experience and action. In this form, everything that is
intended holds open to itself the world as a whole, thus guaranteeing the
actuality of the world in the form of accessibility. (Luhmann 1995:60)
This centre is the actuality of meaning, whose referential structure, I have argued, is
actualised through consciousness as the standpoint of reality, which Luhmann
believes that is actualised by meaning through "consciousness" of itself. What I
suggest instead is that this referential structure is self-referential with respect to
human consciousness, which refers simultaneously "not only to what is real (or
presumably real), but also to what is possible (conditionally real) and what is
negative (unreal, impossible)" (Luhmann 1995:60).
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In describing the structure of meaning, Luhmann differentiates a fuzzy "core"
of actuality from its surrounding close potential alternatives:
There is always a core that is given and taken for granted which is surrounded
by references to other possibilities that cannot be pursued at the same time.
Meaning, then, is actuality surrounded by possibilities. The structure of
meaning is the structure of this difference between actuality and potentiality.
Meaning is the link between the actual and the possible; it is not one or the
other. (Luhmann 1984:101-2)
The difference between actuality and potentiality is never seen in its full complex
spectrum of possibilities (they are impossible to enlist) it is seen as meaning, or
meaningful coherence between possibilities and experience. However, I will suggest
that selection of meaning from complexity (or the lack of it) is determined, not
functionally, but by that which consciousness holds to be relevant according to
enacted, imaginary, and emotional grounding. In linguistic autopoiesis, alternatives
are created by consciousness itself, by what it holds to be relevant. This process of
identification is entwined with the autopoiesis of consciousness of self who deals
with the problem of what is meaningful. But it is important to stress that this
meaningful structures are experienced as reality; that is, the idea of reality is only an
idea to the existential observer. In meaningful enaction, there are not always many
alternatives; or rather, there can be unavoidable single imperatives which may even
be pursued relentlessly and sustained structurally. This is when the other two types of
symbols referred to above (mythic and metonymic) emerge in interaction; they tend,
not to differentiation, but to sameness and similarity17 They are symbolic domains
that even ignore alternatives, and constitute an important side of language and of
ideas of reality that Luhmann does not consider in his functionally oriented systems.
As has been mentioned, the centre of intention for Luhmann organises its
functionality according to constant differentiation; but once we consider
consciousness, this centre can also be seen as organising sameness and similarity.
Here, I suggest that instead of grounding meaning between a functional intention and
an abstract horizon of possibilities; it be grounded between actual enacted and
17 Luhmann gives this function to symbolic generalisations (1995) and to his functionalist account of
trust (also of power, money, and love Luhmann 1979, see also Misztal 1996).
273
emotional ties and the horizon of possibilities in human imagination (which is always
situated in particular people and cultural realms). According to Luhmann, the
referential structure of meaning forces the consciousness of difference into constant
selection; but we should also remember that selections may be stopped for being
unnecessary through consciousness of sameness and that possible alternative
selections are also synthesised due to similarity. While the functional process of
selection in meaning amounts to a centrifugal push to differentiation; the absence of
the need for selection or its solution through synthesis pulls centripetally to an
actuality of meaning that is constantly transformed and appresented through emotion
and imagination. Thus, meaning contains, in its relationship with human
consciousness, the seed for further differentiation and for further unification that is
not always necessarily a functional "unity of the difference".
Luhmann's construction of 'meaning dimensions' is useful in order to explain
the structure of meaning with respect to horizons, they are the time, social, and fact
meaning dimensions. But it is important to remember that these are abstract
constructions to aid phenomenological observation that are necessarily differentiated
for heuristic reasons, but whose differentiation depends on a synchronic grounding.
In present experience, the dimensions are indistinguishable from each other.
Luhmann's meaning dimensions cannot be isolated from each other. "They can be
analysed separately", says Luhmann "but in every real intended meaning they appear
together" (1995:86). The two horizons are different for each of the three meaning
dimensions and there are interdependencies between the dimensions that "can serve
to condition and de-tautologise self-references" (Luhmann 1995:76).
According to Luhmann's views on the evolution of meaning, the more
evolved the complexity in a society, the more differentiated these three dimensions
will appear. As has been mentioned though, this construal of evolution is deceptive
because it is based on a deterministic belief in progressive systemic and diachronic
differentiation; but it does not take into account how much meaning depends on the
unifying centripetal tendencies of consciousness towards its core of actuality.
Luhmann represents this movement towards unity in the form of "symbolic
generalisations", which are supposed to bridge the multiplicity of meaning
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dimensions, and makes it possible to solve logical problems. "Even a contradiction or
a paradox has meaning" (Luhmann 1995:95). According to Luhmann, the most
important function for symbolic generalisations in society is their function in
achieving organised complexity: The more tangible the generalisation, the more
evolved the society into dealing with complexity; but this only means that a society
with preferences for descriptive verbal structures be considered as more evolved.
Luhmann's symbolic generalisations have the function of handling multiplicity
operatively and keeping the meaningfully grasped "givens" "available again in (more
or less) different kinds of situations, at other points in time, with other possible
partners of social communication" (1995:93). Symbolic generalisations therefore
have the function of structuring plurality through its relation to "a unity and
symbolized by it" (1995:93). But this symbolisation of plurality in unity is basically
the metaphoric and metonymic function of having something (a past event, a
generalisation) to stand for something else (present, particular event). This is the
"function" also identified by Lakoff and Johnson for metaphor and metonymy:
Metaphor is primarily a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another,
and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy, on the other hand, has
primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to stand
for another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device. It also serves
the function of providing understanding (Lakoff& Johnson 1980:36)
Generalisation can be included in the structure of meaning dimensions as the
centripetal "pull" that the metaphoric and metonymic verbal structures perform
towards the actuality ofmeaning, overriding difference or uniting plurality.
The time, social, and factual meaning dimensions, then, are seen as heuristic
aids to realise abstract possibilities of differentiation and assimilation: the most
extreme form of diachronic differentiation between the meaning dimensions ideally
expresses descriptive verbal structures which are highly functional in purposive
behaviour; the intermediate one that merges the fact dimension with the social
dimension ideally expresses metonymic verbal structures with a syntagmatic function
in language; and the least differentiated form of expression between meaning
dimensions, the analogic type of communication, ideally expresses metaphoric verbal
structures whose function is paradigmatic. Nevertheless, as in the following example
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of Frye's, no specific meaning function can be given to a specific symbolic
expression:
Suppose, for example, we were to decide that the "true" meaning of the word
"in" was being contained by a container, as with "peas in a pod". In all other
cases the word "in" would be metaphorical, including the "in" that stands at
the beginning of this sentence. It will soon become clear that nobody can use
language like that: all language is permeated by metaphor simply because
words are juxtaposed. (Frye 1982:59)
Ideally and analytically, the verbal structures can be differentiated, but in language
they are found together, overlapping and complementing each other through human
consciousness, enaction, and interpretation. That is, the difference between meaning
dimensions is phenomenological and not textual or progressive
Luhmann's 'temporal dimension' of meaning is determined by the before and
the after of an event; thus, the horizons of the temporal dimension are past and future.
It is also related to presence and absence in the present. Therefore, past and future
can only be thematised or intended according to what is or what is not there, but they
cannot be experienced or acted upon from the present. From an existential
perspective, the present moment unfolds into newness and impermanence, which
dictates irreversibility. But from Luhmann's functional perspective, the
meaningfulness of past and future experiences creates a sequence that systems can
follow in an ordered manner in order to avoid irreversibility. This may be true to a
functional and systemic extent, yet the horizon of past path dependencies and future
possibilities according to those past dependencies, also organises disciplined
potentiality related to the present meaningfulness of synchronic practice. The notion
of irreversibility (of newness and impermanence) in the time dimension then
organises our present disciplined relationship to the experience of time.
Luhmann lays the horizons of the 'fact dimension' as what the system
identifies as 'internal' or 'external' to itself. From Luhmann's functional perspective,
this schematization organises the difference between external and internal attribution
(disjunction) and defines the borders of the system. Flowever, if we remember
Lakoffs discussion about schemas, we will realise that a fact dimension organised
around only one of the schemas for human embodied interaction with the
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environment, remains too limited. I have suggested above that the subject-object
divide is also organised around the 'container' schema, and so, it is a limited
perspective considering the present knowledge about human schematization. This is
why the horizons of the fact dimension of meaning in the artificial ideal type of
organisation are those established by the relevant schema or "frame" used in present
meaningful interaction: Whether it is the 'container' schema (inside/outside), (the
relevant one in considering Luhmann's model); or other schemas that structure our
direct embodied experience such as the 'part-whole', 'link', 'source-path-goal'
schemas, or any other that may be found empirically. I agree with Luhmann that the
fact dimension "reduces complexity, eliminates references, and makes it easy to join
operations onto one another" (Luhmann 1995:84), but instead of placing its realm of
relevance in systemic functionality, I place it in the relationship between our
embodied existence and the world. Therefore the fact dimension and our embodied
experience of it organises our disciplined and enacted relationship to the world.
Through his 'fact' and 'social' dimensions, Luhmann attempts a further
division of the subject-object divide which is useful for heuristic objectives. The
'social dimension' is related to the existence of the 'other' in experience; the one that
is regarded as one self, as an 'alter ego'. Ifwe assimilate the social dimension with the
fact dimension, which to Luhmann organises the difference internal/external, we are
left with the subject-object divide. But he objects to this movement, as "[t]he
distinction between factual and social dimensions should not be misunderstood as the
distinction between nature and humankind" (Luhmann 1995:80). To Luhmann, the
differentiation of the social dimension helps us give meaning to the experience of
dissent: In systemic interaction differences are sorted out self-referentially and
avoided systematically, thus giving rise to the possibility of stable consensus. But in
enacted and meaningful human interaction, dissent may well lead to conflict and
confrontation and to the transformation of the system or its dissolution. To expand
the use of a social dimension of meaning beyond functionality, it may include the
horizons of categorisations that are produced socially and imaginatively beyond
embodied schemas. The horizons alter/ego are too narrowly defined along
individualistic mentalities when referring to people and relevant groups of people;
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like families, tribes, organisations, nations, which organise collective identity or
sense of self. In metaphoric (mythic) and metonymic (ideal) verbal structures that
express these embodied collective identities, it is impossible not to combine the
social and fact dimensions or even regard them as indistinguishable. Nevertheless,
the social dimension with its alter/ego horizons is useful on its own in order to
disclose an individually-based disciplined relationship among people (part of our
contemporary modern experience and practice of discipline).
The three meaning dimensions are clearly differentiated from each other in
descriptive verbal structures; but in metonymic structures, the fact and social
dimension merge into each other (we are left with the traditional past/future and
subject/object divides which separate emotion from imagination); and in metaphoric
structures the three are indistinguishable (time, facts, and people converge
symbologically). But the three types of verbal structure co-exist together at all times
as long as the human type of consciousness that we are familiar with is present, but
in different degrees of cultural ascendancy. The centre of actuality in meaning
coincides with intention; but from the perspective of an existential consciousness that
stands on groundlessness this centre is surrounded by the possibilities enfolded in
the whole nexus of referentiality, or self-referentiality, the consciousness of oneself.
"With each and every meaning, Luhmann says, incomprehensibly great complexity
(world complexity) is appresented and kept available" (1995:60); but I would add to
this that its possibilities for differentiation or unity are coupled to the imaginary and
emotional movements of human consciousness. I agree with Luhmann in that the
world does not become simpler through selections —nor is it simplified through unity
in metaphor and metonymy. Selecting one meaning or assimilating different
meanings with each other creates further meaning possibilities, as every meaning
suggests possibilities of connection or synthesis, thus "making others improbable,
difficult, remote, or (temporarily) excluded" (Luhmann 1995:61). However, it is
useful to remember that the complex structure of meaning can be dropped at any
moment either in the synchronic perspective of observation based on groundlessness,
or practically, through disciplined/spontaneous trust in interaction.
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The imaginary and emotional ties that produce meaning may be observed
both in the collective realm of society and in the individual realm of human beings.
In society, emotional ties are collectively determined by recognisable cultural
identities, ideas of sacredness, and particular and local "relational spaces"; in
individuals, emotional ties are manifested in compassionate behaviour, principles and
values (the Weberian substantive rationality) or affective relationships with desires,
ideas and ideals, people, groups of people, animals, objects, etc. In interaction,
discursive intention is always constructed by discipline either in the future (in
promises and resolutions) or a posteriori, with respect to the collective realm of
references within which one interacts. In the present flow of experience both
spontaneity/chance and disciplined intention are present, they cannot be
distinguished from each other. Intention is emotionally either discovered in past
interaction or seen in future plans. The disciplined observation of this life-path is
what is meant by the scrupulous disciplinary maxim "know thyself1.
Disciplined behaviour of the kind described as an exclusive characteristic of
the human species can also be considered as a biological phenomenon because it is
allowed by our physiology (or our biological human organisation and structure), and
this is a characteristic of our species: our behaviour is shaped by our culture. One of
the most important points of this work is to show that, in order for our species to be
creative, intentional human discipline is not enough, nor is it possible. Our organic
orderly spontaneity as embodied living beings and as humanly conscious beings
cannot be stopped. Spontaneity may be guided to aid creativity, or managed through
repression into privacy or a stipulated 'unconscious' realm, but it is experientially
ineradicable while we are embodied human beings. This is why only in explanation
can we identify disciplined behaviour exclusively with the artificial ideal type of
organisation and spontaneous behaviour exclusively with the organic ideal type of
organisation. Both spontaneity and discipline contribute to human creativity.
However, in experiential reality, in present consciousness, it is impossible to
distinguish between our disciplined and our spontaneous behaviour; in the present
moment they are both experienced as being the same thing.
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Note well that innate behavior and learnt behavior are, as behaviors,
indistinguishable in their nature and in their embodiment. The distinction lies
in the history of the structures that make them possible. Therefore, our
classifying them as one or the other depends on whether or not we have
access to the pertinent structural history. We cannot make that distinction by
observing the operation of the nervous system in the present. (Maturana and
Varela 1987:171-2)
In phenomenological observation, it is only when looking to the past that we may
be able to reflect on our behaviour a posteriori and manage to assess, in explanation,
the effect of systematic discipline in the way we live our lives in the present; and so,
project disciplined plans for the future. Intentionality and contingency, identified
clearly as such, can only be found in sequential explanation, which is already a
construction about present experience. But, as a social species, and one that engages
in creating an imaginary realm to live in it, human beings cannot stop producing such
kind of constructions. The explanation (or construction) attempted in this work
assumes that just as there is always a form of discipline (guided by spontaneity) in
the development of human; there are also elements of spontaneity (guided by
discipline) in present orderly behaviour. They are complementary, the one cannot
exist without the other.
Following Luhmann, meaning has been portrayed as the connection between
structured actuality and potentiality; and I have portrayed the meaningfulness of the
structure as related to human emotion and imagination. The relationship between the
latter characteristics of our conscious embodied self both determines structural
limitations in human interaction (and may appear to determine them rigidly); but also
provides the space for creative possibilities which may overturn and dissolve
structural rigidities at any instant. Structural limitations may result in either diligent
disciplined systematicity or in tedious and entrapping oppressive situations; creative
possibilities may result in spontaneous refreshing freedom from rigidity or in terrible
and violent consequences. The potentiality of a situation is as varied as chance itself -
-newness and impermanence— it depends on the particular circumstances and the
perspective we assume in assessing a human situation. But this assessment will
always be located in the particularity of an enacted and imaginary situation with
emotional grounding, and this will be identifiable in the kinds of symbols that the
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interacting person or organisation holds as relevant. From an existential perspective,
conscious potentiality contemplates infinity itself; but it does not necessarily loses
this awareness in the despair of solipsism: it is aware that it stands on nothing and
eventually lets go of all possibly meaningful boundaries. In chapter IV above, I have
explained that, from here, consciousness of self has the potentiality of becoming
sunyata or Absolute nothingness —the realm of karuna (compassion) and agape
(religious love). But this is one type of trust in human enaction and interaction which
cannot be grasped intellectually, because certain trust is faith —however guided or
misguided by symbols—, it is appresented synchronically through experienced
moments of unity and simultaneity.
Trust has also been contemplated as spontaneous in the organic type of
human organisation; but here, in the artificial type of human organisation, trust is
construed as based on discipline. Both of these notions of trust are synchronic and
intricately entwined with one another. Both spontaneous and disciplined trust refer to
consciousness, but one is practical and the other discursive; the former's intentions
are disclosed as they are enacted, but the latter's may be projected through the time
meaning dimension into the past and the future. It is both synchronic types of trust
that, together, give shape to a sense of systematicity and stability that is lived in
human ontogeny18. Whether this projection be mythical, transcendental, or factually
descriptive is relevant for the potential consequences of the structure of the
disciplined practice. It discloses a discursive intentional realm of shared symbolism
as the disciplined manifestation of the notion of purpose in human interaction. This is
not necessarily the same as purposive behaviour, but a notion of the direction of
human consciousness of self be it individual, spiritual, or collective, as consciousness
of self conceives of itself (the purpose may not be posed explicitly, and it is very
possible that there be an absence of purpose, or that the purpose may be the absence
of purpose itself). And so a trust in discipline is produced through a relevant
awareness of meaningful potentiality. By the same token, in human order, future
projections of behaviour are always framed in a particular tradition and within the
18 This is the systematicity where Luhmann's functional explanations of trust are based (see Luhmann
1979).
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expectations expressed by the created and creative structures enacted by us in
collective interaction. The artificial ideal type of human order is sustained by
consciousness of self and its disciplined potentiality, however it may be enacted and
construed discursively. Organic and artificial organisation both complement and
create each other at the same time.
282
My words are easy to understand
And my actions are easy to perform
Yet no other can understand or perform them.
My words have meaning; my actions have reason;
Yet these cannot be known and I cannot be known.
We are each unique, and therefore valuable;
Though the sage wears coarse clothes, his heart is jade.




The Experientialist Myth of "Objective" Observation
In the two parts of this thesis I have illustrated two instances of human order which
we choose to engage with, and which in the spirit of clarification, I have
distinguished as institutions and organisations. What has been shown through this
artificial distinction is that all of human interaction has both an ideal aspect and a
pragmatic one. The former dictates the shape of orderly practice of discipline, yet the
latter finds itself already structured by human worldly -already past— spontaneous
ongoing interaction, experience, and embodiment. The notion of legitimation has
been used here to refer to ideal legitimate reality, rather than to legitimate authority;
yet any form of authority must resort to the prevalent idea of reality in order to
formulate any legitimacy claims. And so, the notion of legitimacy used in the first
part of the thesis directly denotes the prevalent notion of what is real, and indirectly
points to the idea of reality through which authority formulates legitimacy claims.
This latter type of legitimacy, political legitimation, is therefore based on the "spirit
of the times" or Zeitgeist of the society under analysis. In contemporary global
interaction though, the Zeitgeist is already based on the modern ideals of liberal
democracy, freedom, and humanism; which are values that remain couched within
the Western/Christian view of reality as human history. But they are also based in the
disciplined practice of living in society through the organisation of secular
institutions and the definition of private and public realms of interaction. I have
argued throughout this work that even as these values remain important
contemporary realms of human interaction, they put too much reliance on the agreed
exclusion of areas of human experience which are then deemed illegitimate qua
"reality".
Nevertheless, as has been argued in this work, no ideal type is ever fully
determinant of human interaction because —organisationally and not institutionally—
there remain areas of human experience that, however privatised by the factualising
thrust of modernity, are relevant in ways that overcome our sense for mere "factual
historicity". This relevance is the measure of their "reality" in social interaction, and
should therefore be considered theoretically at the same level of relevance in any
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model of human "public" or social order. I have considered these realms —excluded
from historical factuality— as the spiritual and animal aspects of our humanity, which
I have represented through the theoretical presence of cultures other than Western,
grouped in two sets —pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic. This differentiation is
arbitrary in the sense that it is still organised by Western perceptions of "other
cultures", but as has also been argued, it is difficult to see how we can access other
cultures if not through our own cultural inheritance. Through this initial
differentiation of cultures, and their theoretical-ideal relationship to relevant realms
of human experience, I have organised a critique of their conception as "inferior" or
"private" manifestations of human experience within the Western cosmos of what
legitimate "reality" is.
This critique brings us into considering the ideal assimilation of both what is
spiritual and what is animal to human experience beyond the intimate realm of
privacy. The ideal realm of sacred reality is what traditionally has organised the
public sphere of human interaction. However, in their self-interpretation, modern
cultures —ideally or institutionally— displace the sacred roots to authority by secular
rationality. Yet I argue that, organisationally, this institutional ideal has not been
possible, on the one hand due to its ideal essence, and on the other due to structural
"path dependencies" within the organisation of cosmology, and so the notion of
legitimate reality today effectively remains bootstrapped to sacred mythical roots that
remain hidden by the secular expulsion of those roots to oblivion. Also, an ideal
assimilation of what is animal to human experience, beyond private and "hidden"
awareness, has brought into view the arbitrariness of defining and dividing an animal
type of time from a historical human one. The Darwinian cosmological division
(legitimate in the modern view of reality), through which humanity dissociates itself
from nature, gives a specific kind of humanity —the historically conscious one— a
factual and moral upper hand over it. And so, as has been argued, even if these
created borders may be useful in our everyday embodied life in the world, they can
also become terrible ontological-cosmological divides that exclude the possibility of
breaking with the long-worn habit of seeing nature as our slave, and us as its masters.
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The assimilation of nature and spirituality into current understanding of
human interaction, I have argued, is important to construe a theoretical model of
order that contemplates the present relevance of the humanist moral ideal of a
universal humanity as legitimate "reality", as much as both an assimilation of this
universality with the infinite particularity of nature and with its sacred roots to
reality. I have attempted to portray both of these movements of assimilation: The
sacred roots to reality are considered in the ideal aspect of human order conceived as
the legitimate reality that "institutions" portray (and their relationship with time and
language); and the infinite particularity of nature is considered in the ideal types of
human order conceived as "organisation", where all of these types of legitimate
reality are effectively mixed and simultaneously entwined with human imagined,
emotional, and embodied experience in changing structures of actuality. It is this
awareness, that gives what I have called the existential observer (standing on
"groundlessness") a sense for a variously textured approach to empirical "reality",
and a very close reflexive consideration of his/her own imagined, emotional, and
embodied relationship with the organised world s/he examines. This, I have argued,
is an important step towards tolerance in the discipline of modern self-interpretation;
as our Western tradition of knowledge is presently ethically moving towards
considering "nature" both as part of ourselves and as a social construction (see
Delanty 1997), as well as beginning to consider the Eastern traditions of knowledge
to aid us in this movement (see Varela et al. 1991).
And so, the critique of knowledge aimed at traditional Western assumptions
of what knowledge is, in this work, is launched both from the Western tradition of
knowledge itself, and from traditions of knowledge that in the West have generally
been regarded as 'outsiders' to the realm of what we consider as legitimate secular
knowledge. To be sure, one can think of other ways of criticising the Western
tradition of knowledge (communitarianism, feminism, post-structuralism, post-
modernity); but, as I have suggested throughout this work, these types of critique
may also inadvertently rely on the typical Western categories that they try to criticise
through a too well-defined rejection of its assumed dichotomies. From my own
constructed (and partly constructivist) perspective, that takes into account the
286
'outsider' traditions of knowledge as well as the notion that our created relationship
with reality creates our sense of self back, one can say that our Western tradition of
knowledge is couched in too much individual agency, even while individual agency
is already culturally relevant in modernity and "real" to us in that sense. But too
much agency discloses a tight relationship with a self that is, on the one hand,
already constructed as individual, and on the other, too determinant of a view of
universal morality which feels itself justified in looking down on particularity.
Extreme reliance of individual agency also veils the universal importance of an
"ethics of care" to embodied interaction (see Gilligan 1982, 1988). The latter is
transcendentally and universally represented in religious love {agape) or compassion
(,karuna) (Nishitani 1982).
The Western notion of self, which is constructed as individual due to cultural
path dependencies, is at odds with the worldly collective self of the pagan/primitive
view of reality. But the latter, even as it is pre-eminently symbolised in fantastic
myth, discloses the human emotional, imagined, and experienced collective
dependence on each other which, as has been discussed in this thesis, is essential in
the constitution of persons within any culture in the ontogenetic process of growing
up from infancy to adulthood. As has been said following Frye (1982), human beings
live in myth or explanation, and not only this, also the formation of our idea of self is
intimately related to some form of imagined and emotionally cognised dependence
on myth or explanation. We can speak about these two entities "myth" and
"explanation" as if we could clearly differentiate between them. Yet, the two of them
remain linked to each other and it is hard to identify where one begins and the other
one ends, mainly because "explanation" is so closely related to "objective" reality
which, as has been discussed, can itself be regarded as a kind of "myth".
Nevertheless, the awareness of this impossibility to differentiate objective
explanation from myth is important in order to observe how it is that, despite the
Western ideal that we can build a self-determining notion of individuality —and
effectively hold an extremely intense emotional relationship with this notion— we are
nonetheless still determined by the type of social interactions that surround us, which
in their particular ways determine what we come to regard as our notion of self.
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Despite the very high regard that we have for individuals in the West, we do have a
notion of self —however minimal and neglected— that emerges from intimate
personal relationships —even if only with one other person. The "freedom" of
individuality that the Western person strives for is essentially an ideal unattainable in
factual reality (not in spiritual reality), which remains couched in the realm of the
'not yet'. But this predicament is also expressed here through what I have
characterised as the pagan/primitive human notion of a collective self that the
modern person is unable to leave behind. In other words, organisationally, there is
also a collective sense of self in the modern everyday person, even while this sense is
not recognised as legitimate and is actively opposed as a "backward" dependence on
family or some other person as a form of pathos (see Berman 1992, Maturana &
Verden-Zoler 1995).
It is an idealistic principle to assume that we ever come to stop relying on the
collective self or in fantastic myth to deal with what we experience as "reality". I
have tried to express this in a model of human order that points at our extended
dependence on metaphor and metonymy as paradigmatic and syntagmatic verbal
structures that cannot be left behind by language as the "unity of the difference"
(Luhmann 1995), or as purely descriptive language (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980). I
have also tried to express this in the assumption that any model of human interaction,
no matter how based on any type of experience, remains itself nothing more than a
useful myth to organise reality and discipline. Following the Weberian methodology
of concept formation, then, "objectivity" is therefore tied to subjectivity in an
intimate manner. In our Western tradition of knowledge, this reality is organised
around conceptual systems and symbolisms that aspire to be factual and descriptive,
but which are structurally displaced from this ideal; and so, our discipline tries to
make up for this through theoretical consistency. Nevertheless, as the emerging
paradigm of complexity shows, we must now incorporate uncertainty as an element
of "objective reality", most clearly perceived in the present experience of paradox,
which should be integrated in the structure of the theoretical model itself. My model
for observation of human order contemplates complexity and stochasticity as a more
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viable route through which to follow the flux of experience, than a pre-established
determinism (Morin 1984, Kauffman 1995).
Following the rationale of Lakoff and Johnson, then, I will say that any
methodology or disciplinary activity relies on some amount ofmetaphor and imagery
(metonymy) —however small— and so remains a useful myth to approach experience,
and nothing more, but also nothing less. "Objectivity", then, always portrays a
cultural system and a set of cultural values that may be at odds with other ideal
Utopias or myths, and so, they may go to their different imagined consequences or
even oppose each other:
Being objective is always relative to a conceptual system and a set of cultural
values. Reasonable objectivity may be impossible when there are conflicting
conceptual systems or conflicting cultural values, and it is important to be
able to admit this and to recognize when it occurs.
According to the experientialist myth, scientific knowledge is still possible.
But giving up the claim to absolute truth could make scientific practice more
responsible, since there would be a general awareness that a scientific theory
may hide as much as it highlights. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:227 my
emphasis)
They call their own approach the experientialist myth, basically because they want to
highlight that science could be objectively more responsible if its practice remains
aware of what scientific knowledge is and what its limitations are. My own approach
is congenial with theirs in that I have suggested throughout this thesis that scientists
can only produce useful metaphors, always based on honest observation and
experience (experientialist) and the consistency of theory {myth). Any form of
symbolisation of social reality conveys a tale that exists nowhere but in human
emotion and imagination, as well as in enacted embodiment and conscious
involvement within an ongoing view and experience of reality. This latter
consideration of unavoidable embodiment gives the experientialist myth a common
human "grounds" for the type of experience that we are familiar with as embodied
human beings. And it is through this experientialist myth through which I try to avoid
the pitfalls of idealist assumptions: the world as a mere "projection" of our minds and
hearts is still "objectivist" in its "subjectivist" extreme (see Lakoff and Johnson
1980:185-194 and also Varela et al. 1991).
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This is linked with the constant human predicament of trying to realise when
the borders that we create are useful and when they become terrible. This is an
eternal predicament in as much as it is an ongoing present living aspect of human
embodied interaction: one that we deal with alternatively through reflective and
disciplined systematicity, through spontaneous trust or distrust, through ethics either
of care or of justice, through morality or compassion. I suggest that this predicament
may be approached theoretically only in the awareness that the borders that we create
are only heuristic fleeting instants of order, and that our Western intellectual
discipline is displaced from pronouncing any definition of reality to be taken as truth.
As I have tried to show in the model of human order, this attitude may produce
synchronic areas of overlapping among different views of human reality which can
then be seen as relevant to human experience and organise its ordered perception of
reality "objectively" or otherwise.
My own formulation of the above possibility is seen in the synchronicity or
simultaneity of the three ideal types of views of "reality": Both transcendentalist
views are rooted in cosmological notions of mythical reality that determine them in
their structural present actuality, while the mystic notion of ideal (universalist)
compassion discloses a type of freedom from attachment which is the self-same
freedom that is sought for by the Western (historical and humanist) tradition.
Nevertheless, while the Eastern notion of freedom is ideally positioned in
transcendence as the only legitimate realm of reality qua infinity, its mystic
spirituality cannot be reduced convincingly to any notion of finite self (either
collective or individual) and so strives for experienced selflessness; while in the West
the striving for freedom is bootstrapped back onto a notion of self that is individual
and is systematically confused with the type of experience that can be disclosed by
individual human embodiment. And yet, as has been posed, from a synchronic and
ideally mystic perspective, universality can be contemplated in the particularity of
any of the aspects of the world that we experience, even particular embodiment and
personality. However, the ideal Western/Christian view of reality considers both
world and transcendence as real, and so, there remains an insurmountable structural
gap between world and transcendence that is illustrated by the Cartesian error
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pointed out by Husserl (whereby the transcendental knowing Ego is identified with
the res cogitcins, Hammond et al. 1991); which Husserl himself is then unable to
surmount when he wants to go back to his notion of an "intermonadological
community of transcendental subjects" which can access transcendental knowledge
(Luhmann 1995)
As has been argued throughout this work, the perfect reflection between the
particular and the universal cannot be conceived of through conceptual means, it is a
spiritual realm of experience. Conceptual symbols are descriptive and factual, or
based on "objectivity", which is one of the biggest myths of our times. The perfect
spiritual reflection between the particular and the universal is experienced in silence
as Absolute emptiness (Nishitani 1982), because it discloses an emotional
relationship that humanity has —ideally— only with the transcendental realm of being.
In the experience of Absolute emptiness the factual reality of the world is still
perceived, but it is done at peace with what is perceived, with perfect compassion
and forgiveness, regardless of the cruelty that might at times seem to be perfectly
apparent.
At the beginning of the first chapter of their Book The Tree of Knowledge,
Maturana and Varela portray the painting Christ Crowned with Thorns by Bosch, a
Medieval painter, where the figure of Christ stands in the middle in perfect patience,
while four other human figures surround him, who represent his tormentors and who
also represent "four styles of estrangement and loss of interior calm" (Maturana and
Varela 1987:17). One of those figures, they point out, is particularly relevant to their
own endeavour —and I would say that it is particularly relevant to the endeavour of
anyone who calls her/himself an "objective" observer, a scientist, a philosopher, or a
myth-maker. This man, or "human figure" in the picture,
is grabbing Jesus by the robe, tugging him to the ground. He holds on to him
and restricts his freedom, fastening his attention on him. He seems to be
telling him: "Now listen to me, I know what I'm saying!" This is the
temptation of certainty.
We tend to live in a world of certainty, of undoubted, rock-ribbed
perceptions: our convictions prove that things are the way we see them and
there is no alternative to what we hold as true. This is our daily situation, our
cultural condition, our common way of being human. (Maturana and Varela
1987:17-8)
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And so the temptation of certainty is also the human need of living in culture, one
that we need to interact, but also one that we find ourselves with; as in the Christian
original sin or in the Eastern notion of factual experience as the endless sea of
suffering. But before (or after) the discovery of transcendence, and at the same time
as we are aware of it, there is a synchronic realm of human (animal) experience,
where the joy and experienced wholeness of embodiment and worldly interaction is
symbolised as legitimate sacred reality. This realm is the source of any ulterior
emotional grounding for the symbolisation of what came to be regarded as
redemption and deliverance in the transcendentalist traditions. Nevertheless, certainty
about this or any other type of symbolisation may eventually become mythical or
ideological traps for the expansion of consciousness. The temptation of certainty may
become an existential hell of madness; one may restrict ourselves extremely as we
restrict one another. And yet, some degree of restriction is needed in order for
discipline to be learnt, practised, and handed down ontogenetically. And so, this is
why freedom as total release from social restrictions cannot be factual, some degree
of restriction is needed in order to give orderly shape and coordination to the realm of
human interaction in whatever culture. But I believe that the dynamics through which
useful restriction becomes extreme oppression are related to the dynamics through
which the human need of living in some form of provisional certainty becomes the
temptation of knowing something for certain and attempting to impose this certainty
on others.
From this follows that, through any kind of symbols, no definitive or absolute
principles about reality may be defined, only general tendencies, affinities,
regularities. Borders are useful fictions that help us organise our immediate reality,
yet they may produce habits of separation that may become rigid marginalising
principles to manipulate reality. I believe that the subtlety of this difference
constitutes the eternal human predicament, and it is eternal because it is present and
constantly alive. It cannot be solved in a "once and for all manner" in history, nor
through mere heteronomous obeisance to legality, nor only through a judgmental
moral position; even if these forms of symbolising the predicament are "objectively
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real" and must be considered epistemologically in the social sciences. I will argue
though, that the "human predicament" ought to also be represented by the social
sciences through a simultaneous vocation of the observer towards an existential
prehension of peace through trust, forgiveness, and compassion. This "vocation"
leads us through the field of nihility (described by Nishitani 1982), which can be
translated into an existential awareness of death in embodied observation; but one
that is not necessarily nihilistic as it searches for Absolute emptiness. This attitude is
expressed by the position of the observer in the present moment of meaningful
experience, one that is 'not yet' as in our own Western historical tradition and should
therefore strive for "objectivity" in consideration of the "far side" transhistorical
realm (the Judeo-Christian moral standing), but also constantly searches for the
dissolution of the ego in practice and contemplation of the "near side" transhistorical
realm (the ethical standing of undifferentiating love as compassion) as a "sign post"
towards which the present field of consciousness moves. And yet, this attitude is also
aware that any intellectual form of contemplation of human order, as it is based in
some sort of 'ideal' myth, is also always a tale of metaphorical nature. Whatever
experienced "reality" is remains a boundless mystery. And so the observer knows
that s/he is also a primitive entity, the human animal, telling tales to shelter its




In the first part of the thesis I argue that Institutional legitimation depends on
disciplined practice and on the notion of experienced time that the discipline regards
as relevant to its view of reality. While historical consciousness legitimises the
experience of time as diachrony, spiritual and primary imagination are legitimised in
the experience of synchronic time. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that
historical reality has overcome its primary-mythological and spiritual roots. Its
formulation is based on the Christian Tale of a beginning and an end of times within
human progress moving towards transcendence. Every notion of modern progress has
the Christian Tale as its mythological ancestor. As has been said, the Jasperian axial
age is a good example of a humanist consideration of cultures other that Western in
universal history, but it keeps the shape of Christian historiography. This highlights
the importance in human order of ritual interaction with the sacred and of hierophany
(the experience that discloses the human relationship to transcendence). The notion
of progress is already an important part of our Western tradition but its original
conception, just as in other cultures, involves the movement of human consciousness
towards transcendence. The Western secular tradition has redefined human progress
with respect to its Judeo-Christian kind of morality towards political freedom, wealth
expansion, rational enlightenment, etc. But I have argued following Voegelin (1974)
that these symbols are already deformations of the original path to transcendence.
Therefore, transcendence is unavoidably linked to the construction of a historical
kind of progress.
According to the typology described above, in our Western tradition,
theoretical knowledge is legitimated in the diachronic essence of factual, sequential,
and coherent explanation. This means that it is situated within the Western/Christian
type of time as human history and as a kind of progressive movement in the
expansion of consciousness in the direction of experiencing transcendence —not
necessarily in the direction of progressive rationalisation of discipline, as in Weber's
Sociology of Religion (1965). The pagan/primitive type of an idea of reality is
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sustained by an intuition of transcendence, which is nevertheless poised on the brink
of death by the immediateness of embodiment. But explicit transcendence is the
original aim, on the one hand, of the Western mythological tale of collective progress
to higher realms of morality in history and of intellectual knowledge in science and
secular philosophy, and on the other, of the Eastern/mystic idea of the path towards
spiritual Enlightenment. So progress is analogous to the path of expansion of
consciousness, either towards self-knowledge or towards transcendence. Any other
notion of progress beyond these two is regarded in this work as a deformation of the
original spiritual search that can be apprehended as expansion of consciousness1, and
is generally transformed and deformed into forms of organic, material, economic,
and political progress. The shape of the deformation of the original spiritual symbol
of'progress' in modernity is captured by Octavio Paz:
We now know that the kingdom of progress is not of this world: the paradise
that it promises lies in the future, an untouchable future, unreachable,
perpetual. Progress has populated history with the wonders and the monsters
of technology but has not inhabited the life of men. It has given us more
things, not more being. (Paz 1993:244)2
And yet, diachrony as the typological shape of progress is most conducive to a
representation of the development of intellectual knowledge in our Western tradition
and scientific endeavour: a disciplined practice which is already structured by it,
looking into the past from the contemporary perspective of observation.
I have referred before to the axial age identified by Jaspers as an important
age of transformation for the human consciousness. What this means is essentially
that during this age, transcendence was experienced and symbolised by what the
West considers as some of the most important spiritual traditions. Jaspers identifies
this "outburst" of transcendentalism in his axial age but I have said, following
Voegelin (1974), that the Jasperian thesis is already framed within the historical
' Although, in our tradition, this consciousness is necessarily informed by progressive noetic clarity,
differentiation of symbols into rationally-based abstract concepts, and the secular ideal of striving for
self-knowledge.
2 "Ahora sabemos que el reino del progreso no es de este mundo: el paraiso que nos promete esta en
el futuro, un futuro inlocable, inalcanzable, perpetuo. El progreso ha poblado la historia de las
maravillas y los monstruos de la tecnica, pero ha deshabitado la vida de los hombres. Nos ha dado
mas cosas, no mas ser" (Paz 1993:244)
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setting which assumes historical progress, or at least an evolutionary increase in
human awareness of the humanist universalist ideals. His account leaves out Moses
and Jesus, so the possibility remains that other hierophanies happened and continue
to happen beyond his axial age. My assumption is that many were never symbolised
by specific peoples or by history, they might not have been relevant to the culturally
ascendant type of view of reality in any particular society or at any particular
moment in history. Here, I agree with O'Brien's view (1965) according to which,
apparent variations in the mystical 'outputs' of different ages are an illusion.
The explanation for the seeming lack or abundance of mystics at any given
period is 'not that a time and place favourable to mysticism brings mystics
into existence'. On the contrary, it is merely a question of whether more or
less attention is paid to mystics in different ages. Where mysticism is
fashionable and accepted it is fully reported; where it is not nobody bothers to
keep any record of it. (Lewis 1989:20)
Lewis finds this 'tolerant catholicity' disappointing for his own sociological enquiry
according to which transcendental experience is necessarily linked to social
environment. But I believe that the latter is an unnecessary form of determinism in
order to carry out his sociological analysis: while transcendental experience will
always be informed by social environment, it does not follow that the social
environment will always be affected by transcendental experience —yet it sometimes
is in very visible and historically important ways. But to pose like Lewis that the
social environment is always affected by transcendental experience is to give the
latter an overwhelming power of historicity and to take away from this experience its
essential aspect of intimacy3.
Nevertheless, the human discovery (or invention) and representation of
transcendence provides an aim or objective for the experienced duration of time and
life. In the Eastern view of reality, progress is seen as the spiritual development of
the initiated soul towards spiritual Enlightenment4 and in the Christian view, this is
the spiritual progress of humanity as a collective body. In our secular view of reality,
3 Secret inner-worldly mysticism is celebrated in Tibet as a virtue (Sogyal 1992)
4 This Eastern notion is closest to the experience of time as history; but it is linked to the individual
history of embodiment and the cosmological "wheel of rebirth", not to human history in the Western
sense.
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progress is a way of symbolising the experience of time and constant change in
developmental terms; in physiology and psychology it is applied to the growth of
children into adults; and politically in contemporary capitalism, it is seen as the
development of nations towards the European ideal of liberal democracy and
economic maturity. But the notion of movement in time should be seen as a concept
laden with mystery and not only as a mere linear process that generally becomes
linked to the prevalent values of society --or to materialistic values in modern society
(growth, wealth expansion, fitness). Here, it must be stressed again that we can only
speak of superiority of the Western tradition with regards to awareness of historical
time (a symbological product of this tradition) and its progress towards the
emergence of adequate symbolism to represent intellectually differentiated
experience —a structural characteristic of the scientific discipline.
The philosophers must beware of the fallacy of transforming the
consciousness of an unfolding mystery into the gnosis of progress in time. A
study of order does not have the purpose of showing up the primitivity,
nai'vete, logical deficiency, or general benightedness of ages of the past but,
on the contrary, to show men of the same nature as ours, wrestling with the
same problems as ours, under the conditions of more compact experiences of
reality and correspondingly less differentiated instruments of symbolisation.
(Voegelin 1957:5-6)
Conceptual representation is highly valued in our Western tradition, but it
may become a dogmatic 'burden' that defeats its own purpose in a search of a type of
'truth' that is imprisoned by its own dogma. Conceptual differentiation of experiential
reality was brought about by reliance in the power of abstraction to portray a kind of
reality that was seen as beyond ordinary experience. The creation of abstract symbols
may help to expand knowledge of the self, but it may also become a misleading
source of symbols for imaginary constructions of reality that may become rigid and
oppressive systems of exploitation. The other two kinds of knowledge (primary and
spiritual), which exist beyond (or below) precise conceptualisation are also ways of
knowing the self and, if acknowledged, may help to prevent the excessive
consequences of abstraction. Our tradition contemplates the diachronic symbolisation
of historical time as the highest accomplishment of conscious humanity; and the
conceptually coherent view of reality that it produces according to the rigid mandates
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and conclusions of human rationality, which in their thorough factuality, may miss
elements of experience that are equally relevant to the life of human beings.
As I have said before, my criteria to differentiate the legitimate ideal view of
reality in any social or historical setting is based on the different symbolic expression
of relevant events as either synchronic or diachronic. What this means is that the
ideal views of reality express their institutional and legitimate notion of time in
disciplined practice as holistic synchronicity or divided diachrony even if the
organisation of a discipline already includes both. According to Ricoeur:
The world of symbols is not a tranquil and reconciled world; every symbol is
iconoclastic in comparison with some other symbol, just as every symbol, left
to itself, tends to thicken, to become solidified in an idolatry. It is necessary,
then, to participate in the struggle, in the dynamics, in which the symbolism
itself becomes a prey to a spontaneous hermeneutics that seeks to transcend it.
It is only by participating in this dynamics that comprehension can reach the
strictly critical dimension of exegesis and become a hermeneutic; but then
one must abandon the position —or rather, the exile— of the remote and
disinterested spectator, in order to appropriate in each case a particular
symbolism. (Ricoeur 1967:354)
In a similar way, it is important to remain aware that we are always dependent on
symbolic expression to carry out the abstract exercises of the critical discipline, and
on the appropriation of symbolism for grounds: we are dependent on our own belief
system in order to interpret symbolism. Our tradition relies on conceptual clarity in
order to symbolise the abstract relations that our rational discipline elucidates; but we
also resort to analogies, metaphors, allegories, and even myths (see Lakoff &
Johnson 1980). No language, not even the technical kind, is ever wholly free from
these associations. The symbols we use to communicate are generally linked on the
one hand, to what we know, and on the other, to what we aspire to know, to the
unknown. This double horizon makes symbols dynamic and their transformation
determined by the prevalent values (emotional ties) of the society where they are
used.
According to Northrop Frye, people are unable to live nakedly in nature like
animals, and this does not refer only to the human physical need to dress, he speaks
about a mythological universe: "a body of assumptions and beliefs developed from
his [human] existential concerns" (Frye 1982:xviii). He believes that the conscious
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organising of a cultural tradition is the practical function of criticism, and this should
make us more aware of our mythical conditioning. 1 believe that this conditioning
may become even more acute —and more misleading— when the universe of beliefs is
accompanied by an extremely artificial environment that is perceived and lived as
reality. To be sure, human-created environments have existed all through human
history, but never in such an extended manner as in the contemporary urban life,
especially in the most affluent societies. It is important to carry out a critique of
Western assumptions in order to clarify their position in the universe of human
mythical symbolisation. This does not mean that Western symbols do not have an
abstract superior clarity, but that precisely because they do, conceptual clarity
becomes systematically confused with absolute reality (just like modern artificial
environments convey the illusion of human "mastery" over nature). This unavoidably
becomes (and has been) oppressive to the infinite possibilities for symbolisation of
what human beings can conceive of and experience as "reality". The Western thrust
towards rational domination of experience may help to liberate human beings from
contingent natural conditions, but it may also at the same time enslave them to their
own artificial and intellectual creations. Therefore Western mythology on its own is a
two edged sword in its function of providing humanity with order; just as any other
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